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ABSTRACT
How do we systematise oui* Icnowledge without undermining mores and beliefs that have thus far guided our 
conduct? How do we account for free will in a cosmos made o f molecules and universal laws? Is a metaphysical rebellion 
against the absurdity of a universe devoid o f  ethical significance unavoidable? Is this rebellion inevitably leading to the 
organization o f  tire world in exclusively human terms? These are the problems that have been tackled among otliers by 
Dostoevsldj, Kaflca, Dickens, and Camus, thinkers who framed questions o f paramount importance without finding 
persuasive answers (Davison 1997; D odd 1992; Lary 1973). These are tire same problems that many bio-scientists have 
grappled with in tire past aird I analyze the solutions they have identified.
Tlris work o f mine could be seen as a follow-up to the qualitative survey carried out by Kerr, Cunningham-Burley, and 
Amos in 1998 am ong British scientists and clinicians with a well-established reputation. That investigation looked krto tire 
way the latter distance themselves from the dark shadow of eugenics and revealed that tire equation o f old eugenics and new 
genetics is deemed irrational because:
• scientific Imowledge has grown by leaps and bounds ever since;
• tire socio-political circumstances are radically different as coercion is undrinkable and the final decision rests with dre
iirdividual who is protected by the principle o f informed choice;
• the aims o f eugenics simply cannot be technically met;
• the new genetics involves drerapeutic aims as opposed to eugeirics that concentrated on the alteration o f tire human 
gene pool;
the application o f science is not necessarily one of scientists’ main concerns;
My contention is that these objections are too facile and unpersuasive. I submit that there is an obvious connection 
I between how the existential and humanistic side o f  science faded to prove humanitarian, namely benevolent, compassionate 
ïnd ultimately useful -  the good - ,  tire effort by several academicians to ground ethics on scientific evidence — the true - ,  
find our iircapacity to confront abnormalitj'^ — the beautiful.
This connection is eugenics. Eugenics is the scientific response to modern existential angst and social predicaments 
and is here to stay.
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PREFACE
Wlien I was an undergraduate student at tire University^ o f Bologna (Italy), it became clear to me that I had three 
main interests as regards didactic matters: death, deviance, and compassion. I was soon to realise that they would play a 
central role in my private life as well. The choice o f  volunteering for an association assisting terminal patients and non- 
autonomous elderly people was the logical outcome o f such leanings. It was with them tliat I learnt the meaning o f  deatli 
(and Hfe), for they devoted a considerable amount o f time to musing over deatli and its role in their life-journey and in 
modern society. A t about the same time, I made friends with Valeria, who opened my eyes about disabilitj^
During those years 1 learnt that, when it comes to practical matters, abnormality, sickness, mental impairment, 
physical disability, etc. are synonymous with deviance. In a world that places an enormous emphasis on efficiency, 
productiveness, utility', competition, and the harmonious functioning of the social gearings, as well as on appearances and 
social sldUs, the deviant is anybody who is not in step witli other people. Bokg/iesl are well known for their Idndness so that 
there was no disdain or pity on the part of the non-deviants towards these “new deviants” . However, no matter how hard 
they tried to cope with the “new deviant” members o f their commruiity, the growing acceleration of the contemporary' 
lifestyle would no t allow them to meet this challenge. Apart from professional carers, only students, retired and unemployed 
citizens could afford to devote a decent amount o f time to their careb The result is social deatli for a good few.
At the same time, some o f my friends were studying to become scientists and doctors and they all agreed that only 
tlieir passion enabled them to keep up widi die demanding requirements o f  dieir courses o f  study. They are now life- 
sciendsts, or biomedical researchers, as they prefer to be called. The cleavage between these young, zealous, overburdened 
students o f LIFE who are expected to alleviate the suffering of the older, slow, deviant “philosophers” o f DEATH^ remains 
in my mind one o f the most fascinating phenomena that I have encountered in my life and has certainly deeply inspired my 
research.
Another intriguing issue, one closely related to the former, diat prompted me to undertake such an inquiry, was the 
cjash between faith in a transcendental being and faith in the explanatory and liberating power o f  science.
I  The Italian Parliament has recently passed a law banning the use o f donor sperm, eggs or surrogate mothers. This
l^aw will also confine the right to artificial fertilisation to “heterosexual couples in stable relationships”, forbid doctors to 
create more than three embryos for each attempt, and to cryogenicaUy store embryos or use them for stem-cell research. 
One o f the m ost controversial passages, one that will probably be amended, reads that screening for abnormalities on tiro se 
embryos is forbidden, regardless o f the risk o f  the future child being born with serious congenital defects. The coordinator 
o f die opposition explained his agreement with die spirit o f the bill on account o f die risk that lack o f legislation on these 
issues would open the door to liberal eugenics and argued: il Ubensmo appiicato alia sclenap e alia gmetica rischia d ipnd ttm  mostri 
[liberalism applied to science and genetics is at risk o f creating monsters] (Francesco RutelU, La RepubbHca, Friday 
December 12, 2003). However, the majority o f the deputies o f  die opposition rather believe that, if  passed, diis law would 
undercut the principle o f the secularity o f the state and the rights o f citizens to make autonomous decisions as regards 
procreation, as well as restrict freedom of scientific research. This is only the latest episode o f a protracted confrontation 
between religion and science diat is set to intensify as scientific discoveries more and more dramatically challenge our 
beliefs.
The thrust o f this thesis is to explore the possibility that the application of a Weberian approach to die study o f  the 
interplay o f science, ediics, and society, is likely to throw fresh light on die aforementioned confrontation.
 ^http://www.bandieragialla.it/articoH/articolo.asp?id=1297
2 Due to their fear o f and fascination widi death, diey would time and again involve me in radier complex existential discussions, 
ranging from their experiences in concentration camps to the meaning of Job’s vicissitudes.
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Classically, a Weberian approach (Weber 1949, 1968, 1972a, 1972b, 1992, 2000) consists in tlie combination of 
interpretation, comparison, and generalization. Weber’s basic assumption is therefore that social action is eminently 
subjective in spite o f given societal constraints and that social phenomena can only be understood by means of 
psychological, empathetic understanding {Rinflihlmig and lS.rlebnis) of the meaning and values that the involved social actors 
explicitly or implicitly attach to their behaviour. The interpretation o f subjective motivations thus constitutes die core o f 
Weberian sociology. My inquiry is Weberian in diat I sought to re-experience what a number o f life-scientists o f  the past felt 
on confronting particular historical circumstances (e.g. die rise of eugenics, scientism, and the Lebensreform movement; 
colonialism and imperialism; several massive economic crises; the emergence o f political experiments o f  a totalitarian kind; 
and die seemingly irreversible advance o f democracy and liberalism). This partly explains the liigh occurrence o f quotations 
that I drought were necessary in order to illustrate my attempt to attain the greatest possible understanding (Vej'stehefi) by 
identifying with the actors under study {Er/ebms) and their subjective motivations, and reliving their experiences {Einjrihlrm^. 
The frequent use o f quotations, lists, glosses, and asides is also a tribute to Paolo Rossi, one o f die foremost historians and 
philosophers o f  science. Rossi crafts sentences and paragraphs in unpredictable and thought-provoking ways, so that the 
reader is constantiy stimulated, and repeatedly shows that he cares for his readers, that he is not narcissistically writing for 
liimself or for a few supercilious specialists but for a larger audience. It is above all his passion and his professional 
commitment — that he shares widi Weber himself — that I seek to replicate with this study of mine.
For Weber observers, insomuch as they are direct or indirect participants in the social interaction, cannot possibly 
maintain an absolutely neutral stand vis-à-vis events and as a result they are guided by subjective criteria of sigiificance and 
relevance, that is, by their points o f view and penchants. Because die social sciences must aim to draw informative 
generalizations while social realities considerably differ and constandy vary, Weber employs the analytical device called “ideal 
type”, diat helps the observer to simplify realitj' by selecting some attributes o f a given phenom enon that are deemed more 
salient diaii others and assimilate some while accentuating the deviation o f others from the ideal type.
Accordingly, I have selected several case studies (USA, Germany, Japan, Italy, South Africa, and Sweden) that I 
believe could best exemplify' the Idnd o f socio-cultural pressures faced by dozens o f renowned bio-scientists whose opinion 
(Arried a lot o f  weight in the eyes o f  the public opinion. I thus tried to compare different realities — liberal and social 
^democracies, fascist totalitarianisms, and segregationist states — by keeping my focus on die subjective perception o f those 
realities on die part o f leading bio-scientists. 1 have therefore “ideal typified” the ethos o f the life sciences, the sort of 
pressure exerted upon them by a given establishment, and die establishment itself so as to distinguish more easily between 
the conduct o f  scientists who adhered to certain (ideal t}'pified) doctrines not really compatible with the spirit o f  the 
scientific m ethod (ditto) from diose who did not. The goal o f  such an examination was to detect possible regularities in the 
behaviour o f scientists subjected to pressure o f a political and ideological nature. It goes without saying diat I cannot make 
any pretence to exhaustiveness. This remains my own interpretation, only partially corroborated by my sources, and it is 
precisely from this combination o f historical and anthropological perspectives that this work derives its originality, given 
that anthropologists o f  science tend to consider eugenics a liighly problematic topic to be left to the care of historians, 
whereas it seems to me that liistorians have been up to now quite reluctant to make forays into anthropology. Ultimately, I 
see no alternative to an approach along the lines o f the history o f ideas as outlined by Arthur O. Love joy (Lovejoy 1936, 
1960), namely the investigation o f those ideas and compounds of ideas that have circulated widely outside intellectual circles 
and have affected the taste, aspirations and prejudices o f the public
It goes widrout saying that, in order to prove the validitj' o f  my inferences, I had to compare data from the past 
with contemporary data. Consequently, I interviewed 23 young biomedical researchers hoping to elicit views not dissimilar 
from those held by their “ideal-typified” precursors. This choice o f interviewing young informants was based on the premise
that the common, traits would be detectable early in their careers, that is to say that scientific training would be conducive to 
those habits o f thought and standards o f  conduct that I was interested in.
Naturally, such an approach is open to criticism in so much as it heavily relies on anecdotal and impressionistic 
evidence. How do I Imow that those scientists did actually believe what has been reported? Are tirose views truly 
generalizable?
But then again tlris is the trouble with aU Idnds o f qualitative research. I personally look at social sciences as a 
collective enterprise. A single study should no t be expected to clarify with finality such complex arguments. It simply is an 
hypothesis that m ust be verified by other investigators using different means and different perspectives.
Besides the perusal of the relevant literature, my fieldwork has consisted of a series o f individual interviews (23), 
conducted between winter 2002 and fall 2003 in N orthern Italy, Scotland, and Canada. The open-ended senri-structured 
character o f my questions granted some leeway to both die interviewer and the interviewees. Contemporaneous notes have 
been taken and written up in a final form a few hours after the interview. In Scotland questions have been integrated with a 
brief period o f participant observation with young researchers outside the laboratory.
INTRODUCTION
I  had been taught science as a steady pmgmsion of insights by intellectual giants. It had never occimed to me that these heroic figims wen 
fallible Inman beings, as competitive, jealous, ambitious and biased as any othergmp of expetfs.
David Suzuld, geneticist (Hindmatsh & Lawrence 2001: 4)
Everybody has his blind spot or his Achille's heel, and scientists an no exception. Many of them believe they an impartial in their thinking 
and uninfluenced by their surroundings. Some are very egoistic, andputforward ideas that they feel the whole human race has got to bow down -f;
and accept. Others might be excellent in one area of science — astrvnonry, for instance —yet believe that have insights into allfields, without an 
awareness of the pifalls. Scientists are human — they'n as biased as any other group. But thy do have one great advantage in that scknce is a %
selfcornctingprocess
Cyril Ponnampernma, chemist (Weintraub 1984:14)
What I ’m getting at is that i f  you examine the history of science you can see that it has been manipulated in the name ofpolitics and religion.
The Narfis did this. There’s been lots of sham science that in retrospect was misguided. Atrd this has brought untold harm to society. Granted 
you’re a person who closely gathers evidence, but most people, told by authority fiÿires that something is “scientific”, swallow it whole and go 
along with whatever thy say. A nd to me that’s very frightening
Muralrami Haruki spealdng to Hiroyuki Kano, an AUM-Shiiuil<yu member who had previously claimed he wanted to 
madiematically prove Buddhism (Murakami 2001: 222)
My point o f departure is that ever since the Enlightenment (Gay in Barber & Brumfitt 1967; Hilts in Mendelsohn 
1984), society has been partially shaped by those worldviews that biomedical professionals concurred to create through their 
activities and the divulgation of there theories and data (Sfez in Lavoie 2001; Zack 2002). A parallel assumption is that when 
this is the case bio-scientists are more liable than their colleagues to lose sight o f the big picture and faÜ to figure out 
properly the etliical and social implications o f the theories they present to their peers and to the public at large.
Professionals should therefore be seen as ideational agents, i.e. creators o f worldviews that over time can even be 
turned into coercive mindsets (Barber 1978) when an ill-advised trust in a “scientific attitude” as the ultimate solution to all 
society’s flaws (Gregory-Miller 1998) prevails.
AU in all science affects our morality and cognition^:
1. By changing our worldview and the way we deal with what surrounds us
2. By providing us with more things to do and a greater leeway, which also entails new opportunities o f
wrongdoing
3. By demolishing our anthropocentric outlook
4. By suggesting that the scientific m ethod is suitable for malting value-judgements
Hence, one o f  the h}'potheses I sought to demonstrate with this tliesis was that, particularly in the life sciences,
every scientific statement can also be a political one (Seidler & Rett 1982) and that the protagonists o f this genomic era
should be more cautious when they air their views. This should be self-evident in the light o f  the historical evidence that 
humanist scientists and doctors have time and again lost sight o f the cardinal principles o f the Enlightenment that is, 
personal autonomy, universal justice, and basic human rights (Pichot 1995, 2000).
We may postulate that this was probably inevitable insofar as modern humanism arose from the overcoming o f the 
conventional view o f  life in the service of transcendental purposes or mundane virtues, which was replaced by a 
conceptualisation o f life as a quest for happiness and a goal in itself that could be attained through rational means (Taylor 
1984). The nub o f the problem is that the ideal o f  emancipatory critical rationalism has spawned those dogmatic and 
delusional beliefs that typify scientism (Taguieff 1987). Furthermore, the yearning for absolute objectivity on the part o f
%
3 According to J.B.S. Haldane in “Science and Ediics” (1932) as quoted by VoUrath 1990
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Mdnel & V oswinckel (1994; 18)
5 Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, course syllabus
I
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scientists, and tlieir treating their vocation as self-evident, something that cannot be renounced, induce many scientists to 
embrace an ascetic, stoic self-discipline, and to make a fetish o f their vocation and practice (Burrow 2000). This has caused 
several o f them and the public to believe in their worthiness to assume priestly functions in an ever mon secularised society (Daston &
Galison 1992).
Objectivity, specialization, and professionalization give rise to a myopic expertise (Nietzsche 1974), which turns
Imowledge into information and wisdom into technical mastery (Weingart et al. 1988), as well as forming scientists who are |
not expected to wholly understand either the overall scope o f their tasks or their social implications (Brown 1998). This
parcelization o f duties is certainly alienating (Longhi 1997), and it has been suggested that the end result is a golem, a system
that appears to be unguided and possibly uncontrollable, being the resultant o f disparate, temporary decisions (Gyorgj' #
Markus in Gavroglu et al., 1995: 142). Genetic counselling is a case in point:
We an in a fast-moving train, and we manage to learn how to eat in the train, even sleep in the train. But I  don’t think we think very much 
about where the train is going. Or, at least, we are very simplistic.. .O f course, geneticists an the ones cnating the technology. But it is being 
created without too much thought. O f course, i f  you really want to get to the social issue, you’d better get to whoever is driving the train... When 
I  began, this work belonged in academic medicine; now it is rapidly commervialisfing. Pretty soon, it will just be profit-making labs offering Mts.
They’ll have a rovinggenetic counselor to pcy lip service to mafiractice insurance. This is not what geneticists wanted when we insisted on genetic 
counseling
Ayram Terguvnick, medical geneticist (Rapp 2000: 23)
I believe Terguvnick has made an important point here. That is not what scientists originally wanted. A humanist 
enterprise has gradually soured. Why did that happen?
Should we posit that it was because Wissenschaft ist human im Sinne von menschlich und riicht.. .per se “humanistisch ”
[science is human in the sense that is being done by human beings and n o t.. .because it is intrinsically humanistic] 9
With this thesis I investigate those factors that have thus far thwarted human efforts to establish a veritable 
scientific humanism. These factors will include:
• Vulgar utilitarianism and arid consequentialism (Weindling in Lee 1990; Marks 1995; Glass 1997). A good few
scientists do not see the potentially dangerous implications of their public statements and blindly rely on the 
equation of social utility and beneficence (Sarah Cunningham-Burley & Anne Kerr in Conrad & Gabe 1999; i
Kass 2002);
• Reductionist materialism, biological determinism, genetic essentialism, scientism (Gould 1981; Sprinkle 1994;
Vandermeer 1996). The idea of man as an abstraction which is typical o f biological determinism and genetic 
essentialism is apt to be exploited in the pursuit o f totalitarian goals (Taknon 1970);
• Obsequiousness to the imperatives o f bio-politics (Foucault 1980, 1994a, Agamben 1995, 1998), grounded on 
the concomitant blind devotion to Western meta-narratives such as “science and technology lead continually 
to progress” (technocracy); “perfect rationality is achievable and is the ground o f all legitimate decision­
making” (unrestrained positivism); “science itself is neutral, good and evil are matters o f  its application”
(scientism); “democratic or human values can correct the errors and excesses o f  new technologies”
(retroactive decision-malting; “ethics are universal and can (and must) be agreed upon by all humans” 
(monocultural universalism) (Michael Fortun 2003^; see also Weingart et al. 1988; Tucker 1994; Darnowsky in 
Tokar 2001)
• Misguided idealism (Freeden 1983; Becker 1990; McLaren 1986, 1990, 1992; Burrow 2000): I  project myself into 
the future and look back at myself and my fellow human beings in the present, and I  say to myself. What is it that needs to be 
done now in order to bring about change much sooner (medical scientist Jonas Salk in Weintraub 1984: 104). When
I
techno-science fails to meet actual human needs this does not only happen due to greed and lust for power 
but also because scientists lose sight of them when they are blinded by visions o f salvation via technical fix 
(Midgley 1992)
• Elitist callousness and superciliousness (Field 1911; Sax 2000; Childs 2001; Stone 2002). Several among tlie 
leading scientists exhibit and at times alarming self-righteous hubris and insensitivity as though people do not 
Imow what is good for them whereas scientists know better (Noble 1999). A case in point is Francis Crick’s 
assertion that he would rather live in a world in which the point of view of people like me was mote or less held by the 
great majority people (Weintraub 1984: 28). But is not this the core belief o f the inquisitorial mentality? That 
what does not harmonize with the Truth ought to be damped down, like heresy? (Baud in Nathan-Olff 1993). 
This same condescendence lies at the foundation of social Darwinism and eugenics, for the fittest could realise 
the ideal society only by stamping out die weak and inefficient, i.e. the burden (Breeman et al. 1990). Lilre 
Victor Frankenstein (Vasbiiider 1984), m ost eugenicists, for all their pretence o f humanism, failed to prove to 
be able to truly love humanity.
The first three entries have been extensively analysed over die past decades and I treat them in chapters 1, 2, and 5. 
To my surprise, the last two have been relatively unheeded, perhaps due to their highly controversial nature. It certainly 
requires boldness and a strong body of evidence to insinuate that snobbery and ill-advised idealism played and still play a 
major role in scientific research. And yet we know that science is a socially embedded endeavour as its goals, theories, focus, 
and methods are affected by the broader social context (Barnes 1972, 1974; Mendelsohn et al. 1977; Gould 1981; Latour & 
Woolgar 1986; Latour 1987; Proctor 1991; Agazzi 1992).
It is indeed of the essence that readers o f this thesis understand that the overall layout and thrust o f this work rest 
on the assumption that the above-mentioned penchants are not uncommon among scientists. Eugenics in particular — but 
there is no reason to believe that the same does not apply to current repro-genetics and genetic engneering —, in that it had 
a direct impact on  the everyday life o f masses of citizens, was tremendously apt to bring those proclivities to bear upon 
basic bio-genetic research.
O n the other hand, I find it rather puzzling that a number o f professionals in the social sciences and biomedical 
sciences shut their eyes to the reality o f facts, i.e. that the identification o f the genotype of future people will inevitably lead 
to a eugenic revival (Kitcher 2003). This inevitable outcome was already clear to R. D. Hotchltiss as early as 1965 (Abelson 
1965) when he said:
M aty ofusfeel instinctive mulsion at the ha^tds of meddling with the finely balanced andfar-ieaching y  stems that mahe an individual what 
he is. Yet I  believe it will simty be done or attentpted. The pathway will. .. be builtfivm a combination ofaltruism, private profit and ignorance
Even if  we choose to understate the importance o f  die guilt-feeling o f parents who feel responsible for their 
children’s shortcomings, still this world shamelessly tolerates such a measure of social and economic inequity from the 
moment o f a child’s conception that it seems difficult to believe that public outcry will arrest the creation o f furdier 
biological disadvantages through reprogenetic interventions (Capian 1997).
The basic problem is not how to prevent a new eugenics from taking place, for that is inevitable, but how to get 
die message across to scientists as well as to laypeople that a society still plagued by powerful racial and class biases as well 
as by huge economic and educational disparities is likely to make bad use of techno-scientific innovations o f such a scope 
(Roberts 1964; Kitcher 2003). It follows that those who fault the H G P for the negative répercussions of its discoveries are 
seriously mistaken, in that we are the culprits, for we have partially failed to learn the lessons o f  the past. It is precisely those 
lessons that I revise in my study.
Father Zossima in “The Brothers Karamazov” observes that in science the only matter o f consequence is the
sensuous world, not spirituality, which is instead scorned with a sort of triumph, for such a rejection opens the door to true
freedom (P. Simpson in Burnett 1981). Accordingly, in 1876 Dostoevsky declared that (Davison 1997: 117):
Juom of humanity is inconceivabk, incompréhensible and even impossible without a belief in the immoriality of the soul Those who, having 
tipped to pieces our belief in the immortality of the sotd, seek to replace this belief with that other ideal which is love ofhumanity, these people, I  
say, trespass against themselves, for instead of love of humanity it is nothing but the seed of hatred of humanity that thy sow in the heart of 
those who have ceased to believe.. ,I maintain and dare to declare that love of humanity in general is, as an idea, one of the most inaccessible to 
the human mind. Precisety an idea. Only sentiment can provide it with justification. But sentiment is only possible i f  one is convinced of the 
existence of the soul
I cannot help but feel that such a view acquires a greater significance in the light o f what we have learnt about the 
nature and aims o f  the eugenics movement and in view o f the stated purposes o f  contemporary genetic engineering. Should 
we presume that those scientists involved in such an enterprise — tlie manipulation of the genetic code o f  animals and plants 
— are conscientious enough to steer clear o f the hubris intrinsic to a worldwide project that at times depicts man as a 
potential Nietzschean God-man, the succulent fruit o f our creative rebellion against our transcendental father? Should we 
really expect them to be moral agents as well as exceptional pioneers o f human knowledge? A t the same time, how do we 
explain the emergence o f  that new brand o f  utopianism called Transhumanism that feeds upon both New Age cultism and 
the promises o f genetic engineering? W hat part do bio-scientists play in the promotion o f such ideologies tlirough tlieir 
unguarded announcements and their outlining futuristic scenarios o f predictive medicine, greater physical and intellectual 
faculties, and enhanced staples?
O n one side we see an absolute faith in the capacity o f humankind to effects those social reforms that will become
necessary once the whole range o f new biotechnologies will be made available. They include hundreds o f scientists
committed to the I-Iuman Genome Project, thousands o f  people who hope that bioscience and medicine will cure their
illnesses or somehow better their existence, naïve cultists such as the extropians and the transhumanists, and tlie biotech and
pharmaceutical corporations together with their lobbyists. I suspect that if  they were asked to explain the denouement o f die
Poem o f  the Grand Inquisitor, many of them would subscribe to the interpretation made by D.H. Lawrence, Niet;(sche’s
majoi'English disciple (Carey 1992: 75):
A nd we cannot doubt that the Grand Inquisitor speaks Dostoevky’s own final opinion about Jesus. This opinion is, baldly, this: Jesus, you 
are inadequate. Men must correct you. AndJesus gives the kiss of acqtnescence to the Inquisitor
Belknap (1990:127)
A nd they would be seriously mistaken, because on several occasions Dostoevsky himself maintained that his
intention was to run against the Grand Inquisitor’s rationalization o f despotism (Bellcnap 1990). Jesus’s kiss is rather one o f
mercy, one that proves that since even the Grand Inquisitor could be forgiven, then lesser sinners would surely be saved as
well. In this way Dostoevsky exposed the futility o f the G rand Inquisitor’s plans and, indirectly, contested the Protestant
and Calvinist belief that a reward should be sought in tliis Hfe. He also questioned the assortment o f the till then
unstructured themes, desires, and habits o f the mind that would give rise to the eugenic dogma that it is only through the
enhancement o f the creation that humankind can attain its “redemption” and spiritual refinement. Accordingly, he lumped
together scientism, utilitarianism, positivism, materialism and voluntarism under the rubric “tlie enemy” (Belknap 1990):
The finest science of his time was reductionist, seeking simple material explanations for complicated biological, geolofical, mental, social, and 
even spititualphenomena. Dostoevsly rejected this reductionism and thepositivistic faith that went with it
Bellmap (1990: 34)
The other side is that o f the apocalyptic pessimists who cannot beHeve diat compassion and soHdarity permeate 
society to a measure sufficient to guarantee diat such techniques won’t be misapplied and won’t aggravate inequaHty. The 
champions o f  this view would agree with Camus that rejecting the G od o f Love or the principles o f solidarity- and
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egalitarianism more often than not involves embracing a paternalistic and nihilistic humanism. Many theologians, 
philosophers, and social scientists, as well as a few scientists, position themselves in this quarter.
In the middle stand all those who are too puzzled to take sides.
I take the liberty to  confess that I started my fieldwork on the side o f the pessimists and I then went over to the 
otlier side — as I was influenced by the enthusiasm o f my informants —. All through my research I have been, in the words of
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Camus, “prey to my truths” . As of now, I find myself nonplussed. I suspect my fieldwork has become an existential journey
Î,also due to the proximity of the Ufe-sciences to the realm o f the most deep-felt and challenging questions about the meaning 
o f life, tiie role o f  our species in the universe, and the quest for freedom, happiness and serenity. The pivotal role o f science '1|
in many persons’ moral development is best described by Francis Crick’s assessment o f his intellectual and spiritual journey 
(Midgley 1998: 78):
This /oss of faith in Christian religon atrd nry gorving attachment to science have pfajed a dominant part in ny scientific career'.. .1 realised 
early on that it is detailed scientfic knowledge which makes certain religiorrs beliefs untenable... What would be mote important than to find  
our tt'ue place in the universe !y removing one try one these unfortunate vestiges of earlier beliefs?.. .it seemed to me of the first importairce to 
identfy these unexplained areas of knowledge and to work toward their scientific understanding
This sort o f transition from the well-trodden path o f faith to the uncharted territory o f the discoverable unlcnown
generally exacts the payment o f a high price in terms o f cognitive stability. Within science the loss o f firm landmarks and
templates has proved to be apt to provoke a fluctuation between anthropolatrj' — anthropocentrism run wild — and nihilism
— “humans pollute tlie Earth” (Midgley 1996). This is so because an understandable apprehension about one’s own
insignificance in comparison to the sub-atomic and cosmic vastness o f the universe is likely to lead to scientific mysticism
and utopianism (Midgley 1996: 142):
Such fantasies.. .have to be comperrsations, nyths designed to supply significarrce, dreams that console scientists who are starved of spiritual 
fodder try a confused Puritanism, a mistaken isolation of the intellect fivm the test of life
But this should not be seen as inevitable if scientists were allowed to become “whole humans” , accepting that
the truths o f science are not the only available truths and that science alone cannot be a spiritual guidance. If  they were
taught ethics and the history o f science, they could enjoy my same feelings o f awe and bewilderment before the enormous
implications o f the choices we are facing instead of the self-imposed assurance o f those who simply have no alternatives but
to quicken thek pace lest tliey should come to terms with obnoxious dilemmas. Through a basic training in humanities, thek
own rebellion agamst nature’s determinism could benefit from the spirit o f Ivan Karamazov’s rebellion (Davison 1997: 119):
Ivan } revolt is deeper than that of the Pomantic movement in general, of which it is nonetheless a part, because it emphasises... solidarity and 
love, whereas the Romantic revolt was individrcalistic and blaspheming against a cruel God
%1 MODERNITY AND SCIENCE
The outcome of the scientific apptvach is to depreciate, man. Ashvnony pmclaims his micfvcosmic siqe. Biology claims that he had animals, i f  
notforpamits, at leastfor first cousins, in the long evolutionary series. Chemistry ajjirms that he is a compound of hydrogen, o>ygen, carbon, 
and other elements, of the same essential stuff as sticks and stones. [...]. I f  we add to the theoretical degradation of scie tree the fact that it has 
supplied the weapons wherviy the human race can be liquidated, the indignity is complete
Francis Eiisley (as quoted by R. Allen Utke 1978:190)
Yesterday’s science is today’s common setue and tomorrow’s nonsense
Frank B. Livingstone (anthropologist, University of Micliigan)
E t toutes ces données, ces mesures, ces moyennes ne s’enlisaient pas dans une objectivité amorphe de traîne-savantes. Elles étaient dynamisées 
parmi vigoureux manichéisme qui faisait d’elles autant d ’expressions du bien ou du mal
The “scientific” accuracy o f the racial classification drawn by SS Sturmbahnführer Professor Doktor Otto Blattchen in 
NfichelTournier’s novel “Le roi des Aulnes"
In the 18‘'' century an idea became popular among the intellectuals, that hidden though trudi may be, it still is 
discoverable and definitively grasped by those who correctly use their rational faculties. This is what Karl Popper called 
“optimistic epistemolog}'” (McIntosh 1992) and modern science arose from this inquisitive spirit.
Nietzsche imputed the ever-growing importance o f science to an intrinsic need o f Christian believers to seek truth 
and certainty and, being unable to find them in their faith, to turn to science as the ultimate source o f redemption. As 
science proclaimed the death o f God, it followed that Christianity was the cause of its own extinction. In other words, for 
Nietzsche nihilism was inherent to Western values and the completion o f the project o f modernit}' would entail the end o f 
our civilization. This followed from the positive immorality o f  nature (Appleyard 1998) and from the fact that science is not %
self-reflective and cannot set limits to its inquiries. Its hubris is bound to dig humankind’s grave (Teichmann 2001).
That the Christian will to truth has exploded Christianity itself is the first o f four paradoxes that connote progress 
as it has originally uncoiled in Europe, the other three being that:
1. Free individuals are more prone to be fragmented by tlie massification process (Adorno, Marcuse, 
Horkheimer);
2. Capitalism promotes self-development but restricts the gamut of options: market-economy only calls for 
specific abilities and talents (Marx);
3. The growing population with its demands cannot be administered without massive bureaucratisation, 
which in turn restrain citizens’ liberty (Weber);
“The fate o f our times”, for Weber, was that the more we learn about reality the harder it becomes for us to make 
sense o f  our cognisance in terms o f values. The disenchantment (Entqarsberung) o f the world brought about by science means 
that our scientific proficiency is not always sustained by an equally sophisticated collective morality informing our conduct 
(Mongardini 1991). Disenchantment in turn occasions disillusion, a modern malady whose gravity is proportionate to the 
relinquishment o f  the idea that eternal salvation and otherworldly happiness is the final human goal (Hopper 1991). These 
are tlie iron cages of modernity [stahlharte Gehduse) that could transform us in either Fachmenschen ohne Geist, specialists with 
no spirit, or Genuflmenschen ohne sensualists without heart (Weber 1972).
We witness the constant struggle o f  irreconcilable values and between instrumental rationalit)' {Verstand) and 
reason {Vernunft) compelling us to create our own value-orientation with no objective guidance, according to self-chosen 
principles (Brubalrer 1984), namely the Kantian tenet that individuals fashion their own ethical stances (Owen 1994). But 
when we act on the basis o f mere material and mechanic motivations {Zweckrationalitat, i.e. instrumental rationality) rather
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than ethical and spiritual considerations JWertrationalitat, i.e. axiological rationality), we ignore the tension between means 
and ends and confuse facts and values, scientific notions and moral imperatives (Horowitz & Maley 1994). Scientism, one o f 
the main themes of my thesis, persists because natural and scientific models (“is”) have aU too often given rise to 
prescriptive aims (“ought”) (Rigotti 1986).
However, according to this perspective, dehumanization is not the inevitable outcome o f  such a scenario. The gist 
o f Weber’s argument is that modernit}' is not a uniform phenomenon but one typified by a number o f antagonistic tensions 
— self-indulgent hedonism and ascetic frugality, apocalyptic fears and utopian expectations, materialism and spiritualism, 
emancipation and regimentation — that prescribe and proscribe certain behaviours within given life-contexts and spheres o f 
values (Scaff in Turner 2000). Modernit}' comprises a “romantic syndrome” countering the fragmentation and 
objectification o f  the Ufe-spheres and our alienation before the complexity of contemporaneousness (WeiB in Mongardini 
1991), which has been often mistakenly labelled “Counter-Enlightenment” (Berlin 1990) when it really functioned as a 
corrective o f the Enlightenment’s excesses (WeiB in Mongardini 1991), as well as the positivistic outlook addressed by 
Weber and other contemporaries (i.e. Durkheim, Tonnies, Simmel, etc.)^.
The concepts o f  humanity, individuality, subjectivity, etc. developed simultaneously with modern science (Bayertz 
in Sandkiihler & Holz 1987), and the very idea of progress is indissolubly linked to the Romantic dismissal o f a complete 
and permanent Chain o f  Being — from amoebas to G od — replaced by a pluralistic, historical conception o f the role o f 
humans within the Creation (Lovejoy 1936; Wilson 1980). A t the same time, within the realm o f science we also discern 
conservative tendencies (Kaye 1986; 49). The evolutionary model o f ethics that has been proposed by several scientists and 
philosophers, whether they are vitalist, inspired by natural religion, or by a teleological mechanistic understanding o f life, ÿ
looks pretty much like the ancient longing for a past Golden Age in which civilization, nature and biology co-existed
harmoniously, and order still obtained. This phenomenon has been termed “conservative modernization” by Jeffrey Allan ,4
]Johnson (1990), who points out that in Wilhehnine Germany science as an institution was invariably inclined to effect f
exclusively moderate changes lest to subvert the state o f things, in spite o f the tendency of a number of scientists to act and j
think radically.
Tills bizarre compound of modernist and conservative impulses arose in the course o f  the Seventeenth and 
Eighteenth centuries, when scientists sought to combine the social, the spiritual, the physiological, and the natural 
(McKnight 1992) and eugenics in its modern version, which dates back to the 1880s, cannot be understood unless we refer 
to the contradictory nature of this confrontation between individual inclinations, various forms o f positivistic scientism, and 
the Romantic iconoclastic assault on the monistic belief that there had to be a single overarching truth, a single way to arrive 
at it, and a single way to administer society, i.e. bureaucratic rationalisation. Its schizophrenic character can only be 
accounted for by analysing the combined effects o f tlie inherently pessimistic Romantic epistemology, the Enlightenment’s 
positivistic optimism (McIntosh 1992), and the concoction of Arcadian and utopian sentiments that converged into a 
dangerous contempt for the present (Sorensen in Bartels, Leroy, Cap Ian 1993), the hallmark o f those people who feel they 
are born too early or too late. On tliis count, Mary Midgley (1985: 46) has in my view correctly emphasised die resemblance 
of some scientists’ worldview with the Nietzschean contention'^ that higher than love of one’s neighbour is love for the remote and for 
the future. A nd  I  hold love fo r things and phantoms higher than love for men. Consequently, the ideological framework o f eugenics 
presupposed a tendency to cling to apocalyptic predictions and millenarian pessimism, as well as to the delusional faidi in a 
techno-scientific quick-fix, the scientific faith in benevolent progress (Weingart et al. 1988; Tucker 1994). The nature o f  this 
interplay is epitomised by two statements made by Julian Huxley (Huxley 1947):
 ^In passing, many German Romantics were well versed in mineralogy, physics, botany, physiology, and chemistry (Hayes 1994) 
in “Thus spake Zarathustra”
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• humanity will gradually destroy itselffrom within, will decay in its very core and essence, i f  this slow but relentless process is not checked
(p. 51)
• striking a rapid eugenic results can be achieved only by a virtual elimination o f the few lowest and truly degenerate types and a high 
multiplication-rate o f the few highest ad truly gifted types (p. 34)
All ill all, it was this tension between apocalyptic fears®, utopian ideals and reforming aspirations that gave birth to 
that enormously intricate interplay of activism, obsequiousness, boundless optimism, despondency and 
paternalist/pastoralist authoritarianism that characterized eugenics since Ufe-sciences became professionalised. This reflected R
the heterogeneousness of the Enlightenment, which varied from country to countrj', from the British rationalistic optimism, i*|
to the contentious and revolutionary approach o f the French, and to the persistence o f vigorous transcendental yearnings in 
Germany (Ciafardone 1978).
In  Naufragi sensp spettatore (Rossi 1995), ItaUan philosopher and historian o f science Paolo Rossi has beautifully 
summarised these issues:
• Modernity cannot be understood without taking into consideration the tension existing between great 
expectations and the fear o f looming catastrophes;
• the Unear representation of progress is always accompanied by an undulatory or cyclical Idnd. The notion 
o f progress has always been interlocked with utopianism as well as millenarianism, primitivism, and 
retrogression or decay.
• the idea of democracy has normaUy been linked to the notion o f endless cumulative knowledge, i.e. the 
cornerstone o f science;
• tlie idea o f progress was not a peripheral attribute o f science but part and parcel o f its modern conception
• the original concept o f  progress was not as absolutistic and normative as in its late-EnUghtenment and 
positivistic forms and science and technolog)' have never been considered as the only means for human 
Uberation;
• the ambiguous character o f modernity had always been present in the reflections o f  the so-caUed modern 
tliinkers.
In short, there has never been a pure ideal o f Enlightenment thinking — centred on three cardinal principles o f 
logical rigor, experimentation and the verification of hypotheses — that has been subsequently degraded by the dispute 
between positivism and romanticism. O n the contrary, tlie initial ambivalent and tentative outlook seems to have been 
closer to ours than to the mechanistic-positivistic one that dominated science — and pseudo-science — by the nineteenth 
century and that so deeply influenced eugenics (Rossi 1995; Tagliapietra 1997). In tlie 18* century science was viewed as a 
cornmunal enterprise, an edifice that was being buUt thanks to the coUaboration of countless more or less adept inquirers 
and that was not meant to be brought to completion but simply to effectively serve the interests o f the entire human species 
(Rossi 1962). The ideology o f progress was born when the evidence that scientific Icnowledge was improvable and 
transmissible and that it was therefore superior to spiritual wisdom became an axiomaticaUy accepted truth (Rossi 1962).
This rapid and necessarily sketchy excursus has served the purpose of better circumscribing the arguments tliat I 
analyse in my dissertation. The bottom  Une seems to be tliat the secular narrative o f m odern Europe has been incessantly 
possessed by two jarring currents o f  thought, one drifting towards relativism, and nihilism^, and the other permeated by
® IncidentaUy for Jay Taylor (1993) the idea o f destroying a sick society in order to replace it with a utopian brave new world was part 
and parcel o f the totaUtarian ideologies of the twentieth century
5 relativism does entail nUnlism: i f  standards are inherently and inescapably expressions of something called mltim, and can be notlmg else, then no culture can 
be subjected to a standard, because (ex hypothesis) there cannot be a trwis-culturnl standard which would stand in judgment over it. No argument could be 
simpler or more conclusive (Gellner 1992: 49)
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pragmatism, positivism and analytical inclinations. It is impossible to understand the one without referring to the other as 
much as it is incorrect to analyse any social phenomenon, science included, by classifying it into either category. Science 
proceeds from both leanings and scientists as human beings concur to make this interplay more complex and suggestive.
The dynamics o f this confrontation is precisely what has shaped our contemporary society and culture. Intriguing is the 
evidence showing tliat both strands share some sort o f deterministic inclination. Both biological, evolutionistic determinism 
and a finalistic blind faith in progress have been embraced by reductionists and holists al&e.
Consequently, it is a serious mistake to associate the Enlightenment with dehumanization and Enttyaubemng 
(literally, “demagification”) as much as it is erroneous to view Romanticism as a backward-looking reaction to the 
Enlightenment (Rossi 1995; Ferrone in Ferrone & Roche 1997) that would result in the irrational voluntarism o f the 
existentialists, in the nihilism o f Nietzsche and in the Dasein-reflections of Fleldegger (Scalfari 2001). It is true that 
occasionally the philosophes appear to lapse into the bad habit o f mistaking partial, publicly disputable reasons for pure 
Reason, but their legacy also comprises a sceptical approach to all absolute abstractions, reactionary utopianism included, as 
well as the famous trinity “liberty, equality, and fraternity” . Their scepticism prevented them from logically following 
through to nihilism their relativistic premises which they shared with m ost of the proponents o f the Counter-Enlightenment 
(Scalfari 2001).
Likewise, it is hardly controversial that Romantic thinkers were infatuated with the power of the mythical, the 
sacred, and the symbolic, but this does not imply that theirs was wholesale irrationalism (Scalfari 2001). Darrin McMahon 
(McMahon 2001) has lucidly pointed out those traits that make the Counter-Enlightenment an intellectual enterprise that 
was at least as rational and modern as the Enlightenment. For instance it was their inventiveness tliat reformed religion (see 
also Outram 1997). And even if some o f their contributions to the establishing o f a modern outlook were inadvertent, like 
for example their insistence on the moral decadence o f French society that they imputed to the philosophes but that was an 
actual phenom enon in the late 18* century, which concurred to expose the evident shortcoming o f a system in need o f a 
thorough revision, their concern about social fragmentation, dehumanization, mechanism was all but modern, as it was their 
critique o f those claims that techno-scientific progress would go and in hand with moral improvement (McMahon 2001).
My impressions is that both sides demonstrated a remarkable far-sightedness as concerns the detrimental effects o f  progress 
and tliey simply laid a greater emphasis on certain themes that were more congenial to their respective agendas.
The thesis I defend is that this utopian belief in progress, its antithetical but historically complementary belief that 
humanldnd was on the road to dissolution, its absolute reliance on materialism, mechanism, racialism, and moral 
hiérarchisation (Widmann 2001), together with the sentiment that nature and human affairs could not possibly be left to 
chance, is what diverted the life-sciences from the liberal and democratic character o f modernity. Unquestionably, s|
scientism‘° and eugenics were premised on evolutionism and finalism, i.e. on a lopsided view of science and human-led 
progress, namely natural evolution transformed into historical evolution (Allen 1989) — as a panacea for all human iUs. Such 
beliefs were accompanied by traits that we normally relate to the Counter-enHghtenmeiit, such as the widespread conviction 
that modernity is synonymous with mediocrity if not decay (Weingart et al. 1988). Enlightenment and Counter- 
Enlightenment schools o f thought are thus equally responsible for its harmful consequences.
I also contend that the Human Genome Project and its applications cannot be immune from the perks afflicting 
the life and medical sciences in the past because all the aforementioned factors are still in place and only require a change in 
the historical circumstances to rear their ugly head. By the same token, scientists are not exempt from mistaking their own 
vested interests, biased values, creeds, and yearnings for those of the wider society but, unlike lay-people, their credentials 
hinder their capacity to aclcnowledge their own prejudices and fallibility (Jacobsen 2000), that is to say, their occasional 
____________________________ ..ÏÎAccording to Pierre Thuilier (Massin 1990) scientism is an almost blind faith in the cognitive and moral value of scientific 
knowledge
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irrationality. I f  anything, it is reason to be systematically perverted by societal constrictions and ultimately Eugenio Scalfari is t
correct in asserting that it is a lack o f  rationality that m odern society suffers from and not the obverse (Scalfari, 2001). O r f
perhaps what our present society is wanting in is reasonableness, understood as rationality tempered by common sense, j
phmnesis, and mutual understanding. These virtues [arêtè) were m ost certainly absent in the eugenics rhetoric and, m ost \
importantly, do no t enjoy much favour among leading geneticists and bio-technologists. But then again neither Bacon nor %
Descartes, that is the founders o f the modern scientific method, ever felt it necessary to delineate any sort o f code o f 
conduct for responsible scientists. They did not even concern themselves with such issues as tlie value o f  human existence, - /
the morality of the inquiry into the nature o f mankind, the social responsibility o f scientists. That was just beyond their >
scope (Haberer in Cerruti & Fazio 1976), and modernity was built also on this conspicuous absence.
-'.-'Li.; t  .1- I,.-.-;-.»:'
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1.1 TH E LIFE SCIENCES AND THE PEREEClïBinTY  OF MAN; REVOLUTIONARY SCIENCE AND 
PHRENO-MESMERISM
KSnnen ndr uns derMenge mweigem und doch Wissenschaftler bkiben?
Galilei to Andrea in Brecht’s lueben des Galilei
The sdentific apptvach to he examination of phenomena is a defence against the ptm  emotion of fear 
Guildenstem to Rosenctantz in Stoppard’s Rosenctnntt(^  and Guildenstem ate dead
[science] nnvte an end to the ancient animist covenant between man and natim, leaving nothing in place of that precious bond but an anxious 
quest in a fivqen universe of solitude.. With nothing to recommend it but a cetiainprmtan arrogance, how could such an idea win acceptance? It 
did not; it still has not. It has however commanded recognition; but that is because, solely because, of its ptvdigious power ofpeformance.
Jacques Monod as quoted by Dorothy Nelkin (in Mendelsohn 1977: 266)
The traditions o f  thought called romanticism and existentialism iconoclasdcally attacked the monistic belief that
had dominated Western cultures for hundreds o f  years and according to wliich there had to be a single overarching truth, a
single way to arrive at it, and a single way to administer society, i.e. bureaucratic razionalizadon. In a nutshell, these currents
rejected scientific/rational determinism and mechanism — i.e. the tyranny of reason —, that had emerged as a result o f
Descartes’ and Newton’s theorising (Cohen & Smith, 2002; Cotfingham 1992). The dynamics o f this confrontation is
precisely what shaped our contemporary society and culture. Therefore, Darrin McMahon’s interpretation (2001: 200) o f
this phenom enon is all the more felicitous when he observes that
whereas the Enlightenment summoned its enemies into existence through its unprecedenkd attack on revealed religion, the Courrter- 
Enlightenment in turn “created” the Enlightenment as the spectre and source ofmodernity's ills, reaffirming religion's place in the modern world 
andprescribing aprvg-am to leealit that was both idealistic artd radical
Their common effort brought G od to  extinction. Indeed, G od’s death, a most insignificant event to a Confucian
or a Buddhist, demolished the whole ethical apparatus founded on a monotheistic creed, its revelations, and its dogmas. The
importance o f tliis particular historical juncture cannot be overstated, in that owing to both tendencies man is reclaimed
from myth and returned to his historical dimension in which he is at once encouraged to pursue the improvement o f his
condition, what we now call progress. Earlier on tliis would not have been conceivable:
The product of a supreme being (the argument goes), the world must have been created perfect Improvement is thus unthinkabk; the evil the 
universe contains must be necessary to it. [...]. Thus all hopefor progress is illusory.
Eichiier (1982:10)
The Enlightenment debunked such a view but the philosophes and their intellectual heirs unwittingly generated a 
propensity to look to science as the only solution to human predicaments. In order to escape from a form of irrational 
dogmatism some o f them fell prey to another, no less pernicious form, which we name “scientism” and that, ironically, is 
just another form of fanaticism. It is my opinion that scientism cannot be fully understood without referring to die notion 
of human perfectibility and that eugenics arose out o f this growing self-confidence and ambitious aspirations, feeding upon 
the belief in the perfectibility o f man. This chapter explores the history o f the belief in human perfectibility and in the 
attainment o f  happiness by rational means.
I believe the m ost intriguing interpretation o f  the relationship between die existence o f evil and the ideal of 
boundless technical, moral, and biological advance has been made by Antonello La Vergata (Blanckaert, Fischer, Rey 1995).
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a huge earthquake followed by three tsunami waves and several fires causing 60,000 victims
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He suggests that, for one thing, we should consider that die reason for the presence o f  evil in the world has never j
been easy to pin down to any mundane factor. When the first objections were raised against the existence o f an infinitely j
wise, just and good God, it was suggested that man, though faber o f his own destiny, is naturally lazy and prone to lapse back 
into animality unless challenged by the adversities. Tliis was also thought to be what kept the civilizing progress alive, as 
human ascension and perfecting could not be achieved other than dirough painful trials and constant exertion. In fact it was 
assumed by many naturalists that pain and death propelled the economy (Kingsland 1988). This re-conceptuaüsation o f  £
liistory and historicization of nature — i.e. that the Creation and die Great Chain of Being was no t immutable, let alone 
perfectible— clearly facilitated the diffusion o f Darwinism (Lovejoy 1936; Outram 1997) and of a moralised and moralising 
interpretation o f the Darwinian theories. It also favoured the diffusion of the cardinal principle o f  social Darwinism, i.e. the 
metaphor o f the struggle for life. Several Darwinists proclaimed that their effort was aimed at the accomplishment o f the 
universal aspiration of organic life to freedom, through the realisation o f die ideal o f human perfecting (La Vergata ibid.).
Natural variability was then viewed as synonymous with moral freedom, teleological evolution was coterminous with moral 
obligation, and parasitism was mere moral apathy. Consequendy, spiritual progress would go hand in hand with biological 
progress, that is physical improvement was equivalent to spiritual refinement. Thus the struggle for life was no t necessarily ;'i
merciless and sadistic, it actually pushed living beings to improve themselves, to adapt, and to fare better. The m ost 
committed that is, the most successful, would be rewarded in this life, a moral exigency that is remarkably in tune with the 
protestant and Calvinist work-ediics. The conclusion of La Vergata is that there seem to exist ideological compounds that 
stand the test o f time and even contrive to live through scientific revolutions. It stands to reason tiiat one o f the strongholds 
o f such a doctrine m ust necessarily be that individual human beings cannot be faulted for choosing the wrong path. Evil *
stems from natural circumstances over which individuals have no power, so that a modern scheme o f  social reform could i
only be successful provided tliat it comprised a prophylactic approach to the structural causes o f social iUs, and therefore j
presupposed the direct intervention o f the State (Coka 2000). ;
Besides die overcoming o f evil and social iUs, die other cardinal concern o f the Enlightenment intellectuals was •£
how to achieve individual and collective happiness. The modernizing spirit they propagated in the course o f the 18* century " 'Î
involved a positive conviction that universal happiness was widiin reach by means o f  bold social reforms. Happiness was |:
the main subject o f thousands of epistolary exchanges o f men and women fascinated by the wealth o f opportunities made 
available by the new cultural climate (Roger in Ferrone & Roche 1997). The reason for such a keen interest can be easily 
grasped by reflecting on the epochal change o f perspective that had followed the above mentioned explosion o f  the dogma 
o f the original sin — partly occurred as a consequence of the indescribable cataclysm that had visited Lisbon in 1755'* and 
had profoundly disconcerted Voltaire —, which explained why happiness was so hard to attain in this world. Following such f
an occurrence, it became more difficult to look to humans as naturally depraved and both the Christian taboo on sensualism 
and the corresponding favour in which the mortification of the flesh was held lost their meaning (Porter 2000). That o f  V
pleasure as an end in itself became a legitimate pursuit (Porter 2000). But if  the original sin was only a fairy tale, and grace 
could no longer be seen as the only means to attain happiness (McIntosh 1992), then unhappiness was an evil to be 
redressed. Simultaneously, the quest for happiness outside o f  a framework o f religious, transcendent commandments could 
translate into a selfishly hedonistic pursuit à la Sade (Roger in Ferrone & Roche 1997), grounding morality in mere personal 
interest (McMahon 2001).
It was necessary to re-moralize happiness, and the typical solution o f the Enlightenment was the emphasis on 
public spirit, on a civic religion diat would replace popular religiousness. This secular religion was to revolve around the 
notions o f  social utility equating the good with the pleasurable and of cooperative exertion aimed at boundless progress and 
the general betterment o f life-standards (Roger in Ferrone & Roche 1997). Accordingly, Cesare Beccaria’s seminal
formulation o f criminal law disallowed a religious foundation to evil and promoted the idea o f a humanistic society 
administered according to rational and statistical criteria and averse to utopianism. Only such an arrangement could establish 
truly egalitarian social relations (Venturi 1970)
In his Two Treatises on Civil Government, John Locke argued that the three fundamental natural rights are:
• the right to life
• the right to liberty
• the right to property
Governments were expected to preserve these natural rights by virtue of a covenant between citizens and the head 
o f the State that was rooted in the teachings o f the Enlightenment thinkers (La Berge 1992). However, in keeping with the 
true spirit o f the Enlightenment, the pursuit o f happiness became central to the American declaration o f independence. The 
drafters o f the American constitution replaced the third Lockean natural right with the right to happiness (Teichman &
Evans 1991). The other mainstay o f the Enlightenment pliilosophy was that the progress o f  Imowledge would prove that 
human nature is not subject to the laws of necessity but alterable and therefore perfectible (Widmann 2001), another 
stronghold o f eugenics.
Judging by his 1791 report to the Constituent Assembly, I guess Talleyrand was well aware o f the powerful effects 
of human planned intervention on the social and the natural. He wrote tliat un des camctèm les plus fi'appants dans l ’homme est la 
peifectibilité, et ce caractère sensible dans l ’individu l ’est bien plus encore dans l ’espèce (Dhombres 1989). In fact, it is precisely with the 
French Revolution and its mobilisation o f savants that science is designated as the principal instrument o f  manldnd’s 
progress and betterment. Although it was held as likely that humans had not been created naturally good, Imowledge o f 
nature and science could make them so (La Vergata 1990). Obviously this was a view that had not been entirely grasped by 
the masses, let alone shared. The idea o f human beings taking charge of their own destiny and o f science as indispensable to 
the pursuit o f happiness and prosperity remained a markedly bourgeois belief or rather, in the words of Ann Goldberg 
(1999: 40):
a bourgeois Biedermeier sensibility of ordet'lirress, moderation, sef-discipline, and Gemutlichksit [“sentimental good nature”]. [ .. .]. Self- 
mastery over an internal “other”— over the irrationalforces of the ego — was a quintessentialty bourgeois value closely connected, as it has been 
suggested, to the insecurities and aspirations ofa social classforming itself outside ofand against the traditionalist corporatist order
Consequently what took shape was a bourgeois ethos of individual responsibilit}' and self-fulfilment sustained by 
the medicaHzation o f  social Hfe and morality that overruled the traditional bonds of sin and miracle (Goldberg ibid). When 
the values o f tire middle class became hegemonic this hodgepodge o f ideals, inclinations, aspirations, and whims we now call " I
progress turned into the driving force o f Western societies, and charmed countless poHtical leaders. Take Napoleon who, on jf
sailing back to France from Egj^pt, commented (Dhombres 1990): Je me trouve conquérant en Égypte comme l’y  fu t Alexandre; il eut 
été plus de mon goût de marcher srcr les traces de Newton.
Subsequently, progress as an emancipatory and fulfilling process acquired the traits o f a mundane religion and as a 
result everything undertaken in its name was ethically good, legitimate, and above suspicion (Kappeler 2000). This ideology 
eventually combined with three further themes that German romantic philosopher Herder had interrelated within his 
philosophical edifice, I am referring to decadence, to the idea that people are parts o f an organic totaHty, and to the partial 
dissolving o f history into natural history, all o f which would loom large into the eugenics discourse (Thomas 1995).
Eugenicists could then interpret the role o f “exemplary children o f the Enlightenment” (Watts 1994).
We thus see that three seemingly different but really complementary views o f  science have co-existed ever since 
the birth o f m odern science:
• science as a faith;
• science as a political engine;
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*2 A statement attributed by Kant to Frederick the Great was: mgm as much as you like and about whatever you like, but obey!
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• science as a pedagogical and civilising tool;
These three undercurrents equally contributed to the prevailing of a concept o f  science as indispensable to a
country’s pursuit o f happiness and prosperity, Maupertuis (1698-1759) stressed that happiness was the natural goal o f
human beings and that this very goal had to direct one’s conduct and the selection o f what is worth striving for (Hervé
Hasquin in Van de Vyver and Reisse 1991). This resolution was accompanied by the necessity to popularise it as broadly as
possible. During the French revolution the m otto became sanculotiser la science, diat is to bring science to the masses. A
revolutionary scientist, Decremps, maintained in 1794 that the jargon o f science had to be translated into plain language
because il n ’y  aura pas grand avantage d’être savant quand il sera permis à tout le monde de le devenir (Dhombres in Van de Vyver and
Reisse 1991; 33). Encyclopaedias, scientific magazines and universily courses were instituted to meet this need, for citizens
were to be educated on how to build public spirit and civic participation.
Enlightenment is man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man’s inability to mahe use of his understanding rrnthout direction 
fivm  arrother. Self-incuried is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without 
directionfivm another. Sapere aude! Have courage to use your own reason!- that is the Enlightenment’s motto
This is K ant’s definition o f Enlightenment as published by the Berlinische Monatsschrift in. 1784. Flis text, brief and 
slightly unsystematic, emphasises the rupture with the previous historical period, a cleavage that had been formed by 
alterations in die way the use o f  reason and authority was perceived. In  lieu of the “cog-in-die-machine” model o f social 
behaviour, Kant advocates the public use o f reason and the recovery o f the agora, a public and open debate that would yet 'I
averse the subversion o f the legitimate authority, i.e. a system of rational despotism*^. Interestingly the Birmingham chemist 
James Kerr in 1789 proclaimed that the diffusion, o f knowledge, and a taste for science, over all classes o f men, in every nation o f Europe, or 
of Eurvpean origin seems to be the characteristic feature o f the present age (Stewart 1998). Likewise, in the 18* century the early |
practitioners o f science accepted the cardinal mainstay that the access to truth and knowledge ought not to be restrained to 
initiates but radier be virtually open to everyone. According to Descartes, Hobbes, and Leibniz, everyone is endowed with 
the gift o f reason and is consequently able to tell good from wrong. This was the basic assumption o f  the Cartesian method 
and was enlarged by Mersenne, who held that a man can do everything that another man can do and that everj'body 
possesses all that it takes to philosophise and reason about aU things (Rossi & Ferrone 1994). This stance was clearly J
political as exemplified by von Pufendorf, who believed that authority earned by birth was meaningless as the right to 
impose an obligation derives from one’s own principles (Rossi & Ferrone, ibidem). As a result, the top ranks o f society were 
compelled to find different means to induce their subordinates to conform to tiierc will and the médicalisation and |
scientisation o f society turned out to be the finest solution. Tliis resolution involved a trend towards the reinterpretation in 
bio-medical terms o f internal and external threats to the social structure. As scientific research became more complex, 
requiring more effort and more funding, and proved its importance in the promotion o f a nation’s power and prestige, Itings 
and princes transformed a private, almost amateurish undertaking into a profession tliat served die objectives o f the State.
No sooner did science become institutionalised and become popular and successful that the men o f  letters protested against 
tlie passive enslavement o f science to the will o f the ruler and against the corporatism that had come to dominate the 
academe and the cultural life o f their respective countries. Already by the late XVIII century Vittorio Alfieri in his Del 
principe e delle lettere (1983 [1778]) described the cleft that had formed between humanities and sciences. After observing that, 
by contrast with the laws and passions of man, the laws o f  matter do not threaten the establishment, he juxtaposed the 
independence o f thought o f  the man o f letters who is in a position to denounce despotism and educate the people, and the *
acquiescence and sycophancy of scientists craving funding, protection, and patronage.
This is also the reason why French revolutionaries placed so much stress upon the liberalization o f Imowledge and 
expertise. Inevitably, given the huge stress they placed upon egalitarianism, Jacobins came to view science as a task for
-.•'-’-.■J 'i'-it;;;-,
this sense it is not too fat-fetched to regard liim as the forerunner of Lombroso (Teinkin 2002).
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courtiers, an aristocratic subculture, as it were, whose technical jargon distanced the broader population from the truth.
Thus Brissot de Warville in 1782 published a pamphlet tellingly entitled De la vérité in which he stated that formerly 
intellectuals had no t been deemed as such par bttvet and that only les modernes ont intmdtdt dans l ’empire des sciences une espèce 
d'aristocratie élective (Ferrone & Rossi 1994: 115).
At the same time their very popularity backfired on a new generations of scientists who got involved in public 
demonstrations of dubious scientificity. Some newspapers and most academicians began deriding the latest “scientific 
fasliions”, such as mesmerism (animal magnetism), dowsing, and physiognomy, the discipline founded by the Swiss 
Protestant pastor Johann Kaspar Lavater (1741-1801) who held that physical appearances revealed someone’s temperament, 
virtues, and intelligence. This sudden return to pre-EnHghtenment practices o f a pseudo-scientific kind was arguably due to 
the intricacy o f science itself diat was drifting away from the comprehension o f the man in the street. Universal rationality 
was no longer sufficient to master the GaRlean-Newtonian method and scientists had eventually cut themselves off from the 
rest o f society. Their research was not manifesdy relevant to the concerns o f lay-people and there was a growing feeling that 
the academes nuisent à la recherché de la vérité (Brissot de Warville, 1782, as quoted by Ferrone & Rossi 1994:115).
It was the very triumph of science that laid the foundations for this internal struggle, which in turn was simply the 
upshot o f a crisis o f growth and of the reaction to the despotism and arrogance o f  the privileged and their esprit de corps, ■!
accused o f hampering free inquiry and aiming at the monopoly of knowledge. The theoretical and paradigmatic clash that 
followed a veritable crisis o f identity affecting several young aspiring scientists marked the beginning o f the modern 
epistemology o f science, namely the study o f  what science is and what is not and who is entitled to decide on such issues.
Many scientists, despite being stubborn rationalists, explored different avenues and as a result science broke in two, official 
science and popular science, whose respective exponents called each other charlatans.
As mentioned before, at that time two popular disciplines were physiognomy -  the study o f  facial somatic traits — 
and phrenology — the study o f the shape of skulls — whose practitioners pretended they could prove that anatomical and 
physiological characters had an influence upon moral proclivities and intellectual capacities and tliat their expertise could be 
essential in the struggle for education and against crime and insanity (Davies 1955). It is to these two branches o f what we 
nowadays define pseudo or occultist sciences diat we can trace back the roots o f that utilitarian vision o f ultimate perfection 
that periodically resurfaces within the life-sciences. The founder o f phrenology, Franz Joseph Gall (1758-1828), remarked 
that phrenology could provide the elite with the means by wliich the masses would be governed rationally and fliere fore 
effectively. GaU believed that the brain functions were the ultimate responsible for human behaviour, temperament, and 
intelligence and that moral dispositions and intellectual faculties were innate'®. Consistent with his search o f normal and 
pathological hallmarks raflier than attributes common to the entire human species, he recoiled from Enlightenment 
egalitarianism (Lombardo & Duichin 1997). He did so probably on account o f the education he was imparted by the 
religious institute that he attended as a pupil, where his teachers admonished him to bear in mind that talents were G od 
given and that each one o f them was expected to honour a tacit contract with the Providence and make the m ost o f those 
gifts (Temldn in Lombardo & Duichin 1997). This belief in a divine order pervading the Creation and rendering it 
immutable was arguably one o f the chief determinants o f liis anti-historical approach to biological and social change 
(Temldn ibid.). This conviction that there was not such a thing as a progressive, appreciably consistent improvement o f 
humanldnd, as I will show in the course of my research, was also shared by most eugenicists. Ironically, despite his hostility 
to those scientists who try to blend science and religion, the actual with the transcendent, the worldview he advocated was 
germane to tlie traditional dogma of the original sin that so vehemently was being attacked by tlie exponents o f the 
Enlightenment. The only real divergence was the emphasis placed by phrenologists on crime as a disease rather flian disease 
as an expression o f sin. But then again Gall was anything but a sympathiser for the cause of proletarian emancipation. O n
f
the contrary, he was well known in the aristocratic circles and one o f his patrons was tlie count o f Metternich. H e also 
barely concealed his contempt for the mediocre intellectual faculties of the man in the street and claimed that some people 
were born to lead and others to obey (Temkin ibid.).
The above mentioned religious tinge was even stronger among two o f his followers, Johann Caspar Spurzheim 
(1776-1832), and George Combe (1788-1858), a lawyer from Edinburgh. While Gall failed to popularise his discipline in the 
Anglo-Saxon context, tdiey were remarkably successful precisely because they underscored its religious component.
Spurzheim, who had studied theology, argued that phrenology would reveal the purpose o f G od in creating manldnd 
(Davies 1955) and botli Combe and Spurzheim managed to convey the crucial message that phrenology as a scientific 
perspective on human nature was cliiefly concerned with social meliorism without constituting a threat to the status quo 
(Temldn in Lombardo & Duichin 1997). These two tlirusts within the same current o f thinking are extremely significant 
because they reflect the two main aims o f the subsequent eugenics movement, namely social control (bio-poUtics) and the 
perfecting o f  Creation (utopianism). More, their successful co-existence witnesses to the hybrid character o f phrenology that 
consisted o f  an eminendy Romantic outiook, stressing notions such as organism, holism, struggle {Sttvbeti), and uniqueness 
(Eigentüffilichkeii), framed in a positivistic methodology (Jason Y. Hall ki Lombardo & Duichin 1997). Lilte eugenics 
thereafter, it is safe to say that phrenology was the expression of a romantic positivism, or positivistic romanticism (Hall, 
ibid.).
Much in the same way as eugenics, socio-biology, and evolutionary psychology, phrenology managed to catch on d
because o f its oversimplified techniques, demonstrations, postulates and theories, entirely foreign to what was termed
“academic pedantry” by plirenologists themselves, and which were easily graspable by die lay-public:
In the course of his ordinmy duties he must, as a pmst, listen to confessions and give advice on spiritual subjects, as plysidan give advice on 
health, as a Judge with acuteness deride behveen contending parties. Besides tegular^ acting in this triple capacity, he is often a mesmeiist, a 
medical electrician, an hydmpathist, a pychologist, and astrologist
PlirenologistJJ. Spark (Cooter 1984)
Although Gall was by no means a racist and maintained that there existed a substantial unity o f mankind and to 
some extent romantically idealised primitive life (GUozzi 1990), in the course o f time phrenology became a reactionary and 
race-biased enterprise that subsequently heavily influenced the nature of eugenics. Phrenologists were the first to 
"scientifically” lay the emphasis upon die iiiheritability o f physical and mental qualities and to combine a set o f  beliefs that 
were to play a major role in the successive eugenics discourse. These were a belief in progress, in biological determinism, in 
the alterabilit}'- and perfectibility o f  human nature, and in the progressive degeneration (Entariuf) caused by die civilizing 
process (Hilts 1982). Some o f dieir most cherished beliefs were that inferior races would never catch-up with the progress 
o f British intellect; that slavery was to be abolished because intellectually inferior slaves threatened to harm Britain; and that 
women were ill-equipped for abstract thought (De Giustino 1975).
Although the influence o f phrenology and mesmerism upon the “official” scientific discourse was to be enduring,
mass-consumption and the gradual transformation o f phrenology into a self-help panacea that did not require extensive
training, inevitably caused the corrosion o f the authority o f professional physicians and scientists who in turn began to
question its reliability, although at that time no empirical evidence could be gathered to prove that they were unscientific:
American intellectuals had mon concnte and compelling nasons for abandoning these movements. Mesmemm andphrenob^ alarmed many 
ofthem because both sciences promoted unorthodox or radical vieivs on religious, scientfc , medical, and social issues.
McCandless (1992; 228)
Indeed phrenology, as well as competing with positivism, acted as an intermediary between this latter and the 
occultist, hermetic, Neoplatonic traditions, and further undermined conventional views. Idealistic overtones were frequent
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in the phrenomesmeric rhetoric, and it has been emphasised (Mocek in Bayertz & Porter 1998: 226) that it had several 
principles in com mon witli socialist utopianism:
• man’s potential for plasticitj^;
• man’s potential for reintegration in cosmic harmony;
• the dependence o f man’s nature on circumstances;
• its criticism of soulless machinery;
and witli proletarian biologism*'^ (Mocek 2002: 394):
• self-fulfilment cannot be achieved without exertion, namely by working hard, cultivating a Freikotperkultiir (the
culture o f a healthy body), and constructively interacting with nature and the other human beings
• inborn flaws stand in the way to the attainment o f innate human longing for freedom, love, truth, happiness and
health
• although biology and the social müieu determine human existence, exertion may enable people to overcome their 
shortcomings
• all institutions aiming at the emancipation o f  workers must keep into account human physiology
• it is no t the species but the individual that should lie at the centre o f human research. However, individuals must %. 
be aware that it is their duty to  employ their advantageous attributes to improve the efficiency of the wider society
In brief, phrenology was an easy philosophy, expressed in ordinary language, a guide to reform and to Icnowledge, a 
new basis o f morality, a promise o f order and progress in turbulent times, magical and slightly mysterious, precise but 
flexible, awesome in judgement and yet humanely hopeful (De Giustino 1975: 74). Traits that it shared with its outgrowth,
i.e. eugenics, and that made it remarkably adaptable to antagonistic ends (Staum 1995). Like eugenicists, British "W
phrenologists sought to influence the choice o f suitable marital partners and to prevent the transmission o f physical, mental f
and moral shortcomings by recommending die adoption o f legal measures governing human mating (Waller 2001). In a 
nutshell, they endeavoured to convey the message that individual infirmities were social infirmities and had to be treated as 
such, diat is, they required large-scale social interventions (Waller 2001).
Again like eugenics fliereafter, phrenolog)^ also justified urban utilitarianism and individualist meritocracy against 
natural privileges, especially on account o f  flie fact that most o f its practitioners worked at the margins of the official science 
and their social place was quite ambiguous, so that they longed for recognition and for flieir acceptance into higher social |f
rallies (Cooter 1984). The development and demise o f  phrenology cannot thus be disassociated from the exploits and 
setbacks o f a burgeoning industrial capitalism. Popular sciences or pseudo-sciences were to become props for the claims o f 
a dissatisfied bourgeoisie, which perceived that a duly proportionate political power should ensue its growing economic 
power. An aristocracy o f talent was to replace the aristocracy o f birth. In the end, phrenologists shifted flieir focus to S
hereditarianism — and fliey were the first to clearly focus on the iiiheritability o f physical and mental characters by disputing 
the Lockean tenet o f the tabula rasa as well as the Enlightenment doctrine o f equality at birth (Lyons 1998) —, control o f 
reproduction, and racial degeneration, a move instrumental to the exclusion of lower classes from the privileges attained by 
the bourgeoisie, and this led the movement to merge with the nascent eugenic schools o f thought (Cooter 1984). Ironically, 
what had started as an attack on the natural rights o f the dominant classes wound up backing up flie claims and the ascetic 
virtues o f the parvenus and deploring the sensuality o f the Negroes and o f the members o f the working class. Their legacy
In Germany, theorists o f proletarian biologism, though sharing the presupposition that Western civilization was socially and 
biologically decaying, differed from the advocates o f bourgeois biologism in that they strove to humanize science and profit flom its 
advance to emancipate the worldng class and radically reform society by virtue of the genetic and phenotypic enhancement o f 
workers and the betterment o f working conditions (Bayertz 1983; Mocek 2002)
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was an enduring one, though, and with the benefit o f hindsight we now know that it exerted a crucial influence upon ‘-’ï
eugenics:
I t.. .established in the public mind the notion that human behaviourivas capable of classification and measure and that social, economic, and 
intellectual success, on the one hand, andpmblems of crime, delinquency, and addiction, on the other, could be reduced to organic derangement of 
brain
I
Roger Cooter (1984: 270) '
The same could be said o f  mesmerism, a “scientific” movement founded by Austrian physician A nton Mesmer
(1734-1815), who claimed that animal and mineral magnetism could be harnessed to therapeutic ends. Robert D arnton has
defined mesmerism 'Enlightenment run wild, which later was to provoke a movement toward the opposite extreme in the foryn o f romanticism
(Darnton 1968: 39). I am rather inclined to look to phreno-mesmerism as the point at wliich radical tendencies present in
both Enlightenment and Counter-Enüghtenment met, which would account for the fact that it appealed to so many
protagonists o f the French Revolution, from Marat to Duval d’Eprémesnil (Darnton ibid.). Thus for example Brissot wrote
a pamphlet in which he championed mesmerism with an almost religious devotion (Darnton ibid. 97):
Don’t you [academicians] see, for example, that mesmerism is a way to bring social classes closer together, to make the rich mote humane, to 
maks them into realfathers of the poor? Wouldn ’tyou be edified at the sight of the most eminent men.. .srpervising the health of their servants, - #
spending hours at a dme mesmerifing them?
1.2 THE PRODROMES OF EUGENICS
A ns so knmmem Hol^ e, als worms derMensch gemacht ist, kann nichtsgans^  Gerades gefimmert werden
Immanuel Kant, 1784, quoted in Berlin (1990)
Call it what you will; but i f  your aim is to use scientific methods to make the best of the inherited component of the health and wellbeing of the
children ofthe next generation, it is hy definition eugenics
David Galton (2001: XIII)
We’re using exactly the same kinds of techniques used by evolution, but what we’re attempting to do, in a thoughful and rational way, is to ;
facilitate evolution, so it doesn’t operate in a blindfashion.. .butin an optimisingfashion
Leroy Flood, molecular biotechnologist, University of Washington (Stoclc & Campbell 2000: 92)
Tins is an incredible concept, that our species has the ability to self-evolve
Lee M. Silver, molecular biologist, Princeton University (Stock & Campbell 2000: 95)
We have seen that the common denominator of these doctrines was the belief that health and social order where 
two faces o f the same coin and could be restored by scientific means. Indeed, the rhetoric o f therapeutic intervention upon 
a sick society was not a peculiarity o f National Socialism (Gay 1969). The medicaUzation o f society probably started when a 
growing number o f physicians, emboldened by the steady advance o f their discipline, sought to present the Enlightenment 
as a medical matter (Vila 1998). Paraphrasing Kant’s famous definition, German physician Johann Karl Osterhausen 
described medical Enlightenment as man’s emergence from his dependence in matters concerning his physical well-being (Gay 1969: 17).
Many philosophes were very sympathetic to medicine which they viewed as a testing ground for their tlieories and 
some were physicians, surgeons or had a medical degree (Gay in Barber & Brumfitt 1967). Nevertheless, whereas 
philosophers did not really concern themselves with biological inheritance, because they assumed all men to be equal at 
bird:, several prominent physicians, more pragmatically oriented, embraced a militant conception o f  medicine (Moravia in
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Cabanis 1981). They were ready to make value judgements on diversity as well as to endorse public policies aimed at the 
proliibition of marriage between mentally or physically unfit individuals and the arrangement o f  suitable mating (Victor Hilts 
in Mendelsohn 1984). The outcome was a schism between Enlightenment empirical science and Enlightenment egalitarian 
ideals that has lasted to this day, with scientists predicting that some day science would replace religion as a source o f  ethical 
guidelines, and humanists responding that certain basic human values must be held regardless o f  the cogency o f scientific 
theories (Hecht 1999).
In France this current o f thinking propagated those interrelated tenets that have never since disappeared from the 
scientific debate (Vila 1998):
• that mind and body are interdependent and malleable and that by acting on one it would be possible to 
effect changes upon the other
■ • that die gap between physical and moral can be bridged by medical and scientific means
• that ameliorating the human species and arrest its deterioration is a duty
• that medical specialists should be in charge o f these alterations
Antoine Le Camus (1722-1772) was one o f  the first physician-philosophers to state that ethics and health were
closely related (Vila 1998: 85):
We claim, thimgh purely mechanical means, to maks any man a superior' thinker, or', to put it differerrtfi, to ptvvide his soul with all the 
solidness and brilliance that he wishes
His meliorist social scheme also recommended that society should be reformed so that fitter men would attend to 
their procreative duties and that “regiments o f malformed men” should be sent off to the front in lieu of the healthiest 
individuals (Vila, ibid.). These contentions would be resumed by French revolutionary Bergasse, who argued that the best 
way to revolutionize France would be by improving the bodies o f its citizens, as better bodies would improve morals and 
better morals would positively effect French politics (Darnton 1968), but also by Alfred Ploetz, the founder o f German 
racial hygiene (Mocek 2002).
Consistent with Bacon’s prediction that scientists would alter the life cycle o f edible plants, interbreed and create 
new species (Tokar 2001), in 1756 French physician and hygienist Charles Augustine Vandermonde (1727-1763) wrote the 
Essai sur la manière de perfectionner l ’espèce humaine in which he expounded his dream o f perfecting agreeable human talents and 
weeding out disagreeable and disadvantageous traits by rationally administering human breeding. This whole thesis was by 
necessity founded on the postulate that spiritual and temperamental qualities are inheritable, one that echoes phrenologists’ 
convictions (Wellmann 2001). Vandermonde made it clear that he would like to witness the effects o f the selective breeding 
o f children for white skin, artistic talents, and all those faculties that society finds pleasing (Vila 1998: 90). As fate would 
have it, one year later the first eugenic law was adopted by Sweden in order to prevent the marriage of epileptics (Testart 
1994).
Ambroise Condorcet (1743-1794) and his disciple and friend Pierre Jean Georges Cabanis (1757-1808) believed 
tiiat natural inequality was not necessarily at variance with the doctrine o f equal rights, because tirese could be achieved by 
breeding equal human beings, which required a state wholly regulated on both a social and a biological plane and a universal 
science comprising humanities, natural sciences, and theology (Vondung in McKnight 1992). Condorcet (1970), whose 
motto was tout ce qui peut contr'ibuerà rendre les individus plus indépendants est un bien (Testart 1994), observed that the rights o f the 
unborn children involved their happiness and well-being as well as the good o f the society in which they will live and not la 
puérile idée de charger la ter're d ’êtres inutiles et malheureux. In his Fragment sur l ’Atlantide (1793) he proposed in furtherance o f this 
aim the establishment o f an association o f scientists-pedagogues, a clergé scientifique, who would fulfil the Baconian dream of a 
communal endeavour to dominate nature. In the Ouvres Philosophiques Cabanis (Cabanis 1956, Tom e I: 356-357) substantially
25
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summarised m ost o f  the theses eugenicists would latet espouse, although, given the means available in his times, he
confined his hopes to the realm o f euthenics amelioration:
Aptvs nous être occupés si curieusement des moyens de mtdn plus belles et meilleurs les races des animaux, ou de plantes utiles et 
agréable, . .combien n’est-ilpas honteux de négliger totalement la race de l’homme!.. .comme s’il était plus essentiel d’arxrir des bœufs gands et 
forts, que des hommes vigoureux et sains; des pêches bien odorantes, ou des tulipes bien tachetées, que des citoyen sages et bons! I l est temps.. .de 
suivre un système de vues plus digne d’une époque de régénération: il est temps d’oser faire sur nous-mêmes, ce que nous avons fa it si 
heureusement sur plusieurs de nos compagnons d’existence; d ’oser revoir et corriger l’œuvre de la natme
What I find disturbing is the parallel which can be drawn between this statement and what the commentator o f the
periodical “Jung Deutschland” wrote in 1902 (Mann & Wiiiau 1977):
Esgiebt Vereine sqir Zilchtung reinerPferderassen, reinerHunderassen,ja sogarreinerSchrveinerassen. Hatjemarrd rvohl schon etrvas von der 
Ziichtung reinerMenschenrassen, in utuerm Fall von der ZUchtung eines reirren deutschen Edel-Volkesgehort? Ware dies riicht naheliegender, 
rricht notrvendiger, nicht klügergehandeltals die ZUchtung reinerSchrveinerassen?
[there are associations for the breeding of purer races of horses, dogs, and even pigs. Did anybody ever heard of the 
breeding o f purer human races, in our case the breeding of a purer, German noble stock? Should not that be more 
obvious, necessary, and judicious than breeding pure races of pigs?]
Probably as a result o f this intermingling o f utopianism and social medicine, Galtonian scientific eugenics was 
actually preceded by what Léonard (1992) and Carol (1995) call medical eugenics, more inclined to an environmental 
outlook stressing the importance o f the m ost advantageous circumstances for the reproduction (Drouard 1999). These %
proto-eugenicist thinkers resumed the Renaissance ideal o f a state wholly regulated on both a social and a biological plane 
that was to serve as a blueprint for the future political agenda of eugenicists (Plilts in Mendelsohn 1984). Here is where the 
slippery slope argument truly applies, in that these seemingly humanitarian purposes, the accompanying effort to reconcile 
natural laws and the Enlightenment ideals o f liberty, equality, and fraternity, and the intoxicating task of making sense o f  a 
world in which G od had passed away as scientific progress had gathered momentum, eventually drove some biomedical 
scientists towards a totaüst and nihilist mode o f thought (Repp 2000). Eugenics issued from a class-conscious mentality that y?
transformed what could potentially be a reforming and equalizing movement into a threat to the very survival o f many 
downtrodden individuals and social outcasts.
By way o f  a summary, these are the attributes that phrenology and eugenics had in common (McLaren 1974,1981):
• The belief that human nature is malleable and perfectible and that virtues can be cultivated and vices weaned off 
given tliat the doctrine o f the original sin is a sham
• the belief that human faculties are innate and, beginning from the second half o f  the 19‘*' century, that criminals 
belong to a different class o f humans and are not entitled to full citizenship in tliat tlieir degeneration is irreversible
• an utilitarian and deceptively simple approach to the social question that glosses over the intricacies of modern 
societ)'- and therefore appeals to the lower classes
• a crude conception o f evolution in which the bourgeoisie has reached the evolutionary apex and should serve as a i  
model for the other social categories.
• their appealing to both conservatives looldng for new means o f social control and to progressives promoting across- 
tlie-board social reforms
'I
2. SCIENCE, MEDICINE AND BIO-POUTICS
Une société normalisattice est l'effet historique d’une technologie de pouvoir centrée sur la vie 
Michel Foucault (1976; 190)
I l sovrano entra in simbiosi sempre più intima non solo colgimista, ma anche col medico, con lo sdenfiato, con l ’esperto, colpretsé^
Giorgio Agamben (1995:135)
lue but de la morale future sera uniquement de formuler des règles, de créer des penchants compatibles avec la plus grande somme possible de 
bonheur public etprivé, c’est-à-dire de rendre l ’homme plus robuste, meilleur et plus intelligente. Tout ce qui pourra concourir à cette œuvre sera 
moral; tout ce q u ij contredira sera réputé immoral
Charles Letourneau, Uevolution de la morale, 1887^^
Before getting into the intricacies o f bio-politics, it is o f  the essence that we review a few important facts about 
contemporary pharmaco-genomics and bioethics, for tliis will help the readers understand why bio-politics itself is an 
exceptionally pertinent and crucial topic, and will become more so in the years to come.
1. We are being repeatedly assured that technology is neutral, although it should appear as self-evident that 
certain technologies have a greater impact upon society, may require a greater intervention by the State in the 
private sphere, and may provide a different degree o f accessibility to its potential users
2. Another tenet that is being promoted is that genes are us. There are genes for everything, from obesity to
schizophrenia, and from intelligence to homosexuality, and if you inherit a copy or two, depending on '4
whether they are recessive or dominant, you wül be dumb or gay accordingly. The entire Human Genome 
Project was based on the false assumption that the sequencing of human D N A  would provide ready-to-use 4
information and on the deliberate disavowal o f  systems biology and epigenetics*^.
3. Much o f the current bioethical debate seems to be dominated by the attempt to formulate a universal ethical 
framework applicable to all pluralistic societies, ultimately stifling any meaningful democratic confrontations.
This universal code would revolve around utilitarian considerations, stressing the goals (e.g. betterment o f
A-
individual existence) and ignoring the broader social consequences of the pursuit o f  such goals (e.g. social 7:
justice, solidarity). Since the unintended consequences of individual actions are not easily calculable, tliey tend -
to be regarded as negligible.
4. Correspondingly, numerous scientists and bio-ethicists seem to agree that the only real problem we face in the 
genomic era is how to guarantee safety and informed consent, not how to deal with conflicting interests and 
powers, as well as persistent prejudices and beliefs. I f  a technology is safe, so runs the argument, then it is 
perfectly acceptable. The trouble with bioethics as conceived today is that it tends to facilitate the growth of 
biotechnologies, rather than disciplining their applications, and that it justifies individual wishes and desires to 
the detriment o f social justice and the common good: ethics is generally taken seriorcsfy by physicians and scientists only 
when it either fosters their agenda or does not interfere with it. I f  it cautions a slower pace or a more deliberate consideration of
[The sovereign forms an increasingly intimate symbiotic connection not only with the lawyer but also the doctor, the scientist, the 
expert, tlie priest].
As quoted by Anne Carole 1995: 245.
h ttp ://www.sciencemag.org/ content/vol293/issue5532/#speciaHntro.
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science's darker side, it's dismissed as fearful of the future, anti-intellectual, or simputtmformed (George Annas 1989, EGS 
2 0 0 1 *8).
Critics urging that a greater attention be directed to the part played by emotions, traditions, and habits when it /
comes to predict individual decision—making vis-à-vis reprogenetics are often dismissed as irrational and #
backward and unworthy o f consideration. The same labels apply to those (e.g. Nobel Prize winner Amartya 4
Sen among others) who point out that genetically modified crops cause small farmers to depend on major 
corporations, and ignore the problem o f why in some countries overproduction of food can go hand in hand - %
with malnutrition (e.g. India). By the same token, those who suggest that vaccines, nutrition, education, and 
decent worldng conditions could do far more good to society than expensive treatments and selective '
abortions are dismissed as reactionaries. That pharmaceutical and cosmetic industries are obviously targeting 
consumers who can afford their services and care little about the rest o f the population is a fact that is seldom 
taken into consideration.
The advocates o f germ-line engineering, also known as inheritable genetic modification (IGM), are becoming 
increasingly vociferous. They claim such techniques are needed for they wiU allay people’s suffering and 
prevent wrongful births. They do not explain that the same goal could be attained through PG D , or pre­
implantation genetic diagnosis — i.e. in vitro fertilization plus cell-testing and the insertion in tlie woman’s 
uterus o f exclusively healthy embryos —. IGM  has no useful therapeutic aim and it is championed only by 7
those who wish surreptitiously to advance the eugenic agenda.
*8 Ethics, Genetic Technologies, and Social Responsibility in the Trventy-first Century. A Panel Discussion Held on March 14, 2001 at 
the Townsend Center for tlie Humanities, University o f California, Berkeley
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This is the current scenario, and we need to keep it in view so that we may now proceed to explain what is -I
generally m eant by bio-politics.
Ill Surveiller et Punir (1975) Foucault describes how, beginning from the eighteenth century, two crucial social 
changes occurred. O ne was the introduction o f the technologie politique du corps, by which Foucault meant the knowledge o f the 
body, which goes beyond mere observation, and the mastery of its functions. The second change, closely tied to the first, 
was the broad diffusion o f dynamic power-relations among societal agents, that Foucault called microphysique du pouvoir. In 
other words, power does not belong specifically to anyone, but depends on his or her strategic position within society; it 
consists in the whole o f those relations that operate through individuals’ roles, bodies, and expertise. Both factors are 
involved in the perpetuation o f social control due to the internalisation of those patterns that legitimize a specific 
hierarchical distribution of power, that is, o f  worldviews based on a corresponding distribution o f  ideas about what is true 
and what is no t — in other words, what Foucault defines as an “economy of discourses o f truth” (Michel Foucault 1980).
One o f tlie central tenets o f Foucault’s thinking is precisely that there is no power relation without a corresponding
field of Icnowledge that sustains it via internalisation o f norms and values (Michel Foucault 1975). Power generates
knowledge and vice versa. It follows from this premise that “objectivity” is a construct instrumental to die conservation o f
tiiose power-relations that shape hermeneutic and epistemological canons (cultural codes) (Foucault, 1975; 2001). O n a
macro-level, bio-power is the range o f legislative measures that replaced the sovereign’s prerogative to rule on matters o f life
and death by disciplining the biological fields o f procreation, illness, accidents, etc. (“disciplinary technologies”) through the
systématisation o f knowledge.
Ce formidable pouvoir de mort.. .se donne maintenant comme le complémentaire d’un pouvoir qui s’exerce positivement sur la vie, qui 
entreprend de la gérer', de la majorer, de la multiplier, d’exercer sur elle des contrôles précis et de régulations d’ensemble. Ees gteries rte se font
: c
plus au nom du souverain qu’ilfaut défendre; elles se font au nom de l’existence de tous; on dresse des populations entières à s’entre-tuer 
réciproquement au nom de la nécessité pour elles de vivre.
Michel Foucault (1976:180)
The problem with Foucault’s reading o f the history o f bio-politics is that he was forced by the intricacy of tlie
issues under scrutiny to oversimplify them and expose himself to the scathing critiques o f specialists such as Paolo Rossi
(Rossi 1995) and Charles Taylor (Taylor 1984):
I  postmoderni pensano che la modernità sia caratterisrgahik come l’età dell’autolegttimafione del sapere scientifico e della plena e totale 
coincidens^  fra verita ed autoemancipasrfine. [...]. Pensano anche ce il moderm sia l’età di una ragone forte dominata dall’idea di uno ' 
svilippo storico delpensiero come incessante e progessiva illuminaqiorte. Pensando queste cose hanno pensato male. Hanno affermato cose 
banali che, avendo I’aria di essere epocali, appaiono profonde aipoveri dispirito. Non hanno letto i modenri, ma i manuali che pariano di essi.
Sulla base di questa lettura hanno traferito all’indietro e proiettano in avanti fino a farla coincidere con I’intern modernità) 
quell’ottocententesca ideologa “comtiana” del progesso che solo per un breve periodo 'fa  il déclinante secolo decimonono e gli inifi del 
ventesimo” e libernta dai molti probleml, dalle forii ambivaleni^ , da tutte k  sue complicafioni interne, diventb “la fede media della 
intelkttualità eutopea e delk classi dirigenti.
Rossi 1995:112
[Postmodernists think that modernity can be typified as the age in which scientific knowledge legitimised itself and the §
age of the full and absolute coincidence o f truth and self-emancipation. [...]. By thinlting so they got it all wrong. They 'i
have argued trivial things that, looking as if they were epoch-malting, appear profound to simpletons. They have not 
read the modern authors, but the handbooks that deal with them. On that basis they have projected backwards and 
forwards (until they have made it coincide with the whole o f modernity) that “Comtean” ideology o f progress so typical 
of the eighteentlr century, that only for a short period “between the declining nineteenth century and the beginning o f 
the twentieth century” and purged of its many problems, of its strong ambivalences, o f aU its internal intricacies, became 7
“the faith commonly held by the European intellectuals and elites]
*** Tliose taking place in Macon County, Alabama, firom 1932 to 1970, and devised to test the physical and psychological 
degeneration o f 399 African-American men diagnosed with sypliilis, which was left deliberately untreated. The tests had no scientific 
value.
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Taylor objects that Foucault has mistaken the cause for the effect, namely the rise of a new notion o f  identity and 
of a new ethics o f life as the outcome o f the application o f new technologies o f control, when the obverse is much more 
likely to be true. In his view, free citizens were not unwilling to adopt some forms o f self-discipline that would allow free 
institutions to operate. We must indeed concede that not all institutions are instruments o f control and oppression and that %
not all powerful social agents are ill-intentioned and self-serving manipulators. Deborah Lupton likewise contests a certain 
type of black-and-white radical critique that deconstructs without rebuilding by describing medical professionals as tyrants 
and patients as victims (in Petersen & Bunton 1997: 97).
This notwithstanding, Foucault has highlighted real problems, and his approach can be used as a springboard for ^
further analysis.
A case in point is professionalism. I t is a major instrument o f  démocratisation in tliat the power associated with 
expertise is wielded not by virtue o f one’s birth or social status but can, at least theoretically, be acquired through one’s 
abilities; yet at the same time the vertical, liierarchical, sectarian character o f professional organisations is the essence of î|
elitist authority (Michael 2000) which parallels the growing bureaucratisation o f society and the rationalization o f social 
problems (Weber 1992, 2000). Where this latter spirit temporarily prevails, it is likely that a collectivist perspective wiU be 
privileged over one centred on individual expertise, and will call for an interventionist approach to policy-malting that may 
even appeal to careerists and technocrats as well (Burleigh 1991; Dikotter 1998). A m ost pernicious outgrowth o f this 
phenom enon has been evidenced by Tom  W. Schick (1982) who, wondering why black physicians enthusiastically 
participated in the Tuskegee experiments***, found a possible motivation in the main goal o f professionalisation itself, that is.
the socialization o f neophytes to embrace and safeguard the status conferred on them by the professional establishment. 
Black physicians felt even more committed — and special — than their white colleagues, because they had to rise above all 
sorts o f  trials and adversities in order to be accepted as professionals at all.
Witli respect to eugenics, it is by no means surprising that professionals who had achieved their status by 
undergoing a rigorous training, and a careful selection according to merit by their peers, would sympathise with a doctrine 
indissolubly tied to tlie ideal o f self-enhancement and the mastery o f human skills (Watts 1994).
2.1 THE ROOTS OF BIO-POWER
the Inquisitor violently enfomd his creed, because it was unchangeable. The savant enforces it violently because it may change the rrext day.
G.K. Chesterton (1922: 78)
Well before tlie Enlightenment, at the time o f the Greek polis, the notions o f the good citizen and the biologically- 
fit citizen coalesced (Agamben 1998). Giorgio Agamben^** has shown that in classic Greek an important distinction existed 
between the terms (biological, reproductive life) and bios (social life), and that the former was virtually excluded from 
issues pertaining to the polis and confined to the oikos, in tliat politics was seen as the means by which biological life could be 
turned into eu vfn, namely “good life”. 2*
The relation o f eu syen witli eugenics is self-evident. Plato himself recommended in his “Republic” that the 
guardians o f the poUs be well-bred. The ruler would assume responsibility for the well-being o f his subjects, who would in 
turn self-govern their bodies in the interests of the common good. This is in tune with Quine’s observation (1996:132) that 
the widespread notion that the state should control reproduction lay at the very foundation of population policies in both dictatorships and 
democracies. To put it differently, our concern for security, health, and well-being is the fuel o f those technocratic policies that 
are also designed to regulate our sexuality, reproduction and, last but not least, social functioning. This, I believe, is what 
Agamben means when he speaks of ilpurito in cui la servitù volontaria dei singoli comunica colpotere oggettivo [“the point in which die 
voluntary servitude o f individuals relates to objective power”] (Agamben 1995: 9). When I warn that techno-eugenics is not 
as inoffensive as some would lüce us to believe, I refer to the disquieting fact that various aspects o f biotechnology, and of 
our attitudes to it, blur die line separating rrpé from bios due to an excess o f genetic essentialism and biological determinism.
We can and should combat any such excesses. Nowadays, citizens participate in die political life o f a modern 
democracy as both biological and political entities that can be classified and directed quantitatively through computing, 
classification, and monitoring, as before they were dirough demography and statistical-medical recording; and their active 
engagement is now to be secured through biomedical technology. However, this may not necessarily be an unfavourable 
development, given that the same criteria o f classification and professional empowerment can also serve for the benefit of 
all citizens, and were actually devised precisely to .that end (Gelb 2000).
The birth o f social medicine, or hygienism, in the middle o f  the 18th century is a phenom enon diat cannot be 
separated from the engagement o f the State in the field o f health (public health) and population growth (population policies) 
(Weingart in Propping & Schott 1992). An idea o f medical policy had been created, according to wliich the government was 
expected to take on the responsibüit}'' for all citizens’ health and wellbeing (Seidelman 1989). Later on, citizens would further 
be requested to show their commitment to the common good by keeping tliemselves healthy and fit: a veritable 
mobilization o f  consciences revolving around an ethics o f duty (VigareUo 1993). This collective struggle against germs and
20 See also Hanna Arendt’s, “Vita Activa” (1960).
2* As an aside, the 1679 Habeas Corpus referred to the physical body not to the social entit)^.
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22 In Germany the debate on human enhancement resulted into a divergence between the advocates o f Bugenik and those who 
supported Rassmhygiem. Eugenilc stood for a hierarchy of value within a population, whereas racial hygienists held that there existed a 
hierarchy of values between races (link 1999)
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pollution became a convenient pretext for enforcing social control, namely, for carrying out the médicalisation o f society I
(Claudine Herzlich in Auge & Herzlich 1984). O n these grounds public administrators could, under extreme circumstances, I
withhold basic rights, and even, as was the case with eugenics and racial hygiene22, strip away people’s rights to exist.
In some countries where a liberal tradition was deeply rooted in the cultural and social fabric, such as England and '%
France, medical police did not acquire an autocratic character. N ot so in Germany, where different historical developments
were conducive to an authoritarian interpretation of the medical police’s functions, which ultimately resulted in the relatively
unliindered establishment o f die Nazi biocracy. In Germany things came to a head when bio-politics gradually changed into
thanato—politics. In 1920 Karl Binding, an expert in criminal law published a pamphlet on euthanasia entitied Die Freigabe der
Vernichtung kbensumverien hebens [The authorization for the extermination o f the life unworthy o f  living in wliich he urged l|
politicians to intervene once and for all to settle the matter o f all those whose life is rverthsen [worthless] and release diem
(erlosen which, ironically, also means “to redeem”) from their existential burden, in so doing relieving the German taxpayers
o f a huge economic commitment. This is how it begins (Kaiser at al., 1992; 79);
Gibt es Menschenkben, die so stark die Bigenschaft des Rechtsgutes eingebiifit haben, dass ihre Fortdauerfiir die Lebenstrdger wie fiir  die 
Gesellschafi damrnd alien nmi mioren hat?
[Do human lives exist, diat have so completely forfeited their prerogatives that their prolongation has permanendy lost 
its meaning for tiiose who have to lead them as well as for tlie society?]
This booklet would serve as a blueprint for the 1940 Buthanasie-Fwgramm fu r  unheilbami Kjnnken, a euthanasia-
scheme that would be carried out over die next 15 months and would claim between 40,000 and 60,000 lives. In the end, in
the NS Reich the sovereign consorted with the bio-medical experts marking the lowest point o f bio-politics, one at which il
data biologico è, come tale, immediatamente politico e vice versa [biological data as such are at once political data and vice versa]
(Agamben, 1995: 164). The identification o f  the health and hygiene of every single citizen with the health and hygiene o f the
State is thus an important element of modern statecraft, one that the Nazi state exacerbated (Agamben 1998):
Solo peii'hé la vita biologica coi suoi bisogni era ovunque diventata il fatto politicamente decisivo, è possibile compmiderv la rapidità, altrimenti 
inspiegabik, con cui le democrafie parlamentari hanno potato tvvesciatsi in stati totalitari e gli stati totalitari convertirsi quasi senary solufione 
di conümdtà in democrafie parlamentari
[Only by considering the fact that everywhere biological life with its needs had become a politically determinant 
element, can we understand the rapidity, otherwise inexplicable, with which in our century parliamentary democracies 
have been overturned by totalitarian states and totalitarian states have been converted almost seamlessly into 
parliamentary democracies].
Agamben 1995:134
The extermination camp comes to epitomise the point o f no return in western bio-politics, wherein the distinction 
between nature {poe) and politics ipios) no longer obtains: what is a dead weight by the bios criterion (e.g. Jews, Gypsies, 
mentally and physically disabled, etc.) is to be disposed of. In view o f die steady advance o f  reprogenetics, we should always 
bear in mind tliat the bio-sciences, by their very nature, seek to separate once and for all these two domains by malting 
biological life iypé) altogether artificial and by naturalizing social life (pioS). Past applications o f these sciences’ findings to 
society — social Darwinism, eugenics, socio-biology, evolutionary psychology — have all developed crude yet seductive 
theoretical currents that were far from liberating or benevolent.
I
i2.1.1 INQUISITORIAL BIO-POW ER
Be it as it may, it is worthy o f note that at least one national Church was involved in the process o f formation of 
this ideological and institutional compound that we nowadays term bio-politics. Diego Gracia Guillen (Alcala 1984) has 
convincingly argued that in early modern Spain social control was anchored to the medical treatment o f environmental, 
constitutional and temperamental factors that is, to the governance o f life. Doctors assisted the inquisitors in the execution 
of their duties by providing a theoretical and “scientific” justification o f  their practices, and tliis by means o f  three 4
arguments;
• That J ews are intrinsically depraved and inferior;
• That their inferiority and moral depravity does not derive from external factors but from their being members
o f a different race;
• That their “redemption” is not attainable because those characteristics are inheritable.
The Spanish “new Christians” were created by means o f  a biological classification articulated into 20 categories of
métissage, and religious orthodoxy was assimilated to limpiet(a de sangn, i.e. purity o f blood (Dedieu 1992). The biologicisation 
o f faith was a trend that began in the fifteenth century, when social discrimination against all those who were no t Old 
Christians turned into racialism (Kamen 1997). This involved maintaining that by the time o f its conception the foetus had 
acquired its parental traits, and that the Jewish hatred for Christians was an infection that would be passed on from mother 
to child. In this respect, the eminent Spanish historian Julio Caro Baroja (quoted by Guillen, ibidem: 338) has observed that 
the inquisitors' mentality estaba tan catgada de “biologismo” que hacia pensai' incluso que la leche de mujerjudta hada judais^r [was so 
impregnated with “biologism” that one was led to believe that the milk o f Jewish women could “judize”]
Once we disassociate modernity from the Enlightenment we can see that, pace Bauman (1989), Foucault and the 
theorists o f the Frankfurt school, the roots o f Holocaust are not only to be found in French' positivism, or in the iron cages 
of rationality, but also far earlier: such racism is partly a hangover from feudal practices such as the noblesse de race (or of the 
semen).
A  cavallo tra la biologia e la morale, il concetto dipuieiyya del sangue apparteneva già da tempo all’ideologia nobiliare: la pi'atica endogamica 
della nobilta spagnola e tedesca sigiustificava impBcitamente o esplkitamente con I’assunto che k mitt nobilian si eieditassero col sangue
[Somewhere in between biology and morals, tlie concept o f purity o f blood had been for a long time part and parcel o f 
the aristocratic ideology: the endogamie practices o f Spanish and German nobility was implicitly or explicitly accounted 
for through the assumption that aristocratic virtues were inlierited through one’s blood].
Giuliano Ghiozzi (1990: 246)
The aspiration to complete limpies(a de sangre, “cleanness o f blood” (that is to say, “purity o f  descent”), was exported 
to the New World, owing to the fact that it had become a veritable obsession when the Reconquista o f  the Iberian Peninsula 
had been carried through and there remained the problem o f how to deal with the infidels. Furthermore, the Conquista o f the 4
Spanish Empire was beginning and the authorities were determined to find rational ways to administer their new subjects. .4
The approval by Pope Alessandro VI o f the Estatuto de Umpietya de Sangte set in motion the “apartheidisation” o f  Jews,
Moors and die indigenous people of America, but the statutes anticipated the establishment o f the Inquisition (Villanueva &
Bonet 1993).
The Spanish Inquisition was given the green light in 1478 when Pope Sisto IV issued the bull Exigit sincerae 
devotionis by wliich Isabel and Fernando of Castilla were entitled to appoint “honest m en” who would investigate cases of 
spiritual infidelity and administer congruent punishments. From the beginning it appeared clear diat the major difference 
between the old (French, papal) Inquisition and the Spanish Inquisition was the political function o f the latter. As Ricardo 
Garcia Carcel has put it (1990: 13) el factor nligioso — el pmblema judio conctetamente -  no pance decisot'io para el nacimiento de la
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28 Incidentally, in the fotmet, papal model o f inquisition there was a disturbing parallel to the way Nazis executed their plans 
of progressive segregation o f Jews, which was the pre-condition for their extermination: the papal model meant that almost 
all those convicted o f heresy but not imptisoned had to wear yellow cmsses on their clothing (James B. Given 1997: 84)
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Inquisicion moderna, and indeed the Grand Inquisitor Tomas de Torquemada was a state functionary before being a member 
o f the clerg)'- and, paradoxically, a Jew’s grandson.
The assessment o f one’s limpietya de sangte was made through a genealogical survey that made use o f sworn
statements by a person’s acquaintances, and by several witnesses, in order to establish the number o f generations through
which a person could demonstrate tliat the lineage was free from Jewish (or Moor) blood. Converts {matranos and moriscos, or
cnstianos nuevos) were forbidden to take on public offices or to sail to the new American colonies. However many o f  them
managed to dodge the inspections so that a good number o f converts settled down in the New World, forcing the Spanish
Crown to set up the colonial inquisition (25 January 1569). Although in South America the jurisdiction of the American
inquisitors did not include the indigenous, by extension Native Americans fell into a similar category as the converts, as they
were deemed unsuitable to mate with Spaniards.
De hecho los estatutos de limpiec(a cieamn una casta de patias que infectawn a todos aquellos que de alguna manera se les unian, petv una 
casta no teconocible por caracterlsticas externas, porlo cual nadie podia dear qué conupciôn de sangre acarreaba sobre su familia en cualquier 
matrimorrio que pudiese contraer, [ ..] . Podemos compterrder cômo esta imborrable mancha se debio diptrdirpor la sociedad de modo que 
podia aparecer en cualquier momento en los lugares mas iiresperados
[The statutes o f cleanliness actually created a caste of pariahs who infected those who had any sort of contact with 
them. But this caste could not be identified by external characteristics, so that diere was no way to foresee the degree o f 
blood-corru^tion that a marriage would bring upon one’s family. [...]. Understandably, this indelible stain would $
propagate through society so that it could unexpectedly surface in any place and at any time] ' *
Henry C. Lea (VOL. II; 1983:177)
Objections have been raised against this one-sided interpretation o f early racism in Spain. Kamen (1997) argues X
that we would be misguided in believing that the entire Spain fell prey to this “epidemic” o f intolerance. Very few public 
institutions adopted the statutes and m ost o f them delayed the adoption and were lax on their enforcement: the statutes were 
trever part of the public law of Spain atrd trever featured in arty body of public law (Kamen ibidem: 239). There was indeed an 
“impressive opposition” by the elites, that were considerably “tainted” by cotrverso blood — the royal lineage included — and 
feared that the exposure o f one o f their members would bring infamy upon the whole family, and by several popes. 
Nevertheless, Kamen also remarks that the criterion o f limpiesya remained customary in those power struggles fought to 
enhance one’s status by debasing the status o f one’s political adversaries. Thousands o f families could not vindicate their 
honour for several generations.
Interestingly, Dedieu (op. cit.) observes that the inquisitors did not really believe tliat heterodox): and heresy ran in 
tlie blood. They merely used this diverse and finicky taxonomy so as to reinforce and corroborate the proofs that they had 
already collected. Yet it was because o f the inquisitors’ concern about purity that Spaniards came to regard racialism as a 
suitable way o f  categorizing people and that this attitude became part and parcel of the formation o f Spanish identity28.
O n balance, this mania with cleanliness was by no means a pathological aspect o f Spanish society but existed in the 
common parlance o f  European nobles and laypeople alike. The identification of an aristocratic lineage with a specific racial 
stock was quite common in early modern France and Germany (Gliozzi 1990), and it is self-evident that the discriminatory 
norms operated so as to widen the gap between tiiose who were already privileged and those who could only aspire to 
become such. The vast majority o f the Spanish population was made up o f Old Catholics, and discrimination among 
Catholics did not meet witli their favour (Kottek & Garcia Balles ter 1996) for it ran against the universal value and function
g
o f baptism. Anyhow, few obtained any profits from the new state o f affairs whereas the nobles, who were often “manchadof’ 
but possessed the means to bribe the inquisitors, seldom lost their status (Villanueva & Bonet 1993).
However, against Foucault and Weber, I want to argue that modernity did not only produce an iron cage o f  self-
and hetero-disciplining but also the means to scrutinize, question, and undermine the system. The inquisition was
obscurantist, but simultaneously developed traits o f modernity, such as a remarkable ability to keep an accurate and updated
record o f people and goods, to organize countries and communities homogeneously, and to exert a thorough social control
(Given 1997), something that did not invariably encounter the hostility o f the population; on the contrary, many Latin-
American natives felt the necessity to modernize themselves (Platt, lecture notes; Schwartz & Salomon 1999). O n the other
hand, the means o f  social control and integration that the Inquisition devised turned out to be a m ost efficient way for the
colonists to deal with problems o f ethnic boundaries, ethnogenesis, and the fragmentation o f cultural identities. Back in the
motherland, Moriscos were by no means treated more humanely. Once again we behold the association of an ethnic minority
with an infectious disease, a vermin in the social body o f Christianity. Only an uprising in Flanders prevented the Spanish
Crown from carrying out a plan to sink ships fiUed with deported Moriscos off the Spanish coast (Booth 1988):
genocide was a very realpossibility, and it was senousfi considered by the Qvwn, as was cassation of all male infants and the enslavement of 
all adult maks.
Booth (1988:131)
Tliis identification o f moral traits with biological and physical characteristics, and the resulting discriminatory 
attitudes, resemble to an astonishing degree beliefs and practices o f German, American, and Scandinavian racial hygienists 
and eugenicists (Weingart 1988; WeindHng 1989; Kiihl 1994, 1997). Blood as a discriminatory criterion was to become once 
again a popular idea between the First and the Second World War, when the Austrian immunologist Karl Landsteiner 
discovered blood-groups^'*, which enabled his German colleagues to direct their attention to the variability o f  ABO and 'i
rhesus blood types across Europe, so that Nazi propaganda portrayed Germany as a bulwark o f type A blood fighting the 
encirclement of people with type B blood (Mazumdar 1990; Greely in Peters 1998). Similarly, in interwar France serologists 
displayed a racially-minded approach to the hygienic and medical measures that had to be taken in response to the rising 
immigration rate (Schneider 1994).
In conclusion, what happened in Spain, as later in Nazi Germany and elsewhere, was that tliis phenom enon was 
aggravated through the employment o f purportedly medical and scientific criteria, and die more systematic formulation of 
racial doctrines. We should remember (following Bonet’s assumption in Villanueva & Bonet 1993) that the Inquisition also îj
fulfilled the all-important functions o f  social control, and strengthened the elite’s authority and economic power by - J
depriving the minorities o f their financial and political assets. Most telling in this regard is the statement by the Archbishop 
of Valencia, Juan de Ribera (1532-1611): ay tambien en este medio una gran conveniencia que es hacerlos pobm  [what is convenient 
about these means is that we make them poor] (Kottek & Garcia B allés ter 1996: 127). The unprecedented emphasis on 
biological traits, that is, on prevention, and on the disciplining and correction o f the social body through indoctrination 
rather than methodical corporal punishment or execution, are precisely those modern traits that Foucault has mistakenly 
attributed to a later stage o f development o f Western societies (Perry & Cruz 1991); and there is no reason to suppose that 
something similar may no t occur again in the future.
24 A discovery that earned him the Nobel prize in 1930.
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2.2 EUGENICS AND THE MEDICALJSAHON OF SOCIETY^s
In my opinion, it is meaningless and dangerous to encourage the illusion that health is a birthright of man, and that freedom fivm disease can be 
achieved by the use of drugs and ty other medical procedures. Like political jkedom, fieedom from disease should not be regarded as a 
commodity to be distributed iy science or government. [...]. Health can be earned only ly a disciplined way of life.
René Dubos (1961: 93-94)
Being modern means being disciplined, ly the state, ly  each other and ly ourselves;... the soul, both one’s own and that of others, became t
organised into the self, an object of réfection atrd atrabysis, atrd, above all, tratrsformable in the service of ideals such as pmductiviy, virtue atrd |
strvrrgth.
Robert van Krieken (quoted in Given 1997: 219)
After Foucault, “médicalisation” designates the process by which Western thought has come to conceive diversity: 
as preventable biological unfitness. This prevention can be attained through self-discipline, expertise and record keeping.
The resulting approach to the resolution o f social problems, also Imown as the “médicalisation of deviance” (Labisch 1992) 
or “biological standardization” (Canguilhem 1972), is — according to Foucault — part and parcel o f the paradigm of K
maximisation that has been established over the past two centuries as a natural accompaniment o f capitalism. This current o f îf
thought was inaugurated by the theories o f the American engineer Frederick Winslow Taylor — hence tlie designation o f .It
“taylorism” — and gained much ground among Darwinist sympathisers, who regarded the mechanism of natural selection as 
a prodigious instrument to render efficient human reproduction and in so doing guarantee the perpetuation o f our species 
(Kühl 1997):
Telle doit être la méthode de TEugétrique; perfecthtrtrer les qualités et réduire au minimum les itrcorrvétriettts des défauts. C ’est, en somme, 
l ’application à l’individu de la méthode de Taylor qui s’impose à l ’orgatrisation des sociétés humaitres; c’est la méthode de la division du travail 
appliquée engrarrd darts l’irrdustrie où elle a donné les meilleurs résultats.
French biologjst and doctor Edmond Perrier (in Carole 1995:196)
There logically follows a pecking order o f citizens, from the least talented to the m ost adroit, from tlie hopeless 
cases to the perfectible and perfect, the former doomed to be a burden to the State budget (Foucault 1994) and therefore 
dispensable.
This event occurred as a consequence o f a paradigmatic change that took place during the last three decades o f the 
nineteenth century in both  medicine and population policies. The focus shifted from the individual to the social (from micro 
to macro) and from solving to preventing (Maiocchi 1999), and eugenics was arguably the most salient result o f  this “new” 
outlook. I-Iistorically, outbursts o f eugenics by and large coincided with phases o f major disruption in the social fabric and 
with massive economic crises, such as the 1880s or tlie 1930s. We can thus hypothesise that historical circumstances played 
a crucial part in the radicalisation o f these leanings.
The Marxist definition o f modernity — all that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned — best exemplifies the 
cultural and moral predicament o f fin-de-siecle Europe. In tlie second half o f the nineteenth century a wide gap formed 
between the great expectations of universal regeneration that had accompanied the 1848-1849 insurrectional movements, 
and the reality o f post-1849 Europe, a continent dominated by despotic, uncompromising and reactionary leaders (Talmon 
1960). By 1880, classical liberalism in Western Europe was inexorably receding across the continent. Criminality was
28 According to Michel Foucault (1994b), médicalisation is the semantic and functional integration o f existence, conduct, behaviour, 
and die human body in a medical firamework. One o f its corollaries is that even healthy people are inclined to feel at risk (Armstrong 
in Albrecht et al. 2000)
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2** The notorious fascination with the possibility of a technological fix
22 There is.. .one hng-mognityd weakness in Utopian spéculation: the inadequacy of man, the extreme unlikelihood that man can live rp to his own 
ambitions. It is for this reason that the idea of a genetic imprvvement of man has a pedalfascinatmn for Utopian thinkers (Medawar 1990:103).
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identified either with parasitology or with racial decay, and in 1888 Charles Féré would maintain in his Dégénérescence et 
criminalité that those who did no t meet the standards o f normality and were not only unproductive but also costly -  
criminals, mentally retarded, disabled -  were to be considered as so much social waste and, as such, had no right to live 
(Pick 1989). The misplaced reliance on extreme rationalism, besides being conducive to the progressive biologicisation o f 4
values (Weindling 1991) and tlie conflation o f virtues and hygiene (Colla 2000), gave rise to the social science o f population 
health, or “social medicine”, a discipline that assessed the strength o f a countr): on the basis o f tlie health o f  its citizens 
(Porter 1999). The expression médecine sociale made its appearance in 1848, coined by French orthopaedist Jules Guerin 7|
(1801-1886) (Canguilhem 1994)
Correspondingly, this increased the status o f die medical profession, so that the task assigned to doctors became 
not just healing die sick but also safeguarding public health (Maiocchi 1999). O n the one hand, the ascent o f  positivistic 
scientism was relentless thanlcs to repeated triumphs, especially in the field o f bacteriology, which induced the public to turn 
away from the transcendent and symbolic chracterization o f dlness typical of religious creeds (Cosmacini 1989). On the 
other hand, politics and empirical sciences merged, to a greater or lesser extent, depending on the cultural context. In /
Germany the final outcome was a technokratische Antipolitik (Liibbe cited by Weindling 1991). I will give a brief summary of 
these events:
I
The stock exchange crash o f 1873 brought about the so-called Great Depression which lasted until the 1890s. High 
mortality, morbidity, and crime rates, combined with massive labour unrest and the rising birth -rates o f the lower ^
classes, had become a growing concern for national elites (MacMaster 2001). They dreaded an imagined degeneration if
o f the human species, accompanied by the perception o f a rapid decline of Western civilisation, increasingly viewed 
as a krankmacherrde Gesellschafi, a society conducive to siclmess and self-destruction (Schott in Propping & Schott 
1992), because o f its inherent predisposition to exert psychologically and physiologically debilitating influences on its 
members (Herman 1997). Ironically, the only real decline that it witnessed was that o f aristocratic hegemony (Stone 
1999).
The growth in number of the feeble-minded was manifestly due to better means o f population survey and recording, 
as well as to the establishment o f universal education that made evident the inability o f numerous pupils to keep pace 
with their peers (McLaren 1986). But this explanation did not satisfy eugenicists, who strove to frame a scientific 
model alternative to the two proposed solutions to the problem of pauperism, i.e. the Marxist dictatorsliip o f  the 
proletariat, and the liberal-Welfarist plan of broad and expensive social protection for the underprivileged 
(Ambroselli 1994; Weingart, KroU, Bayertz 1988). The ironic twist in the eugenic saga is that even self-proclaimed 
Marxist scientists espoused eugenics, perhaps owing to their being members of the intellectual elite (Beckwith 2002).
But cultural and ideological blinkers prevented many intellectuals from reaching a true understanding o f die causes o f 
this malaise. The dominant frame o f reference became the biologisation o f pauperism: socially subordinate people 
were ignorant, sick, and poor because they were naturally inferior, they actually constituted a race apart (Dorothy 
Porter 1991). The two feelings that caused many a fin-de-siecle intellectual to embrace eugenics were a widespread fear y
of a biological threat from below (Scherer 1990) and a boundless optimism about the opportunities offered by 
techno-scientific advancement to carry out a planned, technocratic development oriented to the perfecting o f human 
beings and to biological salvation (Weingart et al. 1988; Tucker 1994)24 This faith in a techno-scientific deterministic 
response to huge social challenges is ultimately responsible for the eugenicists’ fluctuation between socialist f
reformism and racist totalitarianism (Bernardini 1997)
This tendency was further reinforced by the fact that sustaining eugenic arguments witiiin a biological-organic 
theoretical framework was in vogue and widely accepted as a solution to the “vain idealism” o f those who naively 
believed that social problems could be solved through purely social means (Sieferle 1989). This alleged nai'vite was to 
be replaced by the absolutization o f the doctrine o f  social and biological progress, whereby social issues would be 
analysed not in terms o f what men actually are but o f what they should be -  and could eventually be after appropriate 
interventions (Talmon 1960; Dikotter 1998)22. It is o f some interest to note that all major utopias were anti­
democratic precisely due to their being formded on an ideal configuration o f mankind (Spitz 1965). Hence eugenics, 
with its messianic and scientistic character and its refusal o f tlie principle o f human equality at birth, could not 
possibly be other than totalitarian.
By the 1880s, the working classes had become a reading audience and by the 1890s Darwinism was shaping their 
philosophy o f  life (Kelly 1981). The same period witnessed a shift from liberal and progressive Darwinism -  in 1869 
biologist Friedrich Ratzel explained in the preface to one o f his publications that he aimed to make propaganda for
“progressive tendencies” (Kelly 1981) — to selective, racial, and imperialist Darwinism, as well as the birth o f eugenics 
(1883), the rise o f medical interventionism (Arnold 1988), and a number o f means o f social controls such as passport 
regulations, work quotas, and the first institutions to segregate the mentally ill and mentally retarded (Reilly 2000)^7 
Almost simultaneously the first concentration camps were built in Cuba (1896) and South Africa (1900) (Massin 
1996). Nazi collectivism, epitomised by the slogan: Du bist nichts, Dein Volk ist cilles [you are nothing, your people is 
everything], was only one among many developments made possible by the exigencies of social control.
• Utopian communities all across Europe^^ underwent a radical change, and the initial pseudo-anarchism"^®, premised 
on die primacy o f individual welfare and happiness, gave way to conformity with the iron laws o f  nature, namely, the 
tenet underpinning the Hitler]ugend and Lebensborn projects (Weindling 1989a)^\ A m ost representative instance o f 
this shift is the almost legendary sociaUst-utopian commune o f Monte Verita, near Ascona (Switzerland). Founded in 
1900 as an experiment in Lebensreform and a precursor o f anti-psychiatric practices"^^ owing to the neo-pagan, 
vdlltish, anti-capitalist, and anti-individualist undercurrents of its members, it soon irradiated proto-Nazi doctrines, 
although always beneath a façade o f respectability (Green 1986), Contemporaneously, eugenic societies were 
founded, and some partially experienced this neo-pagan frenzy (Conte & Essner 1995)
• Still in the 1880s, radical right and anti-Semitic doctrines infected occultism — the expression anti-Semitism was 
actually coined in 1879 — whose practitioners, already possessed by considerable contem pt for democratic 
institutions, grew ever more hostile to liberalism and moderate socialism (Glatzer 1997). As a result, in 1881 the 
Association o f German Students was founded, which consecrated itself to the fight against materialism, rationalism, 
liberalism, and their embodiment, tlie Jews, for the sake o f the VoUc, and in 1889 Austrian university fraternities 
resolved to accept Aryan students only (Mosse 1964).
Eventually, the massive repercussions o f the crises o f the 1870s-1880s, and later that o f 1929, transformed 
reforming enthusiasm into a pernicious doctrine. What seemed unthinkable in times of prosperity became commonsensical 
in times o f hardships (Paul 1995)
As I have said, this was not an inevitable outcome and it would be vain to equate eugenics and reprogenetics on 4
account o f their potential for abuse. We Imow, for instance, that in the post-1929 United States the reaction o f the 
population to the crisis was antithetic, because those who belonged to the higher ranks of society went to the wall and their 
life was as miserable as that o f the alleged unfit. In this context, heredity could not possibly be the culprit (Marks 1995).
Nevertheless, by and large, eugenics was thought by many intellectuals to be tlie ultimate, benign solution to this %
unprecedented cultural and moral crisis. For example, Francis Galton argued that what nature does blindly, slowly, and ruthlessly, 
man may do providentially, quickly, and kindly (Galton 1904: 5), that the average citisyn is too base for the every day work of modem 
civilisation, and that eugenics cooperates with the workings o f nature by semring that humanity shall be represented by the fittest races (Galton, 
in Herman 1997: 133). This slippery slope was descended almost unconsciously by several unemployed bio-scientists who 
fell prey to the seduction o f elitist doctrines prescribing a life o f active engagement in the radical transformation o f a sick 
society:
■J
28 What took place following the industrial revolution was tlie transition firom the more or less peaceful co-existence between normal 
and abnormal people to tlie segregation of those “elements” that could perturb social harmony and industrial production (Gabbay 4
and Webster in Oxford Review of Education, Vol. 9, Number 3,1983. Tlieme: Mental Handicap and Education): During the lastyears 
of the nineteenth century the utopian hopes of educating and essentially curing the merrtally retarded had largely been abandorred. More and more, the 
institutions became places where the irrmates were kept isolatedfivm the rest of society, where thy could be trained in certain skills according to the way they 
had been classified, and where a reasonable amount of work could be extractedfivm therrr, under humarre corrditiorrs atrdfor the berrefa ofsociety (Broberg &
Roll-FIansen 1996:15).
2** These social experiments were not confined to Europe. In 1886, Elisabeth Nietzsche, the person who most strove to popularize 
as well as distort her brother’s writing, on the advice of Richard Wagner founded a colony o f allegedly biologically gifted Saxons in 
Paraguay.
80 It should be noted tliat in fin-de-siècle Spain anarchists regarded science as die only means for die achievement o f true 
Enlightenment and the establishment of ultimate truth (Sierra 1996).
8* The term Lebensbom, literally meaning “fountain of life”, is a Nazi neologism and comes firom the medieval German term born 
(“fount”, “spring”, or “source”) and heben (life). Most unfortunately, the Lebensborn project was not consigned to history. In 1990 
the N IH  awarded a grant to geneticist Plomin on account o f his commitment to discovering what genes affect IQ, so as to be able 
to pinpoint children likely to be smarter diaii others (Noble 1999). Incidentally, it is reported that Frederick the Great was eager to 
form a military elite by mating his “best” soldiers with the “best” girls (Bodmer & CavaUi-Sforza 1976).
82 See Basaglia, Foucault, R. D. Laing and Thomas Szasz.
37
88 We meet [in Nietzsche] an individual of the highest adtme, and of a thomughly anginal stamp, who experiences all the tendencies of the time, and suffers 
fivm  the same unsolved contradictions by which the time itself is out of joint. Hence the echo which his kngiage has found; hence the danger of his influence, 
which does not heal the sickness of his age, but increases it. Wilhelm Windelband’s critique ofNietssche (Hale 1971:86) clearty also applies to Haeckel
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such disgruntled academics turned to a range of socially aitkal ideologies, and prophetic philosophies were in vogue. They venerated cultural j
ideologists who raised issues byond the confines of academic science. Cults arose around the figures of Friedrich Nietzsche, Haeckel and tire 
Lebenphilosoph RudolfEucken, who were venerated as offering the basisfora critique of social conventions.
Paul Weindling (1989: 35-36)
Ernst Haeckel88 pubHcly advocated racial selective breeding, the elimination o f the unfit (Gasman 1971; Burleigh & 
Wippermann 1991), and the separation o f sexuality and reproduction — a mainstay o f radical and utopian eugenics (Bayertz f
1994b) that may well have stemmed from some sort o f puritanical sex-phobia (Baker 1990). Friedrich Nietzsche was not a 
genuine eugenicist, but it appears likely that he had toyed with the idea in his élucubrations on the Overman (Detwiler 
1990), especially because eugenics promised to change mankind without changing society as Marxism threatened to do 
(Matthias Weber in Mattioli 1995; Schank 2000). There are a couple o f statements that point in this direction. As to positive -4
eugenics:
Is it not time, now that the type “herd arrimar is being evolved mote and mote in Europe, to maks the experiment of apndamental, artificial 
and conscious breeding of the opposite type and its virtues? Atrd would it not be a Idnd of goal, redemption, andjustficadon of the democratic 
movement itself i f  someone arrived who could make use of it — by finally producing beside its new and sublime development of slavery . . .a  
higher kind of domirrating and Caesarian pirits who would starrd tpon it, maintain themselves by it, and elevate themselves through it?
As cited by Detwiler (1990; 176)
As regards negative eugenics, in “the Wül to Power” (Nietzsche 1968, 734: 389) he also argued that
The Biblicalprohibition “thou shalt not kill!” is a piece of naiveté compared with the serioustress of the prohibition of Ife to decadents: “thou 
shall not prvaeatel”— Ufe itself recognises no solidarity, no “equal rights”, between the healthy and the degenerate parts of an orgarrism: one 
must excise the latter — or the whole willperish. — Sympathy for decadents, equal rights for the ill-corrstituted— that would be the profoundest 
immorality, that would be antinature itself as morality!
Be tliat as it may, most formulations o f eugenic social policy addressed the problem of the reform o f “counter- ' *
selective” institutions -  what we call “euthenics” — such as social welfare and national health care (Weingart 1995), regarded
as factors o f “selection relaxation” (Bodmer & CavalH-Sforza 1976), as well as die uprooting o f  those moral codes that
contrasted with the eugenic utüitarian doctrine (Marks 1995). Many a eugenicist agreed with Nietzsche diat die morality o f
slaves and o f the weak, preaching pity, compassion, and altruism, was sick, as opposed to the healthy, narcissistic and
exuberant morality o f the masters (Sax 2000; Stone 2002). The end result was the Nazi notion o f  biotic communit):
(biocracy), in which the divide between animals and humans was effaced (zoological reductionism), whereas the divide
between die healthy and the sick came to coincide with the one separating life and death (Sax 2000). Intimations o f this were
already evident in A rthur Schopenhauer’s contention that
a real and thorvugh imprvvement of the human race might be attained not so much from without as fivm  within, thus not so much by 
instmction and culture as rather upon the path of generation. [...]. I f  we could castrate all scoundrels, and shut up all stupid geese in 
monasteries, and give pem tu of noble character a whok harem, and provide men, and indeed compkte men, for all maidens of mind and 
understanding a generation would soon arise which wouldprvdrue a better age than that of Pericles.
Bayertz (1994b: 33)
One o f the motivations behind die collaboration o f science with the establishment are intelligible in Nietzsche’s
words, and have much to do with an undercurrent o f scientific hubris in the Western cultural context:
Wirmachen einen Versuch mit der Wahrheit! Vielkicht g h t die Menschheit dran rqt Grande! Wohlan! [We experiment with truth!
Perhaps humanitj: wül be destroyed by it! WeU, so be it!]
Nachgelassene Fragmente 1884 (1974: 84); 25 [305]
84 Conftvnted by the data of experience, men of science begin by leaving out of account all those apects of thefacts which do not lend themselves to measurement 
and to explanation in terms of antecedent causes rather than ofpurpose, intention and values. [...]. Science does trot even profess to deal with experience as a 
whole, birtorily with certain apectsofitin certain contexts (Aldous Huxley, “Science, Liberty, and Peace” 1946, in Dubos 1962: 564).
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Camus’s portrayal o f the transformation of Caligula from a young idealist into a despot due to a personal loss ?
(Braun 1974) may well apply to Ernst Haeckel, who declared that he had become socially and politically engaged after his ''
wife’s death (Weindling 1989), The founder o f a “scientific religion” that he christened Monismus (based on the natural 
selection o f the fittest), Haeckel gradually became an elitist, intolerant preacher. He advocated the reform of society on the 
basis o f  the laws o f nature (Arluke & Sax in Birke & Hubbard 1995), the elimination o f  “lives unworthy o f life” (Burleigh 
2002), and maintained that racial and intellectual inferiority went hand in hand with inferior human worth (Haeckel 1910).
He also held that free wül was a delusion; that liberalism was unnatural and pernicious; that criminals will always repeat their 
aimes no matter how long they are held in prison (Gasman, 1971: 97). He also publicly endorsed state-corporatism o f a fascist kind 
(Stein 1988) and inspired Hitler who plagiarized much o f the m ost questionable content o f Haeckel’s Natiirliche 
Schopfungsgeschichte and the Weltrathsel (Gasman, op. cit.: 164).
W hat emerges from our discussion is that, besides the connection between professionalisation, racial prejudices 
and national goals, biomedical sciences have been plagued by other, more subtle and no less harmful, biases of an 
ideological nature.
John Vandermeer (1996) has identified genetic determinism — the belief that individual temperaments and social 
ills are to be imputed to organic malfunctioning —, neo-Malthusianism, and nature worship as a scientifically inspired and 
socially constructed trinity o f beliefs that propelled Nazism. Their connection was established in fin-de-siècle Germany and is 
at die core o f much eugenic rhetoric. Biological and genetic determinism has been at the core o f three potentially explosive 
doctrines (Robert Sprinkle 1994);
• the cell-state theory (Zellenstaal), collapsing social complexity upon a simplified organic representation o f 
society — state is to body as citizens are to cells (Webster 1981);
• social Darwinism, the notorious misapplication o f the principle of natural selection to society;
• eugenics, a utopian and prejudiced plan to regenerate humanldnd through selective breeding (Sprinlde 
1994; Frewer 2000).
Notably, these three doctrines translated into political schemes promoting an interventionist approach urging life scientists 4
and physicians to perform  their socially therapeutic role within die body politic, and favoured a climate o f  moral panic in 
which shrewd politicians could persuade the population diat the predicament was so dramatic that it was really a matter of 
extreme measures (Burrow 2000). The legacy of these schools o f thought in modern scientific and social theory is still 
potentially deleterious to democracy. O n the one hand, we stül entertain a belief in species hierarchies (“man” at the top), in 
intraspecies hierarchy (some humans are better than others), and in human perfectibility (Rotschild in Goldman 1989). O n 
the other hand, we behold the degradation o f our conception of humanness into flesh and molecules that can be 
intentionally manipulated (Kaas in Lygre 1979. This is characteristic o f scientific reductionism, for science - unlike ethics - S
necessarily deals with shreds o f experience and not with the whole o f human existence (Butler 1976)84. Indeed, we may 4
postulate that a tendency to see success in terms o f genetic continuity, and to regard nature, not man, as the arbiter o f 
thought, is probably inherent in the biological profession’s idea o f itself (Ravin 1978).
Nazism actually issued from the intersection o f these doctrines with anti-Semitism (Conte & Essner 1995).
Obviously, the appalling economic circumstances played a cardinal role in coupling self-interest, nihilism and Social 
Darwinism — a current o f drought that principally appealed to doctors and biologists (Vogt 1997) -  and turning tliem into a
successful ideology (Reiclilin 2002). The two common underlying principles, namely an organic conception o f the State and 
tlie belief that Gemeinnnt^geht Por Eigennutri [public interest comes before self-interest] were combined in a treatise eloquently 
entitled Das Recht auf Gesundheit und die Pflicht sie egr erhalten [the right to health and the duty to preserve it] published in 1921 
by the deeply religious Swiss physiologist and biochemist Emil Abderhalden (Frewer 2000). The foundations had thus been 
laid for the Nazi doctrine described by the slogans Gesundheit ist Pflicht, Krankheit ist Pflichtveigessenheit [health is a duty, illness q
is the neglect o f this duty] (Kudlien in K IZ 1988) and im Mittelpunkt der nafionalsosqalistichen Auffassung steht die Pflicht, gesund sqt %
sein [central to the National Socialist creed is the duty to be healtliy] (Klee 2001: 46); but also for statements o f the kind î
made by Swedish physician Hugo Toll, who in 1913 held that being weak and sick was a great shame (Colla 2000: 103). t
Notably, the Swedish language has a term, skdtsam, which designates someone who has internalised those norms o f hygiene 
and personal care that make for apt citizens and industrious workers. After all, at a time in which nationalists and socialists 
held such a sway over public opinion, it is unsurprising tliat the old dream o f achieving human perfection and therefore 
generalised happiness would be re-interpreted in collectivist terms (Lilienthal 1979).
In truth, the study of the NS ideology and of the eugenic movement reveals tliat the issue is not really whether the 
modern. Western worldview is more harmful or advantageous to the good of humanldnd, but rather how this proclivity to 
find all answers in the natural sciences — or more precisely in the aristakratischer Grundgedanke der N atur 2.nà the fieies Spiel der 
Krdfte as Hitler wrote in his “Mein K am pf’ (Vogt 1997: 282) — could have triumphed in an ostensibly cultured and pluralist 
society such as Germany.
These metaphors and tenets, and the accompanying radicalism, were well known to those bacteriologists and social 
hygienists who sought to arrest epidemics o f typhus and cholera in WHlielmine Germany. Paul Weindling (in E rnst & Harris 
1999; Weindling 2000) and Christoph Gradmann (2000) report that between 1890 and 1920, imperialism and racism 
combined with bacteriology so that Jews, Gypsies and Romanies became identified as germ- and disease-carriers after the 
establishment o f the association between racial attributes and susceptibility to given pathogens.
Interestingly enough, Jews had formerly been associated with plague and leprosy by Christianity (Ginzburg 1991),
and the philosophes had portrayed their attack on Christianity as a medical campaign against a disease, for Christianity was
an infection, a malignant foreign body, a “sacred contagion”, a “sick man’s dream”, a germ sometimes dormant but always dangerous, the 
sorme for epidemics of fanaticism and persecution. In the rhetoric of the endghtenment, the conquest of nature and the conquest of revealed 
religion were one: a strugglefor health. I f  the philosophes were missiorraries thy rvere medical missiorraries
Gay in Barber & Brumfitt (1967: 379)
Much in the same way bacteriologists and phrenologists were regarded as “guardians o f  civilisations” engaged in a
“civilising mission” . Correspondingly, an insightful relationship has been established by David Bodanis between Pasteur’s
extreme right-wing politics and his scientific pursuit (Carey 1992: 25):
Horrified ly democray, and obsessed ly the notion of swarming invisible multitudes infecting and destroying dvili'qed society, he inaugurated the 
immensely itrfluential cultural concept of bacteria, which he described in terms analogous to those used to charmterisye the seething unclean 
masses. Once this scientific model had been offered, it could easily be reversed, so that instead of bacteria resembling the masses, the masses 
resembled bacteria.
By the same token, it was the prestige of bacteriology that spurred Alfred Ploetz to seek out and eliminate tlie germs of 
deviance (Weindling 2000), which sounds familiar these days when criminality is sometimes ascribed to “bad genes”.
In WiUieknine Germany, hygienists agreed to present the strictest regulations on immigration as inevitable and 
advantageous. So much so that immigrants from Eastern Europe were transferred in segregated carriages, or sealed trains, to 
places were they would be inspected, washed and disinfected, together with their personal belongings and felt transmuted into 
dumb animals, helpless and unresisting (Paul Weindling, ibidem: 222). Concomitantly, the political language borrowed terms from
40
4ï
the vocabulary o f  bacteriologists so as to sustain paranoid worldviews instrumental to the enforcement o f tough-minded 
legislation (Gradmann 2000).
The whole process could be described as a vicious circle in which scientists and journalists acted more or less 
consciously as scaremongers, probably in order to obtain funding, visibility, and to further their own agendas, whüe the 
population pressed the politicians to intervene, and politicians more or less gladly “officialised” the emergency by legislating ;
on die matter. The question we should ask ourselves is whether the separation between curing and killing, assistance and 
elimination could become hazy again (Weindling 2000).
2.3 EUGENICS, PROGRESS, AND THE WELFARE STATE
It is doubtfiil whether demociny can long continue in any society except one so set up that the more competent people in every social and 
occupationalgvup are farmed for survival
Frederick Osborn (1951: 324-325)
Eugenics was an expression of a radically meritocrntic outlook.. .It is not quite that the virtue of the bourgeois was in his body — it was 
centralised in his germ plasm.
Martin (1996:123)
Eugenics, a term coined in 1883 after the Greek eugenes, meaning “wellborn” by Francis Galton (Galton 1883),
Charles Darwin’s cousin, stands for the science studying the m ost favourable conditions for the reproduction and 'f
enhancement o f the human species. It is the “rational management o f human reproduction”, die last stage o f the process o f 
rationalization o f  everyday life envisaged by Max Weber. It is o f some interest that for more dian twenty years a concept ë
that is essential for our understanding o f the history of the bio-sciences passed virtually unnoticed. I t was only in the 1910s 
that eugenics became a commonplace in scientific journals and popular magazines (Barker 1983). Throughout its history, 
eugenics remained a heterogeneous movement; but four propositions were commonly shared:
1. human characteristics are heritable and the mechanism o f  transmission can be discovered;
2. desirable and undesirable characteristics can be identified;
3. the fertility o f those with desirable characteristics should be favoured, whereas the fertility o f the unfit should
be curbed;
4. die measures contemplated to achieve such aims were basically the following ones: marriage regulation, birth
control, pedigree charts, sterilisation, castration, and segregation.
N o single, univocal interpretation o f eugenics can be satisfactory as countless national variations existed (Klausen 
1997: 30). Nevertheless these variations can be condensed into prominent strands o f eugenics. Negative eugenics was 
concerned with the elimination o f diseases and malformations and involved sterilisation, selective immigration restriction, 
birth-control and, in the m ost extreme cases, elimination. Positive eugenics encouraged the reproduction o f desirable 
characteristics and comprised social and family policies, prenuptial certificates, the promotion o f an increasing birth-rate and 
o f social hygiene88 (Ambroselli 1994). MacMaster (2001) has argued that negative eugenics was negative on a semantic as 
well as on an ethical plane. I t was racist, authoritarian and conservative, as its advocates were driven by a paranoid fear o f
85 Euthenics orlygiene. . .is concerned with the marrifest qualities of the organism. Euthenics is also called positive eugenics”, which tends to improve the race 
through the individual, who is in turn improved by a perfect social enmvnment. Positive eugenics is differentiated substantially from negative eugenics, which 4
tends to improve the race by impeding the continuation of hereditary defects across generations, and by eliminating the weak, the defective, the sick, the #
degenerate, etc. It relies on repressive methods, such as sterilisation and the obligatory prematrimonial certificate (Poggi as quoted by Horn 1994: 62).
French euthenics was notably called callipédie, namely the art de procréer de beaux enfants (Leonard 1992). It is important to remember 
that social hygiene was N O T free firom eugenic and racially hygienic concerns (Hoelmdorf & Maguly-Seltenreich 1990)
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decline and regression. Positive eugenics was instead progressive, liberal, and humanist and was premised on an optimistic 
view o f a future utopia brought about by ameliorative policies (Rostand [1953] 1987, footnote 11; p. 99).
This is perhaps true, but both types of eugenics could be either coercive or voluntary, and displayed an inclination
to privilege the welfare of the species over that o f the individual, a tendency that in human societies appear inevitably to lead
to discrimination and intolerance. Both seem to have disregarded the whole body o f biological and social studies that
showed how  tire nature of a complex system cannot be reduced to the sum o f its basic components (reductionism). J
Biological reductionism is particularly simplistic in that it neglects tire interplay, both o f tire social and natural environment ' 9
with a person’s genetic make-up (genotype and phenotype), and of genes with molecules. This patent reductionism
oversimplified the nature of social problems imputing their cause to genetic dysfmrctions. But the same surely applies to
environmental determinism o f a neo-Lamarcltian land, tirat was eagerly embraced by the champions o f positive eugenics.
Lamarck’s revival was o f an ideological nature and closely tied to the optimistic view o f  progress as a healer o f  “social
wounds” (PerseU 1999), a trend that is far from uncommon these days among scientists and futurists:
Countless odd contempormy thought-movements, ranging fivm  Ctvationism to strange, neo-hamaivkian prophecies of a jhtme scientific pmgms 
to disincarnated immortality and omnipotence, show how hard many of us still find it to accommodate ourselves to being part of the natural 
world.
Mary Midgley (in Fulford et al. 1994:16)
The eugenic movement was never krdissolubly associated with authoritarian regimes, but also throve in libertarian 
and democratic societies (Widmann 2001). Mark B. Adams (1990: pp. 217-220) has pointed out that other common 
fallacious beliefs about eugenics include:
1. Eugenics is a single, coherent, principally Anglo-American movement with a specific set o f  common
goals and beliefs;
2. It is intrinsically bound up with Mendelian genetics;
3. It is essentially a pseudo-science;
4. I t is essentially right-wing or reactionary.
The first element that strikes us is the broad diffusion o f eugenic lobbyism in the world, from Canada to Sweden,
from Brazil to USSR^ **. But what Adams fails to aclmowledge is that only a few countries brought that lobbyism into effect 
(see below). Furthermore, Drouard (1999) notes that the absence o f such lobbyism did not stop Denmark from becoming 
the first major European country to promulgate a sterilization law in 1929 that caused the sterilization o f nearly 11,000 
Danes before its repeal in the 1960s. Flere and elsewhere eugenics was meant to aid the State to effect those cutbacks on 4
public spending that would make room for a more efficient Welfare State, so that eugenics lobbyism was simply 
superfluous.
By contrast, progressive thinkers in France, Italy and Latin America opted for a neo-Lamarckian approach — as 
opposed to the Mendelianism that prevailed in the above mentioned countries — involving the emphasis on environmental 
conditioning, and downplayed the necessity for negative eugenics, that is actions taken to prevent the insurgence o f 
undesirable traits^?.
85 In both Germany and England, eugenic societies were formed already by the beginnmg of the century: the Racial Hygiene Society 
in Berlin by 1905, and the English Eugenics Education Society in London by 1907 (Buchanan, 2000: 31).
82 In 1866 Gregor Mendel (1822-1884) published in the rather obscure “Transactions of the Brunn Natural Science Society” 
a paper entitled “Experiments with Plant Hybrids”, wliich supported a theory of dominant and recessive genetic inheritance. 
The rediscovery o f  the Mendelian laws only took place at the beginning o f the 20**' century, and radically changed the way 
eugenics was envisaged by reducing the importance o f environmental factors. August F. L. Weismann (1834-1914) 
published his seminal treatise Die Kontinuitdt des Keimplasmas als Grundlage einer Theorie der Vemhung in 1885, in which he 
argued that soma is only the carrier o f germ-plasm through the ages, and that there is no interaction between the two. That
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Dans un pays civilisé, on ne peut songer à supprimer les individus atteints de défauts héréditaires, ni à leur interdire de se reproduite. Nous 
devons seulement essayer de remédier aux imperfections de leurs enfants dès leur plusjeune âge
Edmonde Perrier, zoologist and president of the French Société Eugénique (cited by Roger in Benichou 1989:129)
This approach is also called “social hygiene” and was not exempt from eugenic and racial-hygienic preoccupations 
(Hohendorf & Maguli-Seltenreich 1990). Particularly instructive in this sense is Japan, where an inferiority complex with 
respect to the West drove leading scientists to embrace neo-Lamarclcian eugenics, which held out promises that the genetic 
makeup o f  die Japanese population could be enhanced relatively quickly (Homei 2000). The racist undertones o f  such a 
project were obvious.
A further misconception is the identification o f eugenicists and academic racism. On the contrary, even scientists 
such as Fritz Lenz, Wilhelm Schahmayer and Alfred Ploetz, who were largely implicated in the public debates that opened 
the door to Nazi eugenics, were very mildly racist and by no means rabidly anti-Semitic. Sheila Faith Weiss (in Adams 1990: 
48) holds that none o f the eugenicists rvere involved in any piece o f anti-Semitic legislation. Nevertheless, the exchange of letters between 
Fritz Lenz and Otmar von Verschuer reveals anti-Semitic allusions, although neither ever expressed anti-Semitic feelings in 
public. Knigge-T es che Renate (1999) calls this Antisemitismus der “besseren Kreise”.
Yet, by and large, it would be hard to draw a clear-cut line separating positive and negative eugenics when it comes 
to figuring out measures aimed at forestalling the risk of biological degeneration (Weingart et al. 1988).
In  regard to the belief that eugenics would differ from forthcoming genetic interventions, because the former was 
designed as a centralised, state-managed enterprise, there could be nothing further from the truth: a definition that requires 
coercion leads to seemingly absurd conclusions: that Frederick Osborn was not an eugenicist, or Havelock Ellis, orH.J. Muller, or even Francis 
Galton (Paul: 133).
Finally it was not invariably fallacious from a scientific viewpoint. Some eugenicists were at the cutting edge o f 
science in their time (Kühl 1997). Despite the numerous exceptions, by and large eugenicists’ scholarship was not shoddy as 
compared to their colleagues’ although they inferred a number of conjectures from insufficient data (Dikotter 1998); but this 
has rarely been uncom mon among scientists.
It is relatively simple to tell the difference between science and pseudo-science retrospectively. A t any present time, 
however, we cannot feel confident that we know whether contemporary science is fatally flawed, but we do know that most 
hypotheses are based on the current level o f  understanding of facts, and that it would be seriously misguided in the future to 
judge our science as “pseudo-science” in the light o f what is yet to be discovered (Stein 1988). O n the other hand, labelling 
eugenics as pseudo-science serves to advance the cause o f  those who have in mind its revival but are afraid o f  being 
stigmatised. Consistent with that goal they contend that the divide between past eugenics and m odern genetic engineering is 
so wide that drawing a cautionary parallel would be unfair, if not harmful, to science conceived o f as a free enterprise that 
should no t be trammelled by “mere” ethical considerations.
Once again, how do we account for the fact that most leading geneticists o f the past century were eugenicists? 
Were they all crooks or incompetents? Contrary to the opinion held by biologist E lof Axel Carlson (Neumann 1978), the 
evidence points to the active participation o f  geneticists and other professionals with a strong training in genetics in the 
international eugenics movement (Smith 1975; ITarwood 1993; Kühl 1994,1997; Pichot 1999; Weindling in Burley & Harris 
2002). Kingsland (1988) correctly stresses that, besides being a reform movement, eugenics was also a springboard to a great 
deal o f  research on human heredity. In the main, ambition and political motivation spurred scientists to become involved in 
issues not stricdy related to their laboratory or clinical research (Klausen 1997).
such an overtly deterministic theory could become so popular, altliough its autiror could not experimentally prove tlie 
existence o f  germ-plasm, bears witness to tlie crucial role played by external factors in science.
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All in all it appears as though there exists a striking analogy in the fate o f phrenology, eugenics, and racial hygiene, 
namely an inevitable tendency on the part o f newly established disciplines in die field o f bio-medicine and bio-sciences to 
pursue two main ends: the betterment o f society and, simultaneously, the consolidation o f the social place o f  the bio- 
scientists88. Bio-medical professionals saw that equality was getting farther and farther away from mankind’s reach and 
resolved that, alongside the fight against the presumed degradation o f the human race, the time had come to act so as to 4
make people brighter, prettier and healthier. In so doing, some more or less intentionally sacrificed the values o f freedom, 
self-determination and human dignity for the sake of their ideological pursuit (Becker 1990). There is no disputing, then,
■'that eugenicists’ convictions were certainly potentially dangerous from the point o f view o f their possible political u
implementation. When policies were enacted in conformity to eugenic guidelines they frequently led to the violation o f basic 
human rights.
O n this score, Canada and several N orth European countries are no stranger to illiberal social policies of 
population control. Following a 1934 eugenics law, Sweden sterilized 60,000 people between 1935 and 1976. Similar laws 
were passed in Canada (Alberta Sexual Sterilization Act, 1928-1972: 2,845; followed by B.C. in 19338**), Norway (1934:
40,000), Finland (1935-1970: 58.000), Denmark (1935-1960: 11.000), Estonia and Iceland (1938) (Kühl 1997; Colla 2000; %
Childs 2001). In Vichy France 40,000 mentally hi were starved to death (Ambroselli 1994). In the USA between 60,000 and 
100,000 citizens were sterilized. Only Germany proceeded further along tliis despicable path by murdering 70,000 mentally 
retarded and sterilizing between 300,000 and 400,000 citizens, by virtue o f the GzVeN {Gesetiy lyur VerhUtung erbkranken 
Nachsjvuchses) that became effective in 1934 and was repealed in 1945 (Horban 1999; Link 1999).
Let us now take a closer look at why science and democracy can be at variance.
Mark B. Adams (1994) has noticed that the study o f genetic variation from an evolutionary perspective has often 
proven to be hostile to democratic ideals, for it rationally questioned the notion of equaHly, namely the mainstay o f 
democracy. He claims that, at the turn of the nineteenth century, bio-scientists commonly held that genetic diversity 
privileged aristocracy rather than democracy, which in their eyes meant entrusting the incompetent masses with a huge 
decisional power. Consequently, it is not surprising that in 1929 the American geneticist and eugenicist East in “ITeredity 
and Fluman Affairs” maintained that it would be opportune for the sake of democracy to weight the votes o f those voters 
who met certain competence requirements (Adams 1994).
As I will show, only in a few cases did bio-scientists directly promote radical solutions to the social question, but 
their public stances certainly influenced policy-makers and lay-people alike and were not held independently from deeply 
ingrained political and racial prejudices. Correspondingly, Bowler (1989) notes that the rise o f hereditarian theories has 
always possessed an ideological dimension. By directing attention to hereditarianism, and favouring nature over nurture, A
geneticists were wholly conscious that that could imply they could puH strings on issues of human reproduction and 
population control. We can thus say that eugenics, as a form o f applied biology, was less a scientific school o f thought than 
a social and political movement sustained by scientists that, more often than not, justified and reinforced the status quo by 
peddling die false belief that weakness, poverty, ignorance, violence, and amorality were inheritable.
-------------------------------------------
88 Peter Slcrabanek’s (Skrabanek 1992) deprecation of the tendency o f epidemiologists, in the absence o f epidemics, to turn into 
sophisticated scaremongers, has been recendy (first half of 2003) confirmed by the irresponsible behaviour o f several epidemiologists 
throwing into panic the international public opinion as regards a fancied SARS world pandemics.
8** It is an admittedfact in every civilised country ofthe world today that the unfit are multiplying at a rate something like double that of the fit. Thus, for every 
child born with mental, physical and moral ability to maintain and promote civiliryatmi, two are born with the instincts to flout the essential discipline of f
civilifyation and tear civilisation down. (Vancouver Sun, November 1927 editorial). Be it noted that the SexualSterilisyqtion A ct has been in %
effect in British Columbia firom 1933 to 1973.
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These opinions easily merged with another factor, the sense that tlie complexification o f  social and economic 
relationships was intractable for average-minded individuals and that a radical reform o f administrative structure and 
practices was mandatory.
Beginning from the 19*'' century the welfare state had been designed as a compensation for the hardships and the 
risks congenital to industrial capitalism. Thereby the State-apparatus acquired a vast range of functions and duties 
broadening its influence over its citizens and its role as the guarantor o f their happiness and well-being. In order to achieve 
this all-important goal the modernisation o f administrative structures would undergo a radical transformation hinging on the 
rationalisation o f all aspects o f Ufe, namely, on that combination of bureaucratisation, scientisation, and professionalisation 
that would inevitably correlate health, proficiency, strength, and biological enhancement to national competitiveness, 
efficiency, and productivity. Particularly in Germany, where the call for absolute efficiency reached prodigious heights, 
children and adolescents were expected to be reared by state institutions whenever their natural parents should no t be able 7
to raise their child as an ordentlichen Memchen. . .der der Gesellschafi nütfiich ist, der nicht sosyial schddlich ist [an orderly, socially useful 
person and no t as a socially harmful individual]''**. In other words, control o f life has become coextensive with civilization.
Ironically, the inexorable law o f unintended consequences had perverted what was hoped to be a third, progressive, way 
between communism and liberal democracy (Vossen 2001). W hat followed was a veritable logical and ethical slippery slope 
in which the suggestion was made that public administrators could and should witlihold basic rights, included the right to 
exist — the so-called state o f exception —, whenever a national or international emergency subsisted (Labisch 1992).
Eugenicists found it only too easy to present immigration and the ills o f an iniquitous industrial society as such a land of 
emergency, calling for the undertaldng o f  radical measures of correction lest degeneration o f mankind should become 
irreversible.
This accounts for die ideological proximity of eugenics and progrèssivism in the United States between the end o f 
the nineteenth century and the beginning o f the twentieth (Allen 1989). The connection that in hindsight seems only natural “i?
between science's naturalism, progressivism, and eugenics has been illuminated by the American historian Garland Allen 
(Garland 1976), who has pointed out that the scientific inquiry into those characters determining human behaviour 
encouraged a progressive and eugenic political agenda which emphasised the necessity to rebuild society according to j
rational criteria.
In Germany, professional and bureaucratic pressures finally led to the fashioning o f an ideology that was to linger 
in Western thought, and that liinged on two fundamental notions (Hong 1998):
• the risikofme Mensch, i.e. the risk-free citizen;
• the priority o f Vorsorge over Fürsotge, i.e. prevention over health-care;
This Welfarist-pragmatic-utilitarian ideology found a most telling expression in the words o f Hans Muthesius, who '
in 1930 was asked to celebrate the achievements o f Weimar's welfare state'**:
The most immense attempt at mtionalisyation...we have conceived of the plan to exclude chance from human life and attempt in advance to 
consciously guide the life of both the individual and society. A  grandiose attempt, when we see the progress of adture — at least in theory and 
when observedfrom a certain distance — in the repression and exclusion of chance.
Kevin Repp (2000) has called this approach to broad social issues “disciplined rationality” and imputes the 
comparatively rapid nazification of Germany to its widespread success among conservative as well as progressive and 
feminist thinkers. Weimar democracy fell sUghtly short o f resembling what Jacob Talmon has termed a totalitarian 
democracy (Talmon 1960), one in which tire values o f liberal individualism, entailing both low social constraint and low
Johannes Peteresen. Die bffentliche Fiirsorge fu r die sittlich gejdhrdete und gewerbliche tdtige Jugend (Leipzig 1907), as cited in Folgen der 
Ausgensqing. Studien sqirGeschichte der N S-Psychiatrie in der'Rheinprvvinsy^  Landschaftsverband Rheinland (1995)
'*> Hong 1998: 203
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group identification (Ryan 1997), must be sacrificed to a perfectionist attitude and to die methodical abstraction o f its 
citizens (Weber 2000).
In Germany, as elsewhere, this project of perfecting societ): came down to tlie meanest utilitarian considerations.
The health care system and social welfare established to sustain the weaker ranks o f society during the transition from an 
eminently agrarian to a massively industrial system were regarded as flawed because they helped more the unfit than the fit, t
that is, the tax-payer. A corporative, authoritarian, and “thrifty” administration o f the national economy was regarded as the |
only way to obviate the impending collapse o f the social structure (WeindHng in Lee 1990)
In the words o f Paul Weindling (1987), both eugenics and racial hygiene run against liberal humanism and the 
CathoHc value o f  solidarity in that they are:
• the products o f  technocracy, professionalism, and scientism, which are part o f  a worldview in which social
problems must be rationally managed and science provides the ground for the objective assessment o f social and
political conflicts (utopian optimism)
• tlie product o f  Lebensreform and social Darwinism which predicate tliat social problems derive from a flawed
conduct o f  Hfe and from the counterselective effects o f civiHzation and the welfare state (Arcadian pessimism).
This was also true in a pre-eminently catholic country such as Brazil, where the scientific estabHshment was
inclined to neo-Lamarckism. In the twenties, HéHo Gomes, professor o f law and medicine, in his book Nofoes de hygiene
enumerated the damages caused .by illness:
• proHferation o f sickness: hygienic damage;
• reduction of work fitness: economic damage;
• increased expenses for prophylaxis and treatment: financial damage;
• increased mortality and morbidity: demographic damage;
• decrease o f the biological fitness of die sick: eugenic damage;
• atrophy of civic conscience: social damage;
• sadness, annoyance, pessimism, fatalism: moral damage;
The bottom  Hne was that every individual disease impacts on the whole o f society, that a total commitment to
health was mandatory on the part o f everyone, and that sick persons were a threat to the orderly functioning o f the 
community (Beltrâo-Marques 1994).
W hat is truly strdcing is how widespread the conviction became that a healthy welfare state could not provide for 
all and its benefits were necessarily to be confined to those who could at least partially contribute to its preservation :l
(Usborne 1992). In 1914 Prof. Ignaz Knaup had deHvered a speech in Munich whose title Was kosten die mindenvertigen %
Elemente dem Staat und der Gesellschafi? [How much do inferior elements cost to the State and to society?] disturbingly sounds %
Hke Nazi propaganda slogans (from Kaiser, Nowak, Schwartz 1992).
Eventually, by the middle of the twenties the right wing of the racial hygiene movement alHed itself with the Nazis 
(Proctor in Frewer & Eickoff 2000), who held equally drastic views on how to keep a curb on state expenditures. Clemens 
Cording (2000) sadly remarks that as regards German psycltiatry, most doctors, nurses, and administrators not only did not 
resist eugenic propaganda, but faded to apply that modicum o f common sense and moral scrutiny that alone would enable 
one to see through the Nazi deception. This phenom enon is most troubling in that it appears as though the entire German 
society was not prepared to stand up against the most overt attempt at replacing Christian ethics with a post-Christian, neo­
pagan, illiberal doctrine (Burleigh 2002).
But then again Weimar thinkers were influenced in dieir utilitarian concerns by an American, namely Dr. Louis I.
Dublin (1882-1969), head o f several prominent public institutions such as the American Statistical Association and the 
American Public Health Association, as well as a staunch advocate of the Welfare State and the author o f The economic value of
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human life (1931) (Kaiser, Nowak, Schwartz 1992). Apparently the only solution envisaged was a radical intervention to
improve the biological make-up o f the population, in order to stave off the duty to care for the weak and the sick.
Der icleak Zmtand ist der, daf die Wohljahrtspfkge in Zukunjt unndtig m td und dass ivir allein die Aifgaben auf dem Gebiete der 
' Gesundheitsjuhmng losen
[The ideal condition is that in which the welfare care is unnecessary for the future and we only have to concern 
ourselves with health-care]
Eirch Hügenfeldt, Reichsmlter oi. the NS welfare system in 1933, as cited by AyaB (1998; XI).
Only healthy German citizens were valuable citizens, because by means of ailing parts one cannot obtain a healthy
German “social body”. Most o f all, given that it sought to aid the biologically and economically underprivileged, the welfare
State was deemed responsible for the degeneration o f mankind. Rolf Peter Sieferle (1989) has summarised one o f  the
dominant views among social Darwinists and eugenicists alike:
Jede Miidemng des Sekktionsdmcks durch Hygiene, bessen Emahnmg und steigenden Wohlstandfiihrt dasqi, daf Individuen überkben und 
sich erfolgmcb forpflant^n, denen dies unter einem hohemi Sekktionsdmck nicht mogkch gewesen wan.
[Every mitigation o f selective patterns by way of hygiene, improved diet and increasing affluence, would result in the 
survival and successful reproduction o f individuals who wouldn’t stand a chance in a more selective system]
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3. SCIENCE, RACE AND CLASS
Most of the leading eugenicists of whom Ptvfessor Selden wtites wetv the pmduct of our best schools and universities. What hc^pened duting 
their education? W ly did they turn out lacking in humanity, compassionless, racist, and in the genetics of their d<ty, impoverished? ^  the 
measim of the biohÿcal sciences of their time they wen ill equfped to evaluate the qualities of others or make ncommendatbns for their 
contmL Indeed, sitting in their citadels of infallibility, in the name of humanity and science they utged on g)vemment and the pnfessions the . |
passage of laws of most inhumane and scientifkalfy unsound kind.
I
Ashley Montagu (forward to Steven Selden’s “Inheriting Shame. The story of eugenics and racism in America”, 1999) f
I t is the solemn duty of Government to investigate thegemiplasm of its citis^ ens 
A.M. MoU42
The gnat mountaineer, Whymper, was not a scientist. He devoted some pages ofa pefectty serious book to the avtins and suffemsfivmgoitn ^
in the vallys of the Alps. He was bonified try these people in a wcty which would be impossible to a sdentist, who would ngatd the diseases K
impersonalty and look for the cause. Wtymper allowed his honor to gtow to hatted, and wished to think that the suffetets or their patents wete 
themsekes to blame. He wanted those sufferitigftvm goitte to be consciibed into motisitous armies, to be commanded by idiot cniins. . .That 
people should thitik in this way appals the scientists
John R. Baker (1942; 2)
The preceding chapters dealt with some of the factors thwarting the establishment o f a truly humanitarian science.
This chapter is about two of the m ost obvious biases in scientific research; race and class. I intentionally avoided the 
problem o f gender discrimination because it did not fall within tlie scope o f my inquiry but many colleagues have published 
extensively on the subjecf*^.
A cultural and ethical movement, the Enlightenment, that was originally deeply rooted in the Cartesian and 
Leibnitzian principle o f universality o f reason as the distinguishing feature o f humanity, developed over time empirical 
currents that stressed the importance o f the physiological constraints to rationality, soon to become a biological, “scientific” 
explanation o f social and cultural inequalities (Gliozzi 1990). This cognitive and ideological shift brought with it the triumph 
o f a hierarchical conception o f racial differentiation based on naturalistic premises, o f wlrich Voltaire was one o f  the most 
famous advocates. The scala naturae, or great chain o f being, was arranged according to a rank-order hierarchical scale in 
which the groups and species placed on the higher up rungs were qualitatively superior and those on the lower down rungs 
were inherently inferior. Its original theoretical formulation must be traced back to the Greek speculations about the m ost 
suitable organization of the polis, that is a pecking order arranged according to natural laws — as suggested by Plato — and a 
structure in which those who were slaves by nature were bound to occupy the lowest rung — as postulated by Aristotle. But 
once coupled with a teleological reading o f the notion o f evolution, this conception became advantageous to the pursuing of 
colonial and imperial politics and laid the foundations for the racially biased anthropometry and craniometry.
Dominated by a drive towards the universalization o f knowledge and die ordering o f nature, die eighteenth century 
has been defined as the “great age o f classification” (Schiebinger 1990). Afterwards, the divide between taxonomic and 
value-laden classificatory hiérarchisations continued to remain blurred (Allen 1983), until the ultimate conceptualisation o f ' I
scientific racism — biological determinism, for racism is nothing but biologism, namely the reduction o f the cultural to the ybiological (Delacampagne in Goldberg 1990)'*"* — was crafted by French anatomist Georges Cuvier in 1800, according to ; |
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . . I'^ 2 The problem o f the mentally-defective Child, South Afirican Medical Record, 13, 22, (November 1915), p. 341 as quoted by -S
Klausen (1997; 27)
Among others, Asch, Franldin, Klein, lippman, NeUtin, Rapp, Rothman, Strathern, Wertz. I
The term biologism was coined by German pliilosopher Heinrich Rickert at the beginning o f the Twentieth century (Mann in Vj
Blecker 1993) *
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whom physical nature determined culture, and Scottish anatomist Robert Knox in 1850, who stated that race or hereditaiy i
descent is eveything, it stamps the man (Hudson 1996: 248). The intellectual journey that led to such a fateful conclusion is j;.
exceptionally significant as regards the comprehension o f  the true significance o f the Human Genome Project and the (
forthcoming liberal techno-eugenics. ;
First o f all we Imow that Roman legislators made a point o f superimposing the domain o f rights over that o f  4
natural laws. Blood-ties were no t bound up with a racialist ideology. The term gens connoted all members o f a common y
ancestry (stock) and therefore approximated the meaning o f race, but until the end of the Middle Age conventional wisdom j
suggested tliat there were as many gentes as communities. The idea of grouping aU gentes together in a number of categories - y
according to some kind o f overarching criterion was altogether alien to the European culture o f that time (Hudson 1996). A
The concept o f race only surfaced in the European culture from  the fifteenth century onwards, when the medieval concern -
for rational categorisation foreshadowed later racial taxonomies (Baud 2001). Before then both Muslims and Christians were 4
racists and slavers without having formulated a structured concept o f race (Sweet 1997) and earlier on European explorers 
were still impressed by tire ritual and administrative complexities of certain African and American Idngdoms and judged a i
society depending on its socio-cultural sophistication rather than on the phenotypical characters or the quality o f blood o f j
the local populations (Hudson 1996). During the eighteenth century a generalising trend eventually prevailed that drove 
several prom inent naturalists such as Linneus, Buffon, and Blumenbach'^^ to lump together different populations according 
to their geographic location. The colour of the skin would then correspond to the continents inhabited by these 
populations. The number o f races thus was reduced to around five, and the white European race was deemed the finest one '
(Hudson 1996). Subsequently, the growing pressure o f the affluent mercantile class and o f the imperialist bent o f many 
sovereigns called for the negation o f the Leibnizean tenet — almost proto-Lamarcldan — that somatic and cultural diversity y
was due to different environmental conditions, for this repudiation would bring with it the right to deprive the non-white 
people o f their lands, resources and, ultimately, o f their freedom (Gliozzi 1977). After that and until the end of the Nazi i
folly, reason has been used mon often to justify racism than to combat it (Delacampagne in Goldberg 1990: 86). A t the same time the 
collapse o f another cardinal humanist and anthropocentric dogma took place, one framed by Descartes and Leibnitz, which ^
stated that what distinguishes humans from the rest o f the Creation is their rationalitjf. For Locke, a physician and a 
philosopher, other attributes were at least as important as reason to configure humanness, and the great Swedish naturalist 
Carl Linné (Linneus) through his systematic classification simply incorporated humans into nature.
The neutrality and objecfijtying distantiation of the rational scientist created the theoretical space for a view to develop of subjectkss bodies. Once <
object fled, these bodies could be analysed, categori^ d, classified, and ordered with the coldgat^  of scientific distance
Goldberg (1993; 50)
Racism actually emerged in the seventeenth century as a consequence o f modernity’s dismissal o f religious means ?
o f classification o f  identity and personhood (Goldberg in Essed & Goldberg 2002). When Europeans began construing tlieir -•
“imagined communities”, empiricism, utilitarianism, and rationalism called for the systematic tabulation o f perceived 
differences in behaviour and exteriority and suggested that they were innate. David Hume, in a footnote to the 1753 version 
of his treatise “O f National Character” , wrote that Negroes were naturally inferior to whites (Hudson 1996) and by the 
middle of the nineteenth century race and nationalism were finally coupled. Thus the subjugation o f non-European people *
and the exploitation o f the lower classes became “legitimate” if  not “advisable” and “humanitarian" (Goldberg in Essed & >
Goldberg 2002). I t is well Imown, for example, that for Florence Nightingale the introduction o f health care to India was
“^5 Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752-1840) was not a racist, though. On the contrary, he believed Negroes were not inherently 
stupid and had collected a library of books authored by Negroes (Graves 2001)
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tantamount to a renewal o f the subcontinent and that David Livingstone did not set apart medicine and the preaching o f  the 4
gospels (Arnold 1988). i
Paradoxically, as the major European thinkers strove after the popularisation of egalitarianism, racism, slavery and 
the doctrine o f white supremacy were rampant (Young 1996). One possible explanation (Rossi 1995) is that equality, %
fraternity, and freedom were then meant to be the exclusive property o f rational white, high- and middle-class people as ^
testified by the writings o f Voltaire (1734), Hume (1753), and Thomas Jefferson (1776). Rational were only European males ÿ*
who owned property (Young 1996).
Besides value-laden and ostensibly scientific taxonomies, racist doctrines were also grounded in the conviction that ï
a propensity to sin was transmitted through the blood and that aesthetical criteria could account for moral differences, that 
is what in Greek was called kalokagathia, the equation of beauty and health with the good that we find in the works o f Plato,
Plotinus and Augustine (Gracia Guillen in Alcala 1984; Gliozzi 1990). These two elements ranked highly among the 
motivations driving the eugenics movement from its commencement at the end of the 19* century. A further source o f 
legitimacy was Malthusianism. The paradox o f Malthusianism is that the philosophes were particularly keen on reducing 
human actions and the laws o f nature to calculable variables, and Thomas Malthus was unquestionably one o f tire purest 
heirs o f the Enlightenment; but, as has been argued by Rudolph Binion (1998), his “Essay on the principle o f population”, V
first published in 1798, turned out to be a deadly blow to the utopian expectations o f incessant social progress nourished by 
the philosophes. The premise o f that essay, that the number o f people increased more tlian the means o f subsistence, simply ï j
cut the ground under the feet o f those who believed that enlightened social policies would lead to the indefinite perfecting 
of all human beings and institutions. Malthus himself contended that thinkers who hold such views are throwing us back again 
almost into the infancy o f knowledge (Malthus 1992). Ambroise Condorcet (1743-1794), a French philosopher and the inventor o f 
“republican eugenics” (Testait 1994), was also the first to apply the calculus of probability to the study o f social phenomena. 
Analogously, Francis Galton, the polyvalent scientist who coined the term “eugenics”, had been trained as a mathematician 
and as a physician (Restart 1994) and enthusiastically applied Adolphe Quételet’s law of the deviation from an average to his 
eugenic ends. H e and his disciple Karl Pearson, both sons o f rich Quaker families, fathered some o f the survey techniques 
that are still applied these days but, hampered by class and race prejudices, instead o f discerning actual causative 
connections, found spurious correlations. These were then employed to develop further, entirely unsubstantiated 
conjectures, arbitrarily assuming that they had ferreted out universally applicable laws o f  the inheritability o f social and 
behavioural traits (Watts 1994; Graves 2001). Another eugenicist who took advantage o f statistics to pursue his own political 
agenda was the American psychologist Henry H. Goddard, who introduced in the United States the Binet-Simon I.Q. 
testing, though in a revised version tliat presupposed the inheritability o f intelligence, which was foreign to the original test.
Its introduction also served the purpose o f showing that social sciences should be judged as proper sciences (Dennis 1995).
This idea that human and social variability can be “tidied up” through statistical means is likely to exert an 
irresistible appeal for a certain kind o f scientists. So much so that Sigfried Koller, a former German racial hygienist still in 
die Eighties felt confident that, paraphrasing the Latin saying nomen omen, Hinter jeder Zahl ist ja  ein Schicksal [Behind every 
figure is a fate] and that man kann das Menschliche in Zahlen sehrgut sqcm Ausdmck bringen [that which is human can be expressed 
through numbers] (in Scherer 1990; 121). Also owing to the eugenicists’ campaign for a clear-cut and orderly taxonomy of 
social variables, popular labels such as feeble-minded and pervert were reclassified as scientific categories and acquired the 
value-free character o f statistical data (Watts 1994), even diough their cardinal assumption was the biblical aphorism diat 
“Idee begets like” (Gilman 1982).
Consequently, eugenicists would cling to five main tenets (Gilman 1982):
1. that acquired characteristics are inherited;
2. that heredity is a dynamic process beginning with conception and ending with weaning;
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Interesting in this respect is the comparison made by a Japanese between Japanese and black sexuality: k  vhillte des Noirs est 
extraoidinam, bien que leurs techniques sexuelles 1e soient moins (Kozakaï Toshiaki 1991 : 37)
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3. that character, disease, and temperament are inherited in the form o f tendencies and predispositions 
(diadiesis, or constitutional bent);
4. that sexes play a necessarily different role in heredity;
5. that miscegenation between races is corrupting on both a biological and moral plane.
This in turn made possible the emergence o f  aversive racism (Kovel 1988), an ostensibly liberal and tolerant
attitude to minorities that really conceals the need to keep the out-group at a safe distance, and in so doing to evade racial
anxieties about control and virility
Scientific racism and genoddalfantasies of the eugenicists were no less cultural than contemporary artimlations of racial dfierence. The crania, 
genitalia, and other bocty parts that were measured, exhibited, and stored in spedmen jars in the temples of medicine wete always erotidt^ d, 
constituted through a politics of desire, which remains a calling of science.
Steven Gregory (in Rose Tricia et al. 1995: 21)
Finally, equally important is the role o f metaphorical thinking at the level o f scientific research and communication. 
Stepan (1986) has demonstrated that from the late Enlightenment the study o f human variation made use o f  a series o f 
pejorative metaphors to define racial, gender, and class inequalities that, combined with a biased examination o f anatomical 
features and an even more prejudiced understanding o f hormonal secretion, rendered scientific what had previously been 
mere common sense (Stepan 1986):
Franlc Dikotter (1998) has criticised those researchers in the history of eugenics who exclusively address Western 
events and protagonists and neglect important instances such as China and India. The problem with such a reproach is that 
it presumes that, outside the West, eugenics had a considerable impact on the everyday Hfe o f lay-people. This at the very 
least a problematic assumption, unless we jumble together eugenics, sexology, social hygiene, and marriage counselling: an 
interesting solution that yet warrants the utmost caution and enormous critical elaboration. Focussing on Germany, the 
United States, Scandinavia, and contemporary China is only too natural given tliat tliose are the countries where eugenics 
politics have been or are being enforced. In other words we should not confuse social-poUcy thinking with social policy 
(Freeden 1983). Moreover, by and large eugenics was an elitist movement whose members were scientifically trained wliite 
men and white women working towards their enfranchisement (Brown 1988), and in my view there is no reason to believe 
drat at that time it could flourish in a non-Westernised context. Even in fascist Italy eugenics and racial hygiene were 
regarded by the population as one o f Mussolini’s many wlrims, even though Italian eugenicists had a considerable influence 
abroad (Zimmermann 1992; Stepan in Adams 1990).
We should be wary o f assuming with Gramsci and Foucault that the intellectual sympatliies and political 
orientations o f the elite are bound to be shared by the masses. Eugenics in Italy assured no short-term benefits and became 
a laughing-stock due to the considerable diversity o f the Italian population (Maiocchi 1999). M ost Italians simply ignored it, 
until Mussolini, promulgated those racial laws, modelled after the German example, drat turned thousands o f people against 
the regime, guiltj^ o f aping the allies’ worst practices. Anodrer racist and authoritarian regime such as Soudr Africa remained 
similarly indifferent to eugenics, mainly due to the growing evidence that the inheritability o f cultural and behavioural traits 
was no longer scientifically sus tamable (Appel 1989; Rich 1990). Like fascism, it recycled the same racist rhetoric in terms of 
cultural incompatibility and in so doing laid the foundation for apartheid. Eugenics cannot therefore be subsumed under any
j
unambiguous categorisation and its miscellaneous characterisation calls for a broad analysis o f the cultural and ideological 
framework that gave rise to it.
These introductory reflections serve the purpose o f laying the groundwork for the following attempt to explain 
why Germany, Japan, Italy, tlie USA, and South Africa aU had segregationist discourses along racial lines but Japan and Italy 
did not enact truly eugenic laws'^ .^
Upon reviewing the corresponding literature, I have first to say that I cannot provide a definitive answer. I t seems 
to me that the Catholic background o f Italy was crucial. In Italy, Spain, France, and Latin America, possibly due to the 
hegemony o f Catholic faith that thwarted all attempts to spread a morality grounded on biology * (Bachelard-Jobard 2001) 
and o f neo-Lamarcltism — promoting a belief in die inheritability o f acquired traits — this reformist slant did no t gain ground 
and social hygiene"*  ^ eventually prevailed. My guess is that Mussolini must have sensed that eugenics would bring no benefit 
to his regime and the whole thing was called off. On the odier hand Puritan excesses cannot possibly be die only 
responsible since the eugenics movement in Great Britain failed to put its schemes into practice, and China and Singapore, 
that have passed eugenics laws in recent times, hardly qualify as Puritan countries. A t the same time, the adherence to neo- 
Lamarcltianism did not invariably lead to benevolent social policies. Communism and fascism, resting on the assumption 
that human nature was malleable and that the social question was exclusively due to historical and structural causes, #
exacerbated social hygiene adding a totalitarian character to a project diat originally had progressive foundations and 
radically distorting the underlying scientific principles (Graham 1977; Pogliano 1984; Maiocchi 1999). But whereas in 
Germany and Italy very few scientists put their careers on the line and next to none jeopardised their safety, in tlie Soviet 
Union numerous geneticists protested against the abuse o f  genetics made by Trofim D. Lysenko, an ambitious man with no 
credentials whatsoever except a few crucial connections with tlie establishment. All dissenters were removed from their 
positions and some o f  them were deported or executed (Kohn 1988). All things considered, a combination of factors that is 
difficult to disentangle accounts for such diversities, but this does not necessarily imply that drawing comparisons is 
fruitless.
Over tlie past thirtj'^ years social researchers and historians have demonstrated that eugenics, racism, nationalism, 
feminism, population control, and welfarist policies were everywhere intermeshed (Crook 2002). An additional element o f 
this compound is the separation o f sex and reproduction (Weingart 1987; Bayertz 1994b). Eugenics was meant to be the 
doctrine that would finally bring about the ultimate rationalisation, that o f human reproduction, in furtherance o f the two 
guidelines o f m odern Hfe-governance, the disciplining and optimisation of the individual body within the collective body 
(species, nation), specifically through the control o f sexuality.
Ironically, T.H. Huxley, unlike his son and would-be eugenicist Julian Huxley, but echoing a diffused sentiment
(KHne 2001), dreaded the long-term consequences o f eugenics because he thought tliat movement would go hand in hand
with sexual radicalism, which was in turn bound to loosen family-bonds. But the nub o f tlie problem was really that neo-
Malthusians and eugenicists alike shared the belief that die social question was one and the same with the problem o f sexual
conduct and both should be dealt with by scientific means and through state-intervention (Drouard 1992). For instance
French eugenicist Adolphe Pinard remarked that
Jusqu’à piisent I’acte pmcmteur n ’a été qu’un acte instinctf tel qu’il existait a l ’âge des cavernes. C ’est k  seul de nos instincts n ’ayant pas été 
civilisé. [...]. Je pense, qu’une évolution ou une révolution s’impose à brefdélai
Japan in particular passed the Eugenic Protection Law only in 1948, under US military occupation This law allowed for both 
voluntary and involuntary sterUization for 30 hereditary diseases and was repealed in 1996.
According to Paul Weindling (Weindling 1987) the British Labour Party opposed the promulgation of eugenics laws in Britain 
because its leadership feared the prospect of hugp defections among Irish workers, 
a number o f interventions targeting environmental factors rather than inheritable traits
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Dl'ouard (1992: 446)
American geneticist Herman Muller held a similar view and his eugenic programme presupposed the separation o f 
sexual intercourse and conception, the latter destined to be rationally designed and performed in the laboratory (Pauly 1987). 
British geneticist John. B. Scott Haldane in Daedalus or Science and the future (1925: 65) instead emphasised the more noble 
argument o f individual self-determination: if  reproduction is completely separated from sexual love, manltind will be free in 
an altogether new sense. Peter Weingart (1995) notices that premodern eugenic utopias already contemplated tlie 
aforementioned distinction and that what characterises modern schemes is a major focus on tlie modification o f dysgenic 
institutions. But he omits to mention that sexuality was as important a factor in eugenics as it was and still is in racism 
(Brenian et al. 1990). His oversight is all the more surprising as the close ties between eugenics, white supremacy, bourgeois 
ideology, and “proper” sexuality are manifest in science, literature, and newspapers reports. Ronald Takalti (Takalti 1978) has 
further explored this relationship and found out that, in the 1850s, Plarvard medical students resisted the admission of 
women and blacks, no t only because they felt that their status would be lowered, but also because Jacksonian society 
identified women with housewifery and purity, blacks with savagery, and whiteness with the accumulation o f riches and 
Imowledge; spheres these, tliat needed to be unequivocally separated.
It is noteworthy that the utopian futuristic societies in the novels o f Zamiatin, Huxley, and Orwell all feature males 
who are sexually frustrated by unconventional females (Baker 1990). Shaw, Wells, and several other intellectuals at once 
supported women’s liberation and sex radicalism, and the State management o f childbearing (McLaren 1992). This seeming 
contradiction does add up once we consider the class and racial biases, widespread among intellectuals, that led them to 
discriminate between the right to take pleasure in the. joys o f sexuality and the right o f procreating (McLaren 1992). The 
infiltration in the cultural fabric o f whiteness, consisting of a moralised discourse o f health, purity, balance and rationality 
(Goldberg 1999), o f the licentious behaviour o f feeble-minded and blacks, was inadmissible (Kline 2001)
Here we confront once again the deep ambivalence of modernity, torn between sexual restraint, moderateness, and 
respectability as a means o f sublimation o f the sexual drive, on the one hand, and eroticism and free sexual experimentation 
as a form of escapism from those iron cages o f modernity demanding that very sublimation, on the other. George L. Mosse 
(1982) has abundantly made clear die connection of sexual normality and the bourgeois view o f  an ideal society. In the 
nmeteendi century, abnormality was seen as the worst threat to a healthy, beautiful, and happy world, and these sentiments 
perfecdy suited the nationalist call to sex control as the key intervention against the degeneration o f  society and the species 
caused by urbanization and industrialization and exemplified by sanitary emergencies and social conflict. Sex control was 
accompanied by the hedonistic, but entirely desexualised, bourgeois^® idealization o f  the human anatomy and by an 
obsessive concern for individual health as the cornerstone o f a healthy social body (Hau 2003). Naturally, while scientists 
were asked to find unchanging natural, social, and behavioural laws, physicians, although caught in a perennial struggle with 
the advocates o f  alternative, holistic methods o f healing, gained an ever expanding authority on matters o f appropriate 
conduct and life-style. They eventually saw themselves as redeemers and guardians o f morality (Mosse 1982).
The identification of racial inferiority with unprincipled conduct was logically linked to the moral inadequacy o f 
sensuous homosexuals and women, that transformed love into lust, true art into degenerate art, and brought to ruin a stable 
society grounded on an upright family life. This aversion to deviance from the norm  stands out in the aforementioned 
utopian and dystopian novels, but also in the movie Brazil (Terry Gilliam 1985) where futuristic totalitarian societies could 
only be undermined by the liberation o f the obscure forces o f the sexual, the wild, the feminine, and the crepuscular. 
Uncontrolled erotic pleasure must not be permitted lest the perfect order built by a technocratic elite should fall apart. As I 
mentioned before, though, even those heroes who awake to the fact that the system is brutal and inhuman and must be
For tlie movement called Lebensreform was mainly consitituted by the members o f the middle-class (Hau 2003)
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combated are all sexually fmstrated males attracted to nonconforming or nbellious females (Baker 1990: 31). I postulate that a parallel 
can be drawn between eugenic technocratic virilism and the machismo that still plagues the scientific world. Indeed, in my 
view Arnold Pacey (Pacey 1974) clearly has a point when he states that the pursuit o f techno-scientific advance is somewhat 
compulsive, almost as tliough men should feel compelled constantly to prove their virility. The reverse o f the medal is that 
the formerly enormous proportion o f men in science has also encumbered the advance o f progressive ideas in the realm of 
family planning and procreation. Witness biochemist N. W. Pirie’s startling comment (Wolstenholme 1963: 283) on the 
subject o f procreation:
I  think that most of the impulse to have children is a cultural one, built rrp by the kind of stories you read, the kind ofpicture you see; I  do not 
think it is a basic impulse at all The impulse is sexual and that is the object people are pursuing  ^the children are inadvertent.
3.1 EUGENICS IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM FEEBLE-MINDEDNESS TO TRANSHUMANISM
I f  rve continue to approach eugenics as merely an embarrassing mistake with little historical significance, we will never understand the 
movement’s powerful cppeal to générations of American concerned about the fixture of morality and civilisation
Kline (2001:1)
American eugenicists, like some other progressives, had little faith in the innate ability of men to solve social problems democratkalty. Their 
belief in naturalism caused this distrust of democratic politics; for eugerricists and mary progressives recognised the animal origin of human 
nature and thereby assumed thatfor the majority of human the benefits of civilisation were only skin deep
Pickens (1968:3)
Tens o f millions have been given to bolster up the weak and alleviate the sufi'ering ofthe sick [while] no important means have been provided to 
enable us to ham how the stream of weak and susceptible protoplasm may be checked. [ ..] . Vastly more effective than ten million dollars to 
‘charity’would be ten million dollars to eugenics.
Committee on Eugenics o f the American Breeders’ Association (Cooke 2002)
At the end o f the 19* century nearly 15 percent of America’s population was foreign-born (Kline 2001). The 
United States were no stranger to the radicalisation of preventive measures as concerned immigration. Given the association 
of Italian, Irish, Jews, and Eastern European immigrants with pellagra, typhus, and lower intellectual faculties, the customary 
selection and regulation o f immigration shifted from purely hygienic and medical criteria to more politically laden goals. 
After coming to terms with the fact that epidemics were not a permanent threat to the American social fabric, the advocates 
o f immigration restrictions resorted to warnings against the contamination o f the American genetic pools by certain groups 
o f immigrants (Markel 1997). Additionally, it was argued that contagions could also be caused by doctrines thought to 
undermine the stability o f American society and quarantine was applied not only to contaminated individuals but also to 
political activists o f  die “wrong kind” (Seidelman 1989). Meanwhile, several American geneticists such as Popenoe, Johnson, 
and East, driven by the conviction that the animal origin of human nature could not be curbed by civilisation, that society 
should emulate nature, and that their scientific expertise set them apart from the rest o f the population, persevered in 
undermining the foundations of democracy by underscoring that as hereditary differences disproved the enlightenment 
notion o f equality, then an aristocratic, oligarchic socio-political arrangement would be more suitable in the United States 
(Pickens 1968; Adams 1994).
Sadly, half o f  the geneticists actively promoted the American eugenics movement (Smith 1975). Among the m ost 
prominent, let me mention T. H. Morgan and Hermann Muller (Columbia), D.S. Jordan (Stanford), C.B. Davenport (Station 
for experimental evolution at Cold Spring Harbour, Long Island, New York), W. E. Castle (Harvard), E.G. Conklin 
(Princeton) and, more recently Joshua Lederberg (Stanford) and James D. Watson. Most importantly, according to Bentley
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Glass (Glass 1986) American leading geneticists Castle, Davenport, East, Jennings, and Muller never changed tiieir views 
about eugenics in the face o f scientific evidence.
Some o f them did not even tty to dissimulate their racism. Stanford President David Starr Jordan, ichthyologist,
biologist and pacifist, submitted that (Jordan 1910)
We know that the actual blood in the actual veins plays no part in heredity, that the trwifusion of blood means no more than the transposition 
of food, and that the physical basis of the phenomena of inheritance isfound in the structure o f the germ cell and its containedgetm-plasm. But 
the old word well serves our purposes. The blood which is “thicker than water” is the ymbol of race unity. In this sense the blood of the people 
concerned is at once the cause and the result of the deeds recorded in their history. For example, wherever an Englishman goes, he carries with 
him the elements of English history. It is a British deed which he does, British history that he makes. Thus, too, a Jew is a Jew in all ages and 
climes, and his deeds everywhere bear the stamp of Jewish individuality
And about the nature-nurture debate (Jordan 1915)
The progress of each race has depended on its own inherent qualities. There has been no other leverage. Plysical surwundings have played only a 
minor part To say that one race as a whole is inferior to another is only to repeat what is said every day of individual men. This does trot imply 
that a lower race may not produce its own prophets or scholars or heroes. That race is lowest which shows, on the whole, least capacity for sef-  
elevaPotr. [.. J. In general, the highest range of possibilities in everyfield has been reached by the “blonde races” of Europe.
Likewise, Harvard geneticist and eugenicist E.M. East in 1919 (Allen 1983: 118), commingling Malthusianism and
white supremacist thought, declared that
it is.. .an illogical exterrsiori of altruism [...]  to seek to elevate the black race at the cost ofhwetitrg the white; [..,]. In reality the negro is 
inferior to the white. This is not hypothesis or supposition; it is a true statement of actualfact.
Differently from the UK, in the USA the same eugenic themes caught the attention o f the public opinion. By 1928, 
376 college courses on eugenics were run in the USA (Allen 1989) and several laws were promulgated to meet the concerns 
o f the population, such as the fancied multiplication o f deviants, homeless, hobos, and beggars, and the equally imaginary 
invasion o f immigrants o f “inferior stock”, all lumped together, branded as “feeble-minded” and judged to be a threat to the 
WASP lifestyle and to tlie cultural and biological legacy o f the founding fathers (Roger in Benichou 1989). Ironically, 
beginning from the 1917, the I.Q. o f 1,700,000 American conscripts o f the U.S. Army were examined, and the outcome was 
disheartening. The average mental age was o f 13 years for the whites and 10 for the blacks and recent immigrants. Nearly 
half o f  the white conscripts fell in the category “feeble-minded” (Paul 1995). Such was die embarrassment that the whole 
thing was kept secret until 1921 (Roger in Benichou 1989).
Even those American geneticists who did not openly espouse the eugenic cause or those who disowned it when it 
became clear that racial discrimination would play an essential part in eugenic policy-making, failed to take an unambiguous 
stance in the public arena and in so doing favoured the persistence of the worst instances o f scientific racism and class- 
prejudice (Aden 1978; Beclcwith 1993). For instance, James H. Sang recalls (1997) that professors seldom made reference to 
the biological foundations o f the Nazi ideology so that he learnt about that only shordy before the outbreak o f WWII when 
he was asked to oversee the publication o f a book meant to disprove them.
This is all the more disconcerting as the relationship between American and Nazi eugenics is being thoroughly 
examined (Kühl 1994, 1997), and what is emerging is a picture as complex as it is disturbing o f  two cross-fertilising 
academic settings mutually reinforcing the audacity of their statements and proposals and dramatically influencing a number 
o f social movements ranging from feminism to nationalism, and from social hygiene to the institutionalisation o f the 
mentally retarded and the welfare state (Crook 2002). Notably, it is by now commonly acknowledged that the Nazi 
sterilization laws had been modelled after those o f California (Kline 2001).
In this sense, it is remarkable how Virginia was reluctant to repeal its laws concerning the compulsory sterilization 
o f handicapped people before 1974 (Tudge 2002), after upward of 7,600 citizens, mostly poor women, had been sterilized.
%Analogous laws in several other American states led to the enforced sterilization of an estimated 60,000 to 100,000 people^h
Buchanan’s com ment (2000: 38) on that count is that the analogies between American and Nuremberg laws are unsettling.
As a matter o f fact there is a virtually unanimous consensus that American eugenics and racial laws set an example for the
Nazi theorists and policy-makers (Seidler & Rett 1982). A telling example is the “Act to preserve racial integrity”, enacted by
the state o f Virginia in 1924 (Smith 1985: 156):
It shall herecfter be unlarvfitlfor any white person in this State to many any save a white pemn, ora pemn with no other admixture of blood 
than white and American Indian. For the purpose of this act, the term ')vhite person” shall apply onty to the person who has no trace 
whatsoever of any blood other than Caucasian; but persons who have one-sixteenth or less of the blood of the American Indian artd have no %
other non-Caucasian blood should be deemed to be wlnte persons
The rationale behind this outrageous resolution had been provided in 1927 by Carrie Buck’s sterilisation case. In %
the “land o f freedom” justice Olivier Wendell Holmes accounted' for the decision to proceed with the sterilisation as 
follows:
we have seen mote than ottce that the public we fare may call upon the best citi^n for their lives. I t would be strange i f  it could not call upon 
those who alrearty sap the strength of the Statefor these lesser sacrifices, often felt to be much by those concerned, in order to prevent our being 
swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the world, if  instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for 
their imbecility, society can pevent those who are manifestly unfitfiom continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination 
is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. .. ^ 2
We should also mention the campaign for compulsory sterilisation in American colonies such as Puerto Rico, 
where at least 21% of polled women responded that they had been sterilised; and the Ford Foundation’s Colombian 
experiments, in which 40,000 poor women were sterilised in exchange for lipsticks (Christa Baatz in Roth 1984).
Eugenic measures were more often than not taken on ludicrous grounds such as “excessive masturbation”, 
“immorality” and “hereditary degeneracy”^^ . The fact is, what seems preposterous to us nowadays, was common currency in 
certain segments o f  die American societ}'  ^ during the first decades o f the last century. From the 1910s onward feeble­
mindedness, viewed as the root o f all evil (Paul 1995), was assimilated to women’s sexual licentiousness and its corollary was 
that m otherhood was not a right but a privilege that could only be granted to responsible and respectable women (Kline 
2001). It is thus erroneous to lay too strong an emphasis on the decline o f hereditariness as the root-cause o f  the downfall of 
American eugenics. Eugenics in the US rather comprised both hereditarianism and environmentalism — this latter bolstering 
those charity initiatives that strict hereditarians dubbed as dysgenic and financially inefficient -  and it is important to keep in 
mind diat before 1915 the neo-Lamarckian mechanism of inheritance o f acquired traits had yet to be dismissed (Cooke
1998).
At about the same time diat Mendelianism triumphed, its implications dawned on leading geneticists such as 
Edward East, who pointed out that eugenics policies would be in vain, given diat it would be impossible to detect all 
heterozygote carriers o f feeble-mindedness (Paul 1995). In 1917 it was calculated that over 10 percent o f the population 
might carry die recessive gene. Yet this conclusion did not discourage eugenicists, not even those with a strong background 
in genetics. M ost o f them deduced that eugenics programmes had to be further expanded in order to be effective (Paul 
1995). In the last analysis, those citizens who were expected to exhibit die most rational behaviour turned out to be those 
who acted m ost foolishly, proposing measures that flew in the face o f hard scientific evidence and reliable statistical 
estimates.
Neverdieless it is fair to say that there were some moderate and anti-deterministic eugenicists such as embryologist 
Edwin G. Conklin (1863 — 1952), who criticized those geneticists such as Davenport who, owing to his stricdy Mendeüan
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Commencing with Indiana in 1899, thirty-five North American states eventually permitted the eugenic steiilir^tion of mentalty handicappedpeople. [...].
Both American eugenicists and their admirers in Germany stressed the enormous costs to taxpayers ensuing from antisocialfamilies such as the Jukes, and of
public asylums (Burleigh, 2000, p. 346) ’ I
52 Smith (1993: 5)
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outlook, appeared to rule out o f consideration the process o f development. Conklin also lamented tliat such an unsoundly 
steadfast attitude gainsaid the mainstay o f  the American dream, according to which individuals had a daunting potential o f 
self-improvement, especially through education (Cooke 2002). Most interestingly, we do know that factors outside the 
domain of scientific research may have prompted him to hold on to his moderate views on human selection. In  spite o f 
being born to and reared by two healthy and educated parents, one o f his sons was mentally retarded (Cooke 2002). In view 
o f tlie fact that James Watson may have radicalised liis position due to the birth o f a child with a severe neurological 
disorder, it would be interesting to explore the possibility that such private concerns could have a stronger influence upon f
science than previously thought.
However that may be, when an exclusive focus upon heredity became untenable, also due to the public outrage 
stirred by the Nazi crimes, eugenicists simply dropped it and confined themselves to the formulation o f social reforms 
(KHne 2001). Wliich does not necessarily imply that eugenics as such had been reUnquished. O n the contrary, some 
geneticists reaHsed that the circumstances were not propitious for planned human selection and resolved to wait for a time 
when techniques would be devised that would enable couples to design their offspring and when the principles o f 
egalitarianism would not stand in the way (Mayr 1982; Cooke 2002). Watson and other like-minded scientists believe that 
the time has come to complete the eugenic project and tlie United States will unsurprisingly be the setting o f such an 
enterprise. I say unsurprisingly because an enduring American characteristic is that Americans are enamoured o f two 
concepts that may favour neo-liberal techno - eugenics : (1) the heritabüity o f success and failure; (2) individual accountability 
(Cooke 2002)
This peculiarity has given rise to a specific subculture that has been dubbed CaHfornian Ideology by Richard 
Barbrook and Andy Cameron, members o f the Hypermedia Research Centre of the University o f Westminster, London^'^.
CaHfornian ideology is an offshoot of cyberculture, a worldwide subculture whose most radical adherents dream of a new 
order, tlie overturning o f  the outdated conventions and schemes to the benefit o f a more Hbertarian, harmonious, 
decentraHzed, enriching reaHty. They sometimes do not disdain to employ colorful and vaguely subversive expressions. For 
instance, in its first issue, Moiido 2000 (n. 1 1989) proclaimed that
the gbernet is in place. .. The old information élites are crrmibling. The kids an at the contmls. This magasqne is about what to do until the
millennium comes. We’n  talking about Total Possibilities. Tadical Assaults on the limits of biology, grnvity and time. The end of artificial 4.
Scarcity. The dawn of a nerv humanism. Highjackingtechnologyforpersorral empowerment, fun and games
Ziauddin-Ravetz (1996; 83)
Barbrook and Cameron have detected in CaHfornia a promiscuous aggregation o f values and attitudes of both 
hippies and yuppies leading to a new utopia, typified by the bio-technological manifestation o f the social privileges of the “virtual class”.
[...]. What Wired magasf ne and the Extropians and other leaders of this Memes cult are doing... is basically recycling Herbert Spencer's social 
Darwinism
This Californian ideology is giving birth to a neo-eugenic movement caHed trans-humanism^s or extropianism, the 
culmination o f the Western experiment in tights and reason, as Erik Baard^^ jokingly defined it -  but tliey would probably take that 
remark seriously^? —, that is no longer confined to the American West Coast. Its members, or I should rather call them  
adepts, advocate the control o f human development through gene modification as the only means of salvation faced with an 
increasingly compromised environment:
5'* see http://cci.wmin.ac.ulr/FIRC/ci/caHf5.html#l
55 Short for transitional human, along the path towards post-humanity
5<5 The ViUage Voice, July 30 — August 5,2003
57 We shall regard ourselves as a form o f art, we are the architects o f our existence (Max More as quoted by Christoph Keller 
2003)
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Transhumanists an biotech absolutists. Thy claim humans should not menly be allowed to metamorphose themselves through surgery, 
ybertechnologr, and the like, but should have the right to control the destiny of their genes ly means of progeny design andfabrication
Wesley J. Smith (National Review online, Sept. 20, 2002)
These neo-Nietzschean paladins o f the “transvaluation of values” are strongly adverse to the notion o f sanctity o f
life and the traditional view of personhood and as misantliropic as they come in postmodern times. They promote the use
o f cryonics, robotics, nanotechnologj’^, cloning, human germ-line engineering, AI, and space colonization (Elliott 2003). 90 ' X
percent o f transhumanists and extropians are relatively young, higlily educated, upper class, male (Margaret Somerville,
globeandmad.com, Friday, Aug. 29, 2003). Their radical libertarianism is simply unrestrained and drives them — I cannot say
how consciously — to denigrate our aspirations to a community of compassionate equals and in so doing to disown our
common humanity (Walker 2000).
The fact that so many educated, accomplished people seem untroubled iy  it is truly frightening. I t’s the materialist-nductionist-determinist 
worldview run amok. I t’s what happens when people become disconnected from themselves, others, and nature. I ’ve been at conferences where 
participants use phrases like “when we start engineering our children ” as i f  it’s a foregone conclusion, with no indication that thy appeciate the 
enormity of what th y ’re saying
Richard Hayes (in WaUcer 2000: 87)
Analogously, bio-ethicist Carl Elliott (Elliott 2003), evaluating his participant observation o f  a transhumanist
conference held at the university o f Yale, insightfully remarks:
J was struck more by its religious overtones. The transhumanists have their sacred texts, ‘The Engines of Creation” and “Mind Children” 
among them. Thy have communal gatherings, which usually occur online. Thy have a set of beliefs about résurrection and the afterlife, couched 
in the latrguage of cryonics and computers. Thy divide the rvorld irrto believers and infidels (the "bio-Euddites"), and thy call on one another to t
evangelfe - or, as thy often put it, "spread our memes. "Many trwishumanists believe that we're approaching an apocalyptic end-time thy call 
"The Singularity," a convergence of technologcal developments that will push the rate of change so dramatically that the world could be 
trarrformed byorid recognition. The W TA states that i f  The Singularity comes, it willprobabty be caused ly  the aeation of self enhancing 
superintelligent beings. ' I
Together with their utter disdain for ordinary moral sensibility, these are all traits that they share with classic 
eugenicists. This impression is further corroborated by Elliott’s warning tliat it would be unwise to discount such a 
movement for it combines ideological strands that are deeply rooted in the American society. Among them he mentions the 
ideology o f libertarian individualism, a repressed religious yearning that leads to ostensibly irreligious claims that are really a 
form of sectarianism and, last but no t least, technocratic idealism. We should also add a considerable emphasis on the 4
fulfilment o f narcissistic proclivities (K.A. Pearson 1997).
Elliott correctly notes that the issues raised by the transhumanist movement are the same that we will be
confronting as enhancement technologies are increasingly refined. What he fails to recognize is that those battles have
already been fought in the past, and on tlie same ideological grounds. It is by looking back at what eugenics represented for
tliousands o f  specialists and lay-people alike that we can better understand the success o f  books such as Lee Silver’s
“Remalting Eden: cloning and beyond in a brave new world” (1998) and Gregory Stock’s “Redesigning Humans. Our
inevitable genetic future” (2002), that follow the same lines o f previous utopian and dystopian popularisations o f science
and eugenics (viz. Galton’s, Ploetz’s, WeUs’s58, Huxley’s, etc.). Lee Silver, a molecular biologist and neuroscientist, outlines
one o f tlie m ost lilcely scenarios following the massive application o f germline engineering in a regime of free market (ibid.
249), namely the emergence o f a class o f  genetic aristocrats (GenRich) that wiU seize control o f the mass media, the economy
and the high finance, as well as technoscience:
When the first generation of cognition-enhanced GenRich matured, thy produced among themselves scientists who greatty outshone geniuses 
fiom allprevious epochs....and thy created more sophisticated teprogenetic technohg.es, which thy then used to enhance cognition even further in 
the GenRich of the rrext getreration. g
I
To him, that this is more than just a possibility is witnessed by the fact that some parents are prepared to spend 
huge sums o f money to provide their cliildren with an excellent education and i f  patents are willing to spend this money after birth — 
with no guarantee o f a nturn on their investment-■ why not before? (Lee in Stock & Campbell 2000: 60)
Their artificial evolution would eventually lead to such a genetic gap that some o f them would no longer be able to 
cross-breed with the “natural humans”, that is to say, the human species would branch off. This assessment nicely hangs 
together with Gregory Stock’s prophecy that our descendants won’t see our age as that in which our planet has been 
exploited to the point o f compromising natural diversity, but rather as the beginning of a new bio-historical phase in which 
artificial diversification would bring with it a richer variety o f species (Stock 1993).
Stock’s ideal o f Übermensch is equally daring and somehow resembling the original Nietzschean ideation, although in 
a more impoverished form (Stock 2002). He speaks o f  channelling o f human lineages and inbred professional specializations 
and, in a book that according to James D. Watson reveals the compassionate side o f science (Stock 2002), Stock displays a 
rather alarming lack o f sensitivity and concern for the fate o f democracy, egalitarianism, dignity, and free wül when he 
clarifies that
I f  a society believes that women ate (or should be) more empathetic and supportive, and boys more aggressive and independent, then whether or 
not these gender specijkities are true now is not as important as the likelihood that thy rvillgrndualty become true
By die same token, he suspects that, as far as human conception is concerned, the move from bedroom to
laboratory, which some day will no longer be optional, will be no more dramatic than that from giving birth at hom e to %
medically assisted birth in a hospital.
The peculiar hypocrisy of a member of the upper classes purporting to be the champions o f rights o f the masses to tt
take advantage o f a meritocratic social arrangement, is not uncommon among neo-eugenicists (Stock 2002: 190):
Strong voices will oppose this [gnetic enhancement], but most of the warnings. . .will comefrom people with the most to lose — the well-endowed 
elite. Surety theirs are the children who would uhimatety suffer fiom the armai of a genetic baipar where all parents can obtain equivalent 
talents and potentials for their children. [...]. Now a new elite may wince, because f  the God-given gfis of talent are suddenty laid out for 
everyone else, theirfiiture would not be so secure.
That this is an elitist, reactionary and deterministic discourse is clearly proven by the fact that Stock presumes that
elites maintain their social position thanks to their superior genetic endowment and not to the ceaseless exploitation o f  the
economically and socially underprivileged. This feeling is substantiated by the following remark (Stock 2002:187):
A s society moves closer to becoming meritocray, the most talented from all ethnicities and backgrounds will intermingle, form parinerships, arrd 
mate with similarty talented and succèsf d  others. Over time, this self-sorting will terrd to divide society, increasingly distancing the more gified 
from the less. Narrowty limited genetic screening and enhancement technologr would accelerate such dirtisions and reinforce privilege, whereas 
broadly availabk technolo  ^would counteract them
It is for me intriguing to witness such a revival of the Nietzschean project o f conscious and witting self­
enhancement in concomitance with the arising o f huge expectations about the ability o f techno-science to free mankind 
from toil, pain, and aging. Nietzsche himself (Nietzsche 1996, Aphorism 128: 89) had pointed out that
Modern scie tree has as its goal the leastpain and the fongest life possibk — that is a kind of eternal happiness: to be sure a very modest kind in 
comparison with the promises of religion
In  fact I see a remarkable affinity between the arguments expounded by the boldest advocates o f  genomics and the 
rhetoric formerly typifying progressive eugenics. Particularly striking is the utopian character o f their formulations, which 
seems to point to a direct relation between elitism and utopianism, as though utopias were apt subtly and efficaciously 
further to concentrate power in the hands of the upper ranks o f society (Bof in Colombo 1987).
I believe it is easy to foresee that such stands are apt to undermine the foundations o f our communal life and 
respect for human Hfe as such. In other words, if these views should be given credence, it stands to reason that before long 
we would be offered biotechnologies designed to follow through on the nihiHsts’ demand for self-purification (negative
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eugenics), the mitigation o f self-hatted (positive eugenics) and of the sense o f inaptitude (cloning as the ultimate gainsaying 
o f self-doubt). That would be the age o f  the Underground Man, o f self-solicitous individuals incapable of true love (Scanlan
1999). A possibility that is by no means acknowledged by well-intentioned idealists such as the president o f the German 
Tranhumanist Society, Frank Prengel (Keller 2003: 10):
Sie ivolkn das ewig Eeben?
Wamm denn?
Weil Ich darmiter leide, weil Ich es s(um Veryweifeln finde, dass meine Personlichkeit, meine Intelligenei und alk Kennfnisse, die Ich im 
Verlauf meines Lebens envorben babe, mil dem Tod meines biologischen Korpers vernichtet wetden, well Ich den Tod als eine ungeheim 
Verschivendung von Wissen betrachte
[Would you like to live forever? How come? Because I fear, I find distressing, that my personality, my intelligence, and 
tlie whole o f the Imowledge I have acquired througliout my life, will be lost with the deatli o f my biological body, 
because I regard death as an enormous waste o f knowledge]
I
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3.2 EUGENICS IN SWEDEN
Most i f  not all scientists participating in the Norwegian eugenics debate were ‘ptvgessims
RoU-Hansen (1980: 296)
The experience rvith N a fi policies had limited direct impact and was not decisive for the everrtual abandonment of eugetrics in Scandinavia.
N a fi policies andpractices rvere widely considered a perversion of eugenic ideals and goals with little relevancefor their true evaluation.
RoU-Haiisen (1989: 343)
The 15 to 20 per cent of those at the lower levels of society - those who ate not able to manage even the simplest tasks and often not their
children - should be dissuadedpvm havitrg childrert.
Prof Helmulli Nyborg, flie dean o f  the Psychology Institute at Aarhus University (Telegraph 1/10/2003)5^
Scandinavian eugenics is an even more fascinating topic for the light it sheds on the emerging new eugenics in 
advanced democracies. In 1922 the first European research institute for race biology was established in Sweden (Muller-Hdl 
in Clarke 1994). Eugenics laws on voluntary sterilisation'’^  were enacted in Denmark in 1929, in Norway in 1934, in Sweden 
in 1934, and in Finland 1935 and have been repealed relatively late (Denmark 1967; Sweden 1976). In Weimar times the 
eugenic societ}»^  numbered among its members nearly all the m ost important German and Scandinavian biologists and Alain 
D rouard (Drouard 1999), examiiting the correspondence between Lundborg, the director o f the institute o f racial biology in 
Uppsala, Sweden, observed that he Haised witli some prominent French eugenicists in the 1920s and 1930s and also with X
some of the m ost questionable eugenic thinkers in Germany (von Verschuer, Fritz Lenz, Eickstedt, O tto Ammon, Hans 
F.K. Gunther), in the U K  (Leonard Darwin), and in the USA (Charles Davenport, Harry LaughUn). A t the same time Lene 
Koch (Koch 2002) points out that scientists from democratic countries such as Denmark did no t part company with those 
German scientists who had been implicated in criminal and unethical activities during the Third Reich. The scientific value 
o f their research was sufficient a motive to drop their past into oblivion.
Nils Roll-Hansen (1989a, b) has postulated that five main factors were involved in the growth and the subsequent 
phasing out o f eugenics in Scandinavia:
1. tire decline o f traditional moral norms linked to Christian religion;
2. tire widespread conviction among the medical and scientific professions that Nazi policies were a perversion of 
eugenics ideals that could not be compared to the features o f a purported “Scandinavian way”;
3. the ups and downs in the popular perception o f the role o f the State in their life;
4. tire steady expansion o f Imowledge about human heredity;
5. a cultural shift favourkrg mdividualism;
However, Pietro S. Colla, in a remarkable piece of scholarship (Colla 2000), has successfully challenged the
acquiescence displayed by Swedish scholars when deaHirg with the history o f eugenics in their own country, a deference that 
stems from their a-ctitical acceptance o f the welfarist schemes implemented by their country. His work manages to convey a 
different understanding of eugenics as a worldwide phenom enon by drawing our attention to the wealth o f  attributes that 
intimately relate it to the advancement o f moderirity. In order to understand the reasons behind the persistence of
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2003/10/01/wpsy01.xml&sSheet=/portal/2003/10/01/ixportal.htinl t
To what extent sterilizations could be voluntary remains a moot point ^
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sterilisation laws in Sweden long after the end o f the WWII, one m ust first o f aU bear in mind that the incompatibility 
between democracy and social control on reproduction is a late acquisition of democratic thought^'.
However, it is also important to remember that although the theorization of eugenics was a worldwide 
phenomenon, Its application only occurred in countries with a strong puritan and progressive cultural background inspired 
by the abstract egalitarian ideal o f an “upward adjustment” . Most significantly, before contemporary China there had not 
been a single case of commuitist, fascist, or simply military dictatorship carrying out even a mild eugenic policy. So for 
instance in the United Kingdom the alliance o f the Church with tire Labour party, exceedingly sensitive to the mood o f its 
Irish voters, simply nipped in the bud all attempts to pass an eugenic legislation, no matter how watered down. Even so, that 
in a democratic society the curtailment o f  individual freedom is possible on account o f the pursuit o f uitiversai well-being 
constitutes the m ost conspicuous paradox and intrinsic weakness of democracy, one that we should always bear in mind 
(Colla 2000). Colla has presented a number o f arguments that refer to the specific case o f Sweden but tliat also turn 
particularly serviceable to my attempt to undermine the current downplaying o f the risks inherent to the application of 
reprogenetics innovations.
In Sweden the debate about healthcare and social utility garbled the meaning of hygiene and social virtue: hygiene 
came to comprise etliical and chauvinistic aspects tliat had been formerly altogether alien to it. O n the other hand racism 
was not the only factor that conspired to turn social hygiene in a form of racial hygiene. In fact the idea o f a “chosen Volk” 
did not saturate the public and parliamentary debate. Like their Weimar’s equivalents, Swedish politicians were more 
concerned about social utility, efficiency, and productiveness than about romantic notions o f  metaphysical purity. 
Consequently it is humanitarian and utopian considerations that were referred to ratiier than the brutal eliminationist 
paradigms that would prevail in Germany. A case in point is the advertisement circulated by milk producers that in a way ’i
epitomizes the ideological climate o f Sweden in those years:
E tt friskan slakte ar mallet.. .lât oss alia bit A-manniskor!
[the goal is a healthier race.. .let’s all become A-men^2]
The irony embedded in tliis framework of reference is that medical professionals, some o f die m ost enlightened *•;
representatives o f Swedish culture, found themselves fighting on the same side as the farmers and the clergy against the 
purported degeneration o f pristine customs and the extinction of traditional values among urban workers. Some citizens 
were simply deemed so undignified, irresponsible, and genetically unsuitable that they could not possibly be able to partake 
o f the construction of that ideal society that social engineers were striving for.
Criteria for the selection of the citizens who would be sterilized comprised not only branding people who 
seemingly could not be brought up to the ideal standards as sinneslo (“mentally impaired”) but also included sexual 
exuberance, sexual excesses, impudence, being sexuellt opâlitlig (“sexually undependable”), anti-conformist, bâllningslos 
(“ficlde”), lattledd (“easily influenced”), vidlyftig and losaktig (“licentious”), or konstig (“weird”). As a result, to get rid o f the 
avfallsptvdukter [cast-offs] o f Swedish society was a humanitarian endeavour — axiological rationality — rather than die 
brainchild o f the unsound and misguided use of instrumental rationality.
Predictably, experts o f family-planning and feminists found a huge appeal in such an approach that valued rational 
and far-sighted behaviour over traditional, passé codes o f  conduct. In this respect. Colla correctly relates die reaction o f 
believers confronting sin and the sinner to the approach of eugeiiically-minded people before illness and die sick. As the
This argument most certainly applies to Meiji Japan and to some intellectual circles and political formations o f Weimar Germany. 
For instance, Hider’s Gesett^  tpr Verhütung erbktmiken NacbimcAses (1933), did not break away tiom Weimar’s legislation and when the 
trials against the Nazi estabUslimeiit got started the overwhelming feeling that treating forcible sterUization as a crime against 
humanity would indict suchlike measures adopted in die United States was sufficient to induce the prosecutors to evade die issue 
altogether.
''■2 as opposed to qualitatively inferior B-men (undemiâlig in Swedish)
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hatred for sin ever so many times translates into intolerance if not the out and out persecution o f the sinner, so the dread o f
a specific disease would lead some to despise and detest the sick;
I m  hberayiom della societa dalle sue malattie sociali trascenderà facilmente nelpwgetto di annientaie i soggetti sodali— deboli, malati, indodli 
— che, con la low stessa esistens^ a, ne mano testmoniane^
[the freeing o f society from its social ills wHl easily transcend into lire project o f annihilation of those social subjects ~ ‘if
the wealî, the sick, and the unruly — who, through their very existence, bear witness to them]
CoUa (2000:13)
Another important aspect o f die question is the pervasive presence o f religious metaphors and declarations o f 
missionary commitments to the enhancement o f Swedish society that invoked the principles o f “love thy neighbour as 
diyself ’ and broadened its application to encompass to future generations, as well as the concept o f wrongful birth and the 
right o f parents to raise healthy children, to justify the m ost uncompromising eugenic measures.
Drawing on the history of eugenics respectively in Scandinavia and Canada, Roll-Hansen (1989a,b; 1996; 2001) and 
Angus McLaren (1990; 1992) have successfully stressed the point that in those countries m ost eugenicists were more 
progressive than their opponents. The one analogy that I find most striking between Sweden and Canada is the relative 
absence o f social criticism in the name o f an aseptic political correctness and a relativism of values more imposed from the 
outside than readily embraced that has as its ultimate upshot the preservation o f those dogmas established and strengthened ‘=|
by an elite that, in a burst o f self-serving enthusiasm, regards itself as more modern, progressive and boldly experimentalist 
than its opponents. Resistance to change within these rationalist utopias is in turn made possible by the conviction that a 
social system that has become a model o f progressive and enlightened administration for foreign policy-makers cannot 
possibly constitute a problem or an enigma, and that the adoption of an ethically grounded welfare state is sufficiently 
commendable to challenge all sorts o f critiques, for what truly matters is, after all, not the methods but the aims. CoUa (ibid.
2000) has termed this inclination “moral untouchabUity” and finds that one o f its best expressions is the aphorism on the 
gate o f  the university o f Uppsala: A tt tanka fritt dr star, att tanka rdtt dr stow [free thinking is great, but correct thinking is even 
greater]
The reasoning o f German feminist Gertrud Baumer best exemplifies what sort o f ideological background had 4
facilitated the alliance o f  feminism and racial hygiene in the name o f progressivism and democracy:
in its connection with eugenics, this old ideal [liberal humanism] becomes mow corporeal, more concrete. Even now it wtains its mtiversalty 
valid, all-encompassing signficance. Because the improvement of the raw meatrs the improvement of all Demands of racialpolitics are by nature 
democratic ittasmuch as thy necessarily apply to all and cannot be limited to the amfines of a single clasF^
^  In tliis regard, I wonder whether it is a coincidence fliat it was precisely in Uppsala that the Swedish institute for racial biology was 
founded in 1922 
Repp 2000:180
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3.3 EUGENICS AND RACIST BIOLOGY IN JAPAN AND SOUTH AFRICA
“ivorksrs” in ny house were not the same skin color as family” and fiends” My whiteness was a “sign” that I  was not destined for 
“menial” tasks
The part played by intellectuals in the hegemonic discourse of Japanese “fascism” and eugenics is particularly
instructive. Alessandro Gomarasca (2001) and Sabine Frühstück ( 1 9 9 8 ) note that the slogan o f  Meiji Japan’s social
reformers was bunmei kaika, literally “civilize, enlighten”. The main concern o f the period was to rectify the everyday Hfe o f a
people whose fate, they claimed, hinged on how quicldy Japanese civiHzation would catch up with Europe and N orth
America. This led to the scientific programming o f the individual body in its growing and decaying as the individual body
mirrored the national, collective body in the organicistic conception o f Japanese society that was largely established by the
end o f X IX  century. According to this vision the health {eisei) o f the State depended on pubHc hygiene {kôshû eisei). The body
politic was therefore nurtured, dressed, and sanitised in an appropriate manner, by adopting Western customs, fashions, and
habits, all o f  which was instrumental to the Japanese supremacy poHcy over the Far East and the Western Pacific Basin
(Saitoh in Kawaldta 1993). This hugely ambitious scheme was carried out by taking Germany as a model:
the wticulated elaboration of Japanese concepts of uniqueness in the modem period is immensely indebted to the theoretical world of German 
nationalism. The discovery in midMeiji of a strong affinity between Japan’s situation and that of Germany’s late modernisation led *  an 
increasing dependence on the German example, to legitimise the authoritarian heritage of the Tokugawan state while ostensibly remaining 
faithful to modernisation on Western lines.
Dale (1986: 214)
Flistorically, a continuous flow o f Icnow-how from Germany to Japan took place in consequence o f tlie attendance 
of carefully selected German universities by several hundreds o f Japanese students'’'’. Following this first contact at an 
academic level, a number o f German experts o f law, economics, and natural sciences were invited to  partake in the 
ambitious project undertaken by the Japanese government to  establish an academic institution capable o f competing with 
the venerable and prestigious European universities. This choice to have recourse to German counsellors was to play a 
determinant role. Indeed Martin (1995, 34) has shown that the brand o f juridical and poHtical-economic studies 
(conservative and elitist), and bio-medical experimentation (social Darwinism and racial theories) Hnported from Germany 
helped to establish an authoritarian system and to provide it with an ideological superstructure. The Japanese understanding 
o f eugenics -  translated &&yurgnikkusu oryùseigaku diat is, the science o f superior birth — derived from the German doctrine
‘’5 Frühstück Sabine, 1998, Germs, Genes, and Nerves: Programming the Body in Modern Japanese Medicine and AlHed Science, 
1998 AAS Annual Meeting, Session 174 
408 students between 1881 and 1905 (Martin, 1995)
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South African professor (Steyn 2001: 52)
Perhaps the entity called Aum Shinrikyo resembkspre-World War II  Manchuria. Japan establislred the puppet state ofManchuria in 1932, 
and in the same wcy, the best and brightest - the mtting-edge technocrats, technicians, and scholars -gave up the lives promised to them in Japan 
and went off to the continent thy saw as sofull ofpossibilities. For the mostpart thy rvere young extremety talented, and well educated., their 
heads fe ll of newly minted, ambitious visiotrs. A s  long as thy stayed in the Japanese state, with its coercive structure, thy believed it was 
impossible to find an effective outlet for all their energ. A nd that's exactly wly thy sought out this more accommodating experbmntal land, 
even i f  it meantjumping off the normal track In that sense alone thy had pure motives, and were idealistic, filled with a settse ofpurpose. A s  
far as thy were concerned, thy were proceeding down the "properpath”. The problem is that something very vital was lacking. Now we can 
look back and see what rvas missing was a poperty three-dimensional historical sense, or, in a more concrete kvel, an identity betrveen language 
and actions”
Murakami Haruki (2001: 306-307)
i
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of the racial hygiene o f the Volkskorper {kokiitai) (Richter & Schad-Seifert 2001). Also from Germany Japanese took their cue 
when it came to set up a nationwide network o f marriage and eugenics counselling centres superintending quality control o f 
population growth and racial hygiene (Richter & Schad-Seifert 2001). Additionally, the orderly, ambitious, and recently 
formed German empire soon appeared to mirror tlie aspirations o f Meiji’s regime. Obvious was the link between the 
diffusion o f  eugenic theories and the necessity to advance the Japanese process o f modernization and westernisation 
(Otsubo & Bartholomew 1998). In fact, the accompanying ominous slogan was hukokti kyohei, i.e. “rich nation, strong 
soldiers” (Aya Homei 2000).
Hence, throughout their history as world-powers — with the brief exception o f the WWI — the two countries 4
continued to entertain dangerous liaisons, which ultimately wound up in the unparalleled massacre o f WWII. The '
preparations for the impending war, that broke out when the Japanese army invaded China in 1937, busied dozens of
Japanese scientists and technicians at Ping Fan, in Manchuria, at the time a Japanese colony called Manchukuo. There a
centre for the experimentation o f biological warfare had been established, that employed around 3000 people and in which
no qualm existed as regards the use of human beings as guinea pigs for the development o f those bacteriological weapons
that were meant to bring China, and possibly the Soviet Union, to their knees (Williams & Wallace 1989). The project was
more or less coverdy backed up by a considerable number o f Japanese scientists who, unsurprisingly, got away with dieir
complicity in one o f  the m ost outrageous instances o f biomedical science run amok (Barnaby 2000). These human
experiments (Jintai Jikketi) on Russians, Chinese, Mongolians, and Koreans were conducted between 1933 and 1945 by 3
Japanese doctors and biologists enlisted in the Unit 731, Unit 100, the Manchuria Medical School, and die army hospitals,
and caused thousands o f victims. Takashi Tsuchiya, an associate professor at the Department o f Philosophy o f Osaka Citj^
University writes in a remarkably straightforward article''^ that
except at arnry hospitals, most of the doctors who performed human experiments and vivisections were academic researchers who had been ■ 4
lecturers or associate professors at leading]apanese medical schools and wete temporarily employed by the Japanese Army >
Interestingly, unlike their German equivalents, Japanese medical students were not imparted any specific ethical
training nor were they expected to take the Hippocratic Oath. Their educators would simply presume diat they were fully
aware that dieirs was a calling to beneficence, not to malfeasance or murder (Harris 1994). However the physician and
microbiologist who was appointed head o f die programme, Ishii Shiro, was of a different mind. Womaniser and heavj'
drinker, one o f  his colleagues described him as follows (Harris 1994: 17):
he is very clever and a hard worker. However, he is not a scholarly mindedperson. He is very ambitious artd likes to do big things (in a way he 
is a boaster). He is very eagr about promoting himself to a higher position ly achievingmeritorious deeds
111 tune with his temperament, he proclaimed diat no scruples should get in the way o f  scientific and patriotic 
research, in a fashion that disturbingly resembles the justifications offered by the scientists involved in the Manhattan 
Project:
the research work upon which we are norv about to embark is the completely opposite of these principles [of medical conscience], and mcy 
cause us some anguish as doctors. Nevertheless, I  beseech you to pursue this research, based on the dual thrill of 1) as a scientist to exert efforts 
to probing for the truth in natural science and research into, and discovery of, the unknown world and 2) as a military person, to succèsftrity 
build a powerful military weapon against the enemy
in Flarris (1994: 42)
An issue o f  consequence is that neither he nor his colleagues were especially selected because they proved to have f
particularly sadistic or callous personalities. They were simply ambitious scientists in search o f  more challenging tasks:
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for them, ethics wetv not an issue. They knew tight fiom wrong. In their minds, however, advanced research was not to be inhibited !y ethical 
restraints. Imbued by a fervent sense of rrationalism and a desire to achieve fame and fortune, these men were concerned solely with the fm al 
results of their work. They rationalised that the end didjustify the means
H am s (1994: 43)
Takashi Tsuchiya^^ imputes their despicable behaviour to wartime circumstances; to the fascistoid regime ruling 
Japan at the time; to the threat o f  being branded as hikokumin (“traitors”); to the ,%yo/%//-system (the academic pecking-order) 
in which head professors exercised supreme power over their staff. Finally, in such a setting tliey would have the chance of a 
lifetime to study diseases tliat could hardly be found in Japan with a view to the enhancement o f  their personal prestige and 41
position. Once again we are dealing with ordinary citizens caught up in extraordinary circumstances who fail to live up to 
basic moral standards.
An alternative explanation is that tlie practitioners o f the biomedical sciences, being imbued with the sense of
pursuit o f higher, universal goals, are more susceptible to lose the sense o f proportion and trade in humanity for somewhat
remote objectives, especially when confronting experimentation o f human beings dehumanised by fascist rhetoric or by age-
old racist prejudices. But this is a conjecture which is only partially born out by the testimony o f  Major Karasawa Tomio "S
who, during the trials following the Japanese defeat, declared that:
I  had thought at that time that the execution of this work would be explained as a duty of a Japanese officer, but now pn retrospect], I  shall 
explain it as a doctor who engages in the benevolent art
Harris (1994: 43)
Theirs could well be a further instance o f Messianic syndrome, the realisation o f the boundless power they can
exert with impunity and that is justified by the noble mission they took upon themselves. My impression is corroborated by .
the outrage felt by Sueo Aldmoto, a late-drafted young serologist, at the utter indifference displayed by his colleagues with
respect to their involvement in the Manchurian atrocities (in Williams & Wallace 1989):
it’s astonishing these people have no shame. Their rvork in Manchuria had nothing to do with patriotism. I t was an elitism thatgew like a 
monster
My impression is that when science is viewed as a value-free enterprise scientists may allow themselves to  be 
morally autistic.
We may now summarize tlie traits that science in Germany and Japan had in common for the duration o f their 
fascist experience5^:
• a close alliance of universities, laboratories, big companies, and the state, which is the hallmark o f modern science;
• eugenetic programmes and human experimentation beyond the pale o f a civil society;
• an overarching utilitarian logic paired with nationalism and careerism ;
• a powerful controlling process that enforces a pervasive harmony ideology;
• the annihilation o f subjectiveness and individual worth.
Another country whose scientific establishment was partially inspired by German eugenicists and racial hygienists
was South Africa. Judging by tlie contempt in which many Englishmen held the natives o f  Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, -I
-Îand Canada in imperial times, it is clear that the overwhelmingly disproportionate ratio o f black to white people may be 
expected to play a crucial part in the history of eugenics in South Africa. We do know that after the discovery o f the 
immensely rich South African diamond mines and the subsequent rapid industrialisation and urbanisation o f the country it
58 Eubios, Journal o f Asian and International Bioethics 10 (2000), 179-180 
55 About this broad use of the term “fascism” see Francesco Gatti, Ilfascismo gapponese, Milano, Franco Angeli Editore, 1983.
66
.... V , . C .   L:--------
67
became necessary for the two white minority groups, the British and the Afrdcaners, to join forces in order better to exploit 
the extremely cheap African labour. Given the large number o f poor whites, mainly low-skilled Afrikaners who had moved 
into the urban conglomerates looking for decent living standards, a most welcome solution to the white fear o f being 
“swamped” by the black majority was found in the scientific confirmation o f what was a widely held belief, that is, that black 
people were intellectually inferior and therefore unsuited to assimilation or amalgamation {samesmeltinfrj. The emphasis of 
racial theorists thus shifted from poor whites to black workers once the grudge that had followed the Boer wars subsided, 
most likely for merely utilitarian motivations (Rich 1990; Dubow 1992). Before the 1910s that had not been possible. British 
rulers had grown deeply preoccupied about the prospect o f a relentless degeneration of the members o f the working classes.
250,000 troops had been deployed in South Africa to quench the Boer rebellion, a number that had clouded the fame of the 
British Empire and disgraced the new recruits^o.
Once the successful but humiliating war had come to a close in 1903, W. Taylor, Director-General o f the Army
Medical Service, sent a memorandum to the Parliament that read:
but the want ofpfysique, thus shown to exist with regard to a large section of the community, is not onty serious fiom its military aspect, it is 
serious alsofrom its civil standpoint, for' if  these men are unfitfor military service, what are thy goodfor9
Oram (1998: 75)
That this sort o f argumentations was entirely subscribed to by British eugenicists and Social Darwinists is 
unsurprising. Social Darwinism in particular, insomuch as it fulfilled the ruling class’s need scientifically to substantiate its 
social and cultural hegemony — that is that social class mirrored an individual’s genetic endowment (Searle in Webster 1981)
— was prone to combine the aversion to three different sorts o f miscegenation: between humans and apes, whites and 
blacks, and members o f  the upper classes and plebs (Breman et al. 1990). Their ideal society would therefore be patently 
segregationist. Likewise, the eugenic discourse repeatedly stressed its function as a scientific alternative to the Marxist and ,f
liberal proposals for a solution to the social question tliat had arisen with the pauperisation o f the urban population in the X
second half o f  the nineteenth century (AmbroseUi 1994). In the main, eugenicists would not object to capitalism per se, but 
rather point to the long-term dysgenic effect o f the concentration of averagely unfit labourers according to a narrow and 
myopic perspective o f short-term profitability (Searle in Webster 1981). Consequently, social reformers took it in their stride 
that the lower classes, inadequate as they were to live up to mainstream society’s expectations, were to be blamed for those 
societal ills that plagued their existence (Noll 1995).
In those years in South Africa, as elsewhere, class and racial conflicts merged when “feeble-mindedness” started to 
be seen as the greatest threat to social stability and to the very survival o f the white race. Moral panic broke out when the 
upper class woke up to the fact tiiat the white poor were likely either to clash with the black workers or, worse still, to join 
forces wifli them and start a class war against them that would eventually lead to miscegenation {r'asservet'menginf), which was 
their worst fear (Klausen 1997; Glaser 2001). Subsequently, cultural relativism and scientific racism — that is both cultural 
and biological essentialist explanations o f diversity — conspired to afford South African politicians the opportunity^ to enact 
segregationist laws, by giving them an aura o f scientific and academic authority (Dubow 1992; Magubane 1996). Additional 
medical and social concerns about the propagation o f “native” diseases occasioned the separation o f the indigenous people 
from the white colonists, a true preliminary test o f the feasibility o f a solution along the lines o f racial segregation and 
apartheid (Arnold 1988; Maylam 2001). Segregationism was therefore a further instance o f where a thoroughly rational and j
70 Predictably, diese preoccupations smoothed the way for that despicable conception o f ordinar)^ individuals as dispensable material 
that particularly characterised tlie WWI and its overall military strategy on all fronts: the commanders’ lack of faith in their own troops also goes 
some rtrcy to explaining the obsession with attack. The offensive was considered to be easier to conduct because it activety engaged the troops, thereby reducirrg "a
œncerns about discipline. Within the officer corps existed a “suspicion of the reliability of working-class recruits”. This was particularly so in the case of the 
New A m y formations which made up the bulk of the attackingfforxe in the Battle of the Somme (Oram 1998: 84)
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modernising response to an emotionally biased understanding of critically important social issues such as industrialisation, ÎS
miscegenation, social and historical dislocation, may lead:
ségrégation was not the crude and rigid system that much of the historical literature has presumed.. .segregation triumphedfor the very reason 
that it rrrns flexible and soplnsticated. Mystifying raUonalifing and legitimismg a particular configuration of caste and class, it errabled white 
supremacy to survive in an increasingly threatening world.. .far fivm being the crude, irrational prejudice of igrrorant “rednecks”, segegation 
must be recognit^ d as one of the most successfulpolitical ideologies of the past century. It was, indeed, the highest stage ofwhite supremay
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Jolm Cell (cited by Dubow 1989: 6)
The relative absence of virulent racist discourse was most likely due to both political expedience — it m ust be borne 
in mind that whites were and are a minority in South Africa — and to the fact that a racialised outlook o f society was so 
deeply embedded among all South Africans, blacks, Indians and Chinese included, that a major emphasis on the subject was 
substantially superfluous (Dubow 1989). Correspondingly, the failure o f eugenics to catch on in South Africa was possibly 
due to the existence o f a great deal o f poor whites who disproved its basic postulate that a race could be individuated, that 
displayed all the m ost advantageous characters o f the human species (Maylam 2001). Likewise in the United States eugenics 
was dealt a deadly blow when the 1929 financial crash caused thousands o f whites to lose tliek jobs and security, lapsing to a 
social status comparable to that o f the African-American minority and the immigrants. After the Nazis’ defeat eugenics was 
virtually phased out from the scientific debate in bodi countries.
Finally, let me briefly refer to the psycho-sexual dimension o f the confrontation between black and white people.
We have seen that the distinct sexual nature of racism is undisputable. The customary castration accompanying the lynching 
o f Negroes in the former Confederate states, and the parallel hysteria with black men raping white women in times of 
economic hardness, go to prove precisely that:
sexualfears are not a mere rationalisation of political and economicfears, and white men are gettuinely apprehensive of the erotic competitiorr.
Thus in the opinion of many historians o f race these sexual worries ate the rdtimate basis of racial antagonism.
Hyam (1990: 204)
For Segrest (Steyn 2001), European explorers, because they were reared in a sexually repressive Christian 
environment, projected their inhibited sexuality onto the dark, and therefore malevolent and cunning, as well as sexually 
uitinhibited, natives, and afterwards felt morally compelled to subdue and possibly exterminate the polluted Other, as their 
forefathers did when out witch-hunting. Their paranoid fantasies and anxieties aggrandized the anatomic virtues o f the 
Africans and built a vicious circle o f morbid attraction and repulsion caused by an underlying inferiority complex (Steyn 4|
2001). In South Africa these feelings were aggravated by the minority status o f the whites who faced the classical dilemma of 
an ethnic minority, viz. post-diasporic Jews, tliat is, whether granting individuals freely to choose their partners outside the 
in-group and in so doing undermining the in-group uniqueness, or sacrificing individual happiness for the sake o f group 
preservation, but in so doing also reinforcing prejudices and external threats (Baumeister & Tice 2001). W hite South- 
Africans, afraid o f  not being up to tlie blacks’ sexual prowess, chose the latter option and science and medicine provided the 
rationale for carrjhig out the physical separation o f the two groups:
the image of white-coated scientists, professors, doctors, dentists, veterinarians, laboratories, universities, and front companies, propping up
apartheid with the support of an extensive international network, nms a particularty ynical and chilling one.
ftom tlie final report o f South Afirica’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission chaired by Nobel Peace Prize winner
Bishop Desmond Tutu (fvloreno 2000: 7-8).
711 suspect this relationsliip between holistic materialism and civic engagement could turn out to be a fruitful line o f inquiry 
72 and Franz Boas’ tutor in physical anfliropology (Graves 2001)
3.4 NAZI EUGENICS AND RACIAL IdYGIENE
There’s even something a bit satisfying one has to admit, about seeing Hitler in a newsreel with his silty moustache and silty haircut, screaming 
hystericalty and shaking hisfist. A nd one of the reasons we like to see such films or such newsreels is that thy give us the reassuringfeeling as 
we watch them, that we’re the sort ofpeople who will recognise it i f  it ever should approach us. [...]  I t would beflattering to believe that rve are 
superior in some wcy to the audiences who cheeredfor Hitler.. .but I  think it would be more prudent to make the assumption that perhaps 
we’re not. A t  least we should allow ourselves to imagne thatpossibility for just a momerrt.. .if it should turn out that we are N O T  superior] - ?
our self examination might save a lot ofpeopk — possibty allpeople —from being harmed ly us.
W. Shawn, Notes on justificationfor putting the audience through a different evening 1987 (as cited by Holtzman 1989: 223-226)
The Inquisitor viokntty enforced his creed, because it was unchangabk. The savant enforces it viokntty because it may change the next day 
Gilbert Keitli Chesterton (1922: 78)
Ta réprobation universelle du na-fisme fu t une immmense lypocrisie; l’orientation fondamentale de ce mouvement était d ’améliorer indéfirrement 
l’éspece, de faire k  paradis sur terre donc, au moyen de la biologe, du contrôk de ta reproduction particulièrement. Ce n’est pas à cette 
orientation qu’on s’opposait, mais au génocide des Juifs; la stérilisation des criminels et des malades mentaux, de même que k  recours à des 
reproducteurs d’élite seraient sans doute des pratiques encore courants si elles n ’avaien pas été associées dans nos esprits aux camps de 
concentration et aux fours crématoires
Jacques Dufresne (1986 : 9)
In Germany as elsewhere, an epistemological cleavage formed once numerous life scientists disputed the message 
conveyed by Max Weber in his 1918 lecture on science as a vocation, that people had to resign themselves to the inexorable 
disenchantment o f the world provoked by the scientific inquiry which reduced die ethical and emotional significance o f 
being human to a dull causal mechanism. They instead placed die emphasis upon a holistic, anti-mechanistic, non-atomistic 
philosophy o f the life-sciences (Harrington 1996). Yet, to further confirm that historical and social phenomena cannot be 
easily classified into discrete parts, and that there is not just a single story to teU about how scientific thought evolved from J
Enlightenment to post-modernity, we should not make the mistake of presuming that it was among them that social 
engagement and civic spirit was m ost abundant. O n the contrary, it was reductionist and mechanistic medical scientists such 
as Emil D u  Bois-Reymond and Rudolph Virchow who did most to moralise science7h While comparisons were drawn 
between machines and human virtues, and die practice o f unconditional objectivity enabled scientists to claim that theirs 
were exemplary moral standards (Daston & GaUson 1992), Rudolph Virchow, an eminent and powerful figure in the 
German academic world72, incarnated die romantic ideal o f a medical scientist who takes part in the political life o f his 
country with an eye to the living conditions of the lower classes and a focus as broad as possible (Bauer 1982; Wenig 1995).
Throughout his life he held that culture was die grvfie Feindin des Mo nopals und Privilegs [the great adversary o f monopoly and 
privilege], that ihr Fortschritt der Fortschritt der individuellen Freiheit [its advance the advance o f individual freedom] (Mazzolini 
1988: 13), and that physicians, acting as natural attorneys o f the poor, should see that every citizen be granted the 
constitutional right to a healthy existence (Porter & Porter 1988).
He probably developed this intellectual and ethical posture during the 1848 riots in Berlin and from his visits to 
peasant households in Silesia where he derived a lasting impression of injustice and shame (Otis 1999), for which he faulted 
Prussian colonialism and the clergy’s structural blindness to the need for radical reforms (Mazzolini 1988). A political 
activist, he founded the German Progressive Party and strove to promote national policies that would realize his scheme of -Ii_________________________________________________________________  ÿj
&
Welche Gephîe mussen wohl diese Zeikn.. .bei dem Kenner der Piysik am losen? Verachtmig oder Erbittenmg? Was soil er tun — lachen 
oderweinen?
[What feelings should tliese lines arouse in an expert o f physics? Contempt or bitterness? What should one do? Should 
he laugh or weep?]
a democracy of free and knowledgeable individuals able to take care o f their health as thoroughly as they took care o f  their >î
businesses. Physicians were to become ambassadors o f the poor (D. Porter 1999).
Otlier German colleagues o f  Virchow such as Salamon Neuman and Max von Pennekofer analogously called for )
better housing, food, and education for the whole o f the population in order to forestall epidemics (Porter, ibidem). |
Virchow used to maintain that a scientist’s duty was to establish the facts and no t to philosophise over them  j
(Farrington, 1946); but — and tliis is a m ost significant aspect o f his thought -  he also believed that die Medifin ist eine sofiale 
Wissenschaft und die Politik ist weiter nichts, als Medifin im Grofien [Medicine is a social science and politics is nothing but 
medicine on a grand scale] (Labisch 1992; 253). This is an important statement for it reveals that tlie association o f  politics 
and social medicine was by that time accepted even by one o f the m ost prominent German scientists.
In Germany, this “Romantic backlash” (Berlin 1990) went so far so as to promote the doctrine o f  the Volksgeist
according to which all expressions of human ingenuity were bound, up in the spirit o f a people and its traditions (Gasman
1971). Immersing oneself in the essence o f a Gemeinschaft could help attain its comprehension. This view was enlarged by
scientists such as Ernst Haeckel, a German marine biologist whose international bestseller, “Die Weltrdtsel’ (literally, “the "3
World Riddle”), sold half a million copies in Germany alone, being translated into 25 languages (Shipman 1994). Tliis was a
book that, claiming that its author could solve all the remaining scientific riddles, offered a modern religious faith (Gasman
1971). But this only to uncritical minds, for most German intellectuals felt ashamed o f  such a conceit. The Berlin >1
philosopher Friedrich Paulsen mounted a withering attack on both the author and the state o f education in Germany:
Ich habe mit bminender Scham dieses Buch gelesen, mit Scham liber den Stand der allgemeinen Bildung und derphilosophischen Bildung 
unsetes Volkes. Daji ein solches Buch moglich war, dass es geschrieben, gedmckt, gekauji, gelesen, beivundett, geglaubt wetden konnte bei dem 
Volk, das einen Kant, einen Goethe, einen Schopenhauer besitif, das ist schmerylich
[I have read fliis book with a keen sense o f shame, o f shame at die state o f the general and philosophical education o f 
our people. That such a book has been possible, that it could be written, printed, bought, read, admired, believed by the 
same people that owned a Kant, a Goedie, a Schopenhauer, that is painful]
Cited by Hermann (1982: 78)
Physicist O.D. Chwolson’s comment was (ibidem: 79):
In die light o f these criticisms it may seem extraordinary that only a few scientists eventually stood up when it 
came to defend science from Nazi blandishments. And yet that same anti-reductionist stance that charged positivist #
mechanism with dehumanising society ended up endorsing that extreme form of biological determinism that fostered the *
conception o f National Socialism as angewandte Biologie, i.e. applied biology, as claimed by Hans Schemm, a member o f  the 
Bavarian government from 1933 to 1937 (Labisch 1992; Lerner 1992; Harrington 1996). A dolf Hitler himself stated that 
(Vogt 1997: 288):
So ist unsew Révolution ein weitenr Schritt oder viebnehr der endgiiltige Schritt Übetwindung des Historicismus und sqsr Anerkennung 
tvin biologischer Werte
[our revolution is another step, or rather the final step towards the overcoming of historicism, and die acceptance of 
pure biological values]
From  the Nazi perspective, historicism and mechanistic/materialistic science were peculiarly “Jewish” and 
undermined the “healtliy” organic conception o f Germany as one Volk with one Fiihter, in which a prominent role would be
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assigned to biologists and geneticists, now responsible for the popularisation of tlie fundamental laws of life supposedly
sustaining the regime (Harrington 1996). German biologist Bernliard Dürcken remarked that at the core o f the Nazi
revolution in biology and society lay the notion o f  wholeness (Harrington 1986). Holism accelerated the drift towards the
final solution by reinforcing the idea that, the whole took precedence over its parts, and in so doing it frayed the web o f
collective solidarity towards the weak and the mentally retarded. Additionally, the existence o f disabled people depended
upon an artificial environment, precisely the sort o f environment m ost averse to a holistically minded bio-scientist. N ot
being in tlie service o f life, the disabled and feeble-minded were actually disposable machines. Nazi physician Karl Kdtschau
was very outspoken on this point (Harrington 1996: 186);
our time does not need externalty contmlled machine-people, but rather self controlled people who have developed their own powers schooled in 
battles with a healthy Nature. Our time needs the hemic man, the man who is up to the challenges of the time, arrd who does not have to rely on 
the doubtfulprotection of an all too artfkial environment
Ironically, tliough, Hermand Jost (Jost 1992) has given evidence o f the technocratic character o f much VoUdsh 
utopian literature, in which German engineers are confided the task of redeeming the Fatherland, even though its exponents 
despised Weimar’s technocratic administration of German society. By the same token, Volkish themes {fblkhem) also 
surfaced simultaneously in post-WWI Sweden as tlie triumph of a “mystique of the engineer”, namely, the identification o f 
national prestige with technological innovation and productiveness (Colla 2000). Once again, let me stress tliat these 
apparently antagonistic modes of thinking, technocratic scientism and populist romanticism, that deeply affected the way 
science was being done were really inseparable and complementary. The one could not exist w ithout the other.
The much-despised separation o f  man and nature could be overcome by “life-sustaining myths” that m et with the 
approval o f  the m ost respected European intellectuals (Clark 1993). The price to pay for tlie preservation o f primeval virtues 
and mores was to be exceedingly high: as ethics answered to the needs o f natural selection — a fact that was inescapable for 
Haeckel, for instance —, free will, human dignity, and individual autonomy would be sacrificed to liigher priorities and 
natural calls (Stein 1988). This is a point that cannot possibly be overstated. In its rush to modernization, Weimar culture 
certainly retained atavistic traits and caused an anti-modernist backlash but this, as correctly stressed by Detlev Peulcert (in 
Childers & Cap Ian 1993) and Paul Weindling (1989b), was not in the least a uniquely German occurrence. Harwood (1996) 
hits the nail on the head when he states that, as contradiction and conflict are inherent to modernity, it comes as no surprise 
that Weimar intellectual Hfe turned into a “patchwork quilt” o f hoHsm, vitaHsm and mechanistic materiaHsm. Physicians 
went along with the regime in order to profit from the new poHtical and social framework (Sereny 1974; Gotz et al. 1994; 
SzôUôsi-Janze 2001; Paul 1995; Mildt 1996; Müller-HiU 1988), but they also had soHd reasons o f an ethical and methological 
Idnd to vaHdate their choices. On the other hand, bio-poHcy became the much-sought after surrogate for the Christian 
ethics, that was by many seen as outmoded and too conventional (Stein 1988).
The two persons who m ost clearly foresaw what would happen in Germany, should the dreams o f  racial hygienists
and eugenicists come true, were one of Ernst Haeckel’s m ost famous students, Oscar Hertwig and Haeckel’s lecturer,
Rudolf Virchow. Hertwig (in Vogt 1997: 277) warned that
Ein Merrschenffichter miifte ubermenschliche Voraussicht besitsgn. Gerade sittlich und geistig hochsiehende Menschen sind sich ihrer 
Schwdchen bewusst und wiirden sich nicht ju r ein solches Tribunal meldetr, wie sich friiher gewif nicht die Besten sich r<gm A m t des 
Grofiinquisitors drdngten
[A breeder of people should possess a supermanly foresight. But it is precisely those persons who are etliically and 
spiritually superior that are conscious of their weaknesses, and would not volunteer for such a tribunal, much tlie same 
as earHer on it was certainly not the best people who pressed for the office of Grand Inquisitor]
Virchow analogously admonished Haeckel that his attempt to replace the Church’s dogmas with a religion o f 
evolution would come to grief (Gasman 1971). Haeckel, who did lay down the foundations o f  that beUef in biological
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deteftninistn that smoothed the way for National Socialism, did not live long enough to see the implementation in the 
political and social spheres o f what he preached.
While it is true that the essence of German National Socialism was the merger o f biological determinism and 
politics (Labisch 1992; Lerner 1992), a further fundamental aspect o f National-Socialist Germany was the belief that the 
nation was ill, and National Socialism was the cure. Now this was no t just trite propaganda. Thousands o f people in 
Germany truly believed that, and complied with the regime's doctrine of “applied biology” . One o f my contentions is tliat 
the basic ideological discrepancy between Nazi Germany and fascist Italy is epitomised by the fact that Hitler presented 
himself as a biologist and a surgeon, while Mussolini claimed to be a doctor. We will return to Mussolini's claims in the next 
section.
N o doubt happy to adopt the perspective that callingfor surgical methods always shows less faith in the patienfs constitution
and mon in the skills o f the smgeon (Midgley 1985: 68), Hitler applied extreme eugenic measures, whereas fascism privileged
eutlienics, or social hygiene. This is probably the reason why most o f the leading German bio-scientists agreed with Nazi
political initiatives, forming a sort o f symbiotic relationship with them, one o f mutual reinforcement and reciprocal
legitimation that produced some o f the m ost outrageous laws ever approved (Proctor in Harding 1993).
[The eugenicists] sahen ihren Traum, die XJmset^ ng der 'Eugenik in praktische Politik und die Etab/ierung der Rassenlygiene ais 
Eeitwissenschaft, wahrwerden. Ihn Expertise stand von einem Tagaufden andenn im Mittelpunkt staatlichen Handelns.
[They saw that tiieir dream of an implementation of eugenics in the praxis of politics was coming true. All o f a sudden 
their expertise became central to crucial political issues]
Stefan KxiH (1997:123)
In fact, not a single non-Jewish scientist numbers among German dissidents (Haberer in Cerruti & Fazio 1976) and German 
racist scientists were never boycotted by the international scientific community (Weingart in Aant et al. 1990)
As we have seen, much of the background to eugenic measures was built up prior to 1933, on occasion o f the 
industrial crises that afflicted the already wobbling Weimar democracy (Roth 1984). A t that point Weimar biology and 
anthropology consorted with each other and prepared the ground for the NS Machtergreifung (Labisch 1992). So it was that 
in Weimar Germany courses o f eugenics were established as early as 1922 (Glass, 1997). This resort to genetic data was 
obviously necessary to scholars who had to base their racial hypotheses on “firm ground”, but it led them to view 
individuals in terms o f typologies and to anchor moral values to biological hypothetical laws (Makowslti 1996).
The evidence accumulated by scores o f scholars points to a progressive shift o f emphasis on the part of the 
German élite towards a moral worldview that regarded social inequality as an inbuilt characteristic o f  human nature, a 
persuasion that was tapped into by the Nazis to shore up their power and legitimise their discriminatory policies (WeindUng 
1989; Propping in Propping-Shott, 1992; Friedlander 1995). The underlying rationale was eminently utilitarian and 
efficiency-bound, and left no room for traditional values such as solidarity and compassion, either in bio-medical science or 
in society at large, in a mutually reinforcing process that paved the way to the Holocaust (Glass 1997). The result was the 
general reliance o f politicians on medical diagnoses o f social problems and the suppression o f  the individual rights for the 
sake of the collective good (Usborne 1992). This is equivalent to what we now call tiie “médicalisation of society”, or “social 
sanitation”, and it is grounded on the adaptation to universal laws o f nature, such as natural selection and genetic 
inheritance, that by necessity apply to the moral domain as well. This phenomenon was not confined to Germany alone, 
tliough. Eugenics attacked the mainstays of capitalism and nationalism, by labelling the social policies they inspired as 
dysgenic. Its theories pointed out that that a eugenic utopia could be fashioned, in which class divisions would be overcome 
once and for all (D. Porter 1999).
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These ideas were remarkably progressive for that time, as I shall argue, and their upholders found themselves 
perennially under the threat o f being charged with subversive intent.
In view o f  Weindling’s analysis (Weindling 1987, 1988, 1989a, 1989b), 1 venture to contend that what ushered in 
the sea-change from an anti-establishment attitude to a repressive doctrine was the immoderate nationalistic urge that grew 
more and more virulent after Germany’s smarting defeat in WWl. Indeed, the National Socialists’ astonishing success in 
blending mystical and scientistic undercurrents with some o f  Weimar’s m ost progressive social policies was acliieved by 
capitalising on the sincere commitment o f German life-scientists and biological antliropologists to the foundation o f  a 
genuinely German civic religion, one that was to challenge both the Judaeo-Christian dogma o f the discontinuity o f the 
“Ego” with the universe and the Enlightenment principles o f equality and justice sanctioned by the American and French 
revolutions:
Die am der Evolutions- und Selektmtstheorie gewonnen 'Ethiken” eugenischen Verhaltens nchten sich expli^t gegen die christliche 
ïndividuakthik und den Gleichheitsgmndsat^  ^derAufkidrung
|The ethics derived firom the theory o f evolution and selection are explicitly directed against the Christian ethics o f the 
individual subject and the enlightenment’s principle o f equality]
Weingart, KroU, Bayertz ( 1988: 18)
Even cancer-research was not immune from this blend o f utilitarianism and liturgical mysticism that was Nazism (Pois 1986; 3
Conte & Essner 1995).
Beginning with the Sixties, specific evidence has been sifted which demonstrates that National Socialism was also a 
project o f technocratic modernisation o f German society through scientific means (Dorner in Thom & Mitja Rapoport 
1989; Renneberg & Walker 1994) engaging all those disciplines that proved to be useful to the furtherance o f the Nazi plans 
and, in tlie main, allowing scientists to preserve a rational and results-oriented attitude (Walter Hirsch 1961; Szollosi-Janze
2001). Some scientific methods adapted well to NS, other less so. The strictly quantitative methods, for instance, were 
extremely serviceable to  the regime, whereas more individually oriented ones were deemed useless (Gotz in K.U.Z. 1988).
Aside from its pursuit o f military excellence. National Socialism also produced cutting-edge scientific research on cancer ' ;prevention that had no parallels until the 1960s (Proctor 1996, 1999). The regime promoted biodynamic farming, concern «
about pesticide use, vegetarianism, antivivisectionism, the regulation o f the use o f pesticides, asbestos and food dyes 
(Proctor, ibidem).73 German chemist O tto Flahn once mocldngly told a Canadian interviewer that Adolf Hitler was 
(Hermann 1982: 129)
in seiner Eebenführungfast ein Hei/iger Kein Alkohol, nicht einmal Tabak, kein Fkisch, keine Ftvundinnen. In einem Wort: Hitler ist ein 
eindeutiger Christ
- I
[almost a saint in his life conduct. No alcohol, never tobacco, no meat, no girlfiiends. In a word: Hitler is no doubt a .1
Claris t]
Nazi policy-makers grew pedantic in their striving to act up to their beliefs, but there was much more to tliat than 
mere pragmatism. The reason for this seemingly progressive attitude m ost likely was an almost pathological obsession with 
health and purity on the part of the Nazi leaders, the same wliich led to the extermination o f the “parasites” in the German 
body (Proctor 1996; 1999). The Reich's scientific programmes were mainly intended as a response to the massive demand of 
botli social and corporal cleanliness that had been stimulated by the Nazi establishment itself. In other words, Proctor has 
detected a common denominator for both the anti-tobacco program (pertaining to the domain of bodily purity) and the 
extermination o f  the Untermenschen (concerning the domain o f racial hygiene, i.e. the body politics and Germany’s “social
73 Incidentally, Goring’s laws for die protection o f wildlife still obtain (Arluke & Sax in Birke & Hubbard 1995).
73
7'* Mary Douglas
73 Robert N. Proctor (in Bayertz 1998, p. 36) observes that the 1937 official handbook of the Hitler Youth included a long chapter on Da/wi/Ps 
pnndple of natural selection, August Weismann kprinciple of the „immutability of the germ plasm ", and MendePs lams of genetics 
73 In the case of Japan, an important line of inquiry could be die investigation o f the motivations that kept Japanese geneticists from 
advocating eugenics (Homei 2000).
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body”), that is to say, a “homeopathic paranoia”.7 ' In a way, Nazism was less “applied biology” — in fact, a paraphrase o f 3
Bebel's definition of socialism as applied science — than “intensive therapy” o f a seriously diseased patient. Lifton envisions - ■
the Nazi state as a biocracy, that is, a theocracy ruled in accordance with pseudo-biological doctrines. Economic crisis, ^
financial banlcruptcy, and social malaise were attributed to pathologies that could be cured with desperate remedies. Such \
was the strength o f the metaphor of the “hygienic state” going hand in hand with the transfiguration of Hider as the 
“Robert K och o f  politics” (Koch was, o f course, the father o f bacteriology).
Likewise, Nazi support for genetic research was inspired by ideological as well as utilitarian considerations for, in 
the rhetoric o f the German geneticists o f the time, the genetic doctor (Erbar:f) could create a “healthy and resistant %
combination” instead o f helplessly watching defective human beings pass away as traditional doctors did (Deichmann and 
MüUer-Hill in Renneberg & Walker 1994). The revolutionary character of this doctrine with respect to the solution o f die 
social question is undeniable. Never before had a government so adamandy sought to transform into medical and biological 
issues problems that up until then had been imputed to social and liistorical circumstances (KoUoquien 1988; Thom  &
Rapoport 1989). But then again diis is precisely the origin of its malign appeal to die masses and to scientists alike. And not 
in Germany alone. Let me remind the readers that American scientific journals fully reported die development o f eugenics 
in Nazi Germany, but diis did not spark any public outcry (Seidelman 1989).
The Nazi regime did condition basic research in all those disciplines that were not immediately relevant to their 
war-effort and racial policies: biology, medicine, anthropology, genetics were boosted while others languished (Proctor 
1988). Bankrolling a branch o f  science to the detriment o f others is indeed a m ost efficacious means to distort the scientific 
ethos without directly indoctrinating a single scientist. As contended by Ute Deichmann (Deichmann 1996), biological -1
research throve in die Third Reich’s period73 and the majority o f  grants were not given to openly ideological projects or to 
members o f the Nazi party. In die last analysis the whole process of state-fimded scientific inquiry carried on almost as 
normal, despite the dismissal and imprisonment o f  political opponents and Jews from their ranks. German scientists’ 
commitment to a “pure science” unbiased by any political convictions was a convenient stand, more than a noble pursuit, 
and it sheds light on the intrinsic immorality o f a solely utilitarian perspective in which the individual’s worth is assessed on 
die basis o f economic considerations, that is, cost-benefit analysis in a condition o f scarcity o f  resources.
With die outbreak o f hostilities, things took a ghastly turn and researchers with a training in human genetics -i
collaborated with the regime in disproving the claims of those half-Jews who sought to escape death by pretending that their 
legal father was no t their natural father (Müller-Hill 1993). This seems all but inexplicable when we peruse the oral reports -g
of German doctors trained during the Third Reich, which show that the teaching o f Rassenkunde and Erblehre was far from C
being taken seriously by many students (KudHen 1990). Yet none stood up, and millions o f people were murdered, because 
of the absence o f public questioning of the scientific foundations o f those disciplines.
In a nutshell, the Third Reich was a scientific enterprise (Gasman 1971), not its obverse, and that could account for 
the absence o f dissent among scientists that, on the contrary, especially amidst physicians, joined the Party, and even the 
Waffen-SS, enthusiastically: by 1936, 42 percent o f all physicians in the 31-40 age-group were members o f  the Nazi Party 
(Glass 1997). Incidentally, this is just as true for Japan ( H o m e i ) 7 3 ,  Science simply concurred in the shaping o f tlie ver)  ^
concept o f German nation and German Volk. A pervasive Darwinian worldview together with a Romantic undertone on
the part o f many leading scientists — viz. Haeckel (Gasman 1971) — conspired to bring about the convergence between 
science’s and the nation’s destinies.
Paul Weindling (1989) has realized a thorough analysis o f this process o f scientization o f German politics and 
society, between the unification and the Nazi era, that might help us figure out the mechanisms at work in such a 
development. He maintains that, already during the nineteenth century, scientists had managed to acquire a leading role in 
matters o f  social policy and lifestyle, while simultaneously their disciplines grew ever more distant from the comprehension 
o f ordinary citizens, although a mass-market for scientific popularization was forming. The dominant trends in German 
science were essentially two: 1 . a tendency to professionalization and specialization leading to the constitution o f a 
technocratic elite, and 2. one more democratic and liberal in both its aims and means. Both trends combined to give shape 
to a prevalent view of scientific activities as the chief means to effect those drastic social changes that were called for to 
solve the multitude o f problems provoked by industrialization, urban migration, gentrification and population increase. In 
other words, in a country ruled by a leadership that was strongly adverse to the socialist movement with its claims that the 
status quo was mainly responsible for m ost social Uls, a scientific alternative could not but be welcome. The popularity o f 
science as a true panacea for the German malaise went hand in hand with the dismissal o f all clerical pretence to call the 
tune with regard to social policies and individual self-determination: scientists men high priests o f natun able to determine guidelines 
for a human society (Weindling 1989: 37).
Those few biologists and geneticists who abstained from getting involved In politics found it very difficult to get 
the message through to public opinion that genetics was applicable to man solely in principle, but that much more work had 
to be done before it could turn out as feasible enterprise. People frustrated by the economic crisis and by the bleak 
prospects would not listen (Graham 1977).
Having said that, let me reiterate that German eugenics was rooted not in fringe, lunatic science but in the mainstnam of 
nputah le genetics in mhat mas indisputable the most advanced scientific and technological society o f its day (Caplan in Sloan, 2000: 209), and 
that the benditaiy biologists men at the nseanh fo n t o f their time (Peter Weingart in Mendelsohn &- Nowotny 1984). It is fair to say 
that eugenics, racial hygiene and genetics at their inception could not be conceived as distinct fields (Makowski 1996).
In the end, as remarked by Benno MiiUer-Hill (in Bayertz 1998), German biologists knew what they were doing, 
they were wholly aware that the phenotype was only partially determined by the genotype, but they resolved to deem the 
fate o f  their country more important than tliat o f the individual patient and ignored the countervailing evidence. As a result, 
the majority o f doctors interviewed by Lifton approved o f the sterilization laws: they believed the laws to be consistent with 
prevailing medical and genetic knowledge concerning the prevention o f hereditary defects, though a few doctors had some 
hesitation about the laws’ compulsory features (Lifton, ibidem, 29). A widely employed manual written by Rudolf Ramm 
maintained that doctors had no longer to confine themselves to care—taking but were to become “cultivators o f  genes” 
(ibidem, 30). More people were convinced that genetic inheritance constituted an irreversible process o f deterioration o f the 
social fabric. The result was a conspicuous absence o f moral inhibition. Ultimately, what we now regard as aberrant was 
partly based on reasonable scientific deductions deriving from the knowledge available to scientists o f that time (Bronberg, 
RoU-Hensen, 1996).
This conclusion has a major impact on the question o f the social impact of the Genome Project. Modern scientists 
are not an altogether different sort o f professional from their German colleagues implicated in the Nazi atrocities. As the 
formers are not sociopaths or criminals, so the latter were not suspected o f harbouring any homicidal instinct — and 
justifiably, as they were by no means murderers and once they became West German citizens, they proved to be law-abiding. 
Formerly, they rather displayed a self-serving conception o f the scientific pursuit, as may be seen in Fischer’s statement 
(quoted in Labisch 1992: 190) that:
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Es ist ein besondem und seltenes Gluck jüreine an sich theontische Foischung, menu sie in eine Zeitjdllt, ivo die allgemeine Weltanschauung 
ihr anerkennend entgegenkommt, ja, mo sogarihrepraktischen Eigebnisse sofort a/s Unterla^ staatlicherMapîamen mllkommen sind
pt is a rare and special good fortune for a theoretical science to flourish at a time when the prevailing ideology 
welcomes it, and its findings can immediately serve the policy of the state]^?
The pity is that Benno Müller-Hill is probably correct when he states that the Nazi establishment would no t have 
had such a strong hold on the public opinion witliout tlie endorsement o f the scientific and intellectual elite (forward to 
Lerner 1992 51).
1
77 MüUer-HiU’s translation (1988)
76
1
3.5 FASCIST EUGENICS AND EUTHENICS
La qmstiom demografica (e poi eugenetka) non è quindi un aspetto accessom o mar^nak della conceqione e della politka nmssolintane: ne è, al 
contiw'io, un aspetto centrale
[‘T he demographic (and also eugenic) question is no accessory or marginal to Mussolini’s conception and politics: it 
constitutes, on the contrary, its core”]
Giorgio Israel and Pietro Nastasi (1998:116)
O f course then an no pun races left; not even the Jems have kept their blood unmingkd,.lRacel It is a feeling, nota nality; ninety five percent, 
at least, is afeeling. Nothing mill ever make me believe that biologically pun races can be shown to exist today.. .No such doctnne mill ever find 
wide acceptance hen in Italy.. .Nationalpride has no need of the delirium of race
Benito Mussolini (Bernardini 1977: 439)
Primo Levi, a survivor from Auschwitz and a foremost writer on tiiat experience and of the war as a whole, in “II
sistema periodico” (1975: 66), expresses his view o f how very many Italians managed to play along with fascism, and
simultaneously guard their independence of judgment, by describing a lieutenant:
One could easily notice that he mon that uniform with loathing (...). He spoke of fascism and mar with retkence and with a sinister gaiety that 
I  did not have difficulty to interpret. That was the irvnic gakty of an eniin generation of Italians, intelligent and honest enough to reject fascism, 
too sceptical to oppose it activety, too young to passive^ accept the looming tragedy and to give up their hopesfor the future; a generation to which 
I  myselfmould have belonged, ifit hadn Ï  been for the racial lams which pncociousty matured me and guided me in my choice.
W hat were the reasons behind tlie refusal on tlie part o f Italian officials to carry out Mussolini’s order to take 
prisoners all Jews living in the Italian-controlled areas. As a rule, besides the usual and this time m ost welcome Italian 
disorganization, the motivation normally adduced is tliat such an order was incompatible with the honour o f the Italian 
army (Hiden 1991); but there remains the question o f why two nations plagued by totalitarianism and disgraceful racist 
campaigns “inhabited different moral universes” (J. Steinberg in Hiden 1991: 59). I believe this gap can be partly illuminated 
by pointing to the way the Italian bio-medical profession dealt with the clash between the dominant Catholic morality and 
Mussolini’s appalling decision to indulge his ally, Adolf Hitler.
Applicheremo i rimedi pin drastici anche al pa fiente piu ribelle [“We shall apply the m ost extreme measures even to the 
most unruly patient”], Mussolini once said (Cosmacini, 1989: 147), presenting himself as the doctor o f the nation, one that 
in order to “cure” the Italian “race” was prepared to inject the most toxic poison into the blood of Italians, the poison being racism 
and anti-Semitism (Cosmacini, ibidem: 166). Mussolini would therefore remove from circulations dangerous individuals just 
as doctors would remove contagions (Horn 1994). These statements best encapsulate the difference in leadership stjde 
between Mussolini and Hitler, the former conceiving the art o f government in social-medical terms (Horn 1994), the latter 
understanding it as a socio-biological task (Kühl 1997). As a consequence the decision to exterminate the Jews was a natural 
development o f NS politics in Germany, as opposed to Italy, where it was largely opposed even within tlie party ranks.
The conventional view o f the relationship between science and racism in pre-1938 Italy has always been as 
unconvincing as it is hard to puU apart. It goes like this. Before Benito Mussolini made the decision to toady up to Adolf 
Hitler and enact racial administrative and juridical measures against Coloureds and Jews, Italy was virtually free from racist 
slants, but afterwards tliose scientists who complied with Mussolini’s instructions did so out o f mere opportunism and 
careerism. However, the amount o f evidence that has been gathered over the past years reveals a rather different, multi-
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faceted, and dismaying picture, one in which Italian scientists, far from matching the official image o f sensibility, tolerance, 
and moral integrity, are in many cases portrayed as precursors if not inspirers o f the fascist racial laws.
That Italian-st}de eugenics was a far cry from that pursued by several Protestant countries is still out o f question.
Notably, the president o f  the Italian association o f  hygiene, Achille Sclavo, admonished his colleagues not to pursue the 
dangerous and delusive path o f “human zootechnics” because the human population is not cattle. This view was endorsed 
by Corrado Gini, the president o f  the Italian society of genetics and eugenics (SIGE), who was to become personally 
involved in the drafting o f  the racial laws, but earlier on had argued tliat it would be impossible to tell the m ost fit from the 
less fit (PogHano 1984). This was likely due less to strong personal convictions than out o f compliance with the official 
political and religious course lain by the government and by the Vatican, two institutions that were keenly pro-nataHst and 
anti-malthusian. The medical and biological professionals remained wary of all attempts to introduce in Italy social 
Darwinism and Weismannian-Mendelian genetic determinism’», uniquely apposite to support those harsh negative eugenic 
measures (Schneider in Adams 1990) deemed necessary for the evolutionary betterment o f  human population (Vogt 1997).
As a rule, Latin biologists refused this stance on both moral and scientific grounds, and rather opted for the improvement o f 
puériculture, clinical treatment, statistical surveys and classifying, and the divulgation o f basic information on prophylactic 
social hygiene (Gianferrari 1945; Maiocchi 1999). In so doing they confirmed that ideological and moral tenets heavily 
condition the way scientists look at data.
UtPortodossia s’impose, la quale richiedeva rituali anatemicontm le “abeirafiom”dellapseudosdenqa anglosassone
[An orthodoxy prevailed, which called for ritual anathemas against the “aberrations” of Anglo-Saxon pseudo-science] y
Claudio Pogliano 1984 (82)
Tliis phenom enon was not limited to Italy. In  Germany and Anglo-Saxon countries it was Ufe-scientists who 
headed the eugenic movement, as opposed to Italy, France, Spain, and Latin America where the influence o f clinicians and 
pediatricians predominated (Adams 1990; Drouard 1992; Leonard 1992; Pauly 1993; AmbroseUi 1994; Beltrao Marques 
1994; Schneider 1994; Carol 1995; Gonzalez & Pelaez 1999; Glick, Puig-Samper, Ruiz 1999; Persell 1999; Cleminson 2000).
The choice made by Italian professionals and fascist authorities was quite reasonable on another count, that is to say that 
Italy was, they thought, extraordinarily heterogeneous, and a racial transformation could no t possibly rely on deterministic 
laws. As in Japan (Frülistück 1998; Homei 2000), the establishment felt the need to improve the “stock” as rapidly as 
possible in order to compete with the hegemonic nations and this could only be achieved through a "dynamic theory, rather 
than static, o f race and heredity... [that allorvs for the] elevation o f relatively inferior races through various cycles o f heredity” (Mussolini, as 
quoted by Gillette, 2002: 54).
It is noteworthy that, as in Germany, the earlier liberal governments had already planned m ost o f the health 
policies brought into effect in a much harsher form by fascism, thanks to the pressure o f progressive doctors who tended to 
conflate politics, environmental prophylaxis and divulgation o f basic notions of hygiene amidst the population (Widmann 
2001). Fascism amplified an already established economistic and biological view of life, health, and illness, and promoted 
hygiene as a cultural habit (habitus) together with the idea of the inheritability o f deviant behaviour (Widmann 2001).
Seldom were suggestions advanced tliat measures such as pre-emptive sterilization, eugenic abortion, birtli-control, or 
certificates o f marriage eligibility after passing the premarital examinations, could find suitable application in Italy as well, 
nor did the popular predilection for meliorism, intended as a set o f interventions in the social environment, ever give way to
73 The Lamarckian paradigm that postulated that genetic traits could be acquired and passed on through inheritance was challenged 
and disproved at the end of the 19 :^ century by August Weismann, who proved with almost absolute certainty -  there should not be 1|
room for absolute certainty in science -  that a change in phenotypic characters (body tissues) would not affect reproductive 
(genotypic) characters.
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Maiocchi (1999: 15)
75 Go-dkectoi- o f the “Archivio fascista di medicina politica” (Maiocchi 1999: 39)
30 Gillette (2002) points out tliat biological racism would be taken up only by a tiny minority o f Italian scientists who were much 
more inclined to spiritual racism .
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instances o f  genetically-oriented negative or positive eugenics (Maiocchi 1999). In a nutshell, neither medicalised control nor ' ï
Galtonianism became truly popular in fascist Italy. ;
There seems to have been a certain measure o f awareness, even among the fascist advocates o f political medicine, ;
that, in tlie words o f  Ritialdo P e l l e g r i n i 7 5  ^  socletà umane sono tmppo complesse, e almeno in parte irrafionali, per essete trattate con i soli î
concetti delta medicina [“human societies are too complex and partly irrational, to be treated by means o f medical concepts 4
alone”]. O n the other hand, it is important to reiterate that it was probably just a matter o f circumstances that impeded :i-
ÎItalian eugenics from developing its potentially pernicious aspects. Thus, for instance the Neapolitan eugenicist Leonardo 
Bianchi remarked that II nostro paese è tnppo sentimentale, ed io partecipo alia ripugnanr^ a dei piu per un intervento chimrgico [“Our 
country is too sentimental, and I myself share the common revulsion at the idea o f a surgical intervention”] (Maiocchi 1999: $
24) and the psychiatrist and anthropologist Enrico MorseUi referred to sterilization as a beneficial practice but also observed 
that
Soltanto una lunghissima evolufione dei costumi e dei sentimenti deipopoli civilipotrà imderne mena ostica e tepulsim I’idea efame riconoscere 
la relativa opportunita pratica nella estensione necessaria per un conpleto programma eugeneiico
[Only a very long evolution o f customs and sentiments o f civilised people could render less unpleasant and repulsive the 
idea [of systematic sterilization] and show its relative practical expediency to the extent necessary for a complete eugenic 
programme].
However, Realpolitik eventually gained the upper hand over scientific rigor and several Italian biologists, 
anthropologists, demographers, and statisticians did not refrain fi-om arranging populations according to a racial hierarchy, 
in spite o f tlie unlikelihood that any theory could ever make sense o f the somatic variability o f Italians in terms o f biological 
homogeneity and superiority. A solution was found that employed the notions o f etnia (ethnic group) and stirpe (stock, Sippe 
in German), instead of race — the Italians had been conceived of as a spiritual, or historical, race30, — but substantially 
retained m ost o f the unpleasant features o f much non-Latin eugenics, such as a drive to domination over the inferior races 
(those inhabiting tlie Italian colonies), a creeping anti-Semitism and the prohibition to marry a member of an inferior race.
All this added up to an obsession with racial purity (Israel & Nastasi 1998). It was not a matter o f annihilation o f  the inferior |
by the superior, but of the necessity to secure the predomination o f the latter over the former. Alas! many Italian scientists 
co-operated with the regime in the implementation o f its colonial and segregationist plans, with studies ranging from topics 
such as the effectiveness of the Mediterranean diet for the enhancement o f the stirpe and as a contribution to food-autarchy 
(Israel, Nastasi 1998), to the statistical-demographic demonstration o f the senescence of the French and British nations.
I have previously laid out my hypothesis that utilitarianism goes a long way to explain the success o f the eugenics
pursuit. Italy was no exception. For instance, in 1922 neurologist Ettore Levi founded the Istituto d’Igiene, Previden^ ed
Assisten^a Sociale, designed to devise all the appropriate means to successfully fight all sorts o f “social diseases” . Its
exponents and promoters — one of them was Benedetto Croce — were neither particularly conservative nor overly
innovative. However their moderate background did not prevent tliem from talcing a rather perilous tack. In fact, the
institute’s official bulletin featured an editorial that went like this:
Nessrma conquista, sia nel campo spirituale che in quello politico ed economm, è infatti concepibile se prima non si modificano le cause che 
diminuiscono le possibilità prvdutüve della mirabile macchina-uomo fonte unka e prima di ogniprogressa civile
[No achievement, in the spiritual, political, as well as in the economic realm, is conceivable without altering those factors 
that reduce the productivity of that admirable man-machine that is the primary source o f all civil progress]
j
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HuiTian life was more and more regarded as a marketable good. So much so that Pietro Capasso contended that as
Italy was poor in raw materials, it ought to count on human resources and therefore had a duty to protect them and select
tliem so as to maximize its efficiency and financial return (Pogliano 1984). Much to the doctors’ delight, medicine was
mobilised to rebuild the Italian population and fulfil Mussolini’s imperial dreams. Subsequently, medicine extended its
confines and prerogatives to include economic, juridical, moral, social, and political functions. Benito Mussolini in 1931
addressed the Italian doctors with extremely flattering words:
VoipoMe andatv casa per casa e compere tutte queste deboleq^ inevitabi/i dello spirito umano [ ,.] . Io sono pnfondamente cominto che il 
nostw modo di mangan, di vestin, di lavoratv e di donnm, tutto il complcsso delle nostn abitudini quotidiane, deve essere riformato. [...]. I  
medici demno insistete perché la vita si svolga in forma piu rafionale.
[You go from household to household and straighten out all these inevitable weaknesses of the human spirit. [...]. I am 4
deeply convinced that our way of eating, dressing, worlring and sleeping, the whole of our everyday habits, must be 
reformed. [...]. Doctors must insist tliat life be lived in a more rational form]
Pogliano (1984: 86-87)
Biologists and doctors alike were enjoined to support the State, which claimed for itself functions that had 
formerly been the prerogative o f heads o f  family, district and country doctors, and curates (Pogliano 1984). Once again, we 
see the paradigmatic shift from tlie individual concern for one’s health to the rational government o f  collective health. That 
doctors devotedly pursued this hygienic utopia provides further evidence o f their tendency to suffer from a combination o f 
professional ambition and idealistic delusions that would lead them to a missionary commitment to the enactment o f 
illiberal policies. Life, health and death become commodified in liberal and totalitarian countries alike (Bonetta 1990). The 
difference is in scale and in the means o f enforcement.
With the advent of fascism, these objectives took on a different flavour, one altogether compatible with the
exigencies o f  a totalitarian regime. “Reasons o f State” finally prevailed over more ethical concerns, so that the report
presented by Ettore Marchlafava on the occasion of the constitution of the ONMI, the Opera Nafionale Maternità ed Infanfia
(National Agency for Maternity and Infancy) read as follows (Maiocchi 1999: 30):
Im protefione, Passistenqa- della matemità e deU’infanfia non è soltanto un dovete della solidarietà umana, della carità reciprvca, confortato nei 
crvdenti dal sentimento religioso [...]  ma anche un alto dovete sodale, il cui adempimento deve essere diretto e vigilato dallo Stato, perché dalla 
efficacia delle opetv, volte al bene della matemità e dell’itrfanfia, dipendono il srcccedersi digenernfioni sane e ford, il miglioramento della ran;pa, 
la efficien:^ , la prvsperità materiale, intellettuale e morale, I’onorv e la dignità della nafione
[Tire protection and care of motherhood and childhood is not merely a duty of human solidarity, mutual charity, 
reinforced among the believers by their religious sentiment [...] but also a high social duty, whose fulfilment must be 
directed and watched over by the State, because on the effectiveness of deeds concerned about the good of maternity 
and infanc}  ^depend the future o f strong and healthy generations, tlie betterment of the race, the efficiency, the material, 
intellectual and moral prosperity, and the honour and dignity of the nation]
1
Roberto Roberti in 1929 thus commented on the obligation o f citizens to serve the State:
From the principle.. .that work is a social duty, and that the development ofproduction is an essential element of the life arrd progress of the 
Nation, derives the consequence that the bodily integrity, health, and physical resistance of the rvorker constitute a "good” that must be protected, 
not only and notprincipallyfor individual ends, butfor the ends of the superior interest of the Nation.
Horn (1994: 41)
Eventually, Benito Mussolini came to the conclusion that Italy had to take its cue from Germany, and tlierefore 
needed a “Manifesto o f  the racist scientists” which was then made public on July 14th 1938 and comprised ten theses that I W
summarise as follows:
1. Human races exist. The existence o f the human races is no  longer an abstraction o f our spirit, but corresponds to a 
reality that is material and perceptible with our senses.
2 . There exist large races and small races.
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i3. The concept o f race is a purely biological concept. It is therefore based on other considerations than the concepts o f  4
a people and o f  a nation, founded essentially on historic, linguistic, and religious considerations.
4. The majority o f the population o f contemporary Italy is Aryan in origin and its civilization is Aryan. This population 
with its Aryan civilization has lived for several millennia in our peninsula; very little remains o f the civilization o f the 
pre-Aryan civilization.
5. The influx of huge masses o f men in historical times is a legend.
6 . There exists by now a pure “Italian race”,
7. I t is time that the Italians proclaim themselves frankly racist. [...]. The conception of racism in Italy ought to be "?■
essentially Italian and its direction Aryan-Nordic. [ .. .] .. . this means to elevate the Italian to an ideal o f  superior self- 
consciousness and of greater responsibility.
8 . I t is necessary to make a clear distinction between the European (Western) Mediterraneans on one side and tlie 
Eastern [Mediterraneans] and the Africans on the other.
9. Jews do not belong to the Italian race. O f the Semites who in the course o f centuries have landed on the sacred soil 
o f our country nothing in general has remained. [...]. The Jews represent the only population which has never 
assimilated in Italy because it is composed of non-European racial elements, absolutely different from the elements 
from which the Italians have originated.
10. The purely European physical and psychological characteristics ought not to be altered in any way. Union is 
admissible only with European races.
The inconsistency o f the main tenets o f this manifesto with respect to the theories in vogue among Italian 
scientists was immediately apparent. A plain case o f political imposition had clearly talcen place. Mussolini felt that the fascist 
revolution was failing in one o f its goals, that o f making die Italians less “nice” and at once tougher, implacable, detestable. That 
is, “masters”, as was pointed out by Mussolini to count Galeazzo Ciano, the duce’s son-in-law (Maiocchi 1999: 227). Racism 
and colonial apartheid were thus meant to form this uomo fascista, the new fascist man (Gillette 2002). Incidentally, two o f the 
scientists who signed this declaration retracted when they were informed-about its precise content, a further example o f  how 
fascism exploited science to prop up its power, and of how easily other scientists could disclaim the cardinal tenets o f their 
own disciplines.
The repudiation o f at least part o f what allegedly was the official position o f Italian science is not in the least a 
puzzle. Aryanism in particular was loathed because o f its historical, cultural, and ideological connections with a tradition that 
Italians had ceaselessly fought for centuries. Embracing the Aryan dogma was equivalent to dismissing hundreds o f years of 
continual struggle against Teutonic culture, embodied by fire Barbarians, the Lanzknecht mercenaries and die Protestants, 
and culminated with the Independence Wars (Risorgimento) o f the previous century and, finally, that Great War which had 
claimed such a huge number o f  Italian lives for the sake o f the unity o f  the nation. How could Italians ever forget that, 
especially as they were being bombarded by a massive nationalist propaganda campaign centred on the revival and nostalgia 
o f those epic struggles?
Besides Giuseppe Sergi, a foremost Italian anthropologist, who had reminded Italians how Etruscans had once 
driven the Aryans away from Italy, Mussolini himself had called the Aryans a “progeny of savages” (Israel & Nastasi, 1998) 
and National Socialism a revolution o f the old German tribes of the primeval forest against the Latin civilization o f  Rome 
(Gillette 2002: 46). He apparently changed his mind or, most likely, he simply feigned an identity o f  views with Hitler that 
did not exist. This is what we deduce from a disconcerting testimony of Mussolini’s Realpolitik, namely, a letter he sent to his 
sister Edvige and his niece Rosetta concerning his anti-Semitic turn (GireUi 2001: 317):
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La pmità della rae(pa in questo popolo sul quale sono passate tante invasioni e che ha assotbiîo tante genti dei quattro punti catdinali, e il 
pencolo semlta in una nafione corne la nostra dove persino l'altafinantya, e perfino se manovrata dagli ebm, non puo non diventan qualcosa di ff
cattolico (io, tra patvntesi, so che tu e altte persane délia tua famiglia aiutate gli ebivi, e non me ne displace, e pensa che coâ potete constataie 
l’assoluta labilità delk nostn leggi rar^ fiali) sono evidentemente fandonie da lasciar soivete a certi nlatorl M a se le cimstanqe mi avessen 
poitato a un asse RomaMosca an fiché a un Asse Roma-Berlino, avtei forse ammannito ai lavoratori italiani.. J ’equivalente fandonia 
dell’etica stakanovista e délia félicita in essa racchiusa.
[Tlie racial purity o f this people [the Italian] that has endured many invasions and absorbed so many other peoples from -ï
the four corners o f the world, and the Semitic threat in a nation like ours where even high finance, even if manoeuvred 4
by Jews, cannot but become Catholic to some extent (I myself, incidentally, know that you and your relatives give aid to Ï
Jews, and I don’t mind, and I think that in this way you can observe tlie absolute evanescence of our racial laws), is 
evidently nonsense that will be dealt with by certain bills’ proponents. But if circumstances should have led me to an 
axis Rome-Moscow, instead o f an Axis Rome-Berlin, then I would perhaps have cajoled the Italian workers.. .the 
equivalent nonsense o f Stakhanovism and the happiness it involves]
In public he naturally held a different opinion:
a pim  Italian race is alnady in existence. This pmnouncement [tests] on the very pure blood-tie that tmites present-day Italians. .. This ancient 
pufity of blood is the Italian nation’sgreatest title of nobility.
Connor (1994:194)
But, at the end o f  the day, was there a veritable eugenic movement in Italy, or was it all part and parcel o f 
Mussolini’s political plans? It seems to me that the answer is twofold. Italian eugenics developed independently within the 
cauldron o f  Latin eugenics for the greater stress placed upon environmental factors and a wide though not unchallenged 
dissent on the viability o f  negative eugenic measures (Schneider and Stepan in Adams 1990). These divergences were 
certainly not o f an exclusive scientific nature but had much to do with nationalistic bents (Carole 1995). Wlien Mussolini 
and liis minions acknowledged the usefulness o f eugenics as a scientific and social ideology that would reinforce the hold of 
fascism over the Italian society without fraying its relationship with the Vatican, they saw that it evolved in a moderate 
direction until the raison dE ta t prevailed. That deliberation turned out to be an egregious miscalculation and concurred to 
spell the end of fascism. Anti-Semitism and Nordic racism met with indifference, if not open hostility, on the part o f the 
scientific community, the Church, and public opinion that never forgave Mussolini his acquiescence with German scientism -i
and rabid racism^b The fascist leadership, true to the omnipresent fascist slogan — me ne frego (literally, “I don’t care”) — 
carried on with tiiis widely opposed plan and, in addition to other crimes against humanity, attracted further opprobrium by 
ordering the authorities to assemble all Jews and send them to Nazi extermination camps. This rather foolish intention o f 
waging war against all traditional institutions is testified to by Guido Landra, one o f the leading theorists o f racism in fascist 
Italy, when he explains that:
A  monopoly of Italian scientists mould be dangerous — especially new conver'ts — because monopoly means school, and school means University, 
and the Italian Unimsities are enemies of racism, thy ate proponents of Jewish intellectualism; in a word [thy ate] menacittg dissidents.
Gillette (2002; 67)
The patent futility o f  pursuing eugenic policies in Italy meant that one of the m ost ambitious social plans ever 
attempted, namely the transformation of a non-militaristic country into an imperial power, and o f  its family-oriented citizens 
into war-machines, was bound to fail.
31 Italians were not strangers to racism, but apparently their racism was strong enough to tolerate exterminatory practices.
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4. SCIENCE, UTOPIANISM, AND THE ENGINEERING OF LIFE
La philantmpie, e’est-à-dm la méthode philosophiqe d’aimer et servhfhumanité, est plutôt votre bannière que la charité, qui est le devoir 
chrétien d’aimer et secourir son prochain. [...]. La charité est satisfaite quand elle a soulagé l’inforiune ; la philantropie ne peut l’être qtce 
lorsqu’elle l’a prévenue [...], Les améliorations, son ouvrage [du philantrope], loin de cesser avec lui, se tranforme, tôt ou tard en institutions
«Rapport sur les travaux de la Société de morale chrétienne» (1821) (Anne-Laure Simomiot, 1999; 28)
Wir berqvecken hinesrvegs, eine neue mertschliche Rosse, einen Übermenschen %% schaffen, sondem nur die Defekten Untermenschen 
allmâhlich drmh rvillkürliche Sterilitat der Trdger schlechter Keime rqr beseitigen, und dafiir besserem sofialere, gesundere und glücklichere 
Mertschen •qu eirrer immergrôferen Vermehrung iqr veranlassen
[We by no means aim to shape a new human race, a overman, but only to gradually eliminate the defects o f the unfit 
through enforced sterility of the carrier of inferior germ-plasm and instead to cause more sociable, healthier and happier 
people to multiply]
Swiss psycliiatrist August Forel in 1892 (Domer in Thom & Mitja Rapoport 1989 193-194)
The line betrveen paternalism and idealism on the left is a thin one. On the one side lies the belief that the left knows best. A t its root is the 
notion of false consciousness, meaning that those who act in a certain way do so because they are unable to perceive the objective riatrm and 
source of their opptesâon. On the other side is the hope we can build a better world i f  people look beyond their individual interests to the 
collective good. A t its root is the evangelical notion that a better world is possible i f  people rvould only have the confide tree to fightfor it.
Gary Younge, The capped crusader. The Guardian, Saturday October 4, 2003
According to Giorgio Cosmacini (1997) the nineteenth century was the centurj)' o f health. The eternal struggle o f 
doctors against suffering and siclcness was dramatically intensified by pauperism and proletarianisation, which accompanied 
the industrial era. The medical profession became aware that the progress they championed at times acted as an important 
pathogenic cause, especially when the organism was subjected to taxing working hours under unhealtliy if not appalling 
conditions. Hence tlie genuinely idealistic proclamation o f Augusto Murri, one o f the greatest clinician in Italian history, that 
troi ci schieriamo tra colotv che combattono piu ardentemente per un ordine nuovo [we side with those who fight m ost fervently for a new 
order], meaning that the scientific identity o f  medical professionals had to be integrated with authentic humanitarianism and 
secularly missionary commitment (Cosmacini 1997: 349). Many agreed that “science and humanity” would be the universal 
m otto o f the century.
Analogous aspirations have been described by Jack Elks in “The physician-legislators o f  France” (1990). In  this
work the author points out that between French defeat in 1871 and tlie WWI French medical professionals sympathised
with the republican Left and acted as the legislators’ “spiritual guides”. Their active participation in French political life led
to the unusual circumstance in which doctors exercised a disproportionate influence over French political life. Ellis also
provides additional data that point to a wider and growing trend, taking place all over the world. Physicians, drawing on
their intimate awareness o f tlie Hfe conditions of the poor and the outcast, came to believe they could and had to intervene
to change the status quo. For example Henri H enrot is reported as saying in a speech he delivered at Reims in 1890 tliat;
You ask yourself with growing arrxiety whether all these maladies that cause the physical and moral degeneration ofmen, women, and children 
are truly necessary in modem society, andyou askyourselfwhether there is not a cure to prevent these unfortunate peoplefromfalling so fast arrd 
so far. A t  this point, you are conscious of the social role that you are called upon to play.. A s  a hygenist,you realirye that you have a duty to 
make a supreme effort to stop the development ofdiseases that can be prevented
Quoted by Ellis (1990: 47-48)
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Thus, in Germany, numerous doctors joined nationalist movements for the German unification and some fought 
on the 1848 barricades. In Italy and Iberia, doctors commonly exhibited advanced political ideas that they sought to put into 
practice by fostering social hygienic policies. Curiously, besides Turkey, Russia, and China, the greater incidence o f activism 
among medical professionals was to be found in countries with a Latin background which, incidentally, never adopted 
eugenic measures. Among otliers Ellis mentions José Rigal in Manila, Juan B. Justo in Argentina, the translator o f das Kapital 
into Spanish, and subsequently Salvador Allende and Ernesto “Che” Guevara. The thrust o f  his argument is that doctors 
identified preventive medicine as a formidable means o f enhancement of laypeople’s standards o f living and interpreted the 
role o f  the State as aiding tlie sick and the poor. To corroborate his point Ellis refers to Jules Guérin, editor o f  L a Gasyette 
médicale de Paris who held that only doctors understood the defects of social oiganiryation and the means by which to improve the physical and 
moral condition o f the lower classes (Ellis, ibidem: 8). It was arguably a sincere concern for medicine and the well being o f  people 
at large' that induced French physicians to enter the political arena and form a specific, progressive political agenda. They 
were no mavericks, but successful practitioners, who felt compelled to apply tiieir remarkable skills on a larger scale. A 
similar case o f social engagement o f scientists has been analysed by Colin A. Russel (1983), and took place in early X IX 
century England, when a close relationship between science and medicine on one hand and republican ideals on tlie other 
was formed. Many scientists acted with alacrity as radical reformers, regardless o f the damages that could derive from such a 
stance in a socielyr that fervidly contrasted radicalism in politics (Russel op. cit.).
In turn-of-the-century South Africa, the special aptitude o f doctors in politics was particularly dear to Darley-
Hartley, the founder, owner and editor o f die South African Medical Record (SAMR), an avowed eugenicist who openly
subscribed to the organic view of society that was extremely en vogue in those years (Klausen 1997: 34):
it seems to us that medical training has much to do with the attainment of political eminence ly medical men. First, we must have higher 
education.. .Second, receive logical training,. .The man accustomed to diagnose the diseases of the individual body, and to guide his therapeutic 
according ,^ consciously or uncorrsciousty follows the same lines o f thought in diagnosing arrd treating the ailment of the body politic. Again, 
medical men have an enormous advantage over almost all others, in thefact that their daily work brings them irrto contact with every class o f the 
people, gives them a knowledge of the wants of all... And, lastly, your medical man soon finds ord in practice bow disastrous “nibbling” 
treatment is, and in politics he invariably goes right through a qrrestion arrd takes up the responsibility of a defirrite positionjust as he has to do 
when he isface to face with a care requirirrg operation
A change took place in France and in South Africa at around the same time, i.e. in the 1910s (Rich 1990), when the 
newly elected physicians displayed more conservative sympatliies, as their status was secure and their social and political 
battles had been successful (EUis ibidem). In France nationalism strongly interfered with their political career when, charmed 
by mounting chauvinism, they started worrying that Germany could eventually subdue France. The final blow to their 
idealism was m ost certainly their professionalisation, with the concomitant surfacing o f obscure jargon, monopoly of 
practice, adherence to norms and interests strictly internal to the professional category, and so forth (Diego Gracia in D ou 
1987). In Germany Charles E. McClelland (Torstendahl 1990) has detected an analogous shift towards corporatism deriving 
from professionals’ pride in their expertise and erudition, as well as their acceptance of the inevitability o f a strong presence 
o f the State, which could also strengthen their social status.
Now, my contention is that since the beginning o f the 20h century bio-medical scientists have picked up the 
discourse o f scientific activism and that this event could lead to the intrusion o f tlie State in the private sphere. One clear 
example o f  this in advanced democracies is the activity o f McGill university’s professors between the turn o f the past 
century and the beginning o f  the Second World War. Sebastian Normandin (1998) explains that they acted as pundits, 
committed through lecturing and newspapers articles to the propagation o f eugenics as a miraculous but scientific panacea 
to all m odern social ills. Those leading biologists who in the 1930s issued the statement entitled “Social biology and 
population improvement” were likewise progressive. They claimed tliat (Freeden 1979: 650):
if
I
I
4
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The most important genetic objectives, fiom a socialpoint of view, ate the imptvvement of those genetic charactetisUcs which make (a) for health,
(b) for the complex called intelligence, and (c) for those temperamental qualities which favour fellow feelings and social behaviour rather than 
those (today most esteemed by many) which makefor personal success, as success in understood atpresent
Likewise, the “Geneticists’ Manifesto”, published in Edinburgh in 1939, stated;
This will m ult in its being regarded as a honour and a privilege, i f  not a duty, for a mother', married or unmarried, or for a couple, to have the |
best children possible, both in respect of their upbringing and of their generic endowment, even where the latter would mean an artificial — though 
alwcrys voluntary — control over the processes of parentage
Bajema (1976; 265)
What seems self-evident is that the liberal view of die relation of science to society is a comparatively recent 
acquisition o f scientists’ professional ethos. This view regards scientists’ social engagement as m ost advisable to the extent 
that it prevents bad policies from being implemented, popularises the latest discoveries, and stands out against sloppy or 
biased scholarship (Dunn 1962). But it is also one that does not overlook the fact that to become spokespeople and seek to 
shed light on matters concerning the public at large also involves the temptation, at times irresistible, to poach on other 
professionals’ preserves and lose both objectivity and the sense o f proportion (Nelkin & Lindee 1995)
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Ideology and hegemony have oftentimes made a crucial impact on science (Nader 1996, 1997). Emblematic in this 
sense are two manifestoes and a speech made at the beginning o f the Great War. Tlie speech was the one delivered by Max 
Planck at Berlin University on October 15‘*> 1914 and, by means o f trite but effective rhetorical devices such as the 
poeticising o f death and o f  the spilling o f blood for the sake of one’s country, it called upon young scientists to sacrifice 
everything to their Fatherland (Haberer in Cerruti & Fazio 1976: 40). The then fiercely antagonistic German and French 
scientists compiled the two manifestoes. In their Aufr'uf an die Kultrmvelt (4 October 1914), the Germans addressed 
international public opinion accusing France and Great Britain o f consorting with Russians and Serbians and unleashing 
Negroes and Mongols against the white race (Haberer, ibidem). The French responded with their Les allemandes et la science • ;f
(1916) in which they stated that German science was inferior to French science and explained why in their opinion it was so.
In the United States several German scientists were prosecuted as spies or interned and generally American scientists did 
not vouch for them  (Allen 1978). This confrontation and mutual ostracism was to last longer than the discord between 
politicians o f  the two sides.
Besides nationalism anotlier powerful ideology was scientism and its attendant conviction that what is teclmically 
feasible must be done. A disquieting example o f where a scientific mindset unaided by adequate ethical reflection may lead is 
Vanevar Bush’s reaction to the dropping o f the atomic bombs at the end of WWII (cited by Toulmln in CIBA 1972: 30):
that time I  knew that civilisation faced an utterly new era, and I f i t  that it might as rvellface it squarely.. Jffor no other reason I  would 
justify the use of the bomb at Hiroshima and Nagasaki because it was the only wcry in which the dilemma could be presented with adequate 
impact on Wor'ld Consciousness.
Now, this phenom enon has huge implications in an age o f genetic engineering and persistent racism. The social 
perception o f  the Ufe-science and their social function appear as massively influenced by how biomedical scientists interpret 
their social role through science advocacy and scientific activism, which in turn conditions society’s self-perception. The 
next chapter explores this intriguing phenomenon.
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4.1 AKIRA UNBOUND: SCIENCE, MYSTICISM AND UTOPIANISM IN POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES
It is not unprecedentedfor fringe groups to serve as incubators for concepts that would not be acceptable in mainstream science: think of the 
A im  Shinrikyo sect and its ventures in biological warfare. [...]. The Raëlians have a knack for drawing in pleasant, attractive, professionally 
successful people in scientific or technical fields. The Raelians ate just a bunch ofpeople who took literally the cliché that science is
replacing religion.
“A grieving family hopes to replace a lost child. A genetics-obsessed sect dreams of achieving immortality. Is this how 
human cloning will begin?” (Margaret Talbot, The New York Times Magazine, February 04, 2001: p. 40)
I  believe with Schopenhauer that one of the strongest motives that leads to art and science is escape from everyday Ife with its crudity arrd 
hopeless dreariness, from thefetters of one’s own ever-shifting desires
Albert Einstein (Goldman 1989:149)
What I ’m getting at is that i f  you examine the history ofscience you can see that it has been manipulated in the name ofpolitics and religon.
The N afis did this. There !r been lots of sham science that in retrospect was misguided. A nd this has brought untold harm to society. Granted 
you’re a person who closely gathers evidence, but most people, told by authority figures that something is “scientific”, swallow it whole arrd go 
along rvith whativerthy say. Arrd to me that’s very frghtening
Muraltami Haruld speaking to Hiroyuki Kano, an AUM-Shinrikyu member claiming tliat he wanted to mathematically 
prove Buddhism (Murakami 2001; 222)
The weakening o f Shintoism following defeat in WWII and the slow but progressive decline o f Buddhism among 
the young generations, has produced a moral void for thousands o f Japanese (Kaplan & Marshal 1996). Simultaneously, the 
traditional religions have given ground to occultism, mysticism, and guruism. In 1993 there were 231,019 registered sects in 
Japan and two hundred million members, even though the Japanese population amounts to less than 130,000,000 people f.
(Murray Sayle, The New Yorker, April 1, 1996). Many Japanese simply join more than one religious organization, indifferent 
to conceptual and ethical inconsistencies. In fact, these new religions enjoy the clear advantage o f not having to prove any 
consistency o f behaviour or doctrine. They sometimes profess a millenarian faith in an incipient new wçrld order and, as a 
rule, they merge divergent traditions in a heterogeneous hotchpotch.
We m ust also add that, historically, in Japan pluralism had little prospect to become conducive to the shaping o f 
one’s own identity. Conformity, acquiescence, deference and devotion to parents and superiors, have always embodied the 
cardinal Confucian virtues. After the war, all o f a sudden millions o f people found themselves catapulted into democracy, 
without having the slightest idea o f what that entailed. In a word, the institution o f democracy was introduced without 
laying the foundations of a culture o f democracy (Maruyama 1969). These factors may in part explain the triumph of 
apocalyptic visions translated into manga and cults.
Wliat does manga stand for? This term literally means “mocking, derisive image”, that is to say, a comic or a 
cartoon. Mangaka is the cartoonist. The importance of manga in Japanese culture cannot be overstated. Suffice it to say that 
Asahara Shoko himself, the leader o f a sect o f  techno-terrorists called Aum-Shinri Kyo® ,^ whose nature and aims constitute 
the main topic o f  this chapter, drew a manga entitled Metsubô no hi [the D oom ’s Day] giving away what he meant to 
accomplish (Manzenreiter 1995). The popular belief had it that the saikimatsu [the end o f the century], would coincide with 
the Jidaimatsu [the end o f time, apocalypse] and this was unquestionably due also to the enormous success o f  Nostradamus’ 
prophecies in Japan (Manzenreiter 1995)
Î
:
« A » stands for creation, « U » for continuation, « M » for destruction 
®3 Much of Japanese science fiction, from the turn of the century on, has had a distinctly and memorable bleak view of society, as is common with Western 
science fiction as well Indeed, the twentieth century in general has long been considered the age ofthe anti-utopia (Napier 1993: 329)
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The m ost representative comic o f this kind is arguably Akira, which first appeared in Young Magazine in
December 1982. The protagonist, struggling in a post-nuclear Neo-Tokyo (completely destroyed by a nuclear experiment
and then rebuilt), is Kaneda. Kaneda is some sort o f bôsôqpku (from bo violent, so to run, and tribe) that is, the member
of a gang o f  reckless drivers that in Japan form a real subculture. Bôsôt^ oku defy police authority, use Chinese characters for
their gangs ta name, wear uniforms o f kamikaze pilots, all symbols usually associated with extreme right-wing political
movements and yakuza members (Standish in Martinez 1998). Kaneda is koha - macho and gallant — and displays makoto — j
purity o f motives — which is what legitimises his use o f violence in the eyes o f tlie reader. Isolde Standish remarks that
His qualities of efficiency and loyalty, combined with his failme at school and his ignomnce, make him the film ’s embodiment of innocence and 
purity. Therefote he is qualified to become thefounder of a new utopian society that will be formed after the old society has been purged through 
cataclysmic destruction
Standish (ibidem: 68)
With the benefit o f  hindsight, we could postulate that tlie founder of Aum Shinrilcyo, Asahara Shoko, may have 
somehow identified with Akira. Born as Chizuo Matsumoto in Kyushu in 1955, due to a congenital glaucoma he suffered 
from impaired vision and was sent to a school for the bknd. There, he bullied his blind schoolmates and sought to create a 
milieu that he could wholly control (Lifton 1999). He claimed one day he would set up his own “robot kingdom” (Lifton 
ibidem) and meanwHle read biographies o f  prominent politicians aiming to become the future Japanese Prime Minister.
After graduating he went to Tokyo were he sought to pass the entrance exams at Tokyo university despite the fact he was 
m ost unlikely to pass them due to his physical impairment. He failed and had to resign himself to earn his living as an 
acupuncturist and healer, the reason why he joined Agonsh , a New Religion, and took yoga classes. When his business 
failed, he went to India (in 1986), resolute to attain enlightenment. Back in Japan he pretended he had gained a considerable 
level o f  sanctity and command o f his magical powers and changed his name to Asahara Shoko, Afterwards he planted a new 
religion and named his sect “Aum Shinri-ky ”®‘^, and proclaimed he was “Today’s Christ” and “the Savior o f Tliis Century” 
as about 40,000 thousands o f  Japanese and Russians flocked round him. After an initial peaceful slant towards cosmic 
harmony, in the course o f time his teachings changed their tune shifting towards ideological totaUsm® .^ Asahara integrated 
his doctrine with the vision o f an imminent Armageddon and this induced his disciples to follow him and found a segregate 4
community on  the slopes o f Mt. Fuji. In such a setting Asahara’s power over his followers and their devotion to him  grew 
inexorably. A t that point the Japanese public realized that their methods were not only unorthodox but patently illegal. In 
their “splendid seclusion” Asahara’s acolytes developed sophisticated techniques of mass-kiUing and stored weapons and 
high technology meant to support their plan to annihilate Japan. On June 27, 1994 tliey carried out the first bio-terrorist 
attack in history, in Matsumoto, causing a death-toll o f seven and injuring hundreds o f people. O n March 20, 1995 their 
m ost notorious action, the assault o f Tokyo’s subway network, lulled 11 people and injured several hundreds. O n both 
occasions more careful planning and execution would have caused a catastrophe, but the mere fact that the attempt was 
made and the consequences were of such a tragic scale proves that basic scientific expertise may turn religious fanaticism 
into a deadly weapon. Let me now describe how this event bears on the thrust o f my research.
During the second half o f the 19 '^' century Ernst Haeckel held a huge sway on many young students o f the life- 
sciences in the German speaking area. Their unstinting admiration is almost puzzling when one considers the complexity o f 
the themes he treated and tire blunt and brutal tones of some o f his argumentations. Like sectarian devotees, Haeckelian 
monists addressed their guru emphatically (Gasman 1971):
^  Aum = “powers for destruction and creation in the universe”; Shinriky = “teaching of the supreme truth” (Reader; 15)
*3 “Everything had to be experienced on an all-or-nothing basis” (Lifton, 1999: 25) f|
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®3 It is useful to remind tlie reader that Heinrich Heine was considered a traitor by German nationalists and conservatives because he 
was a baptised Jew, left-wing intellectual, cosmopolitan and, to add insult to injury, he resided in France. In 1892 not a single 
German local administration accepted to erect a monument in his honour (Glaser 1978).
I  thank Danvin and Haeckelfor emancipating my intellect, for ny deliverance fivm the bonds of traditional slavery, to which a great pari of 
mankind is boundfor all their lives. Thy gave me a k y  towards an understanding of the geat exalted secret of nature and cleared thefog from 
ny yes which had hirrdervd a clear view of the world
Another one commented
A t that moment I  rediscovered ny fatherland and try people, and with that! was relieved of all unclarity and anger', of the irony of Heinrich 
Heine, which is a sign of inner weahiess^ .^ Rather', there arose the strong feeling of cheerfulness and happiness which is born out of faith that is 
sure of itself In this rvcy Ernst Haeckel returned to me tryfaith in ny people.
’1By way o f  comparison, Haruld Murakami’s analysis o f the mindscape developed by the followers of the Japanese :|i
pseudo-religious, terrorist congregation called Aum-Shinrikyo -  many of whom were scientists and doctors — merits a full
quotation (Murakami 2001: 306-307):
A s I  went through the process of intervierving these Aum  members andformer members, one thing Ifelt quite strongly was that it wasn't in 
spite of beingpart of the elite that thy rvent in that direction, butprecisely because thy were part of the elite. [...]. In that sense ahne thy had 
pure motives, arrd were idealistic, filled rvith a sense ofpurpose. [...]. What thy all had in common.. .rvas a desire to put the techrrical skill 
and knowledge thy'd acquired in the service ofa mote meartinffiilgoal Thy couldn't help having grave doubts about the inhumatre, utilitarian 
grist mill of capitalism and the social system in which their own essence and efibrts — even their own reasorrs for being — would be fruitlessly 
grourtd down
A similar analysis of the root-causes o f the Aum-phenomenon has been made by American journalist D. W.
Brackett (Brackett 1996: 71-72) who observes that
A s some of the nerver gerreratioru gradrcated fiom colkge and entered the wor'k force thy began to have ideas and questions that their education 
had not prepared them for. In examining their own lives and the society in which thy lived, many felt lost arrd wondered rvhetherjob security 
and social conformity were all there is to life. Seeking atuwers, thy often naively reached out to anyone or ary group that professed to have a 
solution or held out the promise of irtvolving them in something bigger than themselves. Earnest and sincere, once thy made the leap to a rrew 
faith, thy wrapped themselves in it with the single-mindedness of people who never intended to be lost again
Asahara’s foolish plan was also inspired by Isaac Asimov’s “Foundation series” (Disch 1998), whose key character,
Hari Seldon, is a mathematical prodigy as well as the discoverer o f a new discipline, psychohistory, enabling its practitioners 
to attain true predictions. The plot revolves around the failed attempt made by Hari Seldon to warn the Empire o f the 
looming disaster and the ensuing assembling o f the best drinkers of the Empire in order to found a sect that wiU preserve 
the wisdom and knowledge accumulated up until dien. The prediction turns out to be true and the sect’s acolytes find 
diemselves ruling the universe as no one else has any command of science anymore and they are regarded as wizards.
What occurred in Japan in 1995 was that the reportedly safest country in the world was shocked by the revelation 
that the perpetrators o f a terrorist attack against Tokyo’s subway which was meant to murder thousands o f Japanese and 
create mayhem across the entire country were talented Japanese students. The highest ranks o f AUM comprised mainly 
relatively young scientists who pressed for the adoption o f extreme measures towards the “final solution” o f all Japanese 
plights, i.e. its obliteration (Reader 2000). The weapon selected was the deadly sarin gas, invented by tlie Nazis and already 
successfully tested by Saddam Hussein in his war against Iran, the time and the place the most appropriate for a huge 
massacre. In the Tokyo subway these criminals were to riddle with the tip of their umbrellas several bags filled witli this gas.
The number o f victims was comparatively limited thanks to the presence o f mind of some travellers who upon smelling the 
gas’ odour quickly opened the windows and dispersed part o f the lethal content. As mentioned before, the analyses o f the 
survivors are quite disparate, but I have every reason to believe a common denominator can be singled out, that is, the 
sentiment that
these people have a completely dffierent ethic, thy think differently to us, thy totally believed in what thy did.. .thy don’t live in this world, 
th y’re fivm  another dimettsion
Ikulco Nakayama (Murakami 2001: p. 101)
The mass media undoubtedly contributed to this inaccurate portrayal by presenting a specific, univocal aspect of 
the terrorists’ biographical profile, one accurately worked out in order to conceal the banalit}^ or “familiarity”, o f their aims 
and beliefs. Murakami himself remarks that “the moral principle at stake in the gas attack was all too clear: “good” versus 
“evil”, “sanit)'^” versus “madness”, “health” versus “disease” (Murakami 2001).
In order to understand this tragedy we must bear in mind that as an adolescent Asahara wished he could become a 
doctor, but his application was rejected due to his bad eye-sight. Afterwards he resolved he could still help people by 
working as an acupuncturist, but he soon became aware that he was not able to really cure his patients through either the 
Western or the Chinese medical tradition®^. It was then tliat he became an obsessively religious person (Metraux 2000). The 4
activities o f the sect he founded, Aum-Shinrikyo, were correspondingly centred on the therapeutic treatment and salvation 4
of psychologically and physically sick individuals. In the course of time the sect espoused Mahayana Buddhism, which aimed 
at tlie salvation o f  aU manldnd and eventually there emerged a messianic and millenialist approach to tlie solving o f the 
social question which involved the belief that bio-medical sciences could redeem the world and bring about a harmonious 
and peaceful society:
A im ’s leaden consideted themselves elite intellectuals, molutionaries dissatisfied with the stuff stable world thy saw around them.. Thy wen 
political technoants, find of a fat, lukewarm society. Possessed of hypertrophied imafinations, thy wen convinced thy could change people and 
build a perfect state
Yamaori Tetsuo (Metraux 2000: 79)
Eventually the belief prevailed that killing animals is wrong whereas human beings, who purposefully commit 
misdeeds, cannot be spared (Kaplan & Marshal 1996).
Celebrated Japanese novelist Haruld Murakami became deeply interested in the motivations that led AUM-acolytes 
to adopt such a extremes views. The result o f his inquiry makes for a compelling reading that sheds light on fragments o f 
life and thoughts that, once more, sound by no means unfamiliar to a Western reader. Murakami depicts the cultural and rf
psychological universe of some o f the members revealing traits o f their personalities that are worthy o f a closer examination. it
For example, we are told by Fliroyuki Kano (Murakami, op. cit.: 218) that since he was an adolescent he conceived a drive to 4
attain a superior knowledge tliat neither adults nor peers could fulfil. He maintains having spent hours pondering over the 
m ost vexed existential questions without reading through any book, for I  don’t like nading. When I  nadsomething Iju st see what’s 
wrong with the book (Murakami, ibidem: 218). Although his interests revolve around Buddhism and his own search o f  a 
mathematical demonstration o f it, he candidly concedes that he never got into depth with any study o f Buddhism, as the ones j
4I  read didn’t seem very direct in their approach. I  couldn’t discover the remedy I  was searxhingfor (ibidem: 220). Following this statement %
Murakami challenges the interlocutor noticing that to discard all opinions running against one’s own makes impossible to 
obtain true answers. Accordingly, Hiroyuki Kano proclaims (Murakami, ibidem: 224) that no doubts remained, because all %
our questions were answered. We were toldi “do this, and this will happen. ” No matter what question we had, we got an answer straight 
away. I  was completely immersed in it. Another member, Aldo Namimura (p. 233) reiterates that he [Fumihirv Jôyû, the sect’s 
spokesman] could answer any question clearly and a third one, Mitsuharu Inaba lends further support to this impression by 
affirming (p. 241) that I  was really impressed by rvhat he (Joyu) said. It was so clearly stated — the way he used metaphors, for instance. . .after 
the sermon he took questions, and his answers were extremely precise, each one perfectly tailored to the person rvho asked it. A nother trait 
emerging from dieir accounts to which they attach a particular importance is the favourable turn taken by their lives when 
freed from the burden o f their responsibilities. Harumi Iwakura doesn’t deny that the appeal o f the sect stemmed from the
®7 It is emblematic that one of his future devotees, neurologst Sasaki Masamitsu commented on his life-choices as follows. (Metraux 
2000: 106): A s  a doctor I  specialise in neurology arrd deal with patients with diseases such as cerebral apoplexy, ParMrrson’s disease, muscular dystroply, 
and cervical sporrdylosis, diseasesfor which there are no definite cures. Ifeel keenly the limits of Western medicine and the powerlessness ofa doctor
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®® Interview with Robert Jay Lifton, broadcast by ffeshair (http:/ /  fceshair.npr.org) on December 18, 2001
®5 “Each self becomes a constellation or a collage that is ever in motion, a “self-system” or “self-process” (Lifton, 1999:13).
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fact that the way they did things made life easier — they’d give the order and you just did what they said. N o need to think 
for yourself, or worry about every little detail, just do what you’re told.
Here you can find the most glaring example o f  the sort o f people Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor believed he was 
morally obliged to guide, people who are willing to yield to the persuasive arguments of someone who claims he /sh e  shall 
relieve them of every responsibility^ and heal whatsoever an anguish. These young men and women joined the sect so as to 4
withdraw from reality, shut out all their fears and misgivings, for they were likely to be already estranged from real Hfe, 
incapable o f facing their psychological unease, their mental and nervous strain, their anguish, their overburdening A
responsibilities and prone to irrationaHty, regarded as a safe shelter: they weren’t inherently bad, or evil people they were people in 
searxh of an absolute, a fine line between what they take to be absolute purity and going over an edge when everything in the world is so defiled that 
it must be destroyeeP .^
The highest ranlcs o f AUM comprised mainly young scientists and from them came the decisive thrust to adopt
extreme measures for the “final solution” o f  the Japanese pHghts (i.e. the demise of tlie whole country):
it was with the growth in irrfluetice of what I  term the “scietree lobby” that A um ’s apocafptic visions began to be framed in such vividly 
destructiveforms and that a cottsciousness of advanced and destructiveforms of weaponry became instilled in the upper echelons of the movements
Ian Reader (2000; 187)
i
That science is stiU by many identified with hygienised laboratories and purity o f  motives explains why Aum- t
Shinri-Kyo made science a sacred enterprise. Sacred and profane mingled and their boundaries became more and more 
blurred while fascination for state-of-tlie-art technology and science was used to awe its followers. We know that Shoko €
Asahara, the guru founder o f the Aum sect, had given precise instructions to screen the top Japanese universities in search 
o f briHiant researchers that might turn useful to the pursuance o f several tasks. Subsequently they were kept too busy to 
reflect upon the consequences o f  their work, a no t uncommon occurrence in today’s fast-paced R&D. Intuitively, ceaseless 
activity allows for little critical t h i n k i n g ® ^ ,  and Hitler understood this when he stressed that his party was a Bewegung, a i
movement (Housden 1997).
My impression is that what happened in Japan could occur elsewhere. Aum-Shinrikyo is no t the manifestation o f  a 
pecuHarly Japanese techno-scientific aHenation but rather the perversion o f  what has been the main purpose o f techno­
science ever since the Enlightenment, namely the betterment of manldnd. The common trait o f Aum bio-medical experts 
was a desire to put the technical sldll and Imowledge tliey’d acquired in the service o f a more meaningful goal so as to offset 
the deleterious and aHenating effects o f unbridled capitaHsm (Murakami 2001: 307) and o f hyper-rationaHstic, emotionless 
science (Reader 2000). Incidentally, the same appHed and appHes to many eugenicists. Theologian Langdon Gilkey (in
Robinson 1977) fears that the success o f occult and mysticism among youtli may undermine the worldview tliat science has
constructed over the past centuries. However, Helga Nowotny (Mendelsohn 1977) has remarked that historically magic has ; |
not been replaced by science when this latter has been able to demonstrate its superior efficacy, which was Malinowski’s 
tenet; radier, it was magic’s demise that made possible the triumph o f science. Magic and mydiopoeic thought have never 
been truly relinquished (Bayertz in Sandkuhler & Holz 1987). Tlie explanation o f this phenom enon has perhaps been best 
formulated by D orothy Nelkin (Mendelsohn 1977: 283-284) who believes that
People ate most reluctant to surmider theirpersortal convictions to a scientfic world-view. [...]. for many people religion may be more likely 
than science to provide a satisfactory explanation of reality on which to base their values. Faith in science persists only when it satisfies a sodal 
treed. I f  scie tree loses credibility, people willgopefor more fulfilling constructs
Wliile on the one hand science destroys the traditional collective mythology o f Christianity, it at once paves the 
way for aU sorts o f  science-inspired mythologies: supermen, designer babies, UFO, sci-fi cults, etc. Science actually
undergoes a process of mythologisation (Henighan 1980) affecting scientists themselves. Hence the current persistency o f a 
widespread belief in sophisticated brands o f astrology even amidst the educated public and the proliferation o f  sub- and 
counter-cultures that set themselves the goal o f merging science and magic in order to meet a rising demand for those 
answers that too many fail to find within the scientific realm (Willdns in Fuller 1971; MacIntyre in Mendelsohn 1977; 
Nachman Ben-Yehuda in Neusner 1989). By the same token, biological thinking applied to social reform has constantly 
spawned scientific, at times Manichean, mythologies, especially in times of fancied or real profound crisis and insecurity^ 
which generally coincide with the return of the sacred (Kaye 1986). Fervent biological reductionism à la Crick and Monod^o 
and the messianic aspirations o f socio-biologists to effect revolutionary alterations o f the social structure are merely further 
developments o f this process (Kaye 1986). Indeed, there is good reason to believe that the infatuation with techno-scientific 
advance and religious revivalism are by no means incompatible. For Francis Bacon human ascendancy was central to the 
Divine plan (Noble 1999: 51) and, in a broader perspective, scientific inquiry was boosted by millenarianism in England 
(Webster 1976) and by the Free-Masonic identification o f salvation and improvement all across Europe (Noble ibid.), given 
that the Christian message of salvation needed to be substituted with an ideology of salvation entirely based on rational 
means (Pyneson, Sheets-Pyneson 1999). Enlightenment thinkers themselves were inclined to embrace some form o f  natural 
religion that substituted Man for G od (McIntosh 1992).
Kevles (Byrne 1986) has noted that eugenics was infused with religiousness from its inception and that the
authoritativeness earned by science had grown so strong that many clerics actively participated in eugenic campaigns:
One distinguished botanist bewildeted Darwin by declaring himself a convert on the grounds that the theory finally made intelligible the birth of 
Christ arrd redemption by grttce. A  clergyman was converted on the grounds that it opened up rrew and more glorious prospectsfor immortality.
A nd theohgiarrs declared themselves ready to give up the old doctrine of “the fa ll” in favor of the happier idea of a gradual and uttceasing 
progress to a higher physical and spiritual state
Gertrude Himmelfarb (in Marsak 1964: 92)
O n tire other hand scientists’ motivation for applying themselves so zealously to their tasks derives from the fact
that for many the urge to pursue science is as strong as an urge toward a religious calling (Winter 1970: 27). In the course of
the nineteenth century Rudolph Virchow (Kappeler 2000) maintained that science had acquired the attributes of a religion:
es ist die Wisserrschaft bei uns qur Religion geworden. Correspondingly, in the mid 1920s Leo Szilard, the eminent Hungarian-born
physicist, planned to form a league o f scientists in tlie Rosicrucian tradition, namely with strong religious and rational bonds
(Noble 1999) and in the same period Russian eugenicist Nikolai Koltsov assumed that as cultivated mankind drew
inspiration from religion, it was only too natural that eugenicists would rightly demand a collective sacrifice and much self-
restraint in the service o f the creation o f a higher type o f human being^b An unmistakably mystical-religious and
superstitious character typified m ost o f these very ideas:
Die Ausmer'-qe-Ideologie im Zeitalter der Naturwissenschaften und der Biologie erscheint phsychohgsh gesehen als eine verkappte religiose 
Schwdrwerei. [...]. „Eud}anasie“ und Rassenlygiene erscheirten urn heute als ein massenpsychologschen Beispielfiir die Macht der 
Aberglaubens iiber die Vermnfi und Wissenschaft
[“From a psychological standpoint, the ideology o f eradication in the era of natural sciences and biology appears as an 
instance o f religious fervor in disguise. [...]. Nowadays “euthanasia” and racial hygiene seem to us an example of the 
power o f superstition over reason and science”]
Heinz Schott (in Propping-Schott 1992: 20)
In keeping with this analysis is for instance Julian Huxley’s statement that eugenics... A capable o f becoming the most 
sacred ideal of the human race... one of the supreme religious duties... eugerrics will inevitably become part o f the religon o f the future (Huxley
50 Howard Kaye (ibidem) has pointed out that French biochemist Jaques Monod became a biological reductionist after his 
disillusionment with Marxism and the prevailing in his worldview of pessimistic traits
51 Improving the Human Species in Russkiievgenicheskii fimrnal, voI.l, no.l, 1922, p.273. Quoted by Ivan Frolov 1990:188
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1947; 22). Before long (Dunn 1951: 618-619), he went even further and displayed a remarkable identity o f views with 
Teilhard de Chardin:
once the fact is gasped that we men ate agents of further evolution, and that there can be no action higher or more noble that the raising of the 
inherent possibilities of Ife as represented by the human species, then we shall somehow find ways and means for overcoming the resistances 
which stand in the way ofour performing thatpart of our destiny and our duty
Similarly, Robert Sinsheimer in 1968 referred to the future design of humankind as a cosmic event, and to those
scientists involved in the imminent project as agents of transition to a wholly new path of evolution (cited in Nelson 1980:
95). In 1973 (Hilton et al. 1973: 350) he assumed tliat
much of our ament despair derives fivm  the perception that the errerrry is “us”, that is the corrosion and imperfection deep inside ourselves. But 
now we can be agents of evolution as rve must devise that orrce again on this sweet planet a fairer species will arise — a being new andfirrer to 
expand the meaning of life
This is how in 1974 a Berkeley molecular biologist, Gunther Stent, expounded in an article published by Nature his 
utopian vision:
To oppose human cloning. . .is to betray the Western dream of the City of Cod. A ll utopian visionaries, from Thomas More to Karl Marx, 
think of their perfect societies as beingpopulated not by men but ly angels that embody all ofthe best and none of the worst human attributes
Quoted in PCBE (2002)
In the first half o f the Nineties biologist and oncologist van Rensselaer-Potter (1990; 1995) urged a few good
people, by necessity true believers, to propel a cultural revolution premised on a brand new Idnd o f  global bioethics enabling
humanldnd to overcome its genetic predisposition to material acquisition and day to day planning, to the detriment o f  die
long-term interests o f the species, one that threatens to bring human beings to their extinction. This pseudo-religious
commitment has been echoed by none otlier than John Tooze, secretary o f the Human Genome Organisation, who once
observed that the H G P was about writing the bible o f secular humanism (Müller-Hill 1993: 406). Kenneth W. Culver,
physician and geneticist admits that he takes Jesus Christ as a model o f medical practice for He used extraordinary powers in
his ministry to heal the fundamental bases of illness (Cole-Turner 2001). Francis Collins, director o f the human genome
project and a Christian, described his endeavour as a work o f discovery which can also be a form of worship (Noble 1999:
195), and judges unethical all forms o f delay in the application o f genetic discoveries because Christ himself was a healer
(Appleyard 1998). O ne o f my interviewees did grant that there was some truth in my hypothesis that science is such an
exciting enterprise that sometimes it may almost become a religious or mystical experience:
I ’ve seen great scientists who are very dedicated to their work, sacrifice countless hours.. .whatforfTo show what thy believe is valid. But at the 
same time. I ’ve also seen honorable scientists fight overpower. I t’s not about benefitingpeople with a gnat new discovery anymore, but about the 
struggle to gain power'. So in this ngarrfyes, I  can say that overexcited, enthusiastic scientists are so focussed on the little things that thy miss 
the bigpicture.
Unsurprisingly, given the intensity o f religious devotion and church-affiliation in the United States, a survey 
conducted by Vaughan, Smith, and Sjoberg (Vaughan, Smith, and Sjoberg 1966) indicated that over tluee-fourths o f tlie 
scientists they contacted were members o f some sort o f religious body and only 1.4 percent o f the respondents designated 
themselves as atheists or agnostics. However, almost 40 percent o f them did not believe in life after death as opposed to one 
third o f the respondents who instead believed there was actually something in the afterlife. 60.9 per cent looked to science 
and religion as two compatible but separate spheres o f life and 17.3 percent as complementary and only 13.6 percent as 
conflicting. This religious outlook o f course makes for a missionary commitment to the betterment o f  Creation which was 
not rare among eugenicists (Carole 1995). A clear instance o f such a staunch dedication is V. Elving Anderson, a medical 
geneticist, who interprets G od’s injunction to fill the Earth as a green light to redesign the kinds o f human beings we, and 
implicitly He, want on Earth (Noble 1999). But an even more ambitious goal has been set by Lee Silver (Silver 1998: 250), a 
molecular biologist and a neuroscientist, whose description of the future is strongly reminiscent o f Wellsian utopias.
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Genetically enhanced elite-menibers — GenRich — engineer more advanced human beings, who in turn shape a further 
improved generation until th y  find  themselves coming face to face with their creator.. .Or is it simply their orvn image in the mirror, as they 
reflect themselves back to the begitrrting of tim e...? Marcy Damowsky (Tokar 2001) has perfectly synthesized the nature o f such 
vagaries;
Silver vividly and accurately represents the techrro-eugerric visiott, a horrfying grandiose ideologr shared by a disturbing number of Nobel 
laureate scientists and other influential professionals. [...]. They are motivated ly  a technocratic utopianism similar to the impulse that has 
ahvays motivated supporters of eugenics: the urge to engineer human “perfection”.
Indeed eugenicists o f the past have been described as possessed o f a zeal and passion reminiscent o f a religious cause 
or a political reform movement (Smith 1985: 137) and some latter-day eugenicists, like their precursors, act as though they had 
espoused tlie freemasons’ tenet that the G od o f Genesis has acted as a ^ Single Artificer and humankind is expected to take 
up His demiurgical action (Luria in Byrne 1986). These curious attitudes can be better comprehended in tlie light o f  the 
socio-cultural changes talcing place in Europe in the second half o f the Nineteenth century when science became not merely 
one of the possible grounds for social ethics but an ethic in itself, and indeed the highest, prescribing duties and claiming undeviating 
allegiance, like a religious vocation Q.D. Burrow 2000: 53)
Having experienced tliis phenomenon in the first person, biologist John Vandermeer has shed light on the 
mechanism underlying this mutual attraction o f science and religion. Initially he still believed in science as a modus vivendi 
(Miller 1997), and that evolutionary biologj^ could make sense o f it all: the interplay o f natural balance, evolutionary biology, and 
overpopulation then became something of a new religion form e (\7andermeer 1996: XV). Then, after one o f his rhetorical exploits, his 
first wife caustically commented tliat his scientific method to explain away all misgivings and obscurities o f people’s lives 
was not scientific at all, but appeared as dogmatic and doctrinaire as a religious outlook. Nowadays he fiercely combats his 
former intellectual posture. Another scientist who defected from certain extreme views o f the social role o f science was 
Italian-born microbiologist Salvador E. Luria (1912-1991), who directs his remarks (Luria 1984: 202-203) to those scientists 
for whom science is some kind o f sacred priesthood before which all other interests and considerations must yield, tliose who look tpon science 
in the same way a truly religious Catholic would look upon life within the Church, as a dedication to a supreme, ideal set o f values, and feel 
comforted in believing that orre belongs to a elite, not of birth or wealth, but ofprxtfessiorral worth, a feeling o f election or divine blessing.
The relevant literature and the evidence I have gathered so far seems to point to a high degree o f idealism in 
scientists’ behaviour. One confirmed that:
La scierirya pub diventare davvero come una drvga che rende dipendente, o un vifio mentale. Se ti capita di avete un buon risrdtato, sei 
‘hvirrato ”per semprv: ilpiacere che ti dériva, ti spinge a cervartte ancora, per anni ed atttri... A  parte gli scherfi, credo che lo scienfiato sia 
qualcuno inrramorato della sdentya e delprvcesso scierrtifico, e questo e ’ I’urtico motivo.
[Science may really become a drug drat addicts you, or a fixation (literally, “mental vice”). If  you happen to attain good 
results you are “doomed”: the pleasure you derive pushes you to look for more, for years upon years.. .Joking apart, I 
believe a scientist is someone who is in love with science and with the scientific method, and this is the real cause]
Some o f  the biotechnologists I interviewed were genuinely persuaded tliat their adherence to the anti-global
movement was, in a way, the corollary o f a life dedicated to better understand the world in order to change it for the better.
Likewise, a student o f a biomedical discipline declared:
1 am a Christiarr, and ly no mearts do I  think it unholy to clone. God gave us a mind to think The Bible teaches us to serve manldrrd and to 
be righteous. I f  rve canfree peoplefrom a poor prognosticfuture, wly rrot?
This is a biochemist’s reply to the question why she resolved to be come a scientist;
siempre quise sercierrtificoporque creo que eltrabajo que desarwllamos cada dia es diferentey aurrquepuede sera la larga utta tufitia, elser 
cientifico te da la oporturridad de descubrir algo que puede serdegrnn valor para la humartidad. [Now switching to English]. Dorr’tyou 
thirrk that when you were a childyou rvanted tofirtd a drug agairrst carreer^
Responding to a different question she added:
93
—  _ ■ - - -  - - - - - -  . - ,  - ,  - . ' - - - -  -  :  . .% - - - ™ T —--------------:---------  - -  - - Ï T
1
ÿi.
No qiiien set'amgante, pew sin cientijicos muchas de las comodidades que tiene la sodedad ahora no sedan posibles. Inclusogradas ellos, casi 
todas las enfemedades que apancen en estos dias (nuestw mayor enemigo) pueden ser combatidasy la esperansya de vida es mucho mayor
In fact, a majority o f interviewees appear to be uneasily caught in the middle o f two antagonistic forces.
Idealism:
1. a personal predilection for the s tru ^ le  o f minorities to see that they rights be aclcnowledged;
2. a keen concern for the state o f the planet;
3. a profound conviction that their activities would benefit humankind at large,
and pragmatism:
1. the awareness tliat scientific research m ust proceed and cannot stoop to compromises;
2. that private investors and the State are the only guarantors that their skills will be put to good use;
3. that patenting infringes a number o f rights but is essential to the scientific pursuit;
4. tliat cloning and eugenics therapy lie ahead and it is up to their users to not abuse o f  those techniques;
5. that science is simply too exciting and arduous to be bad.
It is possible that idealism, and my guess is that this is particularly true with highly sensitive individuals, gets f
systematically frustrated by external pressures and may be bent to detrimental ends when the pendulum swings to the 
opposite hand and scientists put on the pragmatic hat. I t’s at that point that the effects o f science intended as a priesthood 
can be felt most:
[the priesthood of sdence] pwvides a sort of absolution fivm  responsibility for any controversial matters that may arise in the applications of 
science. It automatically takes science out of the domain of morality ly  pmclaiming it to be intrinsically moral
Luria (1984: 203)
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4.2 SCIENCE AND SOCIAL REFORM
Most scientists think of science as being a kind of pmijfing intellectual machinery that leads to honesty, to the withering away of ignorance and 
wrong ideas, ittcluding, provided thy are o f the atheistic persuasion, those of religion. [...]. But the greatest scientists have always looked on 
scientific materialism as a kind of religion, as a mythology
E.O. Wilson (in Weintraub 1984:231)
Modem science has as its goal the leastpain and the longest life possible — that is a kind of eternal happiness: to be sure a very modest kind in 
comparison with the promises of religion
Fiedeiich Nietzsche (1996, Aphorism 128: 89)
The idea of genetic therapy has its roots in pre-World War IIfuturism and eugenics. The first su^estiori for the genetic alteration ofpeople for 
both social and medical reasons can be found in the writings o f scientists such as Haldane and Muller .. .B arf advocates of the technolo  ^
drew on Jacques Loeb’s concept of 'biologcal engineering” as a means ofmodifying man and combating the dcgenerntion of the race
Paul A. Martin (in Conrad & Gabe 1999:18)
In a lucid and well-argued autobiography, geneticist Jon Beckwith (2002) argues that a likely explanation for the
participation o f  left-wing scientists in the eugenics movement is that they came from upper-class families. My guess is he
refers to J. B. S. Haldane who once claimed that
So long as we are biologists we are considering men as animals. The biologist should not try to do the work of the pychologist, economist, or 
sociologist. He can very frequently tell them where they are wrong. He must not try to tell them where they are right
Haldane (1928:175)
W hat Beckwith does not seem to realise is that several eugenicists happened to be pragmatic idealists Hke him and 
what led them astray was their commitment to straighten die “crooked timber of mankind” (Kant 1784).
Tliis was indeed an age-old propensity. In 1802, when Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus coined the term Biologie so as 
to designate the science that would study under which conditions and according to which laws life exists, biologists were 
meant to be scientifically trained, activist physicians and chief agents in spreading knowledge usefulfor economic and social improvement, thereby 
preparing the ground for the gradual emergence of a ju st society (Lenoir in Cunningham & Jardine 1990). In 1869 the preface to 
biologist Friedrich Ratzel’s handbook of natural history stated that the aim of the author was to propagate “progressive 
tendencies” (Kelly 1981: 22)
In fact, it has been argued that it is typical o f  older scientists to get entangled in activities o f  social advocacy more 
or less related to their professional expertise (Sindermann 1985). Gradually pulling out from pure research but still enjoying 
a great amount o f admiration and credibility^, they are led to become spokespeople and seek to shed light on matters 
concerning the public at large. Thus for instance Jonathan S. Singer (Singer 2001: XV) dedicates his book to the future 
generations o f researchers explaining tliat ever since he undertook his career, science has been lus consuming passion but 
now that he has reached the age o f 60 something has occurred to him:
I  began for the first time to think seriously about things beyond the classroom and laboratory. From having been only casually conscious of the 
human condition, I  became keenly interested in trying to understand it. Because ny predilections were still scientific, I  rrrantedpartkulariy to 
explore rvhat the new knowledge of biology and the other scierrces might contribute to ny conpreherrsion ofthe world and its affairs
The flip side o f tlie coin is that the temptation may become irresistible, to poach on other professionals’ preserves 
and lose objectivity, developing the so-called Messiah complex, also known as scientific messianism, namely a sort o f  
megalomaniac proclivity to pontificate on broader social issues (Medawar 1979).
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W hether tliis is true or not, and the evidence is too scant to answer this question witli finality, the fact remains that,
historically, social engagement, political consciousness and utopianism intermingled with utilitarianism and class-prejudices
to turn eugenics into a means o f  domination and eventually annihilation (Deichmann 2000)52;
ihetv were undoubtedly many who subscribed to these schools for purely cynical reasons of personal advancement, but offar greater interest are 
those (often able scientists) who evidentlyperxeived an intellectual imperative in such biqarie arrdpernicious doctrirres
Gratzer 2000: 309
In order to better understand tliis issue, I should like to briefly illustrate the ideological and existential trajectory of 
a Lebensreform commune located in the Italian speaking canton Ticino, near Ascona, quite a scenic tourist-resort. I am 
referring to M onte Verita, a utopian colony founded in 1899 by a number of nonconformist thinkers who pledged to 
combat m odern malaise by showing the world a new way o f  life centred on a peculiar form of world-renouncing socialism, 
featuring mystical and matriarchal rituals, nudism, vegetarianism, and homeopatliy. This commune was to become one o f 
die m ost inspiring experimentations with Lebensreform in the world (paralleled by Taormina and Capri in Italy) and was 
visited by a number o f prom inent public figures such as German physician Franz Hartmann, D.I-I. Lawrence, Franz Kaflîa, 
Hermann Hesse, Rudolph Steiner, and Bakunin. One o f  its leaders was German psychoanalyst and pioneer o f the anti­
psychiatry movement O tto Gross, whose father Hans Gross was, ironically, a Nazi ante-litteram. In 1905 Flans Gross 
published a criminological essay entitled “Degeneration und Deportation” arguing that all degenerates should be deported 
so as to save society (Green 1986: 180):
the tramp, the revolutionary, the habitual thief, the pederast, these cannot be either dissuaded or cured. I t’s society’s fardt; it’s culture curse on 
civiliryatiorr. The processes of cultirre reverse those of rrature, byfostering andpropagating the weaker types. So rve must remove themfrom culture 
—from society. Send them to the colorties for life
Perhaps as a reaction against paternal bigotry and narrow-mindedness, O tto became instead a truly progressive 
intellectual. Problems arose when the progressive tendencies that have fashioned the commune he founded, started clashing 
with deeply-ingrained reactionary inclinations. For instance, the whole project was meant to be a return to an idyllic state of 
nature tliat was being threatened by the Americanisation o f German society, namely by individualisation, fragmentation and 
greed. But these were also cornerstones of the Nazi ideology. By the same token, tiieir pursuit o f a pagan and thoroughly 
naturalistic religious life promoting man as a demi-god was to be another cardinal element o f  the vblkish spirituality^ o f 
National Socialism. In the end, one o f the founders, Rudolf Laban, became a sympatliiser o f the Nazis and deprecated the 
africanisation, i.e. degeneration, o f dance, while Alma Drews, another member of tliis commune, wrote in Die Tat, Monte 
Verità’s periodical, that as Christians gather round the cross symbol, so the Asconans should gather under the swastika 
(Green 1986). M onte Verita remains an instructive instance of idealistic protest run astray due to powerful internal 
contradictions, unrestrained elitism, and a yearning for unconstrained freedom. Fin-de-siecle despair really existed for tliose 
who had enough leisure to ponder their existence, and the outbreak o f the WWI was really welcomed witli a sigh of relief by 
the Europeans bourgeoisie, frayed by decades o f directionless passions (Lacquer 1962).
The Lebensreform phenom enon intensely affected science as well. One of the m ost instructive instances o f the 
aforementioned juxtaposition o f teclmical and legitimate knowledge on the one hand and occult loiowledge on the other 
involves a G erman biomedical scientist, Alfred Ploetz (1860-1940), who orbited in the Lebensreform galaxy and ended up 
approving o f  Nazi racial policies, and a German-born Jewish biologist, Jacques Loeb (1859-1924), who m et Ploetz in 
Zurich, and afterwards inexorably drifted towards tlie m ost radical form o f biological engineering, i.e. the creation o f Hfe in 
the laboratory53. Loeb was never a eugenicist but he, Hke m ost eugenicists, demanded that sexual reproduction be duly
52 Nature 405, 739; 2000
53 and one of those features of modernity that Weber would have found most ominous
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disciplined as any other social activity (David King 1998). As it has been put by Adolphe Pinard, a French eugenicist 
(Drouard 1992: 446):
Jt4squ’à pment Pacte pmctéateurn’a été qtPmi acte instinctif tel qu’il existait a l’âge des cavernes. C’est le seul de nos instincts n ’ayant pas été 
civilisé. [...]. Je pense, qu’une évolution ou une révolution s’impose à bref délai
Both Ploetz and Loeb were undoubtedly tire ideological heirs o f those Enlightenment theorists who urged a 
centralised control over life and reproduction (see chapter 1). But the immense difference in their approach to tire social 
application o f scientific discoveries bespeaks the multifarious nature o f eugenics and Lebensreform thought.
Besides readiirg tire works o f Darwin, Malthus, Rousseau, Schopenhauer, and Felix Dahn, as an adolescent
concerned about the social repercussions of the German Gmnderknse^‘^ , Ploetz pursued an educational training in political
economy as ’he felt that economics could be the key to resolve modernity’s contradictions. The entire 1890 generation
actually sought to merge the study o f  biolog}'  ^with those o f economics — giving rise to a new academic domain called human
economics — for those were the disciplines that held out promises o f actual and successful social reforms (Repp 2000).
Ploetz was no exception. He had founded and presided an association of youirg idealists called “Pacific” which was meant to
be the point o f departure for a major socialist pan-Germanic colony in N orth America structured after the French socialist
Icarian communes already established in Iowa. The ultimate purpose of that commune was to become the groundwork for a
vollstdndingen Umrvandlung der menschlichen Gesellschaft, a tliorough transformation o f human society (Kappeler 2000: 139), and
for the glorification o f the German race and civilization (Faith-Weiss 1987). But in 1884, on discovering that those
communes were disbanding, he became persuaded that
dafl mit dem beutigen dimhschnittlichen Menschenmatenal der Zusammenbalt solcher IPalonien, besondets sokber mit gmfetvr individuetler 
Fmbeit nkbtaufmbt ^ // erbalten wan
[with the average human material o f the present it would be impossible to hold togetlier such colonies, particularly 
tliose witli greater individual freedom]
Dreclisel (1993:104)
Like Cabanis, he conjectured that biological inequalities trammel social equality (Simonnot 1999), and that public 
hygiene should outweigh individual hygiene (Reyer 1991). That realisation turned him away from the study o f economics. 
Thus he undertook the study o f medicine at tlie universitj'^ o f  Zurich in the 1890s, where he met Loeb while attending the 
meetings o f an intellectual circle called “Young Germany”, which promoted socialist and modernist ideals (Pauly 1987). 
These young German intellectuals had convened in Zurich as a result o f the laws tliat forbade the existence of a socialist 
party in Germany and prodded each other to seek a way to blend socialism and Darwinism and in so doing solve the 
European social and spiritual crisis. One o f the members o f this intellectual circle was Swiss psychiatrist and neurologist 
August Forel, a eugenicist ante-litteram, who was to permanently influence Ploetz’s utopian vision (Faith-Weiss 1987) when 
he persuaded him to do an internship under his supervision at the neurological clinic Burgholzli. During one o f those 
meetings Loeb m et his future wife, Anne Leonard, an American student in Zurich. Afterwards he followed her to the 
United States, where he would become one o f the m ost popular and respected scientists (WeB 1989). Alfred Ploetz’s 
American experience could not have been more dissimilar. His medical practicing in Springfield, taught him that curing was 
a Sisyphean toil as opposed to the efficient and permanent effects o f prevention (Faitla-Weiss 1987). As a result he 
abandoned the United States and relinquished moderation in his goals and in the means to achieve those goals. The same 
revelation stroke tire other founder o f German racial hygiene, Schallmayer, who grew bitterly distressed during an internship 
at the psychiatric clinic o f Munich’s university hospital (Faith-Weiss 1987). Eventually, like Cabanis before (Simonnot 1999), 
they both agreed that biological inequalities trammelled social equalit)^, and moved closer to biologism.
a major economic crisis afflicting fin-de-siècle Germany
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In those years Loeb was elaborating Iris own scientific method, which privileged experimentation and manipulation 
over theorisation. His conception o f biology was premised on mechanistic materialism — a stance that in the end drove 
asunder Ploetz and Loeb —, the beHef that science was not a worldview but a means to change the world by engineering it to 
the extent that it could finally resemble the artificiality of a laboratory (Pauly 1987). Having befriended with American 
geneticist Thomas H unt Morgan, he gradually spread reductionism and experimentalism across an academic milieu that was 
charmed by such a novel approach to evolutionary processes (WeB 1989). Emboldened by thek successes, Morgan and 
Loeb eventually resolved to found a new, “American” biology, modelled after American progressivism and its emphasis on 
progress, experimentalism and mechanism. In other words, for aU his open-mindedness and civic engagement, Loeb became 
the quintessential prom oter o f a sanitised and technocratic form  of bureaucratic rationality.
Instead Ploetz ended up favourmg a less bio-technologically oriented but way more kivasive and illiberal 
intervention on society. His goal was to contrast any social reform tliat did not involve selective breeding as part and parcel 
o f a humanitarian and socialist policy (Repp 2000) and this drove him to embrace race hygiene, natural religion and, 
eventually, national socialism. For all his profession o f progressivism, that of Ploetz was rather another instance o f 
modernized conservatism as he strove to preserve the traditional conceptions of motherhood and family and blended them 
with a romantic idealization o f rural life and the fatherland (Mocek 2002).
In 1895 he published a paper entitled “Die Tüchtigkeit unserer Rasse und der Schütz der Schwachen”^^  where he 
explained that the humanitarian and socialist ideals inspking the state’s measures for the protection o f  the weak run agakist 
the interest o f the Volk and of die race (Weingart 1987). He then advanced the project o f a rassenhygienische Utopie grounded 
upon tlie key-notion that in a utopian eugenic-oriented society reproduction could not be left to chance and a panel o f 
doctors would judge over the Hfe and death o f unfit children (Kappeler 2000). Below are the prerequisites that Ploetz 
envisioned for such a society to function (Sieferle, 1989: 96):
• Elimination o f abnormal newborn children;
• Killing o f twkis and o f all children who are more likely than the average to be hereditarily abnormal;
• Classification of people according to a scale determining thek entitlement to reproduce;
• Neglect o f the genetically sick and the constitutionally weak so as to prevent thek reproduction;
• Meticulous birth-planning;
• Abstention from smoking and alcoholics;
• In case of war the weakest subjects should be used as cannon-fodder.
It is hard to believe it but Ploetz was actually a candidate for the Nobel peace prize as one o f the chief exponents
of the eugenics’ peace movement, arisen ki response to eugenicists’ preoccupations for the severe dysgenic effects o f war
(Kühl m Szollosy-Janze 2001). These atypical “peace activists” held that an ideal community o f healthy people would
inevitably pursue peaceful means to compose tirek quarrels. However, they also believed that, should a war break out, the
unfit would be “sacrificed” ki order to offset the counter-selection operated by warfare. Unsurprisingly, then,
the contrast between their utopian vision of a eugenicpeace order ofsupetior human beings and the devastating mults of the Second World War 
made them completely immune to moral scruples about the killing of mentally handicappedpeople
Stefan Kühl (ibidem: 204)
Jacques Loeb was a strongly committed pacifist, but he never advocated eugenics and Nazi “intellectual” Alfred 
Rosenberg attacked his mechanistic scientific worldview (Harrington 1996). Gradually, though, it occurred to him that his 
dreams o f social control and biological engineering of deskable social traits — through artificial parthenogenesis -  were not 
likely to come true withki his lifetime and became depressed (Rasmussen & Tilman 1998). The baton was passed on to his
Tlie fitness o f our race and the protection o f the weak
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most faitliful and m ost brilliant American disciples, namely biochemist Gregory Pincus and geneticist H J. Muller (1890- 
1967). Pincus was the father of the m odern contraceptive pill. This contraceptive technology was developed in response to a 
growing desire for smaller families (Usborne 1992), but could also be used to curb the reproductive rate o f  the lower classes.
Hermann Joseph Muller’s German grandparents have migrated to the United States after the 1848 failed revolution 
and had settled down in New York (WeB 1989). In line with his ideological background, after enrolling at Columbia 
University, he joined an association o f  socialist students and divided his reading-time between socialism and biology, 
especially Loeb’s “Dynamics o f living matter” that prefigured tlie total control of evolution and social processes (WeB
1989). In 1910, when he was 20, he exhibited a mindset that little differed from that o f Ploetz at the time o f his studies in 
Zurich. Tliis is what he wrote in an unpublished manuscript entitled “Revelation of Biology and Their Significance” (March 
24,1910; Carlson 1981: 35):
1 ivach the condmion that we should not only check degeneration — negative  ^-  hutfiirther evolution. . .and work positivelyfor the production 
of a nobler and nobler race of beings. Those will become supreme who not only care for those now living, but include, as it were, in the social 
orgatris(a1ion, the remotestfuture, by applying the principles of heredity and variation. [...]. Mankind has nothing real to lose, but only to gain, 
by a process o f evolution. .. Onty tradition is opposed to this plan, and our own stupidity and defective social nature
We can certainly impute to his political leanings his ambivalent attitude to the eugenics o f that period that had a
propensity to disparage immigrants, blacks and proletarians in general. He went so far as to publicly denounce in 1932 the
elitist and racist strands o f eugenics (Carlson 1981). By contrast, he self-righteously contended that (Muller 1935: 44)
There is no chance that the mighty wheel of true eugenics could be set into motion, and then moved effectively in the realty tp-hill direction, except 
Ity a people thoroughty socialty-minded, one willing to sacrifice something of the present for afar-seen common ideal
Muller was more inclined to identify eugenics with the attainment o f human control o f evolution by separating 
sexual intercourse from reproduction and bringing the latter into the laboratory (Pauly 1987). Given that the USSR was at 
the forefront as concerns scientific planning and human experimentation on a large scale, it is all but natural that he would 
spent there a few years seeldng to “eugenicize” Russian communism.
Another communist eugenicist was British biochemist J. B. S. Haldane (1892—1964). In  1923 he published an essay 
titled Daedalrrs, or Science and the Future, which inspired Aldous Huxley’s frightening novel “Brave New World” (Pauly 1987). 
“Daedalus” described biologists as the most romantic figure on earth at the present day (1925: 77), for many are dreamers in 
pragmatic disguise and tlieir dream is the attainment o f human happiness. In 1948 biochemist Joseph Needham echoed his 
views contending that the essence and purpose o f pure science is to make the whole of human society holy (1948: 120)'-^ <>. Thus 
from its inception biology was conceived o f as a discipline that would commit activist scientists to a master plan o f 
redemption and social enhancement and tlie life-sciences in general have proven susceptible to “romantic contagion” 
(Richards in Cunningham & Jardine 1 9 9 0 )^^ Qne o f the cardinal hjqiotheses of my thesis is that the practitioners o f the life- 
sciences are more likely than those o f other scientific fields to display some o f the attributes o f Romantic thought (H.G. 
Schenk 1979: XXII)»»:
Contradictoriness, dissonance, inner conflict; utopian dreams for the future side by side with rrostalgia or the past; a marked nihilistic mood 
accompa tried ly aferventyeanringfor afaith
Tliis may constitute a problem. In 1924, Bertrand Russell responded to Haldane’s Daedalus with his Icarus, or the 
Future o f Science objecting tliat science is liable to be subjugated to the power o f dominant groups and that die more advanced 
science becomes the more easily they can realise their purposes. This is actually a process that has been intensified by the
Notably, besides being celebrated scientists, Haldane and Needham were fervent eugenicists.
This penchant somehow echoes Francis Bacon’s visionary understanding of the nature o f science widi its predominant concern 
for a radical material improvement of human life and the eventual domination of man over nature.
Bio-scientists are N O T prone to such inclinations but simply apter dian, say, geologists or chemists, to develop them because the 
study of biology heavily bears on the conception o f what is human.
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growing direct applications o f science to the transformation o f our environment and to our own modification (Tambiah
1990). However, Haldane continued undaunted to preach his techno-scientific credo (Adams 2000);
I/i vanous writings, he expressed admiration for the transcendence and selfsacrfice of the Christian saints, and his own behavior consistentty 
reflected the same commitment — in his indifference to his own scientific priority, his defense of the meek against the powerful, his derrotion to 
social and political causes, artd his evangelical popularis^ atiorrs," not to mention his lifelong willingness to conduct dangemus experiments on 
himself for the greater good.
It has been argued that scientists’ obsession with absolute objectivity, which caused them  to embrace an ascetic, 
stoic self-discipline aimed at self-purification and at times, as I could witness myself, bordering on self-abnegation (Daston 
& Galison 1992), has sometliing to do with the Protestant background o f many pioneers o f m odern science (Merton and 
Webster in Cohen 1990; Weber 2000)^^. In keeping with these sentiments, Thomas Hobbes in the Leviathan defined 
curiosity, the cardinal virtue o f a scientist, as a lust of the mind, that bj a perseverance of delight in the continued and indefatigable 
generation o f knowledge, exceedeth the short vehemence o f any carnal pleasure (cited by Temkin 1969: 430). By die same token, with 
Locke is no longer pleasure to guide die researcher but love o f the truth, the kind o f love that calls for sacrifices and 
abnegation (Temltin, ibidem). Perhaps Charles A. Winter (1970: 29) is correct in arguing that 
The scientific approach.. .is the most liberated state of mind known short of drug-induced anatehy
Similarly, Jean Rostand (Rostand 1956) believed that the love of truth of scientists is a force whose intensity and 
sway are nearly indescribable and that scientists confront these feelings with the attitude o f  a worshipper or a fanatic.
Finally, the view o f liumanldnd as a cosmic agent entrusted with the task o f perfecting the Creation originated
immediately before and during the French revolutionary years. Condorcet’s words exemplify die correlation between French
revolutionary science and progressivist eugenics (in Nicole and Jean Dhombres 1989):
Si ce perfectionnement indéfini de notre espèce est, commeje le crois, une loi générale de la nature, l’homme ne doit plus se regarder comme un être 
borné à une existence passante et isolée, destiné à s’évanouir après une alternative de bonheur et de malheur pour lui-même... ; il devient une 
partie active du grand tout et le coopérateur d’un ouvrage éternel
This mode o f thought was not in the least new. Francis Bacon had already envisioned an elitist association o f 
scientists devoted to the restoration o f man’s dominion over the Creation. In his utopian work “the New Atlantis” (1627), 
depicting an ideal society run by a college o f scientists. Bacon has a senior fellow o f Salomon’s House state diat (Isaacs 
1987):
The end of our Foundation is the knowledge of causes artd secret notions of things; and the enlarging of the bounds o f Human Empire, to the 
effecting of all things possible
The rationale underlying this project was very conservative, though. It aU came down to the assumption diat 
scientific progress would turn out beneficial to both the ediical and social sphere — for liim truth and utility were the same 
thing — and will preserve the order by alleviating the distress o f the poor and the sick. In other words, social conservatism 
would be buttressed by incessant scientific innovation obviating the necessity to effect any alteration o f the social structure 
(Isaacs ibidem). Functioning as the political arm of genetics (Medawar & Medawar 1977), eugenics became a prop for elitist 
hegemony by pointing to naturally grounded power-relations (Zolofh-Dorfman in Peters 1998; Giove 2001). Eugenicists 
pontificated on matters o f freedom and bare existence (Labisch 1992; CoUa 2000) and legitimated their illiberal posture 
through a considerable amount o f  idealism, utopianism, and even paranormal beliefs (Burrow 2000). Paradoxically, the more 
a scientific worldview’*^® disenchanted human relations, the more it was endowed with mystical attributes (Burrow 2000). 
Like their precursors, physiognomicists and phrenologists, the former studying facial somatic traits and the latter studying
These are for Merton (ibidem) the hallmarks of Puritanism that may have influenced the emergence o f science: utilitarianism, 
intramundane interests, methodical approach, empiricism, anti-traditionalism. For Weber monotlieistic Puritanism was at the core of 
that orderly rationality witliout which science could not have been possible.
Like all academics, I  wanted my professional life to have meaning and signficance, so I  naturalty began applying biolo^ to everyday life (Vandermeer 
1996: XIV)
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die shape o f skulls, who pretended diey could prove the connection o f physical looks with moral proclivities and intellectual 
capacities {kalokagathîà), more than a few eugenicists were influenced by Rosicrucianism, freemasonry, kabala, gnosticism, 
and racialist occultism (Burrow 2000), a discovery that has compelled me to devote die next chapter to a close examination 
o f tliis intriguing finding.
4.3 EUGENICS AS A NEW RELIGION
Sdeniists ate Utopian !y tempeinment 
P.B. Medawar (1990)
J take eugenics m y seriousty, feeling that its ptinciples ought to become one of the dominant motives in a civilised nation, much as i f  they tvete 
one of its tvligious tenets
Francis Galton (Memories 322; cited in Gillham 2001: 324)
What frightens me about Muller and to some extent Huxley is their extteme self-confidence, their complete conviction not only that they know 
what ends are desirable but also that they know how to achieve them
Medawar (in Wolsenholme 1963: 296)
R.J. Lifton (1986; 1990; 1999) has sought to find an answer to the question o f what is about German and Japanese 
doctors that enabled them to become instrumental to the execution o f Hider’s and Asahara’s deadly plans and to Idll in
order to heal. He has described several factors that may have triggered such dehumanizing process:
» A sense o f belonging to an oppositional subculture transcending the ordinary — which we already encountered among
many students o f  biomedical sciences in late Nineteenth- and early Twentieth-century Germany;
• The sacralisation o f science and a parallel scientific approach to collective salvation — something that had already 
been developed by English puritan scientists (Pyenson & Sheets-Pyenson 1999);
• A profound anxiet}^ about the future issuing in an apocalyptic fixation together with the rejection o f all present social 
institutions, norms and values and the aspiration to a global renewal, feelings that fed upon each other in a fatal 
vicious circle — wliich resembles the climate o f despair typifying fin-de-siècle Europe;
• The subordination o f individual welfare to the communal good and individual freedom to a totalitarian doctrine — the
core o f the Nazi approach to the biomedical practice
• A functional megalomania reinforcing tire conviction that they possessed tire absolute truth — unfortunately an all too 
common persuasion amongst leading eugenicists
All o f the above can be fouird itr the eugenic movement as well. Eugeirics started as an oppositional subculture but, 
being the expression o f elitist beliefs, it became a household term for numerous middle and upper class professionals (Searle 
in Webster 1981; Maciricol in Gabbay & Webster 1983; Brown 1988), Nevertheless, it still retained its minority 
characteristics, given that the representation o f tire business communit)’^ and o f tire political and administrative sphere was 
disproportionately low (Brown 1988), probably because the members o f m ost eugenics societies faulted politics and 
unbridled capitalism for bringiirg about social decay — eugenicists repudiated capitalist materialism but upheld scientific
0^^  Incidentally, Ute Deichmann (1996) has proven that freedom of research does not depend on peace and democracy. In poiirt of 
fact Nazi aird AUM scientists enjoyed a considerable leeway within the scope set for them by tireir patrons
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materialism as the only feasible response to the social question — and because entrepreneurs did not need an ideological 
springboard.
This ideological positioning did not avert mystical and vitalist forays. This was particularly true in Germany, where 
from the 1870s onwards bourgeois conventions were being questioned by the young generations who chose to flee to the 
countryside in an escapist rejection o f materialism (Mosse 1988) and founded youth associations precisely in order to arrest 
the materialist shift o f German societ}'  ^which was identified with Jewish liberalism and Jewish experimental science (Mosse 
1964, 1978; Harrington 1996). An attitude best portrayed Bazarov (Turgenev, “Fathers and Sons” , 1865), who cultivated a 
blunt, materialist and utilitarian realism and rejection o f  convention to the point o f  brutality, wliile retaining a humane 
dedication to healing the sick (Burrow 2000: 9). Thus history teaches us that both extremes in science — materialistic, 
deterministic reductionism and vitalist teleologism — are equally potentially harmful.
Interestingly, neither is completely immune from some measure o f religiousness. Parrinder (1995) notes that 
reductionistic and materialistic scientists and socialist eugenicists such as Bernal and Haldane manifested tlie same reluctance 
to accept the materialistic character of m odern democracy — the same which was also criticised by Max Weber and Michel 
Foucault — and invoked a more pronounced readiness to sacrifice the individual self-interest for a higher purpose, i.e. the 
species' welfare. This is all the more intriguing, given that that socialism and eugenics were compatible also by virtue o f their 
materialistic and positivistic premises (Massin 1990). Eugenicists went to great pains to draw an unequivocal distinction 
between scientific and everj^day materialism and sociobiologist E. O. Wilson (Weintraub 1984: 231) is probably correct 
when he argues that
most scientists think of science as being a kind ofpmifing intellectual machinery that leads to honesty, to the withering away of ignorance and 
wrong ideas, including provided they are of the atheistic persuasion, those of religion. [...]. But the greatest scientists have always looked on 
scientific materialism as a kind of religon, as a mytholo^
Significantly, the same mélange of reductionism, religious longing, teleologism, utopianism, cosmic pessimism, and 
the sense o f being involved in a cosmic, epochal struggle against obscurantism (Paul 1998), wliich typified phrenology, 
eugenics and the life-sciences, and that was much opposed by idealist natural philosophers (Temkin 2002), also permeated 
the Aum Shinrikyo’s worldview (Metraux 2000; Reader 2000). In Japan the same sort o f materialism encompassing hyper- 
rational secularisation, ambition, careerism, hedonism, scientism and Stalchanovism, but devoid o f spiritual fulfilment, tliat 
was loathed by m ost eugenicists made possible for a number of promising young scientists to become alienated to such an 
extent that the only option they could envision was joining a techno-cyber-esoteric sect. In this respect, I believe a m ore in- 
deptli analysis is necessary, o f  the connection between science's inbuilt tendency to spawn huge expectations and utopian 
dreams and its incapacity to deliver. To put it differently, these youtlis' desire to explore transcendental questions and 
experiment with superhuman faculties (divination, levitation, extra-sensory perception, etc.) could well be the signal that 
science for them had just become a tedious activity wanting in stimulating and inspiring factors. But the m ost intriguing 
finding is that
Alongside this apparent rejection of science and techno lo^ as the overarching gods of a modem, rational, secular and regimented society, there 
was a reacty acceptance of modem technologies and scientific techniques in the service of religious ends. [...]. While science as the guiding 
principle of a materialist society was thus criticisedfor being unable to answer basic spiritual questions, it was not rejected wholesale but adapted 
into a wider rubric in which, it was believed, it could serve the interests of the religion of the future rather than oppose it.
Ian Reader (2000: 49)
M ost importantly, Aum-Shinri-kyo mainly drew people from the same professional categories fascinated by tlie 
eugenics project: doctors, cardiologists, biologists, chemists, lawyers, social scientists, etc. (Lifton 1999; Reader 2000; 
Murakami 2001). All these upper class, well-off young men had not been intentionally targeted and recruited for their 
expertise, for Asahara had not planned ahead the apocalyptic turn tliat his cult would take. They rather spontaneously 
followed the guru on account o f their existential estrangement (Reader 2000). This movement, like phrenologj^ and eugenics,
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'02 Le tentative d’Alexis Caml de monstndre l’ordre social, en s’appuyant sur la «Science de l’homme» conçue comme synthèse des disciplines médico- 
biologiques et des sciences sociales, s’inscrit dans cette perspective, tout en se rvliant à des assais plus anciens d’inspiration eugéniste comme ceux de Condorvet, de 
Cabanis, ou de George Drysdale (Drouard 1992 ; 456)
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attracted young, ambitious people who could be or were already successful, but who had also come to believe that the 
system in which they were making a name for themselves failed to fulfil their true wishes, that were far from material 
(Reader 2000).
The reader by now is well acquainted with the fact that biological determinism, die belief that individual 
temperaments and social ills must be imputed to organic malfunctioning; the alleged iiiheritabllity of socially dysfunctional 
traits and the consequent rejection o f the principle o f human equality on scientific grounds, all played a key role in 
fomenting an intrinsically anti-democratic eugenic fervour among many bio-scientists. The same psychological and 
ideological process was at work witliin AUM. Instead o f “germ plasm”, the catch-word employed by Asahara and his 
followers was “karma”. Instead of biological decline the threat was spiritual decadence. By living in a sick and corrupted 
society, the adepts were accumulating bad karma that, like a genetic burden, would affect them  for the rest o f  their life as 
well as in the other world. This negative influence could only be counteracted by escaping from the bonds of karma through 
meditation [karuma kara no dasshutsri) or, another striking analogy with the eugenic doctrine, by changing those social 
institutions and conventions that they recognised as tlie roo t of all evil (Reader 2000). The analogies with eugenics are 
patent:
• to positive eugenics corresponded a positive spiritual cleansing through ascetic practices
• to negative eugenics corresponded the annihilations and renewal o f Japanese society when Asahara’s candidacy to 
tlie administrative elections turned into a trouncing defeat
Within Aum we behold the very same scientistic utopia o f  perfect healtli, fitness and harmony that had been 
deliberated in Germany and elsewhere in the first half o f  the Twentieth century and that had arisen concomitantly witli the 
French Revolution. This creed had not been extirpated by the dissemination o f democratic ideals in the aftermath o f WWI A
and Asahara is far from a unique, pathological case. One bio-scientist who was fascinated by Ambroise Condorcet’s 
proposal o f a medicalized society"^ 2 was Alexis Carrel, 1912 Nobel Prize laureate in physiology and medicine and unfaltering 
eugenicist. Utterly inept at starting o ff his juniors’ careers (Weisse 1998), Carrel proved to be more talented as a writer. In 
1935 he published tlie worldwide bestseller “L’Homme, cet inconnu” in which, besides revising Condorcet’s utopian project 
o f a society guided by an aristocratic council o f  superior-minded individuals, he urged policy-makers to pass laws in order 
for certain criminals to be gassed (Carrel 1935: 434-436). Unsurprisingly, he adhered to the pro-nazi Parti Populaire Français 
during the Vichy interval and prefaced the German edition the above mentioned book by endorsing the “eiiergic measures” 
taken by the German government against feeble-minded and criminals calling for the immediate suppression o f  those 
individuals who display a tendency to being dangerous. Assuming that the intellectual sterility o f contemporary science and 
the inability o f scientists to see big picture had accrued from the fragmentation o f science for the sake o f specialization, he %
suggested that medicine, or rather social medicine, was the m ost suited discipline for the role o f liaison among all the otlier I;
branches o f science, due to its comprehensiveness and direct concern for the future o f mankind. But medicine had to be 
transformed from a curative to a governing endeavour in charge of the control o f all human organic and reproductive 
functions in furtherance o f  a civilizing and enlightemng project. Managerial centres modelled after the Pasteur Institute or 
the Rockefeller foundation would superintend the holistic synthesising o f human knowledge and wisdom informing the 
activities o f the executive. The members of these centres, veritable guardians o f morality and progress, would be asked to 
assimilate as much information as possible, ascetically devoting thek entke lives to the study o f  all scientific fields, with no 
room  for love, amusements, politics, and the divulgation o f scientific discoveries. These platonic guilds would not suffice, 
though, without a drastic intervention on the biological make-up o f the citizens. Inspiration alone is ineffective if it is not
accompanied by the accentuation through voluntary positive eugenics o f class differences that have been erroneously 
interpreted as historically engendered whereas they are based on a real biological hiatus, A non-hereditary aristocracy would 
be formed by persuading the youngsters that health-considerations are stronger and more cogent than love-feelings.
Women, who deteriorate by practice harmful dietary regimes and refuse to bear children would be returned to their 
traditional place in society, the household. They would be permitted to receive a higher education not in order to become 
doctors, lawyers, or professors, but to rear their offspring to be valuable human beings. Certificates o f suitability to marry 
and procreate should be issued only to those who do not exhibit congenital defects. By an appropriate education, everyone 
could be helped realize what wretchedness is in store for those who marry into families contaminated by syphilis, cancer, 
tuberculosis, insanity, or feeble-mindedness. Such families should be considered by young people at least as undesirable as 
the poor ones. In truth, they are more dangerous than gangsters and murderers. N o criminal causes so much misery in a 
human group as the tendency to insanity. This would be extremely fair, in his view, for no human being has the right to 
bring misery to another human being. Still less, that o f procreating children destined to misery. During tlie fascist period, an 
Italian commentator, Alberto Mochi, noted that besides revealing an astonishing absence of scientific methodology in the 
analysis and exposition o f  facts. Carrel’s book contained notions distorted to the point o f becoming a caricature, the shadow Û
of all previous utopias (Mochi 1943: 110). W hat’s more, as regards the criteria for the establishment o f  truth, he remarks the %
Carrel’s suggestions are tantamount to the resumption of the Inquisition, but this time under the aegis o f science.
Between the date o f publication o f  his bestseller and his death, occurred in 1944, Carrel amply demonstrated that 
he was the epitome o f the scientist who had let success go to his head. While seeking, to put into action the plans he had 
presented in his writings, he beheld and praised the birth o f the fascist brigades Croix de Feu and made public his contempt 
for tliat democracy that in France was going through its hardest trial. Democracy, he thought, //faudrait... k  remplacer parm i 
regime plus autoritaire and the European predicament meant the failure o f liberalism, democracy, massonic ideology, mass 
production and, ultimately, o f m odern civilization as a whole (Soupault 1951):
La démocratie tue les grandes races lentement, mais sûrement. Un idéal, une foi, une attitude héroïque devant la vie sont indispensable
1
Carrell (Soupault, ibidem: 197) ^
Finally he embraced Nazi mülenarian expectations:
I l j  aura une grande poussée mystique semblable à celle qui précédé Pan mille et qui le suivit. Peut-être cette impulsion, si elle réussite à 
s’incorporer à la science, sera-t-elle la base d’une civilisation nouvelle.. .C ’estnotre seul espoir
Carrell (Soupault, ibidem: 197)
He complained that a total commitment to his profession was no longer satisfactory because biological research tik
does not concern itself with the practical, huge problems afflicting the world. In 1939 he went back to France where, after ’7
the defeat and tlie establishment o f the pro-Nazi Vichy Government under general Petain, he took on the task o f founding ïi
the “Institut de biologie humaine”, an old dream coming true. This institute began its activities in 1942 and focussed, among
the others, on  the problème de l ’enfant (eugenics) and on the problème de la mise en valeur des qualités mentales de la population
(presumably sterilisation and euthanasia o f the unfit). Carrel died of cardiac arrest on November 5‘‘^  1944 on fleeing French
police that were after him for his collaboration with the Nazis and Vichy. I subscribe to the assessment o f his m ost popular
work that has been made by J.G. Simmons (2002: 203):
overall, Man, the unknown, reveals a genius at work in the shadow of fascist designs on the world, chiselling emblems of despotism with tools of 
science.
A British sympatliiser o f a scientifically administered utopian society was biologist and communist activist J. D.
Bernal, sometliing o f a hero for politically active scientists (Brownhill & Merricks 2002). He advocated tlie establishment of 
an aristocracy o f  scientists through the hereditat}'- separation into castes o f the gifted and the dull (dimorphism). These
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experts would efficiently run the world without the masses being aware o f that. They would live docilely under die 
appearance o f freedom and all innovations would occur so rapidly that they would be a fait accompli before giving rise to 
any form o f protest. Eventually, the better organized beings would be obliged in self-defence to reduce the numbers o f the 
others, until they are no longer seriously inconvenienced by them (Bernal [1929] 1970: 73).
These scientists are unfortunately no exceptions in an otherwise impressive assortment o f high-minded, 
benevolent, and responsible intellectuals. The Sixties witnessed a new wave o f daring conjectures, a sort o f secular 
evangelism furthering die traditional eugenics messianic moral crusade, wliich brought Leslie C. D unn (Dunn 1963) to 
remark that their audiors manifested the same benevolent utopianism o f Galton'"^ and that, although ill-advised, dieir 
suggestions would likely be uncritically accepted due to the authoritativeness of their proponents. As to the utopian nature 
of diese formulations, there is a remarkable consonance between renewed eugenic discourse and views on cosmic evolution 
that Pierre Teilhard de Chardin had popularised through liis writings (Chardin 1955). Virtually all eugenicists from Huxley to 
Haldane, and from Muller to Crick, appeared to have shared the belief that science was the doorway to utopia. The source 
o f their utopian inspiration, in lieu o f More, Plato, or Campanella, is nowadays unmistakably Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. 
References to this Jesuit polymath can be found in the tlieories o f several scientists with a eugenics bent such as Julian 
Huxley (1947; 1964)"*', René Dubos (1962), W. H. Thorpe (1965), A.E. Wilder Smith (1968), and Feinberg (1969). Louise 
Young’s antliology o f essays in biology (1970) is essentially a tribute to Teilhard de Chardin.
The problem with utopianism may well be that its upholders are structurally blind to compromises, negotiations, 
and moderation. Apocalyptic prophecies, now focussing on both environmental deterioration and social disruption, 
continue to nurture vain hopes that the key to all contemporary plights lies in our genetic enhancement. Emblematic in this 
sense is Gregory Stock’s portrait o f a sadomasocltistic future society — a veritable Brave New World — in which 
reprogenetics will create genetically in-built professional specialisations, more dependable “gender specificities”, and the 
reinforcement o f those values that a specific society may privilege, such as calmness, obedience, and curiosity (Stock 2002: 194).
The words employed by Bernal in his frightening scenario were not dissimilar (Bernal [1929] 1970; 69):
psydjological and physiological discoveries will give the niling powers the means of dmcting the masses in harmless occupations and of 
maintaining a perfect docility under the appearance ofperfect freedom. But this cannot happen unless the reding powers ate the scientists 
themselves
Calmness, obedience, docility are recurring terms in scientific utopias and we should wonder whetlier by any 
chance the regimented, hierarcliical, orderly and aseptic laboratory environment has anything to do with this longing for 
tidiness and compliance. For instance, besides “salvation” the other concept that subtly and surreptitiously pervades the new 
eugenic discourse is “harmony”. J  don’t want harmony, fo r love o f mankind I  don’t want it, Fedor Michajloviç Dostoevski] has Ivan 
Karamazov say against a clear example of subordination o f the interest o f the individual to tlie wellbeing o f the “collective”.
Our duty is to decry and combat dystopian visions such as Gregory Stock’s portrait of a sadomasochistic future societ)'  ^— a 
veritable Brave New World — in which reprogenetics would create genetically in-built professional specialisations, more dependable 
“gender specificities”, and the reinforcement of those values that a specific society may privilege, such as calmtress, obedience, and curiosity 
(Stock 2002: 194). Such nightmarish visions can only scare people or entice unscrupulous politicians. Incidentally, eugenicist 
Frederick Osborn (1937: 393) urged fliat eugenics pursue pretty much the same goals: tlie development o f a balanced personality and 
normal attitudes toward family Ife. Similarly offensive is James Watson’s lack of qualms in minimising the importance o f demanding 
consensus firom tlie public opinion because it is none of their business. I f  there’s a terrible misuse andpeople are dying then you can pass regidations
As to Galton’s reported benign brand of utopianism, Dunn should have at the very least mentioned that in his utopian essay 
Kantsaywhere Galton portrayed an imaginary society in which the inhabitants would be required to pass a test of genetic fitness and 
the unfit would be confined to labour colonies where they would be forbidden to procreate. (GilUiam 2001: 2)
'O' who also wrote a laudatory preface to tlie English translation o f he phénomène humain (1955)
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(Stock & Campbell 2000: 84). Such statements demonstrate once more that scientists do tend to be liberal or radical in politics 
(Hksch 1968), perhaps because scientific reductionism inevitably appears radical (Appleyard 1998)'05.
My respondents repeatedly stressed that their individual actions and temperaments were expected to harmonize 
with the aims of the laboratory, metaphorically converted into a human beehive, with very little room  for deviation and 
dissonance. In this respect, I find exceedingly instructive the comments that several scientists sent to  Physics Today (1981) 
after reading Nader’s forthright analysis o f the data she collected on the impressions that experts in nuclear energy.at 
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory had formed about thek research practices (Nader 1996). Some o f those comments 
confirmed her impressions and even strengthened the evidence she had collected.
In her article on Physics Today she argued that controlling processes lie at the foundation of the “harmony 
ideology” . These strategies have much in common: emphasis on conciliation, meekness, passivity, reluctance to take issues 
with the authority, and so forth. It turned out that scientists are not exempt from the standardising effects of the harmony 
ideology and display the following characteristics:
• An inclination to group-think and conformity, plus sanctioning of deviancies;
• A preference for abstract over concrete drinking;
• A number o f solid religious-like beliefs such as “progress is equal to growth”, “societies only change from 
the top down”, “technological fixes can solve human problems and forestall crises”.
Some o f those who read her analysis wholeheartedly agreed with it and commented that as researchers are 
nowadays faceless, they cannot feel particularly responsible""'. Others that growth was the American religion and a n/igion is -j
something you accept without subjecting it to analytical scrutiny (266). Nader remarked the high number o f replies that reported 
episodes of censorship, absence o f dissent, and coercion. The chak o f a physics department admitted (267) the great 
frequency o f bullying, silencing, professional ostracism, and machismo. A distinguished physicist and engineer described ^
how he compared the attitude o f plysicists and engineers to cowboys (268) and a senior physicist pointed out that data and number 5?
rationalized different social and personal values (269). Nader comments that both hierarchy and bureaucracy seem to get in the way of 
frank and open expression, but she could have dwelled some more on the psycho-sexual implications o f the evidence she 
gathered. For instance, does it appear likely that analogous attitudes would be detected in a laboratory where the majority of 
researchers are women? At no time did my female respondents mention any forms o f harassment, nor did they feel that 
machismo was widespread in thek laboratories. In the main they were on good terms with thek colleagues and thek only 
anxiety arose from the power conflict involving thek seniors. Thus it would be interesting to take a closer look at how  the 
behaviour o f scientists, both male and female, changes ki relation to die growing pressure, responsibility and competition.
Let m e conclude this chapter with a suggestion. I suspect the relationship between the attitude o f  alchemists 
towards thek opus and that o f scientists towards thek own research project should be methodically explored. It seems to me 
diat the analysis by C.G. Jung (Jung 1953a; 1953b) o f  the alchemists’ mindscape and o f the all-important role played by thek 
subconscious in thek quest is worthy of the utmost attention. One similitude lies in the perception o f  alchemy and science 
as a way of life; another in the kkid o f psychological changes taking place inside the inquisitive researcher; and, last but not 
least, in the religious satisfaction experienced by both the alchemist and the scientist (Dobbs 1975)
'05 The outcome of the scientific approach is to depreciate man. Astronony proclaims his microcosmic sirçe. Biologj/ claims that he had arrimais, i f  notfor 
parents, at leastforfirst cousins, in the long evohéortary series. Chemistry affirms that he is a compound of hydrogen, oxygen, carbon, and other elements, of 
the same essential stuff as sticks and stones. [...]. I f  we add to the theoretical degradation ofscience thefact that it has supplied the weapons whereby the human 
race can be liquidated, the indignity is complete (Francis Ensley in Utke 1978:190)
'06 this mechanism is termed “diffusion o f responsibility”
'07 Significantly, as far as I was given to  understand, at least two of my respondents were keenly interested in the history and 
practice o f  alchemy and derived existential (and perhaps professional) insights from the perusal o f the relevant literature.
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A parallel’line o f inquiry could look closely at the mystical tinges o f AI research, given that three o f its “ founding 
fathers”, namely von Neumann, Wiener, and Minsky claimed to descend from Rabbi Low o f Prague (Noble 1999)
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5. SCIENCE, DEVIANCE, AND THE REVULSION FROM COMMON HUMANITY
It seems to me that laboratory reproduction is radically human corrparvd to conception J/y ordinary heterosexualintervourse. I t is willed, chosett, 
purposed, and controlled, and surely these ate among the traits that distinguish Homo sapietts from others in the animal world.. .Coital 
reproduction is therefore less human than laboratory reproduction
Joseph Fletcher (Carney 1980:152)
The logical outcome of activities in modifying the genetic make-up ofman is to reach the sta^ where couples will want their children to have the 
best possible genes. Sexual reproduction rvill be viriualfy ended. One suggestion has been to remove genetic material from each individual 
immediately after birth and then promptly sterility that individual. During the individual’s lifetime, record would be kept of accomplishments 
and characteristics. A fter the individual’s death, a committee decides i f  the accomplishments are worily ofprocreation into other individuals. I f  
so, genetic material would be removedfrom the depository and stimulated to clone a new individual I f  the committee decides the genetic material 
is unworily o f procreation it is destroyed. ..The question is indeed not a moral one but a temporal one — when do rr>e start?
Molecular biologist James Bonner (in Cavalieri 1981,153)
I ’m very afraid of the middle class deciding what’s bestforpoor and unforiurrate people. I  think they’re patronkqng and they distrust the notion 
of trying to mprove human beings, because they think they’re pretty well off. In reality, th y’re trot really worrying about the people who suffer 
from what I  call ‘’genetic injustice”
James D. Watson (Stock & Campbell 2000; 78)
We are witnessing the erosion, perhaps the final erosion, of the idea of man as something splendid or divine, and its replacement with a view 
that sees man, no less than nature, simpfy as mote raw materialfor manipulation artd homogenisation. Hence, our peculiar moral crisis
Leon R. Kass (1985: 37)
The Lebensreform movement arose from the Enlightenment aspiration to a better life through the pursuit o f 
liberty and happiness, as well as from the Romantic return to nature as a panacea for the ills o f modern life. In Germany, the 
channelling o f  the protest o f tlie young against the bourgeois hypocrisy o f  previous generations into nationalism and racial 
tliought completely subverted the initial progressive and utopian enthusiasms of the very popular Lebensreform movement 
that had gone hand in hand with the women’s emancipation movement.
The purpose o f this chapter is to illustrate what happened, and why the trajectory o f the Lebensreform movement 
should be taken as a cautionary tale. This chapter will also explore some o f the most problematic issues concerning the 
practice o f genetic counselling and the utilitarian-turn in contemporary bioethics. The common denominator is that the way 
the notions o f  “bare life”, “deviance”, and “relief o f human estate” have been recast since the last decade o f the 19‘*‘ 
century, also thanks to scientists’ public stances, indicates that tlie chief questions we should address in the genomic era 
cannot possibly be formulated exclusively in philosophical terms. There are too many scholars involved in the project o f the 
redefinition o f  bioethics in the genomic era who employ the taboo words “National Socialism” only to stifle debate between 
promoters and critics. It is facüe to reduce the wealtli of insights and teachings we may derive from a historical analysis o f 
the relationship between ethics and science to the dogma o f  the “Nazi slippery slope” . I f  anything, the slippery slope 
commenced well before under more favourable auspices, and the issue is far more complex than a mere confrontation 
between short-sighted advocates o f genomics and apocalyptic detractors. I hope this chapter wdl help the readers appreciate 
the depth o f the problem we are facing.
In late nineteenth-century Switzerland — particularly in Zurich, a veritable refuge for dissident intellectuals and 
home to one o f the very few universities that welcomed female students - ,  and in several sanatoriums all across Europe 
experimenting with Lebensreform, some o f those biomedical students who were to become foremost eugenicists and racial
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hygienists in Weimar and Nazi Germany"*® —, keenly read the works o f Plato, More, and Campanella portraying utopian 
eugenic societies (Weindling 1989), and so did Dr. E rnst B., a would-be Auschwitz physician (Lifton 1986). There actually 
took place a “virtual epidemics o f utopianism” (Weindling 1989), probably fomented by a keen sense o f meaninglessness 
following the “D eath of G od” (Martin 1996), and characterised by (Weindling 1989; Burrow 2000);
• an awareness that universities were training more graduate students than they could absorb, and that a permanent 
appointment was a forlorn hope;
• a millenarian, apocalyptic sense tliat a great transformation was looming;
• a messianic belief that they, as scientists, could and were morally obliged to accelerate its occurrence;
• a deep-seated hatred for consumerism, commercialism, and pro fit-oriented practices leading some to embrace the 
most trite anti-Semite stereotjy>es;
• a strong intolerance o f the Christian doctrine o f other-worldly compensation and consolation which implied 
meekness, passivity, and fatalism in everyday life;
• die sentiment that a thorough lifestyle-reform was necessary in order to attain mankind’s biological salvation and 
free the world from misery and disease;
• the accompanying Freikorp erkultur, a blueprint for die future Nazification of German everyday life, which would 
involve a cult o f the healthy body and an ostensibly edifying self-restraint premised on vegetarianism and total 
abstention from alcohol and tobacco (Massin 1990)""*.
' This movement was named Lebensreform diat is, life-reform, and involved the campaign against alcoholism and
venereal diseases, and for the amelioration o f the worldng class’s living standards, dietary reform, and environmental
protection. Those associations championing Lebensreform also pressed for a more interventionist State as regards public 
health, social hygiene, and disease prevention (Ehrenstrom 1993). Emblematically, two o f the most prominent 
representatives o f  diis movement, that is, the Silesian physician Alfred Ploetz, and the Swiss psychiatrist and human 
geneticist E rnst Riidin, expounded views that were altogether consonant with the philosophy inspiring the Wandervdgel 
movement that exerted such a huge appeal on German speaking youth (Neuloth & Zdius 1982; Baacke et al. 1991). 
Although this movement was mainly pacifist and left-wing, it was soon taken over by a devious volkish ideology stressing 
racial regeneration and militarism (Mosse 1982). Alas! a major attempt at fleeing the iron cages o f hyper-rational modernity 
ended up nurturing a sick form o f collective hedonism. Perceptively, Weber had foreshadowed this final outcome when, 
even though welcoming the exploration o f inward and irrational eroticism and sexuality as an effective form o f resistance 
against the disenchantment and alienation of a bureaucratised, routine-bound world, he warned that an exaggerated 
emphasis on  its salvational as well as scientific function would be disappointing and self-deceptive and, finally, conducive to 
that self-serving nihilistic enjoyment of the Genttfimenschen ohne Heriç, i.e. sensualists without heart (Scaff 1987). Things got 
even worse than that. The eternal ambivalence o f modernity, divided by the perennial quarrel between objectivists and 
subjectivists (Scaff 1987), saw the prevailing of the rationalisation and, allegedly, sublimation of both sensuality and sexuality 
propelled by a belief in humane and liberating scientific Imowledge as well as by considerations o f  economic maximisation 
(TVIartin 1996);
That this was no t a mere political strateg}'  ^is evident in retrospect. An entire tradition revolving around reflection 
over the meaning of decadence, illness and death, namely German Romanticism (Hatfield 1952), was on the verge of 
extinction due to the bio-medical imperative to soothe and prevent pain. Hans Castorp, the protagonist o f Thomas Mann’s 
“Magic M ountain”, flees the disease-ridden German flatland and takes up residence in a sanatorium where the illness is
"*® Most German racial hygienists were physicians with a strong training in genetics (MuUer-Hdl 1988; Weindling in Burley & Harris 
2002).
The German youth movement called Wandervogel (1896-1919) displayed many of tlie traits also characterizing Ploetz’s and 
Rüdin’s lifestyle and convictions (Neu loh & Zilius 1982; Weber in MattioU 1995)
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experienced in its full intensity. Tliis option was not really absurd, given that “Der Zauberberg” is an epic o f disease 
(Weingand 1971). After leaving the magic mountain to re-experience the urban malaise, Castorp is eventually drafted and 
sent to fight in the trenches o f WWI where the idealization o f death and pain would sound disgraceful.
Formerly, though, German Romantic poet Novalis had asked himself konnU Krankheit nicht ein M ittel hobenr Synthesis 
sein?, that is to say, could sickness be a means o f spiritual elevation {Steigemnf} and purification {Reinigun '^? (Weigand 1971). 
For Heine, Tyroleans were too stupid to be anything other than healthy, and submitted that durch 'Leidenkdmpfe kdnnten die 
Tierv Menschen werden [through the struggle against suffering, animals could be turned into humans]. In keeping with these 
Romantic sentiments, Castorp believed in a sort o f wcixPkalokagathia, and argued that he felt baffled vis-à-vis a person who is 
at once dull and sick, because one would rather expect intelligent people to be sick. By contrast, to Settembrini, a m ost 
faithful heir o f  the Enlightenment, disease is a humiliation, an insult to the human spirit, that must be misted and overcome at all costs 
(C.E. Williams in Bloom 1986: 40).
This latter perspective is by no means exempt from pitfalls. Countering the Christian doctrine that the sinners, i.e. 
those who cause suffering, will answer for their misdeeds in HeU, and therefore that tliere is no point in taldng revenge in 
this Hfe (“turn the other check”), the EnHghtenment took a mundane attitude towards the problem o f pain and encouraged 
men to seek after its roots and its possible cures. In so doing they did not reaHse that
. . ■ .diegrdfite Krankheit der Menschen istaus derBekdmpfung ihrerKinnkJreiten entstanden, und die anscheinenden Heilmittel haben auf die
DauerSchlimmeres errçeugt, als das war', was mit ihnen beseitigt werden sollte
Nietzsche („Morgenrote“ quoted in KowaHk 1985: 32)
By tliis Nietzsche meant tliat the cure has reHeved humans of their responsibility for their own suffering, and 
induced them to view themselves as victims o f fate, and, ultimately, to neglect the values o f self-determination, moral 
conduct, and self-growth; for the greatest health is that o f the noble man who withstands pain and fights it. Those who 
choose the path o f the externalisation o f  the causes and responsibilities for their suffering are instead prone to self-hatred, 
Hke Settembrini. Yet tlie same sense of intellectual pre-eminence permeates both discourses. Whether they inhabit the 
suburbia and contaminate the abodes o f the intelligentsia, or dwell in the countryside and on the mountain slopes, 
perturbing with their “sturdy ignorance” the lofty speculations o f the members o f the upper classes, the masses embody a 
different species o f  humans whose utility has not yet been defined save tlie necessity to have at one’s disposal a Hmitless 
source o f cheap labour.
5.1 SCIENCE AND BARE LIFE
A  nerv species would bless me as its creator and source; many happy atrd excellent rtafutes would owe their being to me. No father cotrld claim
the gratitude of his child so completely as I  should deser've theirs
Victor Franlcenstein (Nora Crook 1996: 37)
Are we doing something terrible !y ameliorating the illnesses that our compassionate policies of the present and past have helped create?
Daniel Koshlandjr. (in Stock & Campbell 2000: 26)
I  believe it is a moral obligation of patents to act in their children’s best interests, and by definition I  think greater intelligence, health, and
longevity is in their interest
James Flughes (in Stock & Campbell 2000:132)
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Ill 1912, N orth Carolina's superintendent to mental institutions was persuaded that the rdtimate aim o f the school is the 
elimination offeeble-mindedness from the race by segregation (Noll 1995: 26). Ironically, his equivalent in South Carolina only 4 years 
later submitted that i f  our institution does nothing mote than incarcer'ate, teach and train those admitted thereto, o f course it rvill have failed in 
many o f the high purposes for which it is intended (Noll 1995: 26). Noll comments on this discrepancy o f  views by observing that 
historically the social control o f deviance proved incompatible with a complementaiy and not necessarily antagonistic desire 
that the feeble-minded be trained and reintegrated into society as productive citizens. Tliis very divergence was to be fatal in 
Germany, following the 1925 major economic crisis, when the sophisticated network o f clinics and hospitals where generic 
counselling services were provided'"*, and diat had been instituted also thanks to the political lobbying o f  social-democrats 
and feminists, began to change its nature. Financial straits convinced many diat more heedful reproductive behaviour was 
imperative (Usborne 1992). Some went to great pains to turn it into a compulsory service that, alongside a national data­
bank for hereditary conditions, was meant to carry out a systematic, collective screening o f the German population 
(Weindling in Lee 1990). All in all, this trend could be seen as acceptable in view o f its pedagogical and preventive goals 
(Usborne 1992).
Now, the ghasdy developments o f such a system accrued from unbearable economic and social pressures that, in 
dieory, could present diems elves once again. The question then becomes: in such circumstances, could genetic screening 
and die termination o f pregnancy in die collective interest be made compulsory (Baudoin 1994)? A n indication is provided 
by an historical analysis of the societal perception and treatment o f people with disabilities, which shows that there is no 
trace o f a seamless historical transition from persecution or desertion to a sensible and caring attitude (O ’Brien 1999). 
Instead, economic, social and political causes have severely affected their fate along an erratic course.
Guardedness is indispensable when it comes to exploring the meaning o f  personhood in relation to health, 
progress, and collective welfare. I agree with Ambroselli (1994) that the notion o f personhood is so vague that the very 
pursuit o f predictive medicine could devaluate it. Instead the conclusions that Thomas (Thomas 1995) draws from the 
correct assumption that personhood cannot be defined by means of someone’s genotype because tliis smacks o f genetic 
determinism and the genot}'pe cannot be held as sacred, are debatable. I object to liis subsequent deduction that insomuch 
as the only sacred values are freedom and equality, then genetic manipulation would not constitute a menace to a person’s 
integrit)\ It is precisely because freedom and equality (justice) are not solidly rooted in the contemporaiy social fabric, due to 
tlie heterogeneity o f ultimate values intrinsic to advanced democracies, tliat critics o f  the applications o f the Fluman 
Genome Project are more or less grudgingly compelled to play the part o f Cassandras (Missa & Susanne 1999). In our 
society there is no such a thing as a free and educated decision because not all members o f  our society have access to the 
indispensable information, because personal choices are constrained by social prejudices, because o f want o f  adequate 
financial means, and because most people simply neglect the advances that have been made over the past decades as 
concerns the life-standards o f  disabled people (Kitcher 2003)
The m ost obvious and notorious example of the dangerous ambiguousness o f bioethicists in this moral sphere is 
Peter Singer’s claim that tlie sanctitjr o f  life is a futile principle that must be substituted by a notion o f  personhood resting 
on tlie ascertainment o f consciousness. Hence the killing o f a baby within the first 28 days from her conception would be 
permissible. As George Baroff (Baroff 2000) points out, this would presuppose a view of individual existence as worthwliile, 
not for who one is, but for what one can do. There are numerous pitfalls in a view that treats as morally indistinguishable 
some higher forms o f animal life and less fortunate human beings; and I believe the parallelism is fairly obvious between 
specieism -  as Singer termed this doctrine -  and the most arbitrary interpretations o f Darwinism that, by devaluating certain 
less fit human beings, shored up a biological notion o f bourgeois aristocracy and in so doing condemned the former to 
discrimination and, eventually, mass-ldlHng (Weikart 1993).
' "* Tlie term generic counseling was coined in 1947 (Rapp 1988)
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The frailty o f Singer’s philosophising has been wholly exposed by Jenny Teichman (1997) who has tellingly entitled 
one of her essays “the false philosophy o f Peter Singer” . In it she easily pulls apart Singer’ theoretical and logical premises, 
concluding that Bradley’s contention that the man o f mem theory is in the practical sphere an useless and dangerous pedant fully suits 
him, and that bio-ethicists remain trendy by striving to be more and more controversial through the undercutting o f the 
most deeply-ingrained and widely accepted moral standards. She questions Singer’s right to call himself a humanist 
insomuch as he refuses to grant human beings as such an intrinsic value, something which Mes at the foundation o f 
humanism. Rather, Singer is an utilitarian anti-humanist for whom only the attainment o f  pleasure and happiness count as 
cardinal values and criteria for tlie assessment o f how far a conscious person’s life is worth being preserved. The one 
argument that is normally adduced to appease the critics is that this brand of utilitarianism is not only harmless but 
serviceable, because it goes against State interference with private choices. So, whereas Haeckel would argue that reason tells 
us that a perfect State must provide the greatest possible happiness for every individual that belongs to it (Haeckel 1910: 132), Singer trusts 
individuals to  be able to make informed decisions. It goes without saying that only those choices are “informed” which are 
in agreement with bio-utiUtarian doctrine. Better still, they should harmonize with any suggestions bioethicists may come up 
with, given that the duty of a thinker is to follow what his intellect tells him, no matter what the logical conclusions may be (Singer as cited by 
Klieme in Bach & De Kleine 1999).
Alas! the substance o f such an ideology is not dissimilar from former, harmful instances o f  utilitarianism. The
principle o f social utility, together with the notion o f the social cost o f disease (Hats 1998), are two o f the fundamental
bequests o f the Enlightenment (Goldberg in Essed & Goldberg 2002). The other mainstay o f  the Enlightenment is
egalitarianism, but this latter m ust be superseded by the former, for in Singer’s view human lives are not equal. According to
him (Singer 1994: 190), hardly anyone realty believes that all human life is o f equal worth. The life o f  more sophisticated nonhuman
animals is wordiier than that o f severely retarded human beings, and human beings who are not aware o f being persons
(namely, subjects endowed with consciousness) are potentially disposable. The unpleasant aspect of such a doctrine is that
its champions do not seem to be aware tliat it has led to the devaluation of humanness, however defined, both on a
symbolical plane, and — ultimately -  to denying thousands o f human beings their right to exist. Pietro Colla, also drawing on
one o f  the m ost insightful passages o f Hannah Arendt’s w ritings'", observes that to be nothing else and nothing more than
a human being has aU too often been equated to being an Untermensch (Colla 2000: 20, footnote 25). By the same token
(Simone Weil, cited by Ambroselli 1994: 113):
ce n ’est pas seulement impossible à définir en paroles.. .Mais cette notion—là [respect for the human person] ne peut pas non plus être 
conçue; elle ne peut pas être définie, délimitée par une opération muette de la petuée. Prendre pour règle de la moral publique une notion 
impossible à définir et à concevoir, c’est donnerpassagy à toute espèce de tyrannie:
We do not know whether Singer is acquainted with such cautionary reflections. He presents no compelling motive
for holding his views, except some sort o f  gut-feeling and the utilitarian tradition that, however, and I believe much to his
annoyance, has no t yet acquired tire status o f universal worldview that he feels it deserves. Furthermore, Teichman remarks
that Singer scarcely distinguishes between personhood and humanness, running up against both the ordinary and the legal
use o f both terms (including the UN Declaration o f Human Rights) and “bioethically” manufactures ideas o f surreal
persons, “overhumans” that lack materiality. She finally dismisses his position by commenting that practical experience
teaches us that to regard the value o f human life as a convention is utterly siUy, insofar as Singer would be unlikely to
encounter human beings who are not persuaded that their lives have intrinsic importance:
Per'sortism — this is what she calls Singer’s and other like-minded bioethicists’ thought" 2 on the subject of the sacredness 
of life — and Nafism share one fimdamentalprinciple, the principle that (non-aiminat) human beings are of two types, those whom it is
' "  7/ semble qu ’un homme qui n ’est rien d’autre qu ’un homme a précisémentperdu les qualities qui permettent aux autres de le traiter comme leur semblable 
" 2  Jenny Teidrman (2001) names among the „modemisers“ of Anglo-Saxon bioethics Peter Singer, Helga Kuhse, Ronald Dworkin, 
Margaret Pabst Battin, and Jonathan Glover.
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writes:
wmng to kill, and those whom it is all right, or even good, to MU. [...]. “life not worthy of life” would be a masonabty apt sub-titlefor chapter 
2 of Singer’s book Practical Ethics”.
Teiclrman (op. cit.: 98)
Along similar lines, in an article called “Planet o f the Apes” (History Today, Oct. 1994: pp. 6 -8), Michael Burleigh
What Singer fails to engage with is the fact that the N afis and their Weimar intellectual pwgeniton were equally aggressively bent upon a 
secular', post-Christian alternative to the doctrine ofthe sanctity of human Ife ... When he writes, A  self-consdous being is aware ofitselfas a 
distinct entity, with a past and a future ... Killing a snail or a day-old infant does not thwart any desires of this Mnd, because sttails and 
newborn irrfants are incapable of having such desires’ ... Singer is, no doubt unwittingly, for history is not his strong suit, using arguments and 
analogies employed again and again by the Nafls.
Most interestingly, Peter Singer and his colleague Helga Kuhse have edited an anthology o f  bioethical essays 
(Singer & Kulise 1999) among whose contributors are John Harris and Nicholas Agar, two fairly radical drinkers. Here 
follows the standard logical thread o f  their speculations (pp. 165-170):
1 . the first premise: it is not morally wrong to hope for a healthy baby, it is instead particularly advisable.
2 . the second premise: disability is undesirable.
3. the first inference: not taldng steps to pursue the goal o f a healthy baby is morally reprehensible.
4. the second inference: everyone should be discouraged from repr'oducing children who will be significantly hai'med by their genetic
constitution. Please note that such a stance invariably glosses over the problem o f who shall determine what 
“significandy harmed” actually means. But diat this is the gist o f the question does no t seem to bother either Harris 
or Walter Glannon (see Glannon 1998)
5. die diird inference: no moral difference exists between genetic therapy and genetic enhancement when this protects life 
and health.
Nicolas Agar (ibid., pp. 171-181) similarly considers a rational chooser’s scenario only, and sees no problem in
parents wishing that their children may some day realise dieir own unfulfilled desires. More audaciously he goes so far as to
claim that, had a 6 -year-old Mozart mixed with children o f his own age rather than perform musical exhibitions throughout
Europe, we would probably not have The Marriage of Figaro or Don Giovanni. The thought diat such a child as Mozart may
well see touring as not the most enjoyable option, and might prefer to be playing with his peers, does not really cross Agar’s
mind. In  “Bioethics” (Agar 1995: 13), he endorses a form o f “ecumenical enhancement” explaining that
We attempt to list the rrrhole range of morally acceptable human goals and aim to provide capacities which better enable a person to pursue them 
in such a way that does not disaiminate between them.
Another prom inent bioethicist who displays a similarly conceited assurance with regard to the goals o f human
genetic engineering is H. Tristram Engelhardt (1986: 381) who, in referring to the alleged predisposition o f human beings to
belligerence (one that has never been proven, a detaü that he simply chooses to ignore), claims that:
In the end, the continued survival of humans may require engneering around such inclinations and such particular expresnorrs of 
competitiveness
Consistent with my views on die subject is my disagreement with the current use o f Rawlsian theories o f  justice 
(Ledley 1994; Holtung 1999; Buchanan et al. 2000).
It is just unimaginable that we should exclusively focus on individual freedom and self-determination when these 
rights cannot be really exerted by such a great share of the world population due to discrimination and disparities. In diis 
sense, dieories o f justice o f a consequentialist brand are to me o f no use whatsoever, because thek proponents seldom 
consider that a solely just society may well be one wanting in compassion and caring (Childress & Casebeer in Sumner & 
Boyle 1996) that is to say, one in which a right is re-interpreted as an obligation (Tong in Humber & Almedes 2000). 
Contrary to thek opkiion, the State has a duty to intervene to see that parents be in a position to choose without being
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subjected to excessive pressure and expectations, as decisions are not made in a “social vacuum” (Kitcher in Pence 1998).
Kitcher (2003) argues tliat “utopian eugenics” would entail that:
a. Everybody must be in a position to make free and informed decisions
b. Social support must be guaranteed for those born witli genetic conditions whose effects can be attenuated
dirough diat very social support
But o f course such an intervention could only be possible and effective on condition that a concept o f  human 
dignity could be formulated, wliich is an intractable problem because it entails a definition o f  what is human and who is a 
person, that is, the legal and ethical status o f the embryo. For Taguieff this renders virtually insurmountable the conflict 
between die unconditional respect for human dignity and psycho-somatic integrity, on die one hand, and the supreme ideal 
o f human perfectibiütj'’, on the other hand (Bachelard-Jobard 2001). This is so because human dignity is indissolubly bound 
to the notion o f quality o f life, which is subjective and as such undermines the idea of equality between human lives and, 
finally, o f the sacredness o f life. Quality and equality are thus pitted against one another, in a fashion diat is altin to and 
stands in continuity with the menschen-dkono/msche E thik o f  the Weimar period (Meyer 1991), revolving around the notion o f 
social cost o f disease (Hats 1998) and with the characterization of citizens as Menschenmaterial 'm Germany, or manniskoniaterial 
in Sweden, where the term was widely employed in the reformist rhetoric (Colla 2000).
Nowadays, for example, problems could arise in die field of insurance policy when insurers, being forbidden to 
readjust premiums depending on genetic information, will m ost certainly raise all premiums so that everybody will be asked 
to cover the costs o f diseases o f a genetic nature tiiat in fact are only more or less likely to occur in any particular case 
(Beck-Fenwick 1998, Keller 2003). Public health care is another agency that could find itself in a sad plight. For example, US 
Medicare allocates inadequate resources tiirough a cost-utility analysis o f health interventions based on the assignment o f 
numerical scores on a scale from zero to one, depending on the severity o f the disease, in order to maximize health gains. 
These scores — Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs), Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs), and health-adjusted Life 
Years (HeaLYs) — are presumed to measure one person’s quality o f life and, substantially, devalue and disparage the life o f 
chronically ill and disabled people. In other words, the individualistic and exclusionary notion o f a quantifiable quality o f life 
(QL) that recoils from deviance, unpredictability, and imperfection has substituted the solidaristic and all-inclusive concept 
o f the sanctit}^ o f human life (SL) (Koch 2000).
People affected by Down-syndrome would be likely not to get any transplant, despite the fact that half o f  them are 
highly susceptible to heart pathologies and malformations. This has much to do with the notion o f  social worth, that is to 
say, social utility. People deemed as less productive than others — no doubt on an insurance- and income- or perspective 
income-basis — are automatically not worthy o f expensive treatments like dialysis or organ transplants. Pace the Kantian 
principle that people should never be considered as a means to an end (in this case, social good), maximization o f  resources 
is tlie guiding criterion, and human beings are put after profit, which does not augur well for the future o f advanced 
democracies (Himmelfarb in Burleigh, 1997). After all, as has been stressed on several occasions — among others by G.K. 
Chesterton (1922), Klaus en (1997) and Colla (2000) —, eugenics served the interests o f  advanced capitalism, in so far as the 
latter was perennially in search o f valuable citizens, that is, o f highly productive labourers.
5.2. BIO-UTILITARIANISM
The mle played by the guardians of humanity, for Kant, is that they actively operate to pm ent thefomation of such a mognition [that each 
individual must assume responsibility^ for one’s actions] thtvugh such divene tactics as a stms on the frailty of the individual, the 
elevation ofhetemnomous intemts into ends, and the dismissal of the moral law as impractical or incidental
Owen (1994:12)
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A  powerful alliance between medicine and the biotechnology industry will shape the choices available to individuals and divert attention away 
from the social processes that shape inequalities, the experience of ill health, and the human condition
Cmmiiigham-Buiiey & Boulton (in Albrecht et al. 2000: 181)
But the pharmaceutical world, once I  entered it, got me by the throat and wouldn 't let me go. I t had everything, the hopes and dreams we have of 
it; its vast, partly reaUsçedpotentialfor good, and its pitch-dark underside, sustained by corporate cant, Irypocrisy, corruption and greed. A nd  it 
is rrot only the obvious sins that the pharma giants have to answer fo r  the dumping of inappropriate or out-of-date medicines on people they 
reckon won't know the difference; the arbitrary overpricing of their products, underpinned (ry the draconian exercise ofpatent rights. It is not the 
deliberate widening of a drufs specifications at whatever cost to the patient in order to broaden its sales base - so that, for instance, a drug that 
in Britain or the U.S. would be prescribed onlyfor extreme cancer pain is represented to Afiicans as a simple headache cure. It is not even the 
suppression of contra-indications and side-effects, and the repeated campaigns; supported by the U.S. government, to halt the manufacture of 
generic drugs by countries that can't afford inflated Western prices. When the Thais wanted to manufacture their own generic drugs, for 
instance, the U.S. state department threatened to impose sanctions on the import of Thai timber. No, it's bigger even than all that - and, in the 
long run, worse. The pharmas, whether thy know it or not, ate engaged in the systematic corruption of the medical profession, country by 
country.
Jolin Le Carre, interview, Tlie Vancouver Sun, December 16,2000
I suspect bio-utilitarianism is not exceedingly popular in Italy. The impression that a professional genetic
counsellor I interviewed (Italy 2003) has formed o f bioetliics and bioetliicists is emblematic:
bioetica.. .ma che tipo dipotere la societàglipotrebbe date?Infin dei contianche loro sono U M A N I.. .infin dei contLQjdndi iiremnnopure 
loro unpo' di qua e unpo' di là: insomma non se n'esce. Mipiace {idea di ammonite e non vietare, basta che costorv non diventino come delle 
Cassandre. Personalmente. . .ma non è importante.. .sarei abbastangafavorevole alle biotecnologe e alia ricerca in campo biomedico ma lo sarei 
di pill segli sciensfati nonfossero umani, cm conuttibili e imperfetti, come me e tutti gli altri della compagnia.
[Bioetliicists.. .but witli what kind of power could tliey be entrusted by society? After all they are HUMAN Hire 
us...after all. Therefore diey too will shilly-shally. There’s no way around it. I Hire the idea o f cautioning without 
proliibiting as long as they do not become Cassandras. Personally...but this is unimportant...1 tend to favour 
bioteclinologies and biomedical research. But I would do so even more if scientists were not human that is, corruptible 
and imperfect. Hire me and anybody else]
Unsurprisingly, this bioethical trend views intellectual disabilities as compromising the possibiHty for the affected
persons to lead a full life, that is one typified by tlie utm ost intellectual competence. But a course o f poHtical action
exclusively concerned with social utility and man’s worth within a frame o f abstract empiricism conceals totalitarian
potentialities (].L. Talmon 1970; Taylor 1993). It foUows tliat the understanding o f bioethics or philosophy on the whole as
tlie teaching o f  a rationally achieved moral expertise is simply nonsense:
Philosophy as such delivers no verdict upon moral issues; there is no unique set of moralprindples which philosoply as such underwrites and no 
question, therefore, of using that set to uncover the answers which philosoply gives to moral questions. When bioethidsts deliver a verdict upon 
the moral issues raised by medicalpractice, it is their own verdict they deliver and not the verdict of philosophy itself; it is their voice we hear and 
not the voice of reason and rationality
Anne Maclean (1993: 7)
For Maclean human reason is first and foremost human and must be integral, and not aHen, to human nature and 
human life. In  other words, it is vain to juxtapose feeHngs and reason claiming that moral appropriateness cannot follow our 
emotional inclinations but must comply with the imperative o f reason intended as rationaHty, the guidance o f a thoroughly 
rational conduct. Much more persuasive is a conduct that accepts tliat there is no such a thing as an absolute conception of 
the value o f  life and tliat our practices are informed by what goes without saying, what we do as a matter o f  course 
(Maclean, ibid.: 135). It is only sensible to conclude that it is futile to specify rationally grounded reasons to prom ote animals 
and demote humans, as speciesists urge us to do arguing that the claim tliat men are equal is not supported by factual 
evidence. This claim is prescriptive and stems from the daily observation that animals cannot do what human beings can.
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Jthat there is a basic human reality, and that these assumptions have worked nicely to the present day. Ultimately, human 
beings simply have solid reasons to believe them (Boudon 1986, 1999, 2000).
Anotlier aspect o f  bio-utilitarianism is that it is coherent witli the way bio-politics developed in Western countries 
(see chapter 2), and proves that Agamben’s treatment o f the notion o f “bare life” and the rule o f exception are wholly 
applicable to the contemporary debate on bio-engineering and genetic counselling. I have previously (chapter 2) outlined 
Agamben’s theory o f the logical synthesis o f biology, politics, and economy that emerged in consequence o f  the age-old 
paradigm o f  the politicization of bare life. Whether biotechnology and bioengineering could become a new eugenic ideology 
and ritual is left to the m ood o f the intellectual elite and of the lay-public that establish what comes next in the zone o f 
indistinction between bare, biological Hfe {to vyti) and the good Hfe {to eu sty/i), in that, as stated by Aristotle in the first book 
o f “PoHtics”, we may say that while [the poHs] gmws fo r the sake o f mete Ife, it exists for the sake o f good Ife (Norris 2000: 39). There 
follow a number o f consequences (Norris 2000):
• good Hfe is at once different from bare life and bare Hfe is in the process of becoming good Hfe.
• bare life and good Hfe cannot be reconciled, as the really important thing is not to live but to live well (Socrates in Critd)
• the principal function of the sovereign power becomes controlHng the tacit, but growing insertion of their life [the citizens’] 
into the state apparatus (Agamben 1995)
The governance o f bio-poHtics in turn has made possible the constitution of a unique legal status, that o f homo sacer.
According to the Latin grammarian Festus (2"(* century A.D.), homo sacer h  someone who has committed a crime and, found
guilty, finds liimself between and betwixt ius humanum and ius divinum. The homo cannot be sacrificed but the person who
kiUs him is not indictable and by virtue o f this special status he, Hke a trickster, contravenes aU consuetudinary norms. For
Agamben, later instances o f sacredness are those whose life is judged lebensunwertes and parasitic by the sovereign power, and
therefore reduced to merely disposable bare life, i.e. disabled and mentally retarded, Jews, Gypsies, the Versuchepersonen,
guinea pigs subjected to atrocious medical experiments in the extermination camps; and the néomorts, that force us to tackle
the question o f brain-death and the medical and scientific utiHzation o f their body (bare Hfe). By the same token, homines
sacres would be all people aged over 80 or 85, according to the proposal o f Nobel Laureate and co-discoverer o f  the double-
helix, Sir Francis Crick, that such people should be defined legally dead and denied expensive medical treatment (Seidelman
1989). I wonder whether he has changed his mind now that he has reached that age. Lying on the same threshold are also aU
those who are so connoted through “medspeak”:
{Which includes such mnemonic expressions as "SHPOS ” meaning “a Subhuman Piece of Shit” or “Gomer” which standsfor ‘Get Out of 
My Emergency Room” or “a human being who has lost— often through age — what goes into being a human being”
Seideknan (1989: 444)
The ironic remarks o f some genetic counsellors about the adversities faced by their patients encountered by both 
Bosk (1992) and myself could weU fit this interpretive framework (see below). After aU, in a eugenic regime disabled people 4
would be probably treated as homines sacres, borderline figures embodying the twiHght zone, terra di nessuno [“no man’s land”] 
in Agamben’s words, the zone o f  indistinction where zoe and bios at once constitute and exclude each other. There, 
customary morality loses Its meaning and the rule o f exception prevails. The relevance o f this argument for a social and 
ethical study o f reprogenetics is evidenced by Andrew Norris (2000) who explains that because o f the forthcoming advances 
in the field o f  genomics the definition o f humanness will soon become too fluid to serve any legal, scientific, ethical, and 
poHtical purpose.
The chief predicament we will face is the value we want to attach to the life o f  disabled people. Genetic 
engineering brings us to a world where positive eugenics and cloning wiU be viable options for prospective parents. These 
are tlie questions that wiU accompany us tliroughout this journey (Weilde 2000; Danfordi 2000):
1. I f  disabiUty is not desirable then why not prevent it?
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2. I f  some characteristics and capabilities are desirable then why not promote them?
3. Wliat characteristics do we want to shape and which do we want to leave to choice?
4. Whose truth informs what kind o f  legislation?
One professional category that will have to confront this challenge are of course the genetic counsellors. Genetic
counsellors were not originally meant to be included in the present research because I still believe diat since their work criss­
crosses a large variety o f extremely topical issues it warrants a separate study. Nevertheless, I did resolve to interview three 
students enrolled in a genetic counselling Master programme in Canada and one professional genetic counsellor in Italy. 
Unsurprisingly, the literature on this subject is deficient, given the novelty of such a professional figure. The sociological 
inquiries on die self-perception o f genetic counsellors have been few and far between and next to none those highlighting 
the training o f the professional ideology o f genetic counsellors. My sample is certainly too limited and does not enable me to 
draw meaningful generalisations but I did find out that the comparison between my data and the data collected by other 
social scientists is not insignificant.
Shortly after WWII, in 1947, Sheldon Reed coined the term “genetic counseling” which would designate die 
consulting provided to couples with an history o f genetic diseases by professionals with a training in genetics. From die 
inception, those geneticists who took part in such a novel undertaking laid a strong emphasis on neutrality and non­
directiveness. However, many among them did not dissimulate their advocacy of eugenics, as they were persuaded that what 
was wrong widi eugenics was not the goal but the means (Resta 1997).
In the same year, 1952, Clarence Oliver declared that it was his duty to discourage couples likely to beget children
with “undesirable traits”; Sheldon Reed, drawing on the rather arbitrary assumption that mentally normal people, as a rule,
behave normally and therefore in a socially acceptable manner, concluded that such citizens will voluntarily choose
eugenically sound procreation once genetic counseling is made available; and Lee Dice held that genetic counselors should
not merely concern themselves with the well-being o f a given family, but also with the undesirable propagation o f
disadvantageous traits amidst the population (Resta 1997). As to social interventionism, in 1973 James V. Neel, one o f the
first geneticists to serve as a non-directive genetic counsellor in the 1950s, submitted that as screening could not pinpoint all
genetic predispositions, perhaps me should encourage the total population to embark upon a regime which can only result in better health fo r
the average person (Hilton et al. 1973: 359). Twenty years later, on occasion o f  the 1993 centennial tribute to J. B. S. Haldane
(Majumder 1993: 338), he reiterated this argument even more forcefully:
1-ook where practical leaders have taken us. Now should be a time of pvfound reassessment.. .humans will need to exhibit much mote sef- 
discipline than in the past. [...]. Some willfind that what I  am espousing smacks of coercion, an affront to fiee enterprise” and “human 
individuality”. I  remind them that in times ofperceived aisis in the past...humans have accepted some mobiliiyation and loss of individual 
freedoms [ ..] . There is no professioiral group better qualifted, or more oriented, to be ombudsman jbr the fature [than scientists], but yet we 
haven H been doing much of that recentty
In the Hght o f such statements, it is remarkable that such an absolute commitment to a value-free genetic 
counselling could persist for decades in N orth America, especially in consideration o f the fact that in England and 
continental Europe directive counselling is not opposed (Cohen, Wertz, Nippert, Wolff 1997; Wertz 1998; Rapp 2000). 
However, tliis commitment has come increasingly under attack by genetic counsellors themselves (McConlde-Rosell & 
Sullivan 1999). Some (Flarper & Clarke 1997) argue that the excesses o f free market and social coercion cannot possibly be 
countered by specialists. Others (Benkendorf & Prince 2002; McCarthy Veach, Bartels, LeRoy 2002; Weil 2003; Bowles 
2003) underscore that counselees are more resourceful and resilient than many professionals have come to believe and that 
genetic counselling should be viewed as an interactive process (shared decision making) involving a great deal o f psycho­
social consideration that clients may have not contemplated. Furthermore, unacknowledged directiveness could be fa r more 
manipulative (WilHams, Alderson, Fatsides 2002). These are my personal views on the subject.
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The m ost complete and insightful work on genetic counsellors’ self-perception is in my view Charles Bosk’s “All 
G od’s mistakes” (1992). Having the opportunity to devote a great amount o f time to die investigation o f  the practice o f 
genetic counselling in the USA he came up with a remarkable number o f  keen observations that should call for a follow-up 
that, to my Imowledge, has been conspicuous by its absence. By and large. Bosk remarks that this group o f  medical 
professionals has been humbled by the treadmill character o f their duties that do not involve states o f emergency, direct life- 
and-death decisions, and sometimes not even the gratitude of patients. In m ost cases pre- and post-clinical meetings centre 
on the discussion o f scientific publications and the display o f sometimes rather distressful pictures o f severely abnormal 
cliildren. Given their professional ethos, genetic counsellors are not permitted to make a decision for tire prospective 
patents who have come to see them prompted by deep concerns about the health o f tire foetus. Although in m ost countries 
genetic counselling is directive because it is thought that one o f the chief aims o f such a profession is to decrease the 
frequency o f harmful genes in the population (Wertz 1998), in N orth America they must be absolutely neutral and non­
directive. In this way the pressure and the associated sense o f empowerment that typifies their colleagues’ practice is 
somewhat lessened. This impression is borne out by the experience o f one the students o f genetic counselling who, to my 
observation that they are compelled to cling to a non-human imperative o f neutrality and non-directiveness, responded as 
follows;
You’ie right. Patients often getfrustrated became thy come to the appointment expecting to be told what to do. After all, that's what most 
people in the medical profession do. But what we can do is ask them questions to help bring out what would be bestfor them. A nd  based on
their answers we can say things like "Well, based on what you've told me it might be best for you to. " Besides giving information, we help
them come to a decision that's bestfor them.
The three students o f genetic counselling I interviewed agreed on this point. The Italian professional provided a
more nuanced reading o f her profession and ethical duties that is extremely instructive about the cultural discrepancies
separating Old Europe and the New World:
lo credo che per noi vecchi Europei (italiani vecchi in parficolare), tutto quanto did a proposito della non direttività quasi inumana ed alia 
deresponsabiliryyaftone ecc.. sia più sulla carta che nella mente. E d oserei dire: perforiuna fier lo meno da un certopunto di vista). 11 nostro 
retroterra culturale viene sempre fuori, in qualche modo. Dico questo sen;^ superiorità, veramente, antft qualche volta tutto do pud essere un 
ostacolo. E  poi, dato che sono una donna, anche questo un po' mi aiuta. A d  ogni modo, sempre personalissimamente, piùfaccio questo lavoto, 
pin ho tante domande e poche risposte. E  questo non lo dico proprio solo "per dire'', ma ne sono convinta nelprofondo. E d infine, e questo lo 
dico sottovoce, io aborro la bioetica. Spetv che iron suoni come una bestemmia, Quindi come vedi mipiacerebbepvprioparlare di bioetica.
P think for us, old Europeans (old Italians in particular)"®, what you say about the almost inhuman non-directiveness, 
tire relief o f responsibility, etc. is more appearance than reality. And I’d dare to say, lucidly so (at least firom a certain 
perspective). Our cultural background is somehow alwap there. I say tliat with no pretence o f superiority, really. On the 
contrary tliis can be sometimes an obstacle. But then again, as a woman, that helps a little. Anyway, in my humble 
opinion still, the more I do this job, the more questions and the fewer answers I’ve got. And I am not saying tliis for the 
sake of tlie argument. I do believe that. At the end o f the day, and I say this in a whisper, I detest bioethics. Hope it 
doesn’t sound lilce a blasphemy. Therefore, as you can see. I’d really love to talk about bioethics].
Therefore Bosk is probably right when he states that genetic counsellors seem to display a more humble approach 
to health-care and that this is mainly due to the fact that their only function is that o f decision-facilitators rather tlian 
decision-makers. One o f the crucial issues arising from this state o f affairs is whether this role could ever be perceived as 
dissatisfying and whether a change in the surrounding cultural and ideological climate could lead them to push for a change 
o f attitude. This is not an implausible scenario given that, according to a recent survey, 20 percent o f American fertility 
specialists declared that a woman should terminate the pregnancy if  the screening shows that the embryo has a 
predisposition to obesity (Bach & D e Kleine 1999). More generally, it is illusory to believe that there can be an alternative to
"® Please note tliat tlie adjective “old” acquires two different meanings in this sentence . “Old Europeans” stands for Europeans 
with a millenary liistory whereas old Italians means that what she is saying is especially true for people with a long professional 
experience under tlieir belt, who happen to be Italian. The underlying assumption is that Europeans have much in common even 
when it comes to a moot point such as the best way to do genetic counselling.
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the forthcoming eugenics revival (Kitcher 2003). The real problem is, once the genotype o f future people wiU be 
identifiable, a world that stiU tolerates enormous social and economic inequities is unlikely to object to a liberal and 
voluntary form o f eugenics (Caplan 1997).
One thing I feel positive about is that students o f genetic counselling do envisage their future profession as a true 
vocation. The keen enthusiasm I encountered among those Canadian students I have interview ed'" has no parallel in any 
other category of biomedical professionals. I distinctly remember the moment one o f them exclaimed: We are pioneers, damn 
it!
This is also m ost certainly due to tlie fact that many never found laboratory work a very gratifying activity — some 
felt tliey were clumsy, others thought they had no knack for experimentation — while they saw genetic counselling as an 
amazingly effective way to apply their expertise to real Hfe predicaments. This sense of being substantially serviceable to 
human beings in their most difficult choices is definitely what set them apart from the other graduate students I interviewed 
who, if  nothing else, at times revealed a certain tinge o f  frustration stemming from the secluded laboratory environment. 
Conversely, genetic counseUing students could barely contain their contagious passion for what they were doing and wishing 
to accompHsh in the years to come. Something has changed though in the interaction o f genetic counsellors and surveyors 
since the time o f Bosk’s first inquiry in the late Seventies. Over the past two decades the discrepancy between my own 
experience in the field and his has grown obvious and acute. Thus he recounted his first encounter with genetic counselHng 
(Bosk 1992: 5):
non negotiation with hospital administrators, no multiple clearances fmm multiple clinicians, no endless rounds of meetings to explain who I  
was and what I  was about. I  was never ashed to mahe elaborate promises ti> safeguard the confidentiality and anorymity of the institutions or 
itsplysicians. Never rvas there any sug^stion that try work be subject to any sort ofptepublication preview
Alas! in my case bureaucratic requirements and strong suspicions about my ulterior motives and personal agenda 
have certainly contributed to my final decision to discontinue my participant observation and confine my analysis to the tiny 
amount o f data I had managed to collect. Because in Italy I did not encounter die slightest suspicion about my intentions I 
was taken aback by an atmosphere that was not reaUy conducive to a smooth-running survey. Periodical confrontations 
between genetic counseUors and disabiHty activists and a journaUstic coverage that was judged to be unsatisfactory by the 
professional genetic counsellors got in the way o f  a fruitful exchange o f views and information. This is aU the more 
disappointing in view o f the curiosity displayed by the ItaHan genetic counsellor as well as by her Canadian counterparts 
about how genetic counselling is conducted abroad. It is only fair to say, though, diat I definitely lacked those diplomatic 
sldUs, ingenuity and adroiüiess that would enable a professional anthropologist to overcome those obstacles. I can only hope 
I have learnt the lesson.
In Italy, as I said, I was not requested to provide any form of validation of my research aims and proficiency. The 
genetic counsellor I contacted was quite surprised that I had to go to great pains to do my fieldwork interviewing, and her 
comment was rather instructive on the differences between the way genetic counselling is intended and practiced in Italy 
and Canada:
Ije loro preoccupafioni mi sembrano cost strane. Capisco se la cosa finisse su un giomale che ne fa  uno scoop con iitokni del tipo: eugenetica, 
prntica conente dei nostri genetic counsellorf^ \ Che poi questo termine: eugenetica, lo trovo orribile, da qualunque parte logiro.
[“dieir worries seem so weird to me. They would make sense if this tiling wound up on a newspaper with headlines 
such as: eugenics, die current practice of our genetic counseUors. But then again this term — eugenics — I find it horrible, 
firom whatever angle I look at it”]
Because there are very few Canadian universities running programmes o f genetic counselling, I chose to omit where I did my 
fieldwork in order to protect die privacy of these students.
"5 There is no such a thing as an official ItaHan denomination o f this professional category
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This reply surprised me because in an eminently Catholic country one would expect more mistrust and prejudices against 
someone inquiring about the opinions o f practitioners o f  a discipline that, after all, questions tlie notion o f “sanctity o f  Hfe”.
The one feature o f genetic counselHng that most conflicts with this concept is not so much the indirect support to
pregnancy termination as the habit o f malting rather witty jokes about their clinical cases. Bosk observed that the sense o f
being unable to provide an adequate professional service to people who do not seem to Hsten to reason, accounts for this
seemingly objectionable attitude. Drawing on my personal experience as a volunteer carer o f terminal patients and non-
autonomous elderly people I personally feel that the answer Hes elsewhere. The experiencing of deeply unpleasant feelings
vis-à-vis borderHne situations (i.e. homines saaes) compel individuals to seek to metaboHse the event by readjusting one’s
cognitive and psychological frames. In the genetic counsellors’ case it is perfectly possible that a measure o f defusing irony
and exorcizing cynicism serves the all-important purpose of making individual and collective re-adjustments and
negotiations possible. I t is therefore unsurprising that the overwhelming sense o f impotence felt by genetic counsellors
expected to fix what cannot be fixed, and to confront the absolute randomness o f Hfe-events, m ust be somehow channelled
away from anger and suffering, which would harm the individual’s image and the hard-won equilibriums internal to a group
of professional peers. However, I am sceptical about the assertion o f  one o f Bosk’s interviewees who explained that he
frequently thought o f himself as an astronaut boarding a spaceship heading for a different planet, a planet where terrible
things happened, things that would not happen on his own planet. I wonder if that counseUor was being sincere or simply
sought to please the interviewer by adapting to the ideal-type that he presumed Bosk was after. My participant observation
revealed no such schizoid experiences. Genetic counsellors were neither light-hearted nor hardened by unpleasant
experiences, neither heroic nor unusuaUy wise. They were more or less regular human beings who positively believed that
their work was not merely useful but determinant for the happiness of countless famiHes. So, when I put forward my views
on how the practice o f genetic counseUing might change over the next decades:
You might develop a sense of powerlessness as more and more information rvill be available and there will be a shortage ofprofessionals like you 
(massive pressure), and there will also be cotrfusion about the definition of what is normal and what is not, what is a disease and what is not, ij
rvhat is good and what is bad (massive ethical dilemmas)
one o f the students replied:
Yes, there is a lot of controversy out there right now. For example, we had a grotp from the Disability Office come and talk to us who were 
against termination as thy see their disability as a difference, not a disability. The deaf community is really big on this. But everyday there are 
couples terminatingfor the same disabilities these people have (who livefidl and happy lives).
I am not ruling out the possibility that dramatic circumstances could arise that would put a real strain on them, but 
I do feel that tliey beUeve the game is worth the candle; that is to say, for every unfortunate occurrence many more would -I
be the successful accompHshments from both a human and a professional point o f view. O n this count the same student 
added:
I  don't agree that we will become eugenicists. I  believe we offer choices. Ids been done where a baly has been selected to be deaf as the couple were 
deaf and lived in the Deaf community. We can help couples have children without debilitating disease - which isn't really eugetrics but more 
about health care. There is the possibility ofchoosing children for certain traits in thefar future but nuclear energy also brought the atomic bomb.
It's about how we use the information.
At the same time counsellors must thus ignore the coUective impHcations o f their practice, neglect issues o f justice 
and equality and look to their patients as cHents, or else they risk undermining the theoretical and moral premises o f  their 
profession and accepting the labelling o f eugenicists. Again, they are faciUtators, not decision-makers, agents o f  freedom not 
of its curtailment (Kass 2002). O n the other hand, how are they supposed to tackle such tremendously intricate questions as 
the meaning o f health, happiness, normality, dignity, and collective solidarity? Some scholars have suggested that the 
technical and ethical training o f genetic counsellors be supplemented with the teaching o f the limits o f any claims of 
neutraHty, equitability, and non-directiveness (Bosk 1992; Bartels et al. 1993). The viability o f this option ought to be
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carefully considered once we accept the fact that genetic counselling is on the road to becoming a need as well as a lifestyle 'i
(Conrad & Gabe 1999) and a differential access to modern techniques has already been detected with respect to I VF 1
treatment (Lynn-Steinberg 1997). Where would totally neutral social actors draw the line in a free market where the 
individual is entitled to buy whatever genetic service? And how could they operate morally in a coercive and iniquitous social 
context if they are bound to maintain a non-directive stance (Harper & Clarke 1997)?
O n the other hand, that o f non-directiveness is a convention that has no parallels or precedents in tlie medical 
profession. Medical practitioners have normally been taught that making decisions for someone else was part and parcel o f  "Î
their duties and their training was specifically designed to prepare them for such a great responsibility. This may perhaps 
account for the sizable number of British medical professionals who admit that in the field o f genetic counselling, regardless 
o f its non-directive nature, it is not uncom mon that clients’ decisions are shaped by dieir advice (Kerr et al. 1998). But is this 
really a problem?
Let us remember the aims o f eugenics:
• The manipulation o f human genetic pool as the m ost efficient instrument o f social amelioration.
• The prevention o f  disease as opposed to expensive medical therapy.
• The attainment o f  happiness by granting people the possibility o f feeling healthier, prettier, brighter, etc.
We also know its historical consequences:
• N o substantial alteration o f  the genetic pool.
• Enforced sterilisation and "euthanasia” o f people deemed unfit.
• Social and political measures aimed at the betterment o f the lifestyle o f the upper classes to the detriment o f the 
underrepresented and /o r disenfranchised minorities.
A new brand o f eugenics lies ahead. There are four possible types of interventions on a person’s genetic patrimony 
(Gavroglu et al., 1995; Vollrath 1990), and all o f them presuppose that human procreation will be brought into the 
laboratory, with familial and societal relationships bearing the brunt o f this transition:
• somatic cell gene therapy eliminates die clinical manifestation o f genetically-caused disease on an individual without 
affecting the individual’s progeny.
• germUne gene therapy is the insertion o f a healthy gene into a human egg.
• enhancement genetic engineering refers to the modification o f single traits in an individual such as the height o f a
cliild.
• eugenic genetic engineering applies to the alteration of complex traits involving multiple genes, such as intelligence 
and personality.
The problem is not whether these interventions will take place, because they wdl, but only when and what the 
effects will amount to. Most o f  all, will they grant us the happiness we are desperately looking for? Leon Kass (2002) is 
extremely sceptical on this count and his viewpoint warrants a thorough analysis. In tune with the thrust o f my dissertation, 
he argues that the major threat to liberal democracies is represented by those principles that we m ost cherish, that is (Kass 
2002):
• devotion to Hfe and its preservation;
• freedom to inquire, invent or invest in whatever we want, regardless of the moraHty o f the enterprise;
• a commitment to compassionate humanitarianism, whose upholders are wilHng to pay the highest o f prices in the 
name o f freedom from want, suffering, and aging;
• the confident pursuit o f progress through the mastery o f nature, fuelled by unbridled technological advance, 
oblivious to the fact that mastery o f nature is tantamount to mastery over other human beings and that modern 
techno-science is by its very nature bound up with the idea of manipulabiHty;
• the light to the putsuit o f happiness, even when this is confused with self-indulgence and escapism;
• the separation of body and personhood, a dualism that obscures the anthropolo^cal evidence that ours are embodied 
lives and that our cultural and spiritual dimensions are experienced through our bodies. Hence the central importance 
of anthropology to the understanding o f the social effects o f genetic engineering;
• the exclusion of chance from our life, because what is accidental may hamper our search o f happiness.
Kass, like me, is particularly concerned with two fundamental modern misapprehensions. First, an understanding 
o f happiness as freedom from chance, lack, toil, illness and ifie risk o f  death, obtained through the replacement o f  nature by 
human will, that is, the utopian vision of human perfection by scientific means. Secondly, equally disputable is the 
inclination to subject the principles o f justice, virtue, happiness, and dignity to rational, scientific inquiry, as though their 
validity could be grounded in non-subjective, natural, deterministic, a-historical standards. Paradoxically, and this is my 
opinion, the scientific worldview has yielded immense power to humanldnd but, backed up by antliropological relativism, 
has partially undermined those moral premises that were wisely intended to harness the effects o f  that worldview. As a 
consequence, those whose ethical standpoint is m ost affected by this cultural shift, namely biomedical scientists, tend to 
exhibit a worrisome conceit, considering all restraints to scientific research as the result o f habit and ignorance, rather than 
to any serious concern about the undesired consequences o f scientific progress. Among these consequences may be counted 
(PCBE 2002):
• The loss o f  awe and humility vis-à-vis Hfe with its concomitant devaluation exemplified by the view o f the embryo as 
just a “clump of cells” or a “pile o f raw material”, i.e. as a means, not an end, instead o f a potential human being 
(“being-in-the-way”).
• The potential for an alteration o f our conception o f parental and filial relationships, following a shift from child as a
gift to child as a valuable property, a self-designed product, a long-term project; and a shift from the child’s right to 
freedom and independence to the parents’ right to determine their child’s development from the womb as a means 4
of self-fulfilment.
• The prospect o f  manufacturing humans for hedonistic ends, one that is candidly justified by the leading bioethicist H.
Tristram Engelhardt in a rather “Karamazovian fashion” : i f  there is nothing sacred about human nature (and no secular 
argument could show it to be sacred), there is no reason why, with proper reasons and rrnth proper caution, U should not be radically 
changed (EngeUrardt 1986: 377).
Anotlier summary o f the problematic issues related to the application of genetic information to society has been 
compiled by Sally MacIntyre (Macintyre 1997):
1. geneticisation o f society and genetic reductionism: behavioural and physiological variations determined by genetic 
variations (Lippman 1991). The prism of heritability distorts our views o f social and personal issues (Duster 1990)
2. underestimation o f the role o f environmental factors in disease: commercial pressures for susceptibility testing for 
common disorders will promote the notion that genetic endowment and chosen lifestyle together determine future health, while the 
importance of material circumstances (especially poverty) in creating ill health will be glossed over {A. Clarke 1996: 35)
3. discrimination in insurance, employment, healtlicare provision, and so fordi. The double-bind everybody will 
confront goes like this: you may become an object of discrimination either because you refuse to test your DMA or 
that o f  your children, or because you actually opt for it and you or your cliildren test positive (Billings et al. 1992)
4. changed attitudes to parenthood, and commodification o f babies;
5. diversion o f  care, treatment and resources taken away from people with genetic abnormalities;
6. screening for conditions for which no effective treatment has been found;
7. Followitig a screening, what changes in one’s lifestyle might occur, and how effective they would be.
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Ultimately, a legitimate fear o f  irrational abysses m ust not obscure concern for the excesses to wliich a blind faith
in rationality leads many idealists in politics and science. An instance o f that is the thought o f American philosopher Daniel
D ennett who on several occasions exhibited a fierce resolution to demolish the upshot o f centuries o f human thought. In
Iris “die Elbow Room ” (1984: 156) he clarifies liis view as follows:
It could be, for instance, that the concept of pemnal responsibility enshrined in traditional (western) morality is subtly incoherent, and that we 
ought to revise or evenjettison that concept andfamily of ideas sunvunding it: guilt, desert, moralpraise, andprmishment, to mention the most 
important. We might, for instance, have to demote ourselves somewhatfivm our traditionally elevated status as moral agents in order to secure a 
defensible morality.
W hat goes unrecognised among several bio-ethicists is that an exclusively philosophical rationale does no t do 
justice to the complexity o f issues that are, first and foremost, o f a social nature. In concordance with this position, Tom  
Shakespeare contends that it is political philosophy rather dian moral philosophy that must provide the ground for a global 
debate on biotechnologies
Incidentally, what is m ost conspicuously absent in the bio-utilitarian perspective is social analysis, and it is 
astonishing that so many philosophers are loath to admit that analytical philosophy alone is useless when it comes to 
assessing the impact o f biotechnologies. I find it hard to believe that, with decades of sociological and anthropological 
research under our belts, we should still take seriously the naïve view o f society as a sum o f needs and desires, and o f life as 
the maximization o f happiness, with no mention o f the unintended consequences o f individual action and o f the sheer 
unfeasibility o f  regarding happiness as a calculable end^^^.
Correspondingly, drawing on disability smdies that have directed attention to the external constraints that cause 
people witli genetic impairment to feel seriously disadvantaged (Shakespeare in Conrad & Gabe 1999), Shakespeare has 
objected to treating disabilit)^ as a kind o f harm that is qualitatively different from other socially constructed “harms”, such 
as poverty and race. Indeed the rhetorical exploitation of disability made by some champions o f human genetic engineering 
seems to be aimed to produce a sympathetic reaction among a readership driven invariably to regard aU disabilities as 
“random tragedies” and “horrors” (james Watson 2000). A factual assessment o f human existence for Shakespeare would 
instead comprise the notion that the unlimited malleability o f  human potentiality is a myth that m ust be exploded, for lives ■
are restrained by tastes, inclinations and historical and social circumstances.
The truth then seems to lie halfway between the two antagonistic positions o f disability activists and human 
germline advocates: disparities exist, thek origin is both biological and social, and nobody is exempt from abnormal 
characterizations, that is to  say, there is no such thing as a norm.
However the systematic screening o f foetuses will not prevent all “defective children” from being born and 
therefore the few who manage to slip through the net wül probably be subjected to discriminatory practices, no matter how 
illicit these may be (Childress & Casebeer in Sumner & Boyle 1996). This is best expressed by E rnst Klee’s cynical formula 
that der Traum des Genetikers, Behinderte verhindern, ist der Alptraum des Behinderten [the geneticists’ dream is the disabled
people’s nightmare](Klee 2001: 274). Some o f tire more troubling ethical implications o f genomics stem precisely from the 
fact that a diagnosis can be made without any prospects o f therapy. Consequently, to be sick in modern societies has 
become less a biological event than a cultural identity that doctors and bio-medical scientists authorise. The fact is, that the 
Enlightenment principle o f equality, once it becomes absolute, moves society to devolve to specialists its normative function 
by endowing them with the right to determine autonomously tlieir professional charter (Hassenteufel 1997). This is the 
consequence o f an arbitrary re-interpretation o f  the goal o f the universal emancipation of human beings involving technical 
rather than political means.
1 personal communication
Ironically, this doctrine as it were resembles Russian rational egoism (Pisarev, Chemyshevsky), which was mauled by Dostoevsldj 
witli Iris Notesfrom the Urrderground
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The irony of all this is diat, as we increase our mastery over nature and ourselves, we lose our command o f the '
basics o f morality and o f  what it means to be normal, to be healthy and to be fit. It is not that, as Nietzsche would have it, 
science is a source o f nihilism. Science simply uproots traditional tlieological and philosophical signposts, and gradually ■
substitutes them with other signposts o f a medical and scientific nature (Kass 1985). But there is the rub. The diffused ' i
impression among experts (Tudge 2002; Lewontin 2002; Timothy F. Murphy in Singer-Kuhse 1998) is that the fact tliat the 
boundary between “normal variation” and “genetic disease” is in part a social constructional®, wliich entails that “normality” j
and “abnormality” are historically and culturally relative, is not easy to convey. Simpler explanations — that is more 
deterministic, essentialist, and reductionist — are more liable to sound persuasive. The worst case scenario has been outlined "î
by André Pichot (1995), and it is one in which our society winds up ruled by the volonté technicienne de domination du monde, f?
together with repugnance to deviance and a desire for biological order, crass materialism, fanatical hygienism, and an ascetic "I
cult o f  the perfect body. Scientists should always bear in mind what one of their most lucid colleagues once said (Primo Levi -
1975: 35)
petrhé la motagin,peivhé la vita viva, ci vogliono impmetyye, e k  imptme^ delle impmet^ . . .ci vuole dissenso, i ldivem.. .ilfascismo non li -i
vuole, li vieta... vuole tutti uguali. Ma neppme la vh1ù immacolata esiste, o se esiste è detestabile.
{For the wheel to spin, for life to Uve, it takes impurities, and impurities of impurities.. .it takes dissent, , v
diversity.. .fascism does not want them, it forbids them .. .it wants everyone identical. But immaculate virtue does not ^
exist, and even if it does, it is detestable] %
Past events should warn us not to understate tire risks o f too sharp an emphasis on the difference between what 
we judge normal and what we judge non-normal. For centuries the Church has separated the poor in spirit from the
“normal”, and on March 8 1937 the SS periodical Det' Schwats^ Kotps explained that when the Gospel o f  Matthew (5: 3)
recited Blessed an the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven, that meant that every sensible person ought to admit that tire 
feeble-mkrded has no mundane rights, whereas nobody would dispute their right to own the kingdom of heaven (Roger in s
Benichou 1987). Having said that, it seems to me that the misanthropic strand o f bio-utilitarianism could turn out to be the |
tlrtn end o f the wedge and ultimately lead to the revival o f the eugenic premise ungleicher Wert, ungleiche Kechte (Nitschke 1999). "%
In view of the unintended consequences o f modernity and o f the disposition o f sovereignty to regulate bare life,
Leon R. Kass’s preoccupation witlr the results o f an unrestrained development o f bio-engkreering (Kass 1985: 97) sounds all 
the more congruous:
I t is this natural standard that most threatens the notion of human equality. For it leads most directly to the idea that there are second class 
human beings and subhuman human brings, not equally entitled to the rights of life or the pursuit of their own happiness. [...]. The fetus is 
only potential; it has no rights, according to this view. But all kinds ofpeople also fa ll short of the norm: children, idiots, “defective ” adrilts. It is 
this understanding of nature that has been used Urjustfy not only abortion and infanticide, but also slavery.
As a result, disability activists are increasingly worried about the outcome o f  genomics. In their opinion, the notion 
o f disability will be more and more regarded as a remediable distortion o f the normal course o f nature and, as such, m ost 
likely to be stigmatized and considered unworthy o f  social kitervention. Furthermore, D orothy NeUdn^^® and Timothy F.
Murphy (Singer — Kuhse, 1998) argue that the notion o f disability will extend to more individuals than it does now. Among 
others, they cite alcoholism, obesity, susceptibility to serious diseases and pathologies. On top o f tliat, social discrimkiation 
win gather volume owkig to the extension o f the range o f states perceived as “defective” (phenomenon commonly labelled 
“genetic essentiaUsm”) and tire high costs involved ki targeted therapies. This, accordkrg to Gunther Aimer (kr Bar ta & 
Grabner-Niel 1996) will reflect on the decision-makkig process in several fields such as healthcare, employment, insurance,
118 “The new genetics will cease to be a biological metaphor for modern society and will become instead a ckculation network of 
identity terms and restriction loci, around which and dirough which a truly new type of autoproduction will emerge, which I call J
“biosociality”. [...]. Were such a project to be brought to fruition, it would stand as the basis for overcoming tlie nature /  culture 4
split” (Paul Rabkiow, Essays on the Anthropology^ of Reason, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1996: p. 99). i
Galston — Shurr 2001; Kevles - Leroy 1992 . ]
124
education, adoption, privacy, indigenous rights, ecology and biosphere. It may also lead to the restoration o f  the traditional 
Calvinist belief in predestination, this time on a scientific or pseudo-scientific basis (Shipman 1994). As a consequence social 
inequalities could be accounted for by referring to innate genetic dissimilarities, therefore shifting the blame from society to 
genes, that is to say, fate (Dorotliy Nelldn in Galston 2001; Nelldn-Linde, 1995; Murphy in Singer-Kuhse, 1998). It is safe to 
say that a modification in public policies would ensue, addressing biological factors and neglecting the many flaws o f the 
capitalistic system, which is precisely what the higher echelons of society are arguably hoping for and what actually took 
place in Weimar Germany and elsewhere. Thus, for example, the rehabilitation o f criminals would seem a task to be 
assigned to doctors and not social workers; pre-employment medical exams would comprise genetic tests; insurance and 
transplant policies would be established on such parameters (Nelkin in Kevles, 1992; Nelkin-Linde, 1995; Murphy in Singer- 
Kuhse, 1998). Accordingly, illness could be increasingly seen as an employee’s own business, tlie consequence o f a failure in 
addressing those problems caused by reckless dietary and hygienic conduct (Bryan S. Turner 1987).
Insofar as the way we manage our bodies reflects the kind of society we want to live in, the process of 
internalisation o f societal prescriptions — something is good for you to the extent that it is good for your society — wül 
operate through interventions on the DNA. The same formerly occurred in Germany when the social body was ridden o f aU 
those traits that “did not fit” and were “out o f place” from the perspective o f the Aryan mystique. The “healing mission” o f 
Nazism with its accompaniment o f atrocities and mass-murders was, after all, made possible by a rationale that had made 
those practices sound respectable (Wickler and Barondess in Teays & Purdy 2001). The prospect o f a neo-liberal, possibly 
frivolous, eugenics is therefore no less threatening to democracy tlian an overtly centralised brand, insofar as it corresponds 
to die demands o f a democratic state. This state, while allowing for greater latitude, must find ways o f enforcing its laws and 
controlling the national budget, and it has successfully managed to do this by identifying medical and scientific techniques 
(knowledge-production), together with statistical methods and the bureaucracy (knowledge processing and policy- 
implementation), as effective means o f population management and social control. The question I pose is this: do we really 
believe that a couple making a decision against the possibility o f having their baby genetically engineered could neglect to 
consider how their chüdren will be judged by their peers, and especially how other parents and relatives will judge them for 
not having resorted to the available techniques? But what comes next? Where and according to what parameters do we draw 
the line in a post-industrial, post-Christian world where traditional values are weak and we^must redefine our conception of 
humanity? How do we cope with the moral issues arising from the alteration of our bodies, personalities, and social 
structure? H ow can scientists engage the ethical questions posed by bio-technology? Shouldn’t anthropologists seek to 
foresee what is at stake here? Or do we only analyse the consequences once they have occurred?
I t seems to me that a bio-utilitarian outlook is structurally blind to the fact that decision-making does not take
place in a vacuum. A t the end o f  tlie day, it makes little difference whether it is the State or public opinion tliat exerts
pressure in favour o f  positive and negative eugenics, as it is public opinion that ultimately determines who is going to govern
the country and what to expect from them. Thomas Osborne’s treatment o f the relationship between health and statecraft
in Germany and France casts light on this matter (in Peresen & Bunton, 1997: 178):
The German idea ofmedicalpolice and the French ideal of a right to healthfor all harre a certain amount in common in that they both assume 
a one-way, determinate relationship between statecraft and the production of health. [...]. In the one, the pursuit of health is an aspect of 
statecrnft. In the other, statecraft is an aspect of the pursuit of health. In each the relation can be described as being determinate in that the 
augmentation of one value (health or statecrnft) will remit in the augmentation of the other.
This means that a democratic and progressively-oriented socio-political environment does not necessarüy lead to a 
democratic model o f enforcement o f the right to health. When health, from being a right, turns into a citizen’s duty, the 
whole idea of democracy is in peril, especially because this is a transformation that mainly occurs unconsciously but whose 
upshots are quite tangible (Vigarello 1993). A duty to health may bring with it a conceptual shift as concerns the aptness o f 
genetic screening for reproductive choice. Sally Macintyre (1997) fears that some day we may start to think that, once it
125
becomes possible to prevent the birth o f a foetus with a genetic condition, then parents may feel morally obliged to do that. 
Similarly, tlie right o f parents to provide their children with the best opportunities may well become a social duty. Forms o f 
legally sanctioned coercive policies that might ensue would be premised on (Childress & Casebeer in Sumner & Boyle 1996);
• A paternalistic legislative regulation (e.g. wearing helmets): assuming tliat genetic counsellors know better than the 
counselees tlie nature o f  a genetic disorder, tlien tliey should take the necessary steps to prevent any wrongful life;
• cost-benefit considerations o f the financial burden on the individuals, their families, and society constituted by 
disabled people (which is actually the substance o f the American National Genetic Disease Act)
That tliese measures may find wide acceptance among the population is not unUkely. This is true regardless o f how
agreeable the idea may sound that the State places our health and fitness high on its list o f priorities. Wimess the approving
words o f Franz Orsos, president o f the Hungarian National Association o f Physicians during his visit to Germany in 1937
(quoted by Proctor 1988: 284):
Never before has a nation so thorvughf protected its people from disease; never before has a nation concerned itself to such a degree with the 
health of “normalpeople"— thepreople who will be usefidin the future.
Besides, the whole question would amount to a realistic appraisal o f the competence o f public opinion to discern whether
the claim o f  scientific rigor does not really cover a simplistic view o f social institutions, one according to which, as the
trouble with human beings Hes in deeply-rooted natural characteristics, then it makes no sense to seek to better the social
environment (Kingsland 1988). However, this whole point is rather unrealistic:
Si les normes sociales porsvaient être aperçues aussi clairement que des normes organiques, les hommes seraient fous de ne pas s f  conformer'. 
Comme les hommes ne sortifous, et comme il n ’existe pas de Sages, c’est que le normes sociales sont à inventer et non pas à observer
George Canguilhem (1972: 194)
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5.3 "DO YOU DESPISE OR L O V E  HUTvIANITY, YOU, ITS COMING SAVIOURS?” ‘2o
We shall allow or forbid them to live with their wives and mistresses, to have or not to have children according to whether thy have been 
obedient or disobediertt- and thy will submit to us gladly artd cheerfully.
Tlie Grand Inquisitorial
Alors, c’est que tout, autour de moi, est mensonge, et moi, je  veux qu ’on vive dans la vérité. Car je  sais ce qui leur manque, Hélicon. Ils sont 
privés de la connaissance et il leur marrqrre un professeur qui sache ce dont ilparie
Albert Camus’ Caligula
We can talk prindplesforever, but what the public actually wants is not to be sick, and ifwe help them not to be sick, thy ’II be on our side 
James D. Watsoni22 
People are on my side!
Severino Antinori, planning to launch a campaign in favour o f cloning (Keller 2003: 85)
Genetic essentialism is not uncommon among physicians and health scientists (Fox Keller in Kevles & Hood,
1992). Although in fact selves are historically and culturally situated, in course o f time — should this paradigm prevail — the 
essence o f a person — that is, their identity — might simply be equated with their genome. The end-result could be a societ)^ 
where cultural diversity is overridden by genetic diversity — universal human nature, selfish genes, and defective alleles, etc..
Some lament that the modern sciences are constructive, but they are no longer edifying (Gyorgy Markus in Gavroglu et al.,
1995: 141). Heaven help us if they were, and they try hard enough to be ... Among all the flaws and quandaries afflicting 
science, this is far from being the most alarming. O n the contrary, it is imperative tlrat scientists steer clear o f enlightening 
intents, for the m ost important lesson we should learn from history is that scientists have no final answers and that theirs is if
an ongoing pursuit, a work in progress. Yet, the trouble with science, and with scientists in particular, is that they need their 
own, very forceful, imaginative vision (Midgley 1996: 139) o f their rôle in society.
Now, following my understanding of David Stove’s nosology o f human thought (Stove 1991), I have drawn a 
comparison between certain public statements made by the founders o f eugenics and some o f the wildest and most 
disturbing speculations made by bio-scientists since the early 20^  ^ century and, later, the discovery o f the DNA structure in 
1953. The purpose o f such juxtaposition is to expose those illiberal and discriminatory undercurrents that appear to cross 
historical and ideological boundaries without undergoing any significant changes.
Eugenics became fashionable only from 1910 onwards (David Barker in Gabbay, Webster et al. 1983). It is thus 
quite remarkable that already in 1911 eugenicist James A. Field voiced his dissent about some o f the most obnoxious 
contributions to the eugenics debate, and observed that racism and revulsion against paupers might alienate a good few 
supporters and ultimately endanger the attainment of the eugenicists’ chief goal, a far-reaching social reform on eugenic 
bases (Field 1910), His complaint followed certain problematic assertions made by Francis Galton and Karl Pearson, the 
former explaining that if he had omitted to refer to the repression o f the inferior stock that was simply because it was
120 p  M. Dostoevsldj, letter to N.A. Liubimov (1879) in Kroeker & Ward 2001 
2^1 excerpt from tlie Brothers Karamazov (1912) by Fedor Michajloviç Dostoevsldj 
'22 in Stoclc & Campbell (2002: 84)
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implicit in the eugenic programme (1883), and urging around tlie turn o f the century the cultivation o f caste sentiments
among those who are naturally gifted (Field 1910); the latter (1909; in Childs 2001: 2) bluntly commenting that
It would be possible to paint a luridpicture -  and label it Race Suicide. That is feasible to any who has seen, even from afar', the nine circles of 
that dread region which stretchesfrom the slum to reformatory, from. . .hospital and sanatorium to asylum and special school; that infer'tral lake 
which sends its unregarded rivulets to befoul morefertile social tracts.
Field’s preoccupations were particularly well founded in the light o f the scathing attack on eugenics that Benjamin
Kidd launched on occasion o f a speech delivered by Francis Galton before an audience o f sociologists (Galton 1904: 13):
I  have a distinct recollection ofmy own sense of relkf that my birth had occurred in the earlier ages of comparative barbarism. For Mr: Pearson,
I  thirrk, proposed to give the kind of people who rrow scribble on our r'ailwcry carriages no more than a short shrift and the nearest lamppost. I  
hope we shall trot seriously carry this spirit into eugenics. It might renew, in the name of sciettce, tyrannies that it took long ages of social 
evolution to emerge from. Judging fivm what one sometimes reads, many of our ardent refor'mers would often be willing to put us into lethal 
chambers, i f  our minds artd bodies did trot conform to certain standards.
Nevertheless these warnings did not have the desired effect. In the United States, Madison Grant brought in his
final verdict. Social and biological misfits were a burden that modern societies could no longer afford. Only by filtering out
“unsuitable candidates” and sterilizing diem could the forthcoming degeneration o f the human race be forestalled:
A  r'igid system of selection through the elimirration of those who are weak or urrfit - in other word, social failures - would solve the whole 
question in one hundred years, as well as enabling us to get rid of the undesirables who crowd our jails, hospitals, and insane aylums. The 
individual himself can be nourished, educated, andprotected by the commmrity during his lifetime, but the state throng) sterilie t^iori must see to 
it that his line stops with him, or else future gener'atiorrs will be mrsed with an ever increasing load of misguided sentimentalism. This is a 
practical, mervijul, and inevitable solution o f the whole problem, and can be applied to an ever widening cirvle of social discards, beginning 
always with the criminal, the diseased, and the insane, and extending gr'adually to types which mcy be called weaklings rather then dfectives, 
andper'haps ultimately to worthless race types.
Madison Grant (1916 [1926])'23
Finally, Leonard Darwin, one o f  Charles Darwin’s sons, published in die same year a paper entitled “O n the 
Statistical Enquiries needed after the war in connection with eugenics” in which, with the characteristic indifference of 
eugenicists to the feelings of those people who had their loved ones right in the middle o f  that carnage that was continental 
Europe, he maintained that the best men do not come back from war, that die unfit for die fight remain in Britain and 
reproduce, and that
It is true that wars in the past have at times r'aised the whole civil death-rate by imposing hardships on the population generally, and where this 
has been the case the total result may have been eugenic in consequence ofthe gener'al weeding out of the unfit. Though no one can tell what lies 
before us, yet there is now so little signs of widespread and severe suffering at home that there is, at present, no reason to suppose that the 
foregoing conclusions as to the dysgenic effects of war will thus be falsified.
After WWII eugenicists simply went underground and let the dust setde, lurking for the time when scientific 
research would make viable and advisable witliin a liberal framework those interventions on the human DNA that had been 
advocated for decades, not least by the Nazis (Soloway 1990; Paul 1998; Paul in Maasen & Winterhagen 2001). But when 
leading researchers in human inheritability and scientists in general chose to speak out, they did not give the impression that 
the tenor o f their arguments had changed appreciably. Below is a selection o f their m ost questionable contentions.
Julian Huxley (Huxley 1947) did not object to Nazi eugenic measures on the ground of morality, humanity, 
decency, etc., but, though aclmowledging that diey were crude and unscientific, he dismissed tliem because tliey would turn 
out to be dysgenic in tire long run and in matters o f evolution we must, I  think, take the long view (ibid. 47). He also added that the 
lowest strata, tliat he believed were genetically less well-endowed, reproduced relatively too fast. Therefore they had to be 
taught birtli-control methods, not be granted too easy access to hospital treatment lest the removal o f the last check on natural 
selection should make it too easy fo r children to be produced or to survive (ibid. 42), and long unemployment should be a ground for 
sterilization (Cawte 1986). Finally, he subscribed to the worn-out cliche that cultural evolution proceeds at a faster pace than
123 Mote that tliis book was favourably reviewed by a MIT geneticist, Frederick Adams Woods.
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biological evolution and therefore exceptionally gifted individuals are indispensable to sort tilings out. That reform eugenics
(Kevles 1985; Ludmerer 1972)'24 was merely a politically expedient façade is attested by what Frederick Osborn — one of the
so-called reform eugenicists — declared in 1951 (Osborn 1951: 61), when one would presume that the interference of the
State in the sphere o f  procreation had once and for aU fallen into disrepute:
the state which fails to me sterilisation is guilty of a grave disservice to future generations, while at the same time it is squandering the 
taxpctyers’ mony.
A .V . Hill, British Nobel Prize laureate for physiology, offers an emblematic rendering o f  the lingering apocalyptic
scenario envisioned by certain scientists in the post-war period:
Some might [take] the purety biobÿcal view that i f  men will breed like rabbits thy must be allowed to die like rabbits, . .Most people would 
still scty no. But suppose it were certain now that the pressure of increasing population, uncontrolled by disease, would lead not only to 
widepread exhaustion of the soil and ofother capital resources but also to continuing and increasing international tension and disorder', making 
it hat'dfor civilisation itself to survive. Would the majority ofhumane and reasonable people then change their minds?
A  comparison between this assertion and the one'25 that the same scientist made one year earlier, in 1951, creates 
an unpleasant feeling, as though the credibility o f scientists’ public statements depended entirely on the circumstances, and 
logical consistency were altogether discretionary:
T hy [the scientists] have developed the habit of critical examination, but this does not save themfivm wishful thinking in ordirtary affairs, or 
sometimes fivm  misrepresentation (even occasionally fivm  treachery andfalsehood) when their émotions or politicalprepossessions are strvngly 
enough invoked..,! would urge that scierrtific people do not get an exaggerated idea of their inportartce or of their moral superiority, but regard 
themselves as dtivyns who have the same moral obligations of honesty, kindness, courage, and tolerance as others. [,.,]. A nd scientists should 
be implored to remember that, however accurate their scientificfacts, their moraljudgnèrrts may conceivably be wrvng.
I t would be hard to encounter a more transparent contradiction. In 1956 Jean Rostand (Rostand 1956) contended 
that under a system o f artificial selection individuals could be born whose intellectual skills would far exceed those o f any 
human beings that had ever lived in the past. In fact, he feels confident that, until such a system has been tested, it would be 
unsound to set an arbitrary limit to what humankind might achieve. In 1963 Francis Crick, Nobel laureate for the discovery 
o f the D N A  structure, submitted that, as people should not have the right to have children unless proven genetically fit, tliey 
should be administered a chemical substance that would render them sterile, and the antidote provided only to suitable 
mating candidates (Wolstenhokne 1963). Nazis also played with the idea o f using a chemical additive to flour to the same 
end (Sax 2000). A few years later Crick submitted that a newborn child should not be regarded as a human being before 
passing several tests screening her genetic endowment that would establish her right to live (Weintraub 1984). Pichot (2000) 
notices that such a statement had already been made by Alfred Ploetz. But then again Crick had the following slogan written 
on a wall behind his desk: reading rvts the mind (Perutz 1989: 194). Linus Pauling, Nobel-prize laureate for science and for 
peace, multitalented scientist and political activist against nuclear proliferation, in 1968 recommended that babies carrying 
deleterious genes be tattooed on their forehead (Kerr & Shakespeare 2002). During the eighties, a Swiss doctor proposed 
that HIV positive people be tattooed on their sex (Gros 1989) and in the nineties a similar measure — this time by means of 
a more sophisticated magnetic signal — was proposed by a Swedish biologist for those who test positive for AIDS antibodies 
(Klein 1994). Still in the sixties, French biologist Jean Rostand expressed his wish that each baby be endowed with a 
standard DNA coding desirable physical and intellecmal traits, so that they would not be the offspring o f a particular couple, brU of 
the entire pedes (cited by Rosenfeld 1969: 143). In  tlie seventies, biologist and geneticist Theodosius Dobzhansky (Hayne 
1976: 21) proclaimed that man had to grasp the reins o f evolution of his own and of other pedes and bring into existence a superior 
humanldnd; but for the panel o f scientists who met in those same years under the aegis o f the Rand Corporation to discuss 
predictions as regards the future applications of reprogenetics, such techniques will be used to create humanlike animals
'24 a.k.a liberal eugenics
'25 A.V. I-BU, Bulletin o f the Atomic Scientists, VII (12), December 1951, pp. 372
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('parahumans”) to perform low-grmle labor (fio tv ik  1971: 102)'26. In  his 1971 presidential address to the American Association for 
the Advancement o f Science, Bentley Glass proclaimed that parents in tlie future will probably be forbidden to burden society 
with a malformed or mentally incompetent child (in Kass 2002: 128). It is useful to recall that a similar statement — whoever is not bodily 
and spiritually healttyy and worthy shall not have the right to pass on his suffering in the body o f his children — featured in Hitler’s Mein 
Kampf In  a 1985 book significantly entitled “Progress or Catastrophe”, Glass added that every couple should be allowed to 
have more than two children onty upon special evidence that the first two are physically and mentally sound (Glass 1985). It is o f some 
consequence that Glass was not unaware o f the scientists’ influence upon society. In 1981 (Glass 1981), he had authored a 
paper in which he acknowledged that the notorious “Baur-Fischer-Lenz” (1921), after the names of the authors o f this 
genetics handbook that popularised the discipline with the German readership, proved to be instrumental to the 
crystallization o f Hitler’s thought on the subject o f racial hygiene and eugenics. It is strildng that this Imowledge was not y
sufficient to refrain him from making such unguarded statements. i
In 1973 geneticist James F. Crow urged policy-makers to put restrictions on individual freedom this generation in order to 
have a lower mutation rate for the benefit of our posterity (Karp 1976: 56). In 1974 Marburger human geneticist Gerhard Wendt 
submitted that the health o f our children and o f the future generations is in danger because o f the increasing number o f 
disabled people and that society should do something quickly about hereditary health (Reyer 1991). A couple o f  years later,
Carl Jay Bajema, professor o f biology, urged policy-makers to see that people be granted marketable licenses to have 
children, on the ground tliat more affluent people are, genetically speaking, better people (Ostheimer Nancy & John 1976).
It is sometimes hard to draw the line between naïve but well-intentioned advocacy on one hand and sheer 
disingenuousness on the other hand. In 1997 James Watson, Nobel prize recipient and co-author o f  the 1953 discovery o f 
D N A ’s structure, contended that foemses should be aborted when carrying genes for homosexuality and that Hitler did not 
err in regarding mental disease as a scourge on society (Kerr & Shakespeare, 2002: 105). Subsequently, he minimised the -î
importance o f demanding consensus from the public opinion because it is none o f their business. I f  there’s a terrible misuse and 
people are dying, then you can pass regulations (Stock & Campbell 2000: 84). Astonisliingly, the leaders o f present genetic research 
simply shut dieit eyes to the reality o f facts. They dismiss tlie slippery slope metaphor because at the end o f the day they say 
that they are just applying the same techniques employed by natural selection (Leroy Hood in Stock & Campbell 2000). But 
at the same time they suggest they ought to be very careful not to admit at the outset [of a scheme o f germline engineering that we’re 
three-quarters evil and a quarter good (Watson). The reader should compare such a standpoint with Dostoevsky’s Grand 
Inquisitor’s candid admission (Dostoevskij 1912) that deception will be our suffering for we shall be forced to lie. The rationale behind 
it has been illustrated by Watson himself. They are well-intentioned and they should only feel proud of destroying the world’s 
genetic patrimony for the sake o f  human population. Ironically, like Camus’ negative heroes, their revolt against fate turns into 
a revolt against nature (Braun 1974). But their initiatives are legitimated by their humanist commitment, for just as the %
Grand Inquisitor claimed tliat he loved humanity more than Jesus did'^?, so genetic scientists get a lot ofpleasure from helping 
other people. That’s rréatwe are trying to (Watson ibid.).
With respect to class-biases, Watson decries the middle class’s reluctance to promote vast programmes o f genetic 
engineering on the ground that theirs is mere selfishness (Stock & Campbell 2000). This is an ironic twist in the eugenic saga 
because m ost classic eugenicists belonged to the middle class (Bullen et al. 1984).
Delusions o f omnipotence are exliibited by biochemist Daniel Koshland Jr., who declares that human cloning is 
not so problematic when he reflects that i f  thy had eight people ju st like me and we were all on the Supreme Court, it would really save 
the United States (Stock & Campbell 2000: 27). A furtlier instance o f scientists’ condescension towards popular culture has
'26 The following link presente the most recent predictions: h ttp ://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1307/MR13Q7.sum.html 
'22 Dostoevskij’s unpublished notes (in Kroeker & Ward, 2001:139)
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been reported by Emily Martin who attended the New York Academy of Sciences conference called “the flight from science
and reason”, a name that gave away the intents o f its organizers. Here is her description of what happened:
Numetvus peakers made plain their contemptfor popular culture. Alteniative medicine was said to be practiced ly  fascists, autocrats, and 
birprre magcians"; quoting Poe, Gerald Weissmanrt remarked that “conventiorral ideas are foolish"; and Sheldon Goldstein commented that 
we are living in a “new a^ of unreason "and that, among the public, “logical thought itself is in bad order'". Most peakers seemed to agree: the 
public knows nothing.
Martin (1996: 44)
It goes without saying that such a position, when paired with the conviction that, because o f their untutored 
minds, m ost lay-citizens are not even capable o f governing themselves, let alone make wise and far-sighted decisions on 
collective issues, inevitably paves the way to a technocratic view of how decisions should be made (Zimmerman 1995).
Finally, a telling paragon has been made by John C. Avise (Avise 1998) at the end of his scrutiny of die social repercussions 
o f genetic research. Avise describes the behaviour o f HAL, a supercomputer protagonist o f 2001: A  Space Odyssej, which 
attempts to murder the members o f a space mission when it realises that the mission itself could be jeopardised by human 
fallibility. Only one astronaut survives and neutralises it. A vise’s comment is that by aspiring to subordinate his human creators,
PLAL precipitated his own demise (ibidem: 218), but his final contradictory conclusion is that he wishes his book could prove 
tliought-provoking because, in the words of HAL, “this mission is too important.. .to jeoparditf". N o more realistic portrayal o f  a 
science-golem rebelling against its creators — mankind in its entirety — has probably ever been made.
This brief sketch of elitist speculations gone astray is indicative o f the intimate relationship between a propensity to
enhance and one to purge, between scientific asceticism and lust for power, and between love o f humanity and disdain for
ordinary human nature. These aspects are excellently exemplified by Dostoevsky’s portrait o f the Grand Inquisitor (1912);
fthere’s only one like nry old inquisitor, who had.. .madefrenifed effor'ts to subdue hisflesh to make himself free andperfect. But yet all his life 
he loved humanity, and suddenf his yes were opened, artd he saw that it is no great moral blessedness to attain perfection andfieedom, i f  at the 
same time one gains conviction that billions of God’s creatures have been created as a mockery, that thy will never be capable of using their 
freedom, that these poor rebels rvill never trmr into giants to complete the tower, that it was not for such geese that the great idealist dreamt his 
dream ofharmony. Seeing all that he turned back andjoined the clever people.
The gist o f  the argument set forth by both Watson and the Grand Inquisitor is that they know better than the lay-
people do, that their expertise entitles them to prescribe universally valid and applicable courses o f  actions, and that the way
of Christ — the way o f talcing responsibility for one’s own action — is not suited for the masses, who do not really know what
to do with freedom since what they really seek is happiness. My guess is that the Devil’s way, the one chosen by the Grand
Inquisitor, and which allows ordinary citizens to escape from freedom and die attending uncertainties into authority,
mystery and miracle, should sound particularly promising to Watson and his like-minded colleagues. Unlike Berman
Marshall (Lash & Friedman 1992), I contend that it is not the State but biomedical science that has become the primary
source of miracle, mystery, and authorit}’-. Sick and dissatisfied people are predictably inclined to believe that these cynical,
paternalist spiritual guides are cognizant enough to make decisions on their behalf (Brody 1992; Hermanowicz 1998). In the
main, by perusing the literature on scientists’ understanding o f progress and human betterment we arrive at two conclusions.
One is that the Western struggling with evil, oppression, and the Absolute has often produced a vast self-righteous hubris and
irrhuman callousness (Talmon 1960: 514). The other is that oftentimes, like the unflinching rationalist Ludovico Settembrini and
the nihilist Leo Naphta in Thomas Mann’s Magic Mountain ~  a setting not dissimilar from the academic ivory tower - ,  self-
styled clever people have in common a more or less explicit contempt for lay-people, and this is aU the more true for
eugenicists (Nelson 1980). Indeed, this is not the only affmity between the characterization o f Mann’s protagonists and the
mindset o f  the above mentioned scientists. See, for instance, Mann’s acute description o f Settembrini’s moral stance:
A nd this morality of Herr Settembrirri’s, what was it, what did it warrt? I t was Ife bound, and thus entirely utilitarian; it was pathetically 
unhervic. Its end and aim was to make men grow old and happy, rich and comfortable-and that was all there was to it. A nd this Philistine | |
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philosopfy, this gopel of work and tvason, served Herr Settembrini as an ethical ystem. A s far as he, Naphta, was concerned, he would 
continue to deny there was anything but the sheerest and shabbiest bourgeoisiedom.
'28 Curiously resembling Turgenev’s nihilist physician Bazarov in “Fatliers and Sons” (1865)
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That feelings o f condescension have never been foreign to eugenicists is witnessed by statements such as those i
made by the Scottish communist physicist J.B.S. Haldane in his “The inequality o f man and other essays” (1932: 213);
J have not very much use for people who ate notin touch with the invisible world [ideas, theories, theorems, scientific laws, postulates, 
etc.]. A i best thy are good animals, and too often not even that.
Karl Pearson, a socialist biometrician and mathematician, as well as a disciple o f Galton (J. Schwartz 1992), in 1883 
maintained that:
to bring again to the fore a feeling of genuine repectfor personified society, the State, is obviously a hard but primary necessity of socialist action.
We must aristocratise as we democratise; the ultimate appeal to tin many is hopeless unless the many haveforesight enough to place power in the 
hands ofthe fittest.
An elitist view o f  society was also espoused at the beginning o f the twentieth century by American biologist David 
Starr Jordan who conveniently held that I t is not the strength o f the strong, but the weakness of the weak, which engenders exploitation and 
tyranny (as quoted by Finzsch in Kaupen-Haas & Sailer 1999).
This outlook has never been uncommon among scientists in general (Longhi 1997), and eugenicists in particular
(Mazumdar 1992), and is typified by the way Jewish physician Berthold Stauber'2® addresses his father in Arthur Schnitzler’s
“The Road to the Open” (1908). After being reproached by his father that it is not only technical proficiency that makes a
good physician but also kindness and love o f mankind, Berthold replies that, to him, pity is tantamount to weakness, and in
hard times one m ust have no scruple in sacrificing the individual if  the common good demands it:
You need only consider that the most honest and consistent social lygiene would have the direct result of anrrihilating diseased people, or at ary ' j
rate excluding them fivm  all enjoyment of life, and I  don’t  dery that I  have all kinds of ideas tending in that wcy which may seem cruel at the 
first glance. But thefuture, I  think, belongs to ideas. You needn’t be afraid, father, that I  shall begin straight away to preach the murder of the 
unhealthy and siperfluous. But theoretically that’s certainly what try programme leads to.
In fact, it stands to reason that all claims o f superior knowledge tend to foster anti-democratic feelings (Glatzer 
1997), regardless o f the legitimacy and authoritativeness of the claim. The inevitable self-perception o f all professionals as 
the chosen few, selected by their informed peers tlirough an assessment of their merits and not by chance or favouritism, 
goes to show that there indeed exists an elective affinity between eugenics and professionalism (Watts 1994). Additionally, 
the unfeasibility o f true popularisation, paired with a sense o f self-complacency, make for a considerable distancing of its 
practitioners from the “consumers” and “users”.
This mindset appears to work subtly and unpredictably, affecting even the m ost clear-sighted among scientists. A 
case in point is the unintentionally offensive remark o f Theodosius Dobzhansky, an otherwise remarkably objective 
commentator o f issues concerning science and its impact upon society. Dobzhansky, on seeking to offset the disdainful 
attitude o f the scientific elite towards the population, reminds them that people are not jrcst manure in the soil in which are to grvw 
the gorgeous flowers of elite culture, and that it is imperative that there are a multitude of climbers. Otherwise the summit may not be reached by 
anybody. The individually lost and forgotten multitudes have not lived in vain, provided that they too made the effort to climb. Mary Midgley 
(IVIidgley 1985: 58) aptly points out that this metaphor of the ascent betrays the disavowal o f Kant’s principle that people are 
ends in dremselves. The symbolical connection between high culture and mountainous heights cannot be denied. In  point o f 
fact, mountain-scaling was a romantic trope that in the hands o f the British intelligentsia symbolised intellectual superiority 
and high endeavour (Carey 1992). And when American geneticist A.H. Sturtevant in 1954 pleaded society to embrace racial 
diversity because this would prove decisive to the advancement o f civilization, he inadvertently demonstrated that even an 
anti-eugenics stand could be profoundly informed by the same fixation with “compulsive progress” — the chmb o f the %
evolutionary ladder — that characterised eugenicists.
O n the otirer hand, selective Darwinism became popular among bio-medical professionals owkrg to their self-
proclaimed mental and physical superiority, the core o f an aristocratic view of the societal arrangement (Weiirdling 1989). In
this respect, I have previously referred to certaitr declarations made by Nietzsche — an eager hiker himself — that would lead
one to believe that he might have sympathized with the eugenicists’ aims. Like many o f  his contemporaries he was deeply
worried about the future and the degeneration of mankind:
everyone who has the rare yefor the overall danger that “man" himself degenerates; anyone who, like us, has recognir^ d the monstrousfortuity 
that has so fa r had its way andplay regarding the future of man. . .suffers from an anxiety that ispast all comparisons.
Beyond Good and Evil (1886: sec. 203)
He did not hesitate to attack democratic institutions, guilty o f undermining man’s will to power and malting him weak and
hedonistic (Detwiler 1990). Accordingly, he felt compelled to pose the problem of
rvhat type of man shall be bred, shall be willed, for being higher in value, worthier of life, more certain of a fiiture. Fven in the past this higher 
type has appeared often — but as a fortunate acciderrt, never as sometlnng willed.
The Antichrist (1895: sec. 3)
For only the greatest o f human beings could redeem the rest o f manltind now that G od was dead and hopes for an 
otherworldly redemption no longer obtained. But this conclusion means that tire existence o f ordinary, all-too-human 
individuals have no intrinsic value if not in relation to the prosperity o f the overmen. Thus he wrote:
Mankind in the mass sacrficed to theprvperity of a sitrgle stronger pedes of man — that would be an advance.
On the Genealogy of Morals (as quoted by Detwiler 1990:107)
The significant aspect o f Nietzsche’s thought is that he has been one o f the m ost precise gauges and trendsetters o f 
fin-de-siecle Europe’s cultural climate and a prophet o f the contemporary predicaments. H e has best expressed bourgeois 
dissatisfaction with the way power was wielded by those who inherited it instead o f acquiring it, by attacking both 
utilitarianism and altruism as harmful to tlie interests o f the better endowed (Hale 1971). He also has given shape to the 
.fears o f the member o f the upper classes who thought the degeneration of the “herd” was self-evident (Stone 2002). A t the 
same time he also charmed tlie champions of a technocratic administration o f society with statements such as diis (Reichel 
1994: 138):
Ich versuche eine okonomische Rechfertigung der Tugerrd. — Die Arrfgabe ip  den Menschen moglichst nuttpar ^ imachen urtd ihn, soweit es 
itgendwie angeht, derunfehlbaretiMaschine ip  ndheni
p[ seek an economic justification of virme. — The task is, to possibly render men useful and to bring man, if that is in any 
way possible, closer to die condition o f infallible machine].
And yet Nietzsche’s views cannot be confined to that period. John Carey (Carey 1992) has in my view persuasively 
outlined the principal attributes o f this modernist phobia towards the lower ranks o f society. Such an eliminationist doctrine 
was essentially built around the idea that the massification of culture imperilled the supremacy of the higher men 
(Nietzsche’s Wül to Power) on account o f their vulgar and prosaic taste and habits (Yeats). I suspect that these philosophers 
and writers would not have expressed such feelings unless they believed that a majority o f tlieir peers would not feel 
ashamed. This impression is confirmed by Carey’s remark that the dehumanisation o f the proletarian masses, accompanied 
by dreams o f  mass extermination and sterilization, served as a refuge for early twentieth-century intellectuals who were 
afraid o f their unrestrained sexuality, mundane interests, and reluctance to become the agents o f their own emancipation as 
well as the protagonist o f a global social reform.
The reader should be able to appreciate the relevance o f this latter argument in the light o f my previous description 
o f the transformation that the thought o f Alfred Ploetz underwent on beholding the degradation o f those utopian
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'2® Among others, Peter Singer, Helga Kuhse, Ronald Dworkin, Margaret Pabst Battin, Jonathan Glover, John Harris.
'5® Several are the flaws imputed to democracy: inclination to compromise and negotiation; tolerance, pluralism and relativism; the 
universal suffirage. (Bobbio in Fini 1976).
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communities in tlie United States about which he had formed tlie greatest expectations. As he turned from utopian 
socialism to racial hygiene, so a great many progressive inteUecmals resolved that the problem with the proletariat was less 
spiritual idleness than biological defects.
The pervasiveness o f such anti-humanistic attitudes have been impressive indeed over the past century, and even
today we should no t feel confident that it will be fenced. According to Brian Morris (Morris 1985: 724), behaviourism,
Durkheimian sociology, sociobiology, structural Marxism and Uvi-Straussian structuralism.have much in common in their repudiation o f the
human subject, in that they all posit a subject-object relationship in instrumental terms (Rasmussen 1996). I t is alarming to find
that an analogous support for an instrumental understanding o f human Hfe is held by contemporary advocates o f
utiHtarianism within the bioetliical community'2® (Teichman 2001). It is not a matter o f  presuming the existence of
supernatural beings to make sense o f our outmoded convictions, but o f historical evidence that proves that whenever this
challenge has been made humanldnd has failed to live up to its own expectations (Teichman 2001: 156):
ifhuman Ife itselfis not an ultimate value how can human beings give value to other things? How could something of non-ulUmate or secondary 
or merely instrumental value understand or create any primary values? ... such an attitude is self destructive and unnatural J
That such utilitarians could think o f themselves as humanists is hardly surprising when one considers that a t
significant measure o f anti-humanism was inherent in the humanist school o f thought. Humanists were members o f  the 
upper classes and shared the prejudices o f their peers (Zilsel 1942), so that an emergent anti-humanism could feed upon the -i);
humanistic distinction between the liberal and mechanical arts, and the subsequent devaluation o f  the latter. My impression %
is that, no matter how questionable it is, this type o f discourse is nowadays being channelled into the dreams and worries f
surrounding biotechnologies.
Finally, the time has come to gather up the threads of my argument. Above all, we must have regard to the context 
in which eugenics and genomics have developed. Modern eugenics emerged as a bourgeois response to the advent o f an 
unprecedented age of massification. Mass-culture was seen by the Hterate elite as the triumph of cultural mediocrity and by 
the eugenicists as a sign o f biological mediocrity (Weingart et al. 1988; Flerman 1997); and post-liberal thinkers accepted the 
premiss that modernity was tantamount to degeneracy and decay (Herman 1997).
The Post-WWI period marked the acme o f the Counter-EnHghtenment movement. The Great War generated a
cHmate o f  messianic expectation but also peddled nihilism, superficiaHty, indifference. A new age o f harmony, peace, and
well-being, tliat immediately after the war seemed imminent, was continually delayed. Frustration, disheartenment, anguish
and negativism cropped up and sapped the strength o f ethical behaviour; while some witlidrew into themselves, many
idealists, on the contrary, were drawn into radical thought and action. The latter countered the essential Enlightenment
dogma o f die progressive improvement o f the human condition through science and technology, invoking the ineluctable
decadence of every civilization, and seeing the contemporary epoch as a phase o f  regression which would usher in the fall o f  f
Western civilization'®®. In the artistic field. Dadaism and SurreaHsm mirrored this incertitude and despondency. “Dadaism”,
a term which was coined after the sound o f  a child’s babble, preached the deliberate renunciation o f thought and expression
(SalvatorelH, 1957: 661). A Dadaist manifesto was put up in Paris at die outset of the 1920s; it read:
Plus de peintres, plus de littérature, plus de musiciens, plus de sculpteurs, plus de religions, plus de républicaines, plus de royalistes, plus 
d’impérialistes, plus d’anarchistes, plus de socialistes, plus de bolcheviques, plus de politiques, plus de prolétaires, plus de démocrates, plus de 
bourgeois, plus d’aristocrates, plus d’armées, plus de police, plus de patries, enfin asseï^  de toutes ces imbécillités, plus rien, rien, EÆ N , E lE N ,
RIEN.
Salvatoi'elli (ibidem)
“The hollow Men” (1925), by Thomas Steam EUiot'®', is another telling manifestation o f tlie abyss o f  debasement 
into which the leading thinkers held contemporary humanity to have fallen:
We an the hollow men 
we an the stuffed men 
leaning together 
headpiece filled with straw
This poem has been described as an indictment o f  scientism (Waggoner 1943) and its delusions to die effect that 
rational causation is the key to the solution o f the human plight; that science is not depreciating and desiccating the meaning 
and mystery o f life; and that science-based doctrines are existentially fulfilling.
Moral anarchy issued from this alleged failure o f Western civilization to meet with the minimal requirements o f a 
decent human life. Surrealist authors proclaimed that: nos héros sont Violette N offèn la parricide, le criminel anonyme de divit commun, 
le sacrilège conscient et raffinée (Aragon quoted by SalvatorelH, ibidem: 877), and invited manltind to reject reason in favour o f the 
automatism o f  impulse, o f revolution for revolution’s sake. Enlightenment yielded ground to the Romantic heritage, 
rejecting out o f  hand the foothold o f  rationalization, Entiyauberung (disenchantment) and, ultimately, democracy itself. 
Norberto Bobbio (Fini 1976) suggests that this aversion to democracy ensued from the growing conviction that democracy 
replaces the heroic with the utilitarian, the sublime with the vulgar, being a sort o f betrayal of the spirit, a corruption, degeneration, decay of 
that civiliirption that ennobled Europe, and it is responsible for the enfeeblement and mediocrity of life. More, the appeal o f a doctrine 
promoting faith and instinct and disregarding history directly anticipates the omnipresent fascist motto: believe, obey, fight.
The repugnance for what is mediocre, inferior, deviant, and erratic is thus tlie hallmark of m ost o f the ideologies 
that oppose the thorough humanization o f science and medicine — eugenics, scientism, totalitarianism, racism, anti- 
Semitism, etc. Wliat the followers o f such doctrines have in common is the fear o f unpredictabiHty, o f the capriciousness o f 
human existence, o f  the absurd, whose m ost perfect embodiment was the proletariat. According to Bertrand Russell, the 
fetishism o f the essence (essentialism) precisely stems from this quest for a psychological safe haven staving o ff the danger 
o f arbitrariness and uncertainty (O’Malley & Painter 1994), WJiere does this repugnance come from?
Martlia C. Nussbaum once rightly remarked that the most patent flaw of Nietzscheanism is that it overlooks the 
aU-important fact that people who have no shelter, no medical insurance, and barely enough food to survive are most 
unlilrely to achieve a publicly aclmowledged greatness. The privilege of affluent people is to be in a position to think free 
from the constraints constituted by the basic necessities o f life, for our inteUectual capacities depend on our physical 
capacities and conditions. Likewise, for Nussbaum self-command and self-regulation thrive when our basic needs are 
fulfilled and Nietzsche’s scorn for the sociaHst agenda derived from this fundamental misapprehension: that besides bourgeois 
vulnerability — loneliness, melancholy, bad reputation, some kinds o f sickness, etc., which are all compatible with doing 
philosophy — there exists a basic vulnerability, i.e. the deprivation of resources so central to human functioning that thorcght and character are 
themselves impaired or not developed (Nussbaum in Schacht 1994: 159).
Such a fear is so intense and deeply rooted in these élites’ perception o f things, and in the way they interact with 
lesser human beings, that they sometimes sacrifice love and compassion for the sake of self-discipline and the unlimited 
control over the contingencies o f the natural environment and o f the social milieu. In other words, tliey can afford to
The Hollow Men is both a characterivption and a repudiation. Modem secular man performs his idiotic dance, his head filled with straw, because he has 
rejected revelationfor science, because he has igrrored the other world in order to try to make the most of this (Waggoner 1943:102).
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ponder, but they cannot afford the luxury o f accepting their own finitude, and acting compassionately towards their fellow 
human beings. In Nussbaum’s words, they do not know how to be "porous” to what surrounds them. And when science is 
viewed as a revolt against the absurd (abnormality) and against death, the Grand Inquisitors offer worldly bread in exchange 
for depriving them o f freedom. Likewise, eugenicists promised future rational economic actors an assortment o f gifts 
ranging from civilisation, discipline and order, to harmony, health and happiness, all in exchange for sexual restraint, 
hygiene, and the control over procreation (G. Jones 1986).
Les hommes meurent et ils ne sont pas heureux [Men die and are not happy]. These are the words spoken by Camus’ ' ;
Caligula on reflecting upon the death of his beloved sister, and those are the words that push him on die road to tyranny.
CaHgula is the embodiment o f the universal temptation to choose a rebellious despotism over the nihilistic experience o f
senselessness (Sprintzen 1988). The rebellion against the experience o f the absurd, an experience more piercing in a
disenchanted world, leads to iniquity. But are not scientists rebels against the absurd and the unknown?
such a world may make sense scientifically. Einstein maintained that God does not play dice with the universe. The laws governing it tnay be 
perfectly rational in terms of cause and effect. Their reliability is indeed essential to the work of the applied scientist. To the microbiologist, the 
bacillus ofthe plague is no more and no less irrational than the D N A  code. It is only when you bring in concepts such as right or wrong good, 
and bad, advantage and drawback, benefit and harm, sin and righteousness, that the problem begins. I t is then very tempting to use the word 
“absurd" to describe a world in which plagues exist
PliiHp Thody (1989: 47)
Debarati (2000) correctly points out that the way Camus ties up the rebel’s need for coherence and unity, 
considered as a vehicle o f mastery over the unknown, with the exclusionary and eliminationist paradigm underpinning 
modern political and philosophical messianism, complements and reinforces Benjamin’s contention that totalitarianism also 
stems from the estheticization o f politics. Equally of an aesthetical nature appears to be the scientific propensity to simplify 
and essentiaüse reality — what we call biological and chemical reductionism and d e t e r m i n i s m ' ® 2  _  and, by doing this, to feel 
entitled to claim, with a sense o f finality, that ultimate solutions to the human predicament are at hand.
A misguided notion o f science as a redemptive mission is mirrored in Camus’s “La Chute” by Clamence’s attempt #
to assuage his feeling o f guilt for not rescuing a drowning woman. The doctrine of absolute culpability that typifies the
coward (La Chute) as well as the assassin (L’Homme Révolté) and presupposes that no one is truly innocent (Viggiani 1960)
is not foreign to certain rhetorical explanations o f how bio-medicine ought to deal with the “problem” o f disability and
mental retardation. Because what are these defects (sins?) if  not the lowest point reached by humankind since its fall from
grace (Davis & Anderson 1983)? And what is science if not the m ost virtuous means to re-attain that previous, ennobling
state?'®® For John Scotus Erigena technology was eminently virtuous because it would restore humans to the condition they
enjoyed before Adam and Eve ate the forbidden fruit. More recently, Leon Kass (1985: 34) claimed that
the implicit goal of biomedical technolo  ^— indeed of the entire projectfor the conquest of nature — could well be said to be the reversal of the 
Fall, and a return of man to the hedonic and immortal existence of the Garden ofEdetd^’^
'®2 See for example Nancy Wexler’s account o f what she esqjerienced as she was bidding farewell to the subjects o f her inquiry into 
the genetics o f Huntington disease in Venezuela (Andrew Revkin, “Hunting down Huntington’s”, Discover 14,12 (1993): 108): A s  |
she waved at [“oldfiiends"] and smiled, she scrys she couldn’t help but visualii^  on their faces the broken-record repeatfiom the plates back in the laboratories, -J!
like the shadows cast ly a Venetian blind. Everywhere she looked, the tri-nucleotide stutter looked back, disgyitrg in itspersisterrt nystery. ‘1 had spent so ^
many years being so curiotrs about what it was sturffing all these peopk whose bodies contained the mystery". Waxier says. “A nd suddenly it was 
superimposed on them, almost like a silk screen. I t was an image without words, saying ’Here’s the answer. A nd here’s arrother question".
'®® It is worthy of note fliat Nordic Lutheranism calls the original sin arvynd, wliich, like its German equivalent, Erhslmde, conveys the 
idea of tlie heritabiHty o f sins and the concomitant futility o f probing someone’s innocence (Colla 2000).
'®4 By contrast, the fall o f the Grand Inquisitor consists in cette prétention d’être à soi-même sa propre autorité, de commuer la responsabilité 
métaplysique dont nous héritons en responsabilité morale que l ’on pourrait se vanter d’avoir acquise, c ’estprécisément ce qui nous faitpasser de la chute 
originelle, dont la responsabilité métaplysique est la trace en nous, à la seconde chute, quiprolonge indéfinitement la première (Van-Huy, Ngpc-Mai, 1974:
205)
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Analogously, in the eyes of the protagonist of The Fall, such an aesthetic, transcendental longing is unquestionably
bound up with the characteristically bourgeois desire for purity, harmony, homogeneity, conformism and cleanliness, namely
for the liquidation o f  abnormality and alterity. His stance is epitomised by later allusions to the Final Solution as a “huge
laundering venture” and to the communist purges as épurations (Debarati 2000). This age-old dream, that could come true
thanks to contemporary techno-science, hinges on the key assumption that either there is no such thing as human nature or
that it is somehow infinitely malleable (L’Homme Révolté). For Camus this is, ultimately, Ivan Karamazov’s conclusion on
confronting the senseless character o f the divine creation. If  G od does not exist, then the objective o f a rebel against this
godless creation will be to pursue a higher principle, that o f justice; they want justice where fate or genes or both has denied it. They
revolt as Job did— 'The Lord denies mejustice!"— but they do not look where Job lookedfor an answer {Qcrricn 2003)'®®
Yet, just like Victor Frankenstein’s intellectual faculties are betrayed by his obsession with the thorough
secularization of the world (Haynes 1994), it is this search for absolutes tliat eventually ruins Ivan. Endowed with a mind of
this world, neither realises tliat the goal o f reconstructing creation, entailing the establishment o f tlie sovereign divinity o f
humankind, is anything but just:
Moral questioru and isstces.. .are neither abstract nor intellectual; and it follows that habits of thought cultivated in ivory towers are not 
necessarily the ones most appropriate to the discussion of them.
Maclean (1993; 203)
'®5 httj)://v.^vw.fhenewadantis.coni/archive/3/cohen.htm
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6. CAN SCIENTISTS PLAY A LIBERATING ROLE?
Is this momentous marriage sekction,jrom motives half rational, halfnystical, in their veneration of the continuance of life, to prevail in spite of 
popular ignorxince and passion? Or, leaving this question ofpracticabiliy for experience to decide, is it after all sensible to burden tlx present 
génération with concern for generations of thefuture whose needs we can hardlyforetell; and, in subservience to the science of the day, to repudiate 
instinct older than all human experience by falling in love intelligently"? We have need of a socialphilosophy to tell us howfar eugenic reforms 
are reasonable and worth while.
J.A. Field, eugenicist (Field 1911: 61) y
iEvérybody has his blind spot or his Achilk’s heel, and scientists are no exception. Many of them believe thy are impartial in their thinking 
and uninfuenced by their surroundings. Some are very egoistic, andput forward ideas that thyfeel the whole human race has got to bow down 
and accept Others might be excelknt in one area of science — astronomy, for instance -y e t believe that have irrsights into allfields, without an 
awareness of the pifalls. Scientists are human — they’re as biased as airy other group. But thy do have one great advantage in that science is a 
selfconectingprocess
Cyril Ponnampetuma (Weintraub 1984:14)
The lid was off. ., Those great and littk scientific minds, engaged hitherto in searchingfor abstract truth or in multiplying the richness of life and 
the wealth of nations, could be turned toward the invention of means of destruction whether thy wished or not
Will Irvin, World War I correspondent, on gas warfare (Slotten 1990:488)
To recapitulate, these are the issues that I have analysed thus far and which scientists, intellectuals, social and 
political activists, and ordinary citizens should carefully consider:
MISPLACED PROGRESSIVISM. We have seen (2.3) that, after Germany and the United States, Scandinavia and
Canada have the worst record with respect to the violation of human rights in the implementation o f eugenic policies. f
Swedish politicians and biomedical scientists justified tliose measures by claiming that the interest o f the community must
always prevail over the individual interest (Colla 2000). Retrospectively, a Swedish doctor commented: all o f us thought like
that...we dreamed we could improve human body and soul...That’s horv the geneticist saw it the and some o f them see it still today (Clarke
1994). In Canada the most extreme eugenics policies were advanced by progressive and scientifically minded groups rather
than by conservatives (McLaren 1986; 1992). That was also true for several other countries (Pickens 1968; Freeden 1979;
Paul 1984). There actually seems to be some sort o f linkage between utopianism, scientism and the new-age ideal o f self-
transformation through conscious evolution (Deery 1996) that is, after all, the gist o f eugenics. Perhaps the encounter o f the
radical disillusion in the capacity of people born unequal to bridge the gap and reaffirm the validity o f egalitarianism and the
underlying sense o f frustration with the minutiae o f laboratory life explains such a relation:
It was very different, when the masters of the science sought immortality and power; such views, although futik, were grand: but now the scene 
was changed. The ambition of the inquirer seemed to limit itsef to the annihilation of those visions on which ny interest in science was chiefly 
founded. I  was required to exchange chimeras of boundless grandeur for realities oflittk worth
Victor Franlcenstein (N. Crook 1996: 32)
D ISCIPLIN ED  RATIONALITY, UTILITARIANISM, SCIENTISM, AND BIO-POLITICS. In Weimar 
Germany a m ost advanced network o f marriage- and sex-counselling centres was established, whose voluntary nature was 
entirely compatible with the new, democratic constitution (Usborne 1992). But two major economic crises in 1925 and 
1929-1930 brought about a paradigmatic shift. Cost-containment and efficiency considerations stressed the importance o f 
orderly behaviour (Hong 1998), social control o f reproduction, and the primacy o f prevention over care that is, o f biology 
and genetics over medicine (Massin 1990). Kevin Repp (2000) has called this attitude to social issues “disciplined rationality”
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and imputes the comparatively rapid nazification of Germany to its widespread success among conservative as well as 
progressive and feminist thinkers. As the curtailment o f individual freedom on account o f the pursuit o f communal well­
being could not be undertaken without professional advice, health- and Ufe-scientists, counsellors included, became deeply 
implicated in the subsequent terrible developments.
Historians who have examined medical encyclopaediasfor the second decade of that century conclude that physicians descended upon sinners like 
deities to stop them from falling off the precipice. ‘We are responsible", the editor of the English medicaljournal The Lancet proclaimed in 
1819, ‘for the employment of our peculiar authority in promoting the prmfication and well-being of human society". Physidarrs came to see 
themselves as guardians of the people’s health and morals.
Mosse (1982: 226)
ELITIST SELF-RIGHTEOUSNESS AND CONDESCENSION: the white ruling class o f puritan countries 
came to think that the pursuit o f order and happiness could justify the exclusion of the non-white, non-Protestant, deviant 
and unfit Other. The New Man tliat was to arise out o f  this major social reform would be an uncorrupted, extra-ordinary, 
aesthetically and ethically subHme version o f them (Mosse 1978). Eugenics is how this project was christened. The definition 
o f human nature in aesthetic terms and the legitimating rationalization o f such modernist schemes were indispensable to 
camouflage the fear and abhorrence that some intellectuals and scientists felt towards the bestial masses that, being 
uneducable, would remain deficient and resist the rightful claims and the ingenious plans o f social engineering o f the 
enlightened upper classes (Carey 1992). The ultimate goal was the dehumanisation of those whom the intelligentsia deemed 1|
abnormal and beyond the pale, mere raw material that could and should be purged (Stone 2002: 71):
Dreams of purification, cleansing and health and the aesthetic modelling of human beings are common and old ones
BIOLOGICAL AND G ENETIC ESSENTIALISM. The evidence shows that the abstraction and hierarcliisation
of distinctive cultural and physical traits into absolutes altogether divorced from reality but not perceived as fictitious is
responsible for the m ost tragic pages o f  the history o f human civilization. Possibly infatuated with the law o f  excluded
middle, according to which A cannot be non-A, scientists have repeatedly nourished such false beliefs through their biased
truth-claims about the inborn essential attributes and differentiations among races, classes, and genders (McPhail 2002).
They had to be aware that in so doing they were not only endorsing but also actually reinforcing iniquitous social structures
and power-relations (Gould 1981; Lewontin 2001).
Socrates: Citions, we shall say to them in our tale, you are brothers, yet God has framed you differently. Some of you have the power of 
command, and in the conrposition of these has mirrgled gold, wherefore also they have the greatest honour; others Ik has made of silver, to be 
auxiliaries; others again who are to be husbandmen and craftsmen he has composed of brass and iron; and the species willgettemlly be preserved 
in the children.. A n  oracle scrys that when a man of brass or iron guards the State, it will be destroyed. Such is the tale; is there ary possibility
of making our citions believe in it? ■%
Glaucon: N ot in the present generation; there is no way ofaccomplishing this; but their sons may be made to believe in the tale, and their son’s 
sons, and posterity after them
KALOKAGATFIIA: The above mentioned predilection for absolutes is bound up with tlie notion o f kalokagathia, 
the wedding o f aesthetics (kalos, beautiful) and ethics (agathos, virtuous). Eugenicists repeatedly identified physical beauty 
and hereditary fitness (Branson 2002) but, Hke phrenologists before, some also argued that a beautiful complexion reflected 
someone’s inner virtues. For them virtues were innate and could not be really taught. Tliis view, epitomised by the Latin 
saying mens sana in corpore sano, originated in Greece and became quite popular in Athens during the 5th century B.C. There it 
was employed to prop up the political aspirations of the new Athenian bourgeoisie and imposed a lifestyle tj’pified by a " I
permanent effort to outshine oneself and the others (Bourriot 1995). Long after the original formulation, German romantics 
resumed and re-interpreted kalokagathia in order to shape ideal citizens for a nation that would revive the glory o f  ancient 
Greece, and eugenicists simply added the autlioritativeness o f science and the linking o f social utility and the hierarchization
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of beauty as a measure o f biological fitness to a belief that was deeply ingrained in the collective unconscious (Essed &
Goldberg 2002). Thus Haeckel (Vandermeer 1996: 27):
...I t is of the first importance that modern science not onty shatter the false structures of superstition and sweep their ruins from the path, but 
that it also erect a new abodefor human emotion.. .the Trinity of “the true, the good, and the beaniful”
In  these concluding chapters I describe the reasons that lead me to tliink that even conscientious scientists wiU find 
it hard to avert the potential misuse of truth-claims and attendant value-judgements made in the name o f science.
6.1 A SCIENTIFIC MINDSET?
You believe in the mission of mankind, don’t you, Kelvin?.. .Just don’t go to the lab, i f  you don’t warrt to lose your faith. It belongs to 
Sarlorious — Faust in reverse.. .He’s lookirtgfor a cute for immortality! He is the last krright of the Hoty Corrtact, the man we rreed. His 
latest discovery is pretty good too.. .ptvhrrged ctyittg. N ot bad, eh? Agotria perpetrra...
Lem (1970: 42)
My proclivity for super dreams had clearty lotrg worried Betty [JFatson !r sister] who feared tat I  rrmrld rrever adapt successfulty to the word of 
ordirrary people
Watson (2002: 11)
Cet arrgélisme scierrtijîque relève d’utre répugrrarrce pmforrde d ’origirre philosophique et même religieuse à admettre que le vrai puisse coexister avec 
l’arbitraire, peut-être même s ’etrracitrer dans cet arbitraire
Girard (1972 : 320)
Vaughn-Blankenship (1973) correctly observes that to become a scientist encompasses a wide range o f teachings 
about what the attributes o f the ideal scientist are, how scientists are expected to interact with their colleagues and lay- 
people, deal with their work, and evaluate their own performance and that o f their colleagues.
His data point to the intriguing characterization o f scientists as civically-minded, socially and politically engaged
citizens who are at once positively persuaded that the use or abuse o f science is none o f  their business. Vaughn-
Blankenship’s survey also reveals that around 40 percent o f  the respondents selected “firequently” as die most appropriate
answer to die question “how often do you get as worked up about something that happens in political or public affairs as
you do about things that happen in your professional life?”. Three-fifths regularly talk about politics and social issues, mainly
with their colleagues, but not exclusively with them. Their involvement in public issues ranges from voting, taking part in
political rallies, supporting candidates by volunteering during their campaigns or through monetary contributions.
A s a group thy appear, in a sense, to be almost “ideal" citisyens — highly educated, well integrated into occupational and family structures, 
participants in rather than merely observers of public events, making their choices on the basis of reason rather than partisan identfications
Vaughn-Blankenship (ibid. 284)
Elliott, Hood, and Holmes produced analogous evidence in 1972 through their survey o f American scientists and 
engineers in the American South (Elliott, Hood, Holmes 1972) and concluded that their unusually high level o f participation 
in die political Hfe o f their communities and their country should be related to their receptivity to social change that is a 
-■fundamental component o f their open-minded and dispassionate outlook on reality. There is indeed no want among them 
for scientific optimism. Biologists Nossal and Coppel (1989: 154) maintain that among bio-scientists there is an excitement and 
an elation that is barely contairrable. The pity is, endiusiasm is not an antidote against misconduct. Dr. S., a former Nazi 
physician, noted that the great enthusiasm that carried through the developments between 1933 and 1939 cannot be denied. Everybody wanted 
to contribute. (Lifton 1986: 29).
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1Elliott, Hood, and Holmes (op. cit.: 425) additionally suggested that, drawing on the results o f other surveys 
showing tliat better educated subjects display a more optimistic and reforming attitude, in all probability the changes they 
[scientists and engineers] contemplate are not the kind that would seriously undermine their professional and social standing.
A relevant consideration is what odier social surveys can tell us about why scientists undertake such a career, that is 
to say, what kind o f emotional drive and aspirations bring them to choose a field where high competition will m ost likely 
crush their hopes for recognition and their idealism?
Bernard H. Gustin (Gustin 1973), spurred by statistical correlations that showed that only a tiny number o f
scientists actually publish most and the best scientific papers, while at least 50% of them are virtually ignored, did such a
survey and asked himself the same question. He first noted that Gaston’s study o f the British high-energy physics
community identified as personal enjoyment the most common reason for their commitment to scientific research (47%),
whereas only 28% cited career as the chief motivation. Incidentally, this conclusion agrees with my observations and with
Carl J. Sindermann’s serene analysis o f the average scientific career (Sindermann 231-232);
immortality, or at least- its temporary equivalent is pvbably an illusion for most of us. I f  we look dispassionately, especially near the end of a 
career in science, at our lastirrg contributioru, they often seem insignificant or even non-existent
It is self-evident that m ost scientists, however hard they try, wiU never earn fame. Some come to terms with this
awareness and regard their endeavour as a little contribution to a greater, collective effort (Klein 1994). Others fail to 'S
acltnowledge their limits and may fall prey to enticing but pernicious political doctrines that promise fame and popularity.
This was M erton’s conclusion as regards his analysis o f anomie (Bryant 1990), the deviant behaviour that would follow the
cleavage between collective goals and individual expectations when society restrains the access to the means by wltich such
goals could be attained and such expectations could be met. Anomie is probably an inevitable outcome o f the unlimited
expectations that nearly everyone attaches to science. A few assertions made by American physicists interviewed by Joseph
C. Hermanowicz (1998) can make plain the matter at issue:
I  had been trained to expect a certain class of Jobs and also been trained that i f  I  did not attain that class of jobs, that that was unacceptable or '(I
to be looked down upon (p. 75)
you replace one anxiety with another. First of all I  had [a] survival anxiety. Now I  have the anxiety that Pm given this remarkable 
opportunity very few people in history have had, that is, to work for some major research university with a searre positiorr. I  have no excuse 
really. I f  I  don’t do something really good it’s because I  wasn’t  smart enough (p. 90)
at the bottom there is this terriblefear that I  will never think of artything ever worth doing that I ’ve published ny last paper (p. 156)
I  think that there are lots of really super peopk that don’t realiiy that thy are super. There are really excelkrrt plysidsts who ate still rreurvtic 
and anxious and worried abord their image (p. 160)
Hermanowicz’s analysis somehow reflects my own conclusions as concerns the elitist frame o f mind o f  so many
eugenicists. He underscores that scientists, like any members of a professional category, for all the arrogance they may • i|
display when it comes to pursue a specific intellectual agenda, need to be constantly reassured about their self-worth. As a %
result, some, regardless o f tlieir renown and accomplishments, just cannot find gratification in their accomplishments. This
is the case of Subramanyan Chandrasekhar, Nobel Prize Laureate in Physics:
I  don’t really have a sense ofjulfilment. A ll I  have done seems to be not m y much. . .Scknce at the present time is geatty associated with haste 
and the desire to be at the top. But try unhappiness or discontent is not due to that, I  think. Perhaps it’s because of the distortion, in some 
sense, of ny life, of it’s one-sidedness, of the consequent loneliness, and ny inability to escape from it all [...]. Ifelt when I  was young that 
when one teaches the age of mid-forties or fifties and otre is moderatety succèsful, one would have a seme ofpersonal security and assurance 
combined with some contentment. I  certainly haven’tfound them. [ ..] . I t’s trot at all clear to me whether the singk-mindedprmuit of science at 
the expeme of other', personal aspects of one’s life is justifiable. N ot so muchfor oneself, but particularlyfor those with whom you are associated.
The person who suffers the most is, of course, one’s wife. [...]. So i f  I  continue to do science it’s largely for ny personal pleasure, and also 
because I  do not know what else to do.. .I ’ve got so used to a certain wcy ofIfe, that it’s difficult to change... You can have your life go by. ;|
Quoted in Hermanowicz (1998: pp. 170-172)
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IAltliough I posed no direct question on this subject, I am under the impression that none o f  my respondents is
interested in achieving fame and success. They simply wish to carry out successfully the kind o f research they have started.
Reputation and pecuniary retribution were mainly seen as spin-offs o f fruitful inquiries and nicely crafted experiments.
Correspondingly, m ost denied that they are after the material benefits o f industrial science. There simply is no telling of the
sense o f frustration and embitterment that an Italian food scientist (2002) felt once he had to resign himself to abandon his
attempts to pursue an academic career -  allegedly due to the incompetence of a supervisor and the disorganization o f the
foreign lab where he was working. These are his words:
lo, pur sforgandomi, non riesco ad entrate nell’ottica dell'industria dove quello che conta è, giustamente, la camera. Intendiamocl, questo è 
giustopeixhé uno lavorapermigliorare se stesso e la ‘pmmotfone"dovrebbe certijkare do,purttvppoperà quello che io noto è una concefione del 
caniemmo basata sulla conoscens^  di “qualcuno che conta”, sul mfftanard i superion, e nelmettere in cattiva luce i l collegaper ottenere dei 
vantaggi. Uintemse per I'afienda e soprattutto per quello che fa ipassa sempre e comunque in seconda piano. Io non sono cost, e non potni mai 
esserloperché va contm i lmio modo di intendere il lavom. Ingnuamente iopenso che fa i il tuo lavmv e fallo benepetvhê qualcuno lo noterà” 
valga ancora, ma do non è veto soprattutto nelPafienda (do spiega Pimbarai^nte incompetenng di alcunipersonaggi a livelligestionali '"I
estwnamente eleoaü, con tutto quello che ne consegue), mentre io penso che nel mondo accademico non italiano valga ancora il concetto che quello 
che puoiguadagnare è sob la stima di chi, come te, lavora perlaghia difan do chepiugli dà soddifafione sen^a dovenipom ilproblema di 
quello che guadagna il collega dell’ujfdo accanto. Con questo non pensate che io non sappia che anche nel mondo accademico non vi sia 
Parrivismo e Pinvidia, ma sono eccefioni, semplicemente perché, di solito, chi ha fame di soldi non sposa la causa del ‘piuttosto pei^ ye sul sedere 
mafare do che uno ama”. Io si, eccoperché voglbfare lo scienfiato
[laowever hard I try, I can’t adapt to the needs of the industry, in which what really matters is - fair enough - your career.
D on’t get me wrong, tliis is reasonable because someone works to improve himself and the promotion should attest %
that. However what I notice is a conception o f career-advancement based on your acquaintance with “the big shots”, 
on sycophancy, and on putting your colleagues in a bad light for your own benefit. Your company and what you are 
doing at no time become your priority. I am not like that and I could never become like that because it goes against my 
understanding of work. Naively, I still believe in “do your job and do it fine and someone will notice it”. But tliis is not 
true especially in a company (this accounts for the embarrassing incompetence of some at the executive level, with the 
predictable consequences), whereas I think that in the Italian universities it still holds true the concept tliat what you 
earn is the esteem of tliose, like you, who work for the sheer enjoyment of doing something that it is truly fulfilling 
without having to mind about tlie income o f your colleague working in the office next to yours. Mind, I am not 
unaware that in the academic environment it is not careerism and envy that lack. But they are exceptions, simply 
because, as a rule, money-thirst people do not espouse the cause o f “better scraping a living if one can do what he 
liltes”. I do and this is why I want to be a scientist]
Such an admission faithfully reflects the idealistic image o f science as a way o f Hfe and a source o f  happiness, 
gratification, and wisdom (Gustin 1973), the same endorsed by several eugenicists (FarraU 1985). Gustin (op.cit.) identifies 
charisma as the element common to both science and reHgion, the charisma o f the founders o f science and o f the 
contemporary eminent scientists who, like lay-priests, celebrate the worldly mass that is scientific research (see also chapter
4).
It is true that for many science is a form o f escapism from the tediousness of daily routine. For example, a Spanish
organic chemist, on responding to the question whether she changed her mind about being a scientist after she began
practicing as such, expressed (Scotland 2003) this view:
No lo se. Muchas veces me arrvpiento de mi elecdon,perv a la ve  ^no creo que pudiera trabajar err un banco o en una tenda hadendo lo mismo 
cada dia
P don’t Imow. Many a time I regretted my choice, but at the same time I don’t think I could work in a bank doing the 
same things every day]
But it is also undeniable that the food scientist’s indictment o f the “enemies of science” also feeds upon the widely
held opinion that science must not be tarnished by business and politics. To my question o f what he thinks o f politically <*
engaged scientists and scientists’ entrepreneurs, an ItaHan biotechnologist (Italy 2003) responded:
Ti rispondo nel modo più sincerv e violento: ok peril “sodalmente” impegnato, ma il foMcamente” e P”imprenditore”pmprw non li tollero!
Vanno contrv ilprincipb delperthê si sceglie difare lo scienfiato.. ,Se c’e un impegnopolitico vuole dire averepreso œmunque tsnaposifione 
nel contesta economico-culturale, seconda me lo sdenfiato deve ragiotrare e operare in modo distinto dal businesspoliiico-economico e da come tira
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il ventoJnipmiditon: è um  pamla che m ifa venin i brividi. [...]. Questo è un aspetto che quando pensavo di fa n  k  sdenfiato non avevo 
pnso in considemifone.
[Let me be outspoken and fierce (sici). I am fine with social commitments but I just can’t stand the involvement widi 
politics and business! It runs against the principles that lead someone to become a scientist.. .If there is a political 
commitment tliat means that one has already taken a stance in tlie political and economic context but in my opinion a 
scientist should think and act according to different standards from those of politics and business and should not be an 
opportunist. [...]. Entrepreneur is a word that makes me shudder. [...]. This is an aspect that I had not taken into 
consideration when I was planning to become a scientist]
Similarly, tlie president o f the Association of Italian Biotechnologists, on the occasion o f a conference held in
Rome in 2001, inveighed against their disingenuous detractors:
Ma soprattutto voglio soffermamd un momenta su affitmafioni di questigiorni che, confesso, considew un gave qffesa a quanti svolgono con 
nale passione ilpmprio compila di ricercaton. M i rifrisco a tutti colon che dipingpnogli scientqati come una comunità connivente congli 
intenssi economici delle multinatqonali.
Comepossiamo din questo dimigliaia di ricenaton. . .che vivono in condiiqonispessopncarie, che certo non hanno nconosdmenti adegrati dei 
saafid che eerie scelte inporigpno, che quasi maipossono aspirare a pnspettive di caniera?!
La condisqone dei nostri ricervatori non pud che dimostrare quanto sia il cuon a muoven le lorv scelte, come questa professione sia inrraniqtutto 
dettata da una passione pmfonda e da un grande desiderio di conosceruqi!
Non sipub din a tutte queste persone, animate da questi sentimenti, che sono solo dipenderrti dagli interessi economid delle multinasqonali!
Va assolutamente smentito!
I  nostri valori, le motivaiqoni che d  hanno spinto verso le biotecnologie sembrano diventan una copa
[Above all, I would like to address certain recent allegations that I frankly regard as a serious offence to those who 
attend to their work as researchers with genuine passion. I am referring to those who portray scientists as a community 
conniving with the economic interests of the transnational corporations. We should not disparage thousands of 
researchers who often live precarious lives, who certainly lack recognition of the sacrifices involved in certain choices, 
who can seldom aspire to a brilliant career!? The condition o f our researchers proves how their choices are inspired by 
their heart, how this profession is fostered by a profound passion and by a great thirst for knowledge! You cannot say to 
these people, who are moved by such sentiments, that their decisions only depend on corporate interests. This must be 
rebuffed! It now seems that we must be blamed for our values and for the motivations that have led us to tiie 
biotechnologies].
The passion in these comments is almost tangible. It was during the interview that it became clear to me that the 
stern contraposition o f arguments and iconographies dividing the advocates and the enemies o f  the biotechnologies, has 
dulled his ability to see that it is precisely the powerful injection o f market economy, venture capitals, and corporate interests 
into American science, that has turned brilliant scientists pursuing knowledge into brilliant scientists pursuing money (and 
power). For all their conscientiousness, young researchers privately admit that they are perfectly aware that they will have to 
stoop to several compromises in order to do valuable research. I feel absolutely positive that the president o f  the Italian 
bio technologists is no t in bad faith but simply has nurtured an excessive confidence in the potentialities o f science to 
establish what is true and viable and what is not, independently from external influences. Truth and science both emancipate 
- as they lead to self-determination - and serve the interests o f the powers-that-be (Wright Mills 1970; Barber 1978; 
Horkheimer and Adom o 1984, 1991; Foucault 1975, 1981, 2001).
The ethical and intellectual profile o f the young researchers I interviewed mostly reflects tliis idealtyqiization.
Public-spirited, tliey enthusiastically advocate progressive and humanitarian causes, despise m ost politicians but not politics,
fear irrational backlash against science but trust the capacity of the public to understand what is at stake when they are
thoroughly informed. But how do we explain then the eagerness their predecessors displayed in backing up causes such as
eugenics, racial hygiene, biochemical and nuclear warfare, etc.? First o f all, there are scientists and scientists. Some are like a
young Italian biotechnologist (2002) who, on pointing out that he is aware that some o f  his peers and colleagues are far
removed from the real world but they believe they can save it, adds
Io ririgmiqo'la mia famiglia... .mi tengono coipiedi e con la testa soprattutto saldamente ancorati aiprvblemi quotidiani della vita di noi 
comuni esseri umani
143
P thanlr my family... for they keep my feet firm on the ground and especially my mind focussed on everyday reality]
There are also data showing that those with a non-idealized and non-exclusionist view o f science will be more 
likely to meddle with politics (Gianos 1974), which goes against my contention that idealism can be extremely harmful to 
science. In fact, that o f the effects o f  externalist and internalist factors upon science is certainly one of the most debated 
argument in the social studies o f  science.
The important essay by Hugh Slotten (1990) on the public outcry tliat took place in the United States over the use
of poison gas during the Great War and the reaction of American chemists to such an outrage will serve as an introduction
to the problem. It all started when the German Army first used chlorine gas at Ypres in Belgium on April 22, 1915. A few
months later tlie Allies retaliated in kind and this sparkled the huge controversy over the appropriateness o f such a new,
deadly weapon. A vast majority of Americans sided with those who proposed the immediate banning of gas warfare but
m ost American chemists rebutted the charge o f being agents of destruction by arguing that their commitment to the
advancement o f science was paired with an equally wholehearted commitment to the prestige and strength of their country.
In so doing chemists joined the ranks of the quite large group of biologists and geneticists who had become socially engaged
as eugenicists and had begun to exercise significant social influence and authority. Their advocacy successfully conveyed the
message that, in fact, gas warfare was more humane than any other kind of warfare and, in the final analysis represented die
attainment of a higher level o f c i v i l i z a t i o n '®6 (Slotten 1990). That a notable proportion o f the American public could share
such a belief witnesses to the typically American infatuation with technological and scientific progress (American
Progressivism), but also to the impressive measure o f political purchase earned by scientists over the past decades and to the
predisposition o f so many scientists to a politically and ethically expedient brand o f self-delusion. A n American chemist, for
instance, declared that research in asphyxiating gases ly no means lacked that fascination which characterfies all reseatxh, an intellectual
journey into the unknown and Charles L. Parsons likewise remarked that War, the destroyer, has been...the incentive to marvellous ‘|
chemical development with a speed o f accomplishment incompréhensible in normal times (both quotes are from Slotten 1990: 486). As a
result, their particular understanding o f the social function of science led them to the successful political lobbying o f the ' | |
American Chemical Association and the American Institute o f Chemical Engineers against the ratification o f the Geneva
Protocol (1926). However, what is most disturbing is that they assumed a patronising and conceited attitude that is far from
alien to the contemporary spokespeople for genetic engineering and biotechnology:
The secretary of the American Chemical Society argued that the Geneva Protocol was “born of lysteria” and fostered by ignorance”.
Similarly, the society 'r president contended that “sentiment and not knowledge was the driving force behind the women’s clubs and associations 
which attached chemical warfare”. The dread andfear of poison gas, another commentator asserted, was “based on an almost medieval attitude 
toward the black mage of science”
Slotten (1990: 492)
This connection o f patriotism and progressive zeal is o f  course not confined to American scientists alone. Paul 
Forman, in a seminal essay on the interplay o f  ideology and physics in Weimar Germany (Forman 1973), argued that for 
many scientists serving the interest o f science and die interest o f their country is one and the same thing.
For several scientists, science had become a Macht-Ersatiq a surrogate o f the military might and political influence
their country lacked. Correspondingly, in the aftermath o f the German defeat in World War I, on November 14, 1918 Max
Planck declared before a session of the Prussian Academy o f Science that:
I f  the eneny has taken from our fatherland all drfence andpower, i f  severe domestic crisis have broken in upon us andperhaps still more severe 
crises stand before us, there is one thing that no foreign or domestic enemy has yet taken fiom us: that is the position which German science 
occupies in the world. Moreover, it is the mission of our acadeny above all, as the most distinguished scientific agency of the state to maintain 
this position and, ifneed should arise, to defend it with every available means
'®6 This was the opinion of none other than the secretary of the American Chemical Society
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Forman (1973:163) \
I feel the notions o f scientific and technical Gemeinschaftsatbeit that is, labour in the service o f the community rather y
than for a profit (Herf 1984), and Leistungsgemeinschaft, i.e. efficiency community, namely an achievement-oriented community j.
primed for self-sacrifice (Finzsch & Wellenreuther 2001) go a long way to explain such an attitude. Both concepts derived 
from the ideals underpinning the Austrian, Swiss and German gemeinniitiqge Geselhchaftm, the associations for the prom otion >
of science for the com mon good (Lowood 1991). I suspect that they still linger in the international scientific communit}^ and 
I now regret that I did no t sift tlie relevant evidence, ;
Nonedieless, my fieldwork data suggest that these days inferiority complexes and homesickness have replaced
chauvinism and nationalism. I yet wonder if the former may well some day, in different circumstances, nurture the latter. An J'
Italian biomedical researcher working in the United States disagreed with my su^estion  that scientists, owing to their
passion and to the prestige attached to science, could be more likely than others to fall prey to chauvinism. However, her j
rebuttal appears to me an indirect confirmation of my conjecture:
Non credo che g/i sdenfiati in genemle possano essere condderati più o meno patriottki di aJtre categork. Per quanto rigrmrda gli scietuqati >■
europei, costrettiper lo più ad emigrate perpoterd formare e costruire le lorv carrière, Paccerrtuakr patriottismo è forse dettato più dal fatto di j
essere lontani dal lorv Paese e di doversi confivntare quotidianamente con una sockta (nel mio caso quella americana) che non appartiene loro e y
che mostra le sue deboleiqq, contraddkqoni e chiusurepur offiendo un ideale ambknk accademico e lavorativo. II rapporto con la nostrapatria è ',ï
quello classico di amore ed odio: essa d  ha costretto a parlire a caresa dell’inadeguatei^ della ricerva scientifica ma alio stesso tenpo d  ha offerto 
un substrata di storia, di tradkqone, di arie e dipenskrv filosojico che questi ameticani ignoranti e belligeranti non arriveranno mai a capire
I do not believe scientists in general should be regarded as more patriotic than other categories. As regards European 
scientists, who are compelled to emigrate to get trained and build their own careers, tlieir marked patriotism is possibly 
due to tlieir being away from their country and to the necessity of dealing on a daily basis with a society (the United 
States in my case) where they don’t belong and which shows its weaknesses, contradictions and narrow-mindedness yet 
offering an ideal academic and professional environment. Our relationship with our country is the classic love-and-hate: 
she forced us to leave because of the deficient standards o f scientific research but at the same time she gave us a -f
substratum of history, tradition, art, and philosopliical thought that these ignorant and belligerent American will never *|
understand
Be it as it may, this hard-won love for Italy, that becomes an embodiment o f the ungrateful Mother that
invariably lets her children down but is too beautiful and lovely to warrant their grudge, is fascinating. This becomes a
painfully conflicting combination of feelings amidst the highly qualified émigrés. The constant longing for one’s roots is
frustrated by the awareness that it is only abroad tlrat one can truly pursue one’s professional aspirations. The one
contribution that is m ost representative o f these conflicting feelings is that o f a geneticist now working for a prestigious
university in New England. Here is one excerpt o f her interview:
come vedi sono molto amarv nei confivrrti dellltalia. Ciè dériva dall’amore che ho per lltalia, la mia terra, ed il desiderio di vivere con i m ki 
amid e famigliati nelposto in cui sono nata e cresduta. Sono arrabbiata perché lltalia ha le potenrfalità di essere un Paese modemo e giusto; 
invece fa  fiiita di esserlo, nascondendo il mardume sotto la tovaglia. Per darii soltanto un esempio di do che mi fa  infuriare; il corso di Laurea 
in Biotecnologe fit istituito alcuni annifa, cteando tanti laureati alPanno in un settore che non trvva sriltppo in Italia, ariiq sta andando in i
prvgtessivo declino. Non e’ stato creato per motim teak di richksta di una certa figura professionale, come domebbe logicamente essere, ma j
soltanto per dare I’idea allEurvpa ed al mondo, che lltalia e ’ un Paese all’avanguardia (e per altri motivi ancora meno nobili di cui non sono I
a conoscen ,^ ma posso immagiriare. ..). Che buga. Cerio non posso generalkqpte a tutto do che succédé in Italia: d  sono akuni centri di 
ricerva seri e prvduttivi, nonché rispettati a livello intemarqonale; e d sono moltepersone realmente impegnate rtella scknsp in Italia, Ma poiché 
questi esempi non costitukcono la normalità in Italia, a queste persone non vkne riconosduto il giusto merito e vengono invece prvgressivamente I
demotivate. Un po’ mi sento anche “traditrice”, per aver abbandonato il mio Paese ed essere arrdata a fare il mio mestiere dove e’facile farlo, 
sentqi invece cercarv di cambiare le cose. Ma sinceramente, non credo che ora in Italia sia possibile attirare I’atteruqone su questa argomento. E d  '
io non ho I’esperkiuqi (o il coraggo) necessariaper una rivolucqone.
[as you can see it is bitterness that I feel toward Italy. It comes firom my love for Italy, my homeland, and my desire to 
live with my friends and my relatives where I was bom and grew up. I am angry because Italy has the potential to be a 
modern and fair country; instead She but pretends to be such a country, sweeping the dirt under the carpet. To give you 
an example o f what makes me furious: the undergraduate programme for the degree in biotechnologies was established 
a few years ago, churning out graduate students in a field o f research that as of now is underdeveloped in Italy, if it’s not 
progressively declining. It has not been instituted because that professional figure was much sought-after, as rational
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decision-making would demand, but only to show Europe and the rest of the world that Italy is at the forefront (and for 
other, less noble, motives that I am not aware of but I can figure ou t...). What a lie. Sure, I should not push too far my 
generalization. In Italy there exist a few serious and prolific research centres that are also internationally respected; and 
there are some people who are truly committed to science in Italy. But because they are exceptions in Italy, their merits 
go unrecognised and they grow discouraged. To some extent it feels like I betrayed my country because I relinquished 
Her and have moved to place where it is easier to do my job, wifliout even trying to change these things. But, frankly, I 
do not suppose tliese days it’d be easy to direct the attention to this problem in Italy. And I lack tlie esqjerience (and the 
courage) that are needed for a revolution].
Canadian graduates and researchers instead display a bizarre form of “compulsive pride”. They take great delight in 
the notion that Canada is one of the m ost successful socio-political experiments o f advanced democracy, but they constantly 
need to reassure themselves that it is great to be Canadians in order to reinforce their problematic cultural identity. 
Comparatively high-minded Canadian scientists are then juxtaposed to the greedy ambitions o f  the American scientific 
establishment, mostly governed by the aims of powerful economic and political interests whose rapacious clutches are 
constantly threatening the stability and credibility of the Canadian arrangement. Social welfare and research freedom are also 
sometimes reported as a measure of the gap separating tlie admirable Canadian model and the flawed social system built up 
by their neighbours. I should also remind die readers that I did my fieldwork at a time when the relationship between 
Canada and the United States had been frayed by the refusal o f Ottawa to endorse the American intervention in Iraq, a 
refusal that had been welcomed by m ost Canadians, who seemed not to tolerate the idea tiiat George W. Bush Jr. could 
have such an influence on Canadian affairs.
As to internalist factors, the results o f a more than three-year-long series o f interviews conducted among scientists 
involved in the Apollo lunar mission by Ian I. Mitroff (Mitroff 1974) are quite enlightening. Those scientists not only 
reacted with irritation or sarcasm when queried about die idea o f pure objectivity and emotional detachment in science 
calling it “simple-minded nonsense” , but also maintained that it ought N O T to be viewed as a prescriptive ideal. Here are 
some o f their comments as reported by Mitroff (ibid. 588-589):
• We m ust be emotionally committed to the things we do energetically. No one is able to do anydiing with liberal 
energy if  there is no emotion connected with it
• You’ve got to make a clear distinction between no t being objective and cheating. A good scientist will not be above 
changing his theory if he gets a preponderance o f evidence that doesn’t support it, but basically he’s iooldng to 
defend it. W ithout [emotional] commitment one wouldn’t have the energy, the drive to press forward sometimes 
against extremely difficult odds
• I still thinic you can be objective in spite o f  having strong interests and biases
• I f  you make neutral statements, nobody really listens to you. You have to stick your neck out. Those statements you 
make in public are actually stronger than you believe in. You have to get people to remember diat you represent a 
point o f view even if for you it’s just a possibility
• Science is an intensely personal enterprise. [...]. In every real scientific problem I ’ve ever seen, the evidence by itself 
never settled anything because two scientists o f different outlook could both take the same evidence, and reach 
entirely different conclusions. You eventually settle the differences, but not because o f  the evidence itself but because 
you develop a preference for one set o f assumptions over the other. How you do this is not clear since there’s not 
always a good set o f reasons for adopting one rather than the other
• I’ve learned, by now that you never completely prove or disprove anytliing; you just make it more or less probable 
with the best o f what means you’ve got at the time
Other surveys seem to substantiate these claims (see Mahoney 1979).
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It seems all the more likely that this could account for the ethical questionability o f  numerom statements made by 
population geneticists, bio-engineers, and psychiatrists, given that their pet ideas in tire scientific realm are closely Imit to 
social phenomena. In such a scenario, some measure of chauvinism would not be out o f  place.
It also stands to feason that their confidence may be strengthened by the passion that they throw into their work «
when they sense that their goals are attainable. Below are three example of the physical effects produced by such f?
expectations (Baker 1942): >
1. I  have been working like a madman at Drosera. . .at the present moment I  can mon about Drosera than the origin o f all the species in 
the world.. .1 am frightened and astounded at my nsults (Darwin to Sir J.D. Hooker)
2. Then are not many joys in Inman life equal to the joy o f the sudden birth o f a generalisation.. .He who has once in his life experienced
thisjoy o f scientific cnation will never forget it (Prince Kropotkin) \
3. My heart began to beat violently, the blood rushed to my head, and Ife lt much mon like fainting than I  have done when in appnhension • *
of immediate death. I  had a headache the nst o f the day, so gnat was the excitement pivduced by what will appear to most people a vety 
inadequate cause (Alfred Russel Wallace, naturalist, co-discoverer o f the theory o f evolution, on discovering a new 
species o f butterflies)
Several o f my informants confirmed that these are not exaggerations. Doing science may actually produce a state 
o f mind aldn to euphoria.
Willis 1-1. Truitt (in Truitt et al. 1974) and C. H. Waddington (Midgley 1992) wonder if scientists' failure to apply
the same passion to  the pursuit of a humanistic brand of science could be an excuse to gloss over the necessity to tliink
about broader issues. Be that as it may, it seemed obvious to me tliat there exists an ever-widening gap between humanities
and natural sciences. 1 wholeheartedly subscribe to C. P. Snow’s famous statement (in Truitt et al. 1974: 46):
Constant^ Ifelt I  was moving among tivo gtvips — conparable in intelligence, identical in race, not grossf diffennt in social origin, earning 
about the same incomes, who had almost ceased to communicate at all
Even though D. N. Michael (in Truitt 1974: 174) rightly argues that two types o f scientists exist, a traditional sort <•;
that dodges every involvement in social issues, and another sort that is closer to tire political entrepreneur rather than to the 
detached thinker, it remains that scientists, especially the young ones who make every effort to start a career, simply cannot 
devote time to anything other than science.
O n the other hand, they demand a deeper knowledge of scientific research and its implications on the part o f 
public opinion as for the layperson scientific discoveries are not dissimilarfivm Greek myths (Dupre in Longhi 1997: 137), a statement 
that curiously echoes Merton’s worry that the general public could be susceptible to new nysticism expressed in apparenttg scientific 
terms (Merton 1973: 277), and Nelkin’s remark that the awe-inspiring media-image o f scientists creates a distance between 
scientists and the public that, paradoxically, obscuns the importance o f science and its critical effect on our daily lives (Nelkin, 1995; 15).
Yet, few are prepared to directly take part in the activit}’- o f divulgation, which stands in blatant contradiction with 
their commonly held opinion that scientists do have some sort o f responsibility toward the broader social domain.
Specifically the researchers employed by the ENEA, the Italian national centre o f research, manifest a certain measure of 
contempt for the intellectual faculties o f the hoi poUoi (Longhi, 1997: 138). This agrees with Markus Gyorgy’s (in Gavroglu 
et al. 1995) and Emily Martin’s analysis (Aronowitz-Martinsons-Menser 1996) of the absence o f an hermeneutics o f natural 
sciences.
Some scientists have become separated from the rest o f society and do not regularly pursue issues o f  a broad 
cultural significance and, when they do that, they clothe their thoughts with a technical jargon that results unintelligible to 
those who have no basic cognizance o f the matters at issue or indulge on clichés that a critically-minded audience can only
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find ii'iitating^^' .^ Consequently, Mullcay (1991) reports a survey among American college s t u d e n t s t h a t  reveals ambivalent
views o f science and scientists. Besides positive qualities such as intelligence, perseverance, abnegation, self-sufficiency,
selflessness and relative indifference to money, the study reveals tliat scientists are also associated with social wididrawal and
“cold intellectualism”. Roslynn Haynes (1994) observes that surveys aimed at assessing how scientists are portrayed by the
general public invariably yield rvholfi negative estimate[s] concluding tliat fear and alienation from  science is the hallmark o f
Western societj'^ as it is testified by much Western narrative. See for instance Ulrich’s perception o f the scientific enterprise,
in Musil’s “The man without qualities”:
But one thing on the other hand, could safely be said about Ulrich: he loved mathematics because of the kind of people who could not endmv it. *
He was in love with science not so much on scientific as on human grounds. He saw that in all the problems that come within its orbit, science 
thinks diffemitly from the laity. I f  we translate “scientific outlook” into “view of life”, “hypothesis” into “attempt”, and ‘truth” into “action”, 
then there would be no notable scientist or mathematician whose life's work, in courage and revolutionary impact, did not fa r outmatch the 
greatest deeds of history. The man has not yet been born who could say to hisfollowers: ‘You may steal, kill, fornicate - our teaching is so strong 
that it will tranforw the cesspool of y  our sins into clear, sparkling mountain streams”. But in science it happens everyfew years that something 
till then held to be in error suddenly revolutionises the field, or that some dim and disdained idea becomes the ruler o f a new realm of thought. : |
Such events are not merely upheavals but lead us upward like a Jacob’s ladder. The Ife of science is as strong and carefree and glorious as a 
fairy tale. A nd  Ulrichfelt: People simpty don’t  realis^ e it, thy have no idea how much thinking can be done aheacty; i f  thy could be tarrght to 
think a new way, thy would chartge their lives.
Robert Musil (1978)
The authors o f textbooks and biographies o f scientists sometimes display an analogous hagiographie attitude to 
men o f science (Hermanowicz 1997). Thus, for some the history o f science is as inspiring in its human values as are the legertds of the 
saints, for others scientists are more fiee from the influence o f passion than those o f other men (Mahoney 1979: 350). Mahoney has Â
brilliantly cut down to size the alleged superiorit}’' o f a scientific mindset when compared to that o f lay-people. O n no 
account, whether we refer to objectivity and rationality, or to open-mindedness, intelligence, integrity, and communality, do 
scientists demonstrate tliemselves to be more gifted than any other class o f people. These are some of the results o f 
Mahoney’s reappraisal (Mahoney 1973: 363):
• scientists are not immune to perceptual biases and is frequently quite emotional in response to technical and
epistemological matters
• scientists may sometimes be unreceptive to relevant data and — particularly in the case o f theorists — prone to hasty
speculation and dogmatic tenacit)^
• reports of data fabrication and experimenter bias suggest that such phenomena are neither rare nor trivial
• scientists tend to be secretive and suspicious until tliey have established a public priority claim to their work; disputes 
over personal credit and priority frequently result in bitter arguments
It is useful to compare these findings with the classic Mertonian (Merton 1973: ch. 13) norms o f scientific research:
1) Universalism: truth claims should be subjected to pre-established, impersonal justification criteria that exclude
consideration o f particularistic criteria such as scientists’ race, nationality, or religion
2) Communism: the findings of science constitute a common heritage to be shared with the whole community with
recognition and esteem the sole propert}^ right o f scientists
3) Disinterestedness: scientists must subject their world to the rigorous scrutiny o f fellow experts and they are ultimately 
accountable to their peers rather than to lay clientele
4) Organized scepticism: scientists should engage in the detached scrutiny of beliefs in terms o f empirical and logical criteria that is 
free from infection by outside institutions such as religion
viz. the report o f CIBA’s conference in Wolstenholme 1963 and the report of tire “Engineering the human germline” symposium 
in Stock & Campbell 2000 
Beardslee and O ’Dowd, 1962
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These norms, together with the following attributes listed by Michael Mulkay (in Mulkay & Voijin 1980) make up 
the so-called “ideology o f science”:
1. Science can generate “objective” knowledge when scientists are granted some leeway in carrying out their work
2. N o external ethical guidance is required in that science possesses an adequate internal value system
3. Much basic knowledge produced by scientists is destined in the long run to prove beneficial
4. This Icnowledge is socially and politically neutral
5. Scientists should not be held accountable for tire misuse o f this ktrowledge
Propositions 2, 4 and 5 are at the very least problematic (Barnes 1974; Jagtenber 1983; Mulkay 1991; Ancarani 
1996). More, as remarked by Peter Weingart (Elias et al., 1982), tire very success o f  science has paved the way to its
transformation from the outside. Its status of dependable source of Imowledge has iirvolved its massive engagement in 
social and political reform, this in turn triggering a process o f  elision o f boundaries and identity blurring. Already Joseph 
Needham had shown that science, democratic and Hberal though it may be, coexists with any type o f  political and economic 
regime as long as it is permitted to operate with a reasonable degree o f autonomy (Busino, 1998: 21). On balance, it is hard 
to tell whether science has a greater iirfluence on society than the obverse but, pace Popper, we have solid reasons to believe 
that it cannot establish what is morally acceptable and that one desire is preferable to another (Russell 1961 [1935]). To put 
it differently, science suggests what we can do, not what we ought to do (axiological neutrality). The contrary would imply 
embracing the naturalistic fallacy, that is, deriving an “ought” from an “is”, a risk that biological determinists run time and 
again (Gyorgy Markus in Gavroglu et al., 1995), albeit science cannot possibly have moral authority. As to the ideological 
and ethical positioning o f scientists, their political orientations, moral perspective and religious affiliations, it is self-evident 
that, given their varied background and geographical provenance it would be nonsensical to expect a great degree o f 
uniformity. Nonetheless there are indications that the pigeonholing o f scientists as politically progressive is more then 
substantiated by my limited sample. Never in my life did I encounter such a concentration of reform-minded subjects. But 
let me first outline the data formerly gatliered by other colleagues and the hypotheses that they have been led to craft by 
their observations.
Clark A. Elliott (1982) explains that from the twentieth century onwards the pursuit o f science became largely 
based on the attainment o f the Ph.D., which implied that in order to become a scientist someone would have to spend a 
significant amount o f time in a university. Universities are powerful agencies of social and political reform and it comes as 
no surprise that such knowledge is inevitably more politicised.
In 1968 in a survey on the characterisation o f American scientists Robert Hirsch (1968) observed several facts that 
I should Hke to rehearse. In the first place, he held that figures showed that there was a rising number o f Ph.D. students 
recruited from the lower social ranks and that there was a statistically appreciable orientation o f young students from lower- 
socio-economic settings to choose biologji" (with the notable exception o f microbiology), chemistry (but not biochemistry), 
and engineering as opposed to the cliildren o f affluent parents who would rather go for humanities, business, law, and social 
sciences.
The m ost important finding for the sake o f my inquiry was that the biological sciences were ovetxhosen by Negtves and 
underchosen by...those who were oriented to making money (Hirsch 1968: 88). In fact biomedical sciences in Nazi times were deemed 
as decadent because o f their association with Jewry and I have already explained that my informants were not expecting or
As an aside, it appears fliat class-biases are apt to influence scientists’ stance vis-à-vis the nature-nurture dispute. In 1968 
Sherwood and Nataupsky (Duster 1990) pointed out that the emphasis upon the correlation o f intelligence and genetic endowment 
was considerable among scientists fi-om tire upper-middle class, as opposed to scientists o f more humble origins who would rather 
opt for environmental factors.
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wishing to become affluent. The classical stereotypical portrait o f scientists as liberal if not radical in political was confirmed
by the actual data but Hirsch quoted (1968: 17) Richard L. Meier as saying^ '*®
Chemists are seldom rebels or radicals. Their politics are usually a non-violent conservatism or liberalism.. .which is compatible with service 
both in corporations and in government agencies. jPlysicists on the other hand are].. .by nature politically radical. Their mind is schooled in the 
proposition that progress is made by discarding various assumptions and premises, thereby making it possible to create a more powerpl theory 
upon a simpler underpinrring: This tends to lead them into a vague leftist philosophy — partly as the only rational set of value premises offered in 
the world of ideas between 1936 and 1940
Notably, although their self-perception is on the average that o f fairly progressive persons, most o f them would b.
stigmatise if  not despise those scientists entering the political arena and promoting their political agenda. This is something I 
experienced myself during my interviews. Probably the only Italian biologist who had chosen to run for the European 
Parliament was either admired as a brave man or detested as someone who had privileged politics over scientific research 
and as such had betrayed the category and its principles. The blunt description made by one of the interviewees was a moron 
who talks bulkhit. He accused him o f having discontinued important research since the 70s and implicitly questioned his right 
to call liimself a scientist. Another respondent likewise argued:
Creo que los cientificos no deben estarinvoluaadosen politicapara riada. Ta ciencia no es un negocio
Some instead believe that (Scotland-based Italian biochemist, switching from Italian to English):
A  real scientist deve avere political and communicative skills. Non a caso Ip iu  famosi scientists contemporanei e passati (sidff^sono e sono 
stati highly committed con la politica e con ipolitici
[A real scientist must have political and communicative skills. It is no accident that the most famous contemporary and 
past scientists are and have been highly committed to politics and with the politicians]
Are we mistaken in thinking tliat perhaps a further factor is at play? In his review o f  Medawar’s celebrated “Advice
to a young scientist”. Max Perutz asks the readers (Perutz 1989; 193)
What else draws people into science? It seems to me that, just as the Church did in former times, science offers a safe niche where you can spend 
a qrdet Ife classifying spider's, away fivm  what E.M. Forster called the world of telegams and anger. To the ambitious poor, science offers a 
wcry to fame or reasortable wealth that needs no starting capital other than good brains andprodigious energy
This would imply that many scientists wish they could have the best o f both worlds: conducting their politically 
and socially relevant inquiries without being consulted about the wider applications o f  their discoveries. This is indeed the 
impression I draw from my fieldwork data. Nevertheless, this also presupposes that it is actually possible to establish clear- 
cut lines dividing what is scientifically responsible and what is ideologically inspired, what pertains to scientists’ preserves 
and what strains their prerogative. Interestingly, neither Bacon nor Descartes, namely the founders o f m odern scientific 
method, ever felt it was opportune to  draw a code of conduct for responsible scientists. They did not even concern 
themselves witli such issues as the value o f human existence, the morality o f the inquiry into the nature of mankind, the 
social responsibility o f  scientists, and the ideological biases affecting a scientific career. That was just beyond their scope 
(Haberer in Cerruti & Fazio 1976).
In the course o f time things changed. According to Daniels (1967: 1699) in 1870’s United States for the first time, 
great numbers o f scientific spokesmen began to vocally resent this dependence upon values extraneous to science [utilitarian, equalitarian, 
religious]. The decade, in a word, witnessed the development, as a generally shared ideology, o f the notion o f science for science's sake. This 
struggle was still developing in the wake o f the Enlightenment’s emancipatory wars against the religious and monarchic yoke 
and led up precisely to the progressive dogma which employed values and rules more consonant to those o f  the scientific 
domain but failed to concede that those criteria could not possibly be o f a universal, everlasting, and pre-established sort.
140 '«The Origin o f tlie Scientific Species”, Bulletin o f the Atomic Scientists, 8 (June 1951), 169-73.
The correct Italian expression would be delpassato (lit. “o f the past”). Passati (adj. “past”) is a literal translation from English.
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Eventually, tlie devastation o f  WWII and the Vietnam Wat forced scientists to acknowledge the existence o f -T
specific responsibilities. In 1939 it was J.D. Bernal who called upon scientists o f the anti-fascist coalition to work toward the
attainment o f a democratic world, the best guarantee for free scientific inquiry. He contended that
Science will come to be mogniryed as the chief factor in fimdamental social change.. .science shouldprovide a continuous series of unpredictable 
radical changes in the techniques (of the economic and social system)... Whether these changesfit or fa il to fit in with human and social rreeds is ?
the measure of howfar science has been adjusted in its sodalfunction
Bernal quoted in BrownhH & Menicks (2002)
Ironically, only a few years later on June 12‘^ ' 1945, the Franck Report was submitted to the American secretary o f
war, Henry Stimson, by a group o f extremely concerned atomic scientists at Chicago University. It read as follows:
jWe] do not presume to speak authoritatively on problems of national and interndtionalpolicy. However; we found ourselves, by the force of 
events during the lastfive years, in the position of a small group of citir^ ens cognir^ ant ofa gave danger for the safety of this country as well asfor 
thepture of all other nations... We therefore feel it our duty to urge that the politicalproblems, arising from the masterirrg of nuclear power, be 
recogni^ d in al their gravity... We believe that our acquaintance with the sdentific elements of the situation andprolongedpreoccupation with 
its world-wide political implications, imposes on us the obligations to offer' in the committee some suggestions as to the possible solution of thee 
grave problems
After the atomic bombing o f Japan the immense might they had unleashed and entrusted to politicians frightened
some o f them (Moore 1996). Biochemist Eugene Rabinowitch expressed similar concerns (in Winkler 1993: 321) >
In the summer of 1945 some of us walked the streets of Chicago vividly imagining the sky suddenly lit by giantfireball, the steel skeletons of 
skyscr'apers bending into gotesque shapes ad their masonry raining into the streets below, until a geat cloud of dust rose and settled over the 4
crumbling city
The political engagement o f scientists in the form of the advocacy of a more humane science is thus inseparable 
from the acltnowledgement on their part that a line had been crossed, that functioned as an historical watershed. Before 
scientists could still believe that their endeavours would eventually produce more advantages than harm.
This was clearly a radical turnabout from the compliance o f American and British chemists involved in WWI
programme o f chemical warfare. A further source o f unease for scientists turned out to be the Vietnam war. Widely deemed
as an imperialist and unjust war, it spread in several universities a climate of hostility towards scientists who somehow
contributed to the American war effort. The claim that die American military build-up was necessary to maintain die
prosperity o f the country was demystified and exposed for what it was, a fairy tale. The psychological pressure brought
many scientists to face up to their unwitting complicity and for some even teaching became a source o f ethical dilemmas:
By the late W s I  wanted what I  did in ny science to be related more to my personal values, and to doing goodfor human beings in a very direct 
manner'. One of the elements of crisis was that while I  was successful as a researcher at Vanderbilt and had long ago dedded that I  would not 
do militay work, I  was teachingg'aduate students who would eventually do military work, while at night and on the weekend, I  was protesting 
the [Vietnam] War. A nd that caused a great deal of stressforme
David Kotelchuck (iVIoore 1996:1604)
Science as a reified entity does not exist, let alone pure science. Blaming science for die existence of weapons of 
mass destruction is a misconception. We should fault individual scientists, not the entire category (Dubos 1961). Precisely 
because scientists are not exempt from prejudices and fraudulence it is imperative that they be invited to partake o f die 
public confrontation o f  opinions, data, and agendas. This is an opinion previously held by none other than Albert Einstein.
One day he wrote to his friend, German physicist Max von Laue — who under the Nazi dictatorship tended to cling to the 
principle o f neutrality — that everyone could see where that silence and self-restraint would lead Germany. H e rather 
believed that people like Giordano Bruno, Spinoza, Voltaire, and Humboldt had set an extraordinary example for scientists i
(Hermann 1982).
6.2 SCIENTISTS AS MORAL AGENTS?
We believe it to be a nsponsibility of scientists in all countries to contribute to the education of the peoples by spreading among them a wide 
understanding of the dangers and potentialities offered buy the rmprecedented growth of science. We appeal to our colleagues everywhere to 
contribute to this effort, both through Enlightenment of adultpoprdations, and through education of the cominggenerations
Declaïatioii of Wien, 1958
To ny mind the history of the eugenics movemerrt in the United States should be essential readingforgnetkists 
Jon Beclcwifli (2002:112)
Mengele gained his notoriety for his experiments in genetics, I  was trained as a geneticist, yet never in all years of ny education or during try 
entire career as a scientist did I  encounter his trame except in the popular press. In tirefield ofscience, Mengele does not exist.
David Suzuki (1989: 24)
Nearly all of my interviewees work in laboratories, a term that comes from the Benedictine motto ora et labora^‘^ \ 
but no one has ever reduced his or her existence to laboratory life, abstract thought, and extraneousness to moral conflicts. 
Political disengagement is nowhere to be found among them. Few o f them are moderate and their political convictions were 
already deeply embedded before they made the decision to become scientists. Their being scientists merely preserved their 
radical inclination as well as their curiosity. This is in keeping with my preliminary assumptions but as my inquiry proceeded 
I have come to realise that political radicalism and social engagement are not necessarily linked. A disposition to apply one’s 
sltills to the betterment o f society has persisted — the same inducing most scientists to accept being involved in international 
committees or study panels (Nossal 1975) —, but what they lack is the grand vision — she. flirtatious concern for, and cloying 
stewardship of, succeeding generations (Gudding 1996) — driving past eugenicists to assume that scientific data serve a prescriptive 
function in the social and etliical sphere, namely that “rationally managed society” and “scientifically managed society” come 
to the same tliing^''^.
My results tie in with Janovy’s remark (1985) that the students o f bio-sciences who display an actual command of 
the etliical discourse are very few. In accordance with Nader’s analysis, few of my respondents doubted the conventional 
view o f  science as clearly separated from its applications. Pace Luria (1984), science is still regarded by many as a sacred 
priesthood absolving its practitioners from any social responsibility. I also have strong suspicions that some of them 
presume that the principles o f compassion, liberality and tolerance they more or less consistently espouse, will some day be 
shared by a majority o f human beings. The impression I have drawn is that o f a relatively optimistic outlook. Even the 
customary distrust o f  politics targets more the academic instimtions, guilty o f stooping to compromises that tlireaten 
research freedom, rather than the political arena at large. Most respondents, especially in Canada, seem to be rather content 
with tlie kind o f  society tliey live in, although they certainly do not fail to deprecate pauperism, industrial pollution, racism, 
and so fortli.
While they do believe, as Weingart suspects (Aant et al. 1990), that there is no link between what they are doing 
now and the errors o f their predecessors, m ost do not even know the meaning o f the term eugenics. They have never been 
taught that tliere existed such a thing as an international movement joined among others by hundreds o f biomedical 
professionals that sought to propagate the belief that what is theoretically correct from a scientific viewpoint — and it need 
not even be thoroughly verified — is morally sound as well. They never heard o f  their campaigning for the mass-sterilization 
o f deviants and o f the public endorsement by several o f them of Hitler’s eugenic policies (Kuhl 1994; 1997). Ironically, 
those who have some cognisance o f the term believe that a considerable number of people are afraid that their work is
pray and work
Viz. Jurgen Habermas critique of scientism (Habermas 1968; 1985; 2001)
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ushering in a new eugenics and wish a better education could stave off such groundless fears. But there is the rub. Thus far 
the only people I met who were seriously concerned about eugenics were uncommonly erudite. By contrast, most o f the 
time I am asked to give a brief explanation of what I mean by eugenics. A further irony consists in the fact tliat the role that 
education should play in the dissemination of eugenic teachings was cardinal in both Nazi Germany (Faith Weiss in Nathal- 
O lff 1993) and the utopian societ}»' described by Alexis Carrel. In fact it was widely recognized tliat through imposition alone 
tlie desired goals could not be achieved. Still in the Eighties, former Nazi doctor Dr. Johann S. (Lifton 1986: 133) was 
persuaded that
National Socialism failed because we could not develop enough biolog teaching -  it was not possible to educate people sufjtcientlj in 
biolog.. .the tragedy of National Socialism was that it was never tmlisyed.
Interestingly, independently from what people Icnow about eugenics, the data I have collected show that what lay-
people think o f them, when they explain what the nature o f their job is, differs appreciably from country to country. In Italy
by and large being a scientist is not perceived as essentially cool: some are lawyers, some are plumbers, and some others are
scientists. Conversely, in Canada and Scotland, there seem to exist a keener interest in what scientists think and do. In
Canada, one student o f  biomedicine instead reported that
Almost all the time, I  get a, ‘Wow... that’s cool. . . ’’or “.. .you must be very smart”. I  don’t know whether thy realty mean it or thy arejust 
being nice. But ny impression is that Icy-people generally think that scientists are smart and 0 e d  people, thy typical “book-worms” if  you 
will. Some consider that the scientific mind can only be given and not obtained (i.e. nature vs. nurhire).
And then added:
I  generally feel that people are always interested in medical advancements and ideas because it may potentially periain to their health as well.
[...]. Nonetheless, Ifeel that Icypeople think that scientists are a differerrt breed of people!
The commentary o f one o f die students o f genetic counselling on what people understand by eugenics was: they do 
not know the meaning of the rrmd but they do know what it used to be. Nevertheless, she also remarked that students are open-minded 
and more receptive. When she talks with them she feels there are fewer ideological barriers, and cloning and tinkering with 
G od’s creation cease to be rhetorical weapons. My impression is that in Canada young researchers feel that public opinion is 
mainly on their side, as opposed to Italy where biotechnologists feel threatened by traditional creeds and new forms of 
fanaticism. Apart from the discrepancies between the way genetic counselling is being done in Italy and Canada, scientists 
self-perception and what they believe is the public perception o f their work is the only domain in which I could detect a 
significant disagreement between Italian and Canadian researchers. Italian scientists lament that too many are indifferent to 
the fate o f science in Italy. They blame successive governments for not paying attention to the brain-drain phenomenon. 
Few are aware that the scarcity o f venture capitals in this field in Italy does not simply accrue from political ineptitude but 
also on structural causes deeply embedded in Italian history and culture. All in aU, they feel neglected by the public as well as 
by politicians and entrepreneurs. It is a case of indifference breeding low self-esteem.
By contrast, in Canada biotechnologies are being generously bankrolled by Ottawa and by some provincial 
governments. The proximity o f the United States has probably made more palatable the idea that science should be closely 
tied to big business and anybody can appreciate the scale o f the changes that some Canadian universities are undergoing in 
order to meet tlie expectation o f potential investors. Unlike their Italian colleagues, Canadian bio-scientists positively feel 
they are important social actors. Economic and political saHency cause public opinion to pay a greater attention to science 
and induce scientists to feel under scrutiny but seldom under fire.
Tlierefore the problem raised by Sarah Cunningham-Burley and Mary Boulton (in Albrecht et al. 2000), that the 
presence o f scientists in those panels discussing the social and ethical impact o f genetic research may somehow defraud 
public opinion o f  its chance to have a say on those same issues, because o f the feeling o f ill-preparedness to challenge
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scientists’ self-assurance, is simply unfamiliar in Italy. My feeling is that it is only abroad that the monopoly of expertise 
could suppress critical discussion (ibidem).
Be it as it may, the two aforementioned scholars seek to stress the “lay expertise” o f the general public and urge 
scientists to become conscious o f the sophistication o f this knowledge wliich appears to be sufficiently ample and 
diversified, although obviously not flawless, for the needs o f non-professionals. Public opinion is to a large extent ready to 
get involved in a general debate. Moreover, scientists must feel that analysts of the social implication o f scientific research |
are no mere detractors but also potential allies. Instead o f laying against scientists and technicians the charge o f enabling the 
powers-that-be to perpetuate a stale and iniquitous system we ought to ask ourselves why the criterion o f cost-benefits is 
determining the shift o f funding to scientific research from a public to a private sphere. It seems self-evident to me that it is 
precisely in the interest o f  big business to widen the gap between die two cultures, by victimizing their critics and ladling out 
praises and moneys in return for sycophancy. The one diing we can take for granted is that the influence o f  big business, 
besides being a fundamental means o f promotion o f democracy and science can be a mortal enemy o f both.
Vittorio Ancarani (1996) has pointed out that an idealistic, anti-utilitarian undertone running dirough the German 
academe by the time o f its foundation conflated the notion o f  Wissenschaft (science) and Bildung (intellectual development) 
and a massive predilection for practical application was not ubiquitous. It was in the United States that this development 
took place and, to use a Baconian distinction, the expérimenta lucifera gave way to the expérimentafi'uctifera.
Although not a new one, as already at the turn o f  the 19th century there were scientists working in university 
laboratories for giant chemical concerns such as Bayer and Hoechst (Cosmacini 1989), tliis is a phenom enon on the 
increase. Big business promotes big science and big science in turn demands an ever growing amount o f capital to conduct 
its investigations in a seemingly unending spiral. This bond between inquiiry and business can’t but open the door to biases %
and malpractice and to a widening gap between theory, social purposes and social impact o f science. On the contrary, 
instead o f appreciating the diversity and broad scope o f social needs and purposes — what is generally designated as “social 
responsibility o f science” or “science in the public interest” —, many appear to be gradually siding with the corporations. Yet, 
some contrast this trend (Lakoff in Spiegel-Rosing, de Solla Price 1977).
Take Nancy Olivieri’s and David Healy’s cases. Their scandals of the first magnitude are two o f tlie m ost glaring 
examples o f  a violation o f  the academic freedom and the right o f patients to informed consent during the past decade, but 
their conduct has been admirable. This has occurred in the form of harassment, intimidation and calumny on the part of 
those who seek to prop the cause of profit-oriented managers o f pharmaceutical industry within the academic milieu. Dr.
Nancy Olivieri, a medical researcher at the Hospital for Sick Children, as well as an associate o f the University o f Toronto, 
has been warned o f legal actions by the Apotex Inc., the corporation for which she was conducting a series of clinical drug 
trials on the efficacy and safety o f deferiprone, a drug employed to combat thalassimia whose patent was held by Apotex 
itself, had she disclosed to the public the confidential information about unexpected risks she had detected in its usage. I f  it 
hadn’t been for an inquiry that has destroyed all suspicion o f malfeasance by Olivieri, the hospital would have ceded to the 
corporation’s demands that she be removed. Dr. David Healy, a British psycho-pharmacist was urged in 2000 to join the 
department o f Universit}'- o f Toronto-affiliated Centre for Addiction and Mental Health but this job offer was suddenly 
revoked after a series o f speeches he delivered in wliich he pointed up the abnormally high incidence o f suicidal attempts 
among patients under treatment with Prozac. What happened was that the executives o f Eli Lilly Pharmaceutical Company, 
which reaps huge profits from the Prozac sales and which financed the above mentioned research centre got significantly 
annoyed by this attitude and pressed the university board to change tlieir verdict rescinding his contract. The trouble here 
lies in the all too common lack o f concern by university rectorates and hospital management for the problems raised by tlie 
current regulation in the matter o f public disclosure of the outcomes of scientific trials run on account o f private business. It 
so happens that confidentiality clauses clash with the duty of a researcher to inform those who will be affected by the tests -
154 I
the classic conflict between the imperatives o f truth and profit — but the dire need for private funds that characterises
modern science tilts the balance in favour o f private companies. In consequence o f this careless conduct universities do not
seem to be in a position to work as intermediaries among general public, politics, and industry. This I think is also the
conclusion reached by Olivieri and some o f her University of Torornto’s colleagues, who have subsequently set up an
independent organisation, i.e. Doctors for Research Integrity (DRI), aimed at securing the independence and integrity of
scientific research against external threatening pressures. In fact the relationship between funding sources and scientific
research might become a source o f heated dispute over ethical dilemmas. The pressure placed by patients on both scientists
operating in the field o f pharmacology and the suppliers o f legal drugs makes for one o f  the biggest businesses o f all. More,
this same pressure is directed at the discovery o f immediately applicable techniques and saleable products (Wofsy 1986).
Knowledge for the sake of knowledge, namely the initial conception of science, plays no part within this framework. Then
one must add the spectacular increase in expenditures, die progressive curtailing of public funding to universities and
laboratories, and the ceaseless flow o f donations by pharmaceutical industries to university students, a behaviour that
seriously disrupts all attempts to build up a deontologically oriented conscience amidst young scientists. The bond between
researchers and private enterprise that is being so prematurely established is no doubt lilcely to endure, not least because o f
the current prevalence b f short-term contracts and grant-dependence. As a consequence, Barbara CulUton, news editor o f i
“Science” , in 1981 commented on the rising concern that die new ties between the acadeny and industry will strain the fabric of the
university, and that the public perception o f science will be attend (quoted by Wofsy 1986: 479). A major threat lies in diis state of
affairs, which is usually termed “client science”, turning the biotechnologist into a salesman, more involved in die business
and less prepared to stand up and denounce possible malpractices. Consequences may be truly star ding:
In otherpmminent professions of our age we see similar cinumstances in which people no longer see themselves as self-conscious moral agents and 
citizens of a fiee society, but rather as subjects of large corporate bodies that, while extending organir t^iottal control, gadualty eliminate the 
individual’s treed to thirrk
Langdon Winner in Durbin (1990: 56)
Entomologist and ediologist Giorgio CelH refused to sign a contract that obliged him to not make public the
results o f a research he would conduct for an important chemical concern:
Nonfirmai, perxhé riterrrri, e sotto atrcora oggi della stessa opitriorre, che le scoperte della scienita, mitrime o massime che siarro, soprnttutto se corrsegtite 
in un ambito pubblico come lUrriversità, siarro patrimonio di tutti. Per evitare che se un ricercatore scopre, per esempio, che utra certa molecola 
immessa rrelfambiente è carrcervgetra, rronglisia impedito difarlo sapere in giro, perché chipaga ha posto il veto.
P did not sign because I reckoned, and my opinion has not since changed, that scientific discoveries, however important, 
particularly when achieved in a public sphere such as the university, belong to all. I wanted to avoid that if a researcher finds 
out, for instance, that a given molecule released outside o f the laboratory is carcinogenic, he or she could be prevented from 
malting it public because the sponsor has put a veto on divulgation].
La Stampa - 3 June 2001 by Giorgio CeUi
For the m ost part the social studies of science are dominated by a curious neglect o f the figure o f the socially 
responsible scientist, because many still regard it as an oxymoron. But let me reiterate that the question at issue is not 
science advocacy but the dissociation o f scientists from the effects they bring about on the populace at large. The 
development o f  biological weapons, the spreading o f human-made viruses, the pollution of the environment, the potential 
threat o f genetically modified living beings to the bio-sphere, and the social and ethical consequences o f the manipulation o f 
human DNA are not issues that scientists must be permitted to wash their hands of. The science that in the name o f value- 
neutrality feels no concern for the consequences of its deeds is nothing but irresponsible scientism (Albeit in Sandkühler &
I-Iolz 1987). Scientists have instead a moral obligation to partake o f the ongoing debates on controversial issues (Broberg, 
RoU-Hansen, 1996) for science is nowadays no longer in danger of being silenced or squelched by the State.
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Science is an indispensable component o f the process o f decision-making and none would doubt that this is a 
phenom enon destined to aggrandize. In such a situation moral neutrality ~ for instance on matters related to the belief in 
biological determinism, one whose validity is being questioned by nearly all serious experts in the field o f biology, but with 
insufficient vehemence — is tantamount to complicity in public deliberations endangering the institution o f welfare state or 
individual liberty. In D ante’s Divine Comedy the uncommitted in times of crisis {ignavi, die lukewarm) were deemed not 
good enough for Heaven and not bad enough for Hell. These souls, who are faulted for not even being able to sin and 
tiierefore do no t deserve the slightest compassion, dwell in the Ante-Inferno, a marginal place inside the gate o f Hell but 
before the river Acheron, and are administered the worst torment, that is, they must ceaselessly and vainly chase a blank 
banner, stung by hornets and with worms lapping their blood. This is after all what is meant by the “enlightening role o f 
science” (Broberg, Roll-Hansen, 1996), that scientists have the duty and the responsibility to serve society 
(Gmeinschaftsarbeii) rather than the State or a private business (Resnik 1998)
It follows that scientists could not only be agents o f emancipation but also have a moral obligation to apply their
skills to die critique o f  all social and scientific axioms as well as refrain from indulging in unfounded dogmas. They can be
subversive intellectuals in the way put forward by Jeffrey Goldfarb (in Delanty 2001) that is, promoters o f die subversion o f
the common sense. Their essential quality, critical thought, stems from the amplification o f what is perhaps the hallmark o f
human beings, our naturally inquisitive character. Here is one interviewee’s description of what it is like to be a scientist:
Ho capita che fa n  h  scienfiato non è solo kggen libri ed impamn cose gà scritte. Uno scienfiato è mo che pensa, si prone ilpenhê di cose di 
cui nessuno si era posto ilpenhé e, patlendo da do che già si conosce di qmll’atgomento, comincia ad immagnan quello che avmne ad un 
livello un poco pitt appmfondito. [...]. Uno sdenfiato è in pratica una persona estnmamente mriosa di do che b  cinonda
P understood that being a scientist involves more than reading books and learning things that had been written down 
already. A scientist is someone who thinks, someone who asks himself why something unknown is die way it is and, 
starting from what is already known about the subject, begins to guess what goes on at a deeper level. A scientist is 
substantially a person who is extremely curious about what surrounds him]
Another one recalled that during his childhood:
I  can see that 1 had an inquisitive mind. After watching educational science ptvgnmming on televisbn (le. Bill Nye, Beakmen’s World, etc.),
I  would try to “ndo” the experiments. Partly because I  wanted to observe such phenomenon nryself. [...]. Basically, I  chose to become a 
biomedical scientist because I  have a strong intenst in sdence, I  know that jobs are almost guaranteed with a science degee, and I  think being a 
scientist is kind of honourable
This is precisely the ideal-type o f scientist that most scientists claim to model themselves after ever since Galileo
Galilei’s time. The associated ethos has at its core pluralism and collaboration, creativity, open-mindedness, curiosity, all
qualities tiiat make an outstanding scientist. Historically, science may well have legitimised racism but it also disputed racist
claims tlirough the accumulation o f  compelling countervailing evidence (Barkan 1992). Scientists have the right and the duty
to see that citizenry (and politicians) be aware of what is at stake. One of the Italian émigrés I interviewed seemed to have
embraced dûs ethos and predictably admires the ethical stance o f Jon  Beckwith. These are her reflections on the issue:
Ogg lo scientfato deve anche essere ingrado di renderepubblico e comptensibile ilsuo lavoro, per evitare di diventare un “tirmtno”e togliere al 
resto delle persone la posâbilità di scegliere e decidere per la propria vita. [...]. ho scienfiab stesso é anche responsabile dell’impatto delle 
innovafiorii tecniche sulPopittione pubblica, e difar comprendere in modo chiaro il sigriificato e le prevedibili (ed imprevedibili) conseguetu^  del 
prvprio lavoro.
[These days, scientists must be able to popularize their work so as to avoid to become a “tyrant” and prevent people 
from being able to decide on their own about their own life. [...]. Scientists themselves are also responsible for the 
impact o f teclmological innovations upon public opinion, and to help clarify the meaning and foreseeable (or 
unpredictable) consequences of their work]
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CONCLUSIONS
Tliis inquiry was conceived as an investigation into what it means to be a Ufe-scientist in the course o f the current 
biotechnological revolution (Graham 1981). I intended to interview young life-scientists about their social responsibHit}’-, if  
they felt they had any, as well as the principles informing their behaviour. What inspired me is the growing awareness that 
today life-scientists are widely regarded as authoritative and influential, and their presence in the media and in the political 
and business arena is no longer exceptional (Nelkin 1995a; 1995b; Webster 1994; Weingart 1999). Having developed a --
principled conscience (Easlea 1973), some are now promoting advocacy initiatives in science, policy-making and society at %
large (Salomon 1970; Ezrahi in Thakray and Mendelsohn, 1974; Mulkay 1980; Habermas 1985; Ancarani 1996). W hen I set 
about to conduct my fieldwork, I believed that science in the Twentieth century should be viewed as an enterprise struggling 
to preserve its functional autonomy (Mulltay 1980; Andresen et al. 2000), while in the process o f  being incorporated by 
market and politics (Lyotard 1979; Schwartz in Nader 1996) and thrust into the so-called stahlhartes Gehause, i.e. the iron 
cages o f bureaucratic rationality (Weber 2000). My fieldwork data show that this is indeed tlie most pressing concern o f the 
young life-scientists, who are becoming painfully aware that in a market-driven world pure science is no t an option.
I went into the field possessed by the romantic vision o f young scientists striving to make a name for themselves 
by means o f some epoch-making discoveries. My grant proposal claimed: the young life scientists I  am meeting blend traits o fB m hfs 
Galilei (Bm ht 1963) and M usil’s Ulrich (Musil 1978): anti-heroes confronting extraordinary circumstances. I was soon to realize, 
however, tliat in the sphere o f science there is more self-delusion than actual prospects and that many o f them are utterly 
dissatisfied with the treadmill practice o f laboratory science. They do love what they are doing and they still hope some day 
their contribution will make a difference, but I suspect a good few are bound to lose their enthusiasm, crushed by the 
exploitative methods o f their supervisors and by the highly competitive standards o f contemporary life-sciences, due to both 
an overflow o f  graduates and to increasingly demanding funding agencies.
I had postulated that a new generation o f scientists was emerging that regarded notions such as humanity, freedom, 
civic engagement, and social responsibility highly as part o f their professional ethos (Easlea 1973; Brubaker 1984; Lujan,
Martinez, Moreno, 1996; Sintomer 1999), that is that attitude to modernity that Kant and Foucault identified as die hallmark 
o f Enlightenment (Kant 1784 in Albrecht & Hinske 1981; Foucault 1978 in Rabinow 1991). However, I have now reached 
the conclusion that tliis youthful idealism is tempered by the growing feeling that groundbrealting research is not being done 
in their institute; that the huge sacrifices tiiey are asked to make seldom allow them to cultivate other interests and are only 
occasionally truly gratifying; that the public opinion is simply too ignorant to wholly embrace the scope o f their endeavours.
Given their influence in modern society, I initially believed that a good measure of humanity, civic engagement, 
political consciousness, and social responsibility are an indispensable component o f tiieir professional ethos. However, the 
tragic outcome o f past social and political commitments on the part o f biomedical professionals cautions us against 
overrating public spirit in die life-sciences. We know for instance that Karl Brandt, a doctor and the head o f Nazi euthanasia 
project, cited both Schweitzer and Hider as two examples of praiseworthy life-conduct (Lifton 1986).
Contrary to my expectations, this research has proven to me that the figure o f the civically-minded bio-scientist is 
highly problematic. This conclusion is also validated by Alfonso J. Damico (Damico 1982), who has correlated the model of 
cognitive development and moral maturity unveiled by Kohlberg (Kohlberg 1981; Puka 1982) with the propensity of
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individuals to acquiesce to authority and peer-pressure (Stanley Milgram '^*'  ^ and S. E. Asch 1952). He has levelled a 
perceptive critique at Kohlberg's contention that there exist universal laws regulating moral development. Drawing on the 
analyses o f a number o f social and cognitive psychologists, Damico rather contends that the situational context, i.e. the 
social network o f interactions, roles, expectations, obligations, etc., exerts a powerful influence upon moral choices and 
maturation that goes -beyond a simple coupling o f cognitive and moral development. This can be ascribed to the fact that a 
society’s morality reflects its power structure. He then goes on to assert, and this is a crucial theme o f my dissertation, that <?
just men do not necessarily build just societies. In other words, civically-minded individuals with advanced cognitive sldlls 
are not more likely to cultivate self-determination and morality in a paternalistic and highly ideologized milieu (e.g. 
corporativism, chauvinism, millenarianism, utopianism, and so forth). In those instances, their moral competence is as 
hindered as that o f  lay-people but their skills may become mortally dangerous.
We should finally concede that politically responsible science is a vast ethical quagmire (Ricciardi-Platen 1993;
Micklos & Carlson 2000; Deichmann 2000). Science has displayed the greatest measure of public spirit precisely during the 
eugenic era, especially in the Third Reich and progressive America. In this sense, the questions posed by Michael Freeden in 
“Eugenics and Ideology” (1983) are exceedingly topical:
1. Why did a considerable number o f well known and lesser-known social reformers find some o f  what the 
eugenicists had to say interesting and important?
2. Why did many eugenists feel a need to associate, verbally and practically, with some salient arguments o f  social 
reformers?
3. W hat could liberal and socialist social reformers see in eugenics?
The answers He in the present. Nowadays we witness the medical and ethical rehabiHtation o f eugenics, which is 
now scientific, ethical (in that it respects individual choices), as well as cost-effective (Benichou 2002). The anthropological 
pessimism of the past, that had given rise to negative eugenics, has now been replaced by a combination of anthropological 
and historical optimism (Roucloux 2002). This optimism is in turn paving the way to the re-worlting of ethics on scientific 
foundations, namely the chief goal o f eugenics (Simonnot 2001).
JuHette Chung (2002) suggests caution when it comes to malting value judgements on eugenics. She argues that 
some o f the questions raised by eugenicists were not wrong-headed. Pauly (1993) has ventured to suggest that we should 
return to the original broad meaning o f the term “eugenics”, that is, the biological improvement o f human beings, which 
would encompass all relevant disciplines and remove conceptual inhibitions.
My feeHng is that tliese scholars may be right. O ur inclination to place a taboo on all aspects o f national socialism 
and eugenics is self-defeating. The evidence shows that National-sociaHsm and eugenics, Hke tlie Inquisition before, have
An impressive instance o f the influence o f science upon lay-people’s behaviour has been provided by MUgram’s experiments fliat 
were meant to quantify the level and frequency o f submission of a representative sample of population to the authority of a 
professional and to the noble goal o f furthering scientific inquiry (Milgram 1974). They presupposed die presence of a professor, a 
tested subject and a collaborator who was to answer correcdy to the questions put by the study participant lest he receive a discharge 
up to a maximum of 450 volts. It goes without saying that the real experiment did not consist in testing the efficacy o f compulsory 
teaching but rather the leverage of power. It revealed that (MHgram 1974a): 2 f 3 of this study participants fa ll into the category of obedient 
subjects, and they rvpment ordinary people drawn from the working managerial, and professional classes. 65% of all of the teachers punished the learners to 
the maximum 450 volts. No subject stopped before reaching 300 volts. 60% of Yale undergaduates were p ity  obedient. The same experiments were 
repeated in AustraHa, Germany, HoUand, Italy, Soutii Africa, Spain, Jordan, with analogous results (Meeus, Raaijmakers, 1986). 
MoraHt)r did not matter face to face with bureaucratic and scientific authority and only when a case o f confHctiiig authoritj^ was 
introduced, was action Hable to become paralysed. One of the guinea pigs, Mr. Braverman, was told the real nature and purpose of 
the experiment and, interviewed one year later, he affimned (Milgram, ibidem): what appalled me was that I  could possess the capacity p r  
obedience and compliance to a central idea, i.e., the adherence to this value was at the expense of violation of another value, i.e., don’t hurt someone who is 
helpless.. .as my wife said, tyou can call yourselfBichmarm”, I  hope I  deal more effectivety with arty pture conpcts of values I  encounter'. Tlie conclusion 
we should draw from MHgram’s experiment is not only that scientists, just Hke any other human beings, are ready to succumb to 
authority (Cole 1983), but also that, in this day and age, scientists themselves embody authority.
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been modern and, in a paradoxical and alarming way, progressive answers to ancient questions and problems. It is only in 
retrospect that we can describe how tragically mistaken their champions were. But those questions — the quest for 
happiness, health, harmony, well-being, order, longevity, existential meaning, etc. — still haunt us, and the related ideals, 
fears, aspirations, prejudices, obsessions, and hubris brought about by the eugenic era are likewise forcefully present. 
Eugenics is here to stay because it is embedded in both the Enlightenment project and tlie Romantic sensibility; because the 
pursuit o f  progress cannot possibly cast aside the biological enhancement o f all species; because, in the final analysis, 
eugenics is part o f our being human. W hat we can do is to be fully aware of the negative repercussions o f such an 
undertaking and counter them with strong determination.
In conclusion, I have three pieces o f advice for those who would like to pursue a career in science. Please, consider 
that they are not meant to be exhaustive. The problem is o f such a magnitude that everyone should feel compelled to 
ponder It.
First o f all, we must explode the really pernicious myths of biological determinism, genetic essentiaUsm — the belief 
that social problems and individual temperaments arise from inborn and inheritable characters —, and physico-chemical 
reductionism — the belief that life comes down to mere chemical formulas — which can potentially lead many scientists and 
engineers to espouse technocratic solutions to massive social problems and, eventually, to an unwitting complicity with 
illiberal schemes.
■ Secondly, scientists must keep in mind tliat every program of social reform generally takes its inception from the 
demolition o f what is regarded as a stale worldview. This is apt to leave a moral vacuum that science by its very nature 
cannot fill because science is meant to describe and under no circumstances is entitled to prescribe. It follows that science 
and technology alone cannot either claim to pursue the highest good for manltind or set goals and have the final word in the 
problem-solving process. After Bertrand Russell, scientists accumulate knowledge but cannot provide wisdom, that being a 
communal endeavour rather and not a professional, elitist monopoly. This was a point completely missed by those German 
and Swiss biomedical professionals that I described above and that has not been clearly understood by sociobiologists and 
evolutionar}^ psychologists either, who continue to preach that human conduct should be changed according to biological 
laws (Roger in Benichou 1989). But those disciplines will share the same fate o f phrenology (Lyons 1998).
Thirdly, a liberal view o f the relation of science to society m ust predominate. This calls for the utm ost caution on 
the part o f scientists when they advertise their discoveries, take a clear stand on matters o f general interest, and conduct 
experiments on human beings (and animals). They should remember that a truly liberal and democratic society must be 
founded on the Socmtic combination o f knowledge and ignorance (Dallmayr 1991) that is, the awareness that human beings are not 
omniscient. As no Hippocratic oath has ever been formulated for bio-scientists, everything is left to their discretion. 
Therefore they should always seek to be vigilant and to not excessively indulge on the selective suspension o f disbelief.
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